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GSM Security
Presented by:
USMAN ZULFQAR
GSM Security
• Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) Card
• It is operator dependent smart card which contains A3/8
algorithms, IMSI and Ki.
• Mobile Equipment (ME)
• It contains A5 algorithm. It never sees A3/8 algorithms and Ki.
• Authentication Centre (AuC)
• It is used by a HLR to generate random challenges (RAND) and to
store secret key information (Ki) relating to each of its MS.
• The AuC database contains; International Mobile Subscriber
Identity (IMSI), Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI),
Location Area Identity (LAI), Authentication Key (Ki).
Mobile Station
• Every GSM mobile phone has a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM).
The SIM provides the mobile phone with a unique identity through
the use of the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI).
• It stores security related information such as the A3 authentication
algorithm, the A8 ciphering key generating algorithm, the
authentication key (Ki) and IMSI.
• The mobile station stores the A5 ciphering algorithm.
• The SIM can be protected with a Personal Identification Number
(PIN) chosen by the subscriber. The PIN is stored on the card and if
entered incorrectly thrice, the card blocks itself. At this point, you’ll
have to contact your cellular provider who can unblock your mobile
phone, by entering an eight digit Personal Unblocking Key (PUK),
which is also stored on the card.
Equipment Identity Register (EIR)
• It stores all the International Mobile Equipment Identities
(IMEI) of mobile equipment and their rights on the
network.
• The EIR maintains a white, gray and black list.
• Those on the white list are permitted on the network.
• Those on the black list are blocked from the network.
• The gray list consists of faulty equipment that may pose a
problem on the network but are still permitted to
participate on the network.
Authentication Center (AuC)
• The Authentication Center (AuC) is a protective database that
houses the KI, the A3 authentication algorithm, the A5
ciphering algorithm and the A8 ciphering key generating
algorithm.
• It is responsible for creating the sets of random numbers
(RAND), Signed Response (SRES) and the Cipher key (KC),
though the created sets are stored in the HLR and VLR.
Security Mechanisms
The main security measurements of GSM security can be written in 4
principles;
• Authentication of a user; it provides the ability for mobile
equipment to prove that it has access to a particular account with
the operator.
• Ciphering of the data and signaling; it requires that all signaling and
user data (such as text messages and speech) are protected against
interception by means of ciphering.
• Confidentiality of a user identity; it provides IMSI’s (international
mobile subscriber identity) security. GSM communication uses IMSI
rarely, it uses TMSI (Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity) to
provide more secure communication and to avoid disclosing of
user’s identity.
• Using SIM as security module; Incase SIM card was taken by
opponent, there is still PIN code measurement.
A3 Algorithm
• It provides authentication to the user that it has privilege to
access the system.
• Firstly, a 128 bit random number (RAND) is transmitted to the
mobile station over the air interface.
• The RAND is passed to the SIM card, where it is sent through
the A3 authentication algorithm together with the KI.
• The output of the A3 algorithm, the signed response (SRES) is
transmitted via the air interface from the mobile station back
to the network.
• On the network, the AuC compares its value of SRES with the
value of SRES it has received from the mobile station. If the
two values of SRES match, authentication is successful and the
subscriber joins the network.
A3 Algorithm
vA3 Algorithm
A8 Algorithm
• Once the user is authenticated, the RAND (delivered from the
network) together with the Ki (from the SIM) is sent through
the A8 ciphering key generating algorithm, to produce a
ciphering key (Kc).
• The A8 algorithm is stored on the SIM card.
• The Kc created by the A8 algorithm, is then used with the A5
ciphering algorithm to encipher or decipher the data.
• The A5 algorithm is implemented in the hardware of the
mobile phone, as it has to encrypt and decrypt data on the air.
A5 Algorithm
• A5 is a stream cipher which can be implemented very
efficiently on hardware.
• There exist several implementations of this algorithm,
the most commonly used ones are A5/0, A5/1 and A5/2
(A5/3 is used in 3G systems).
• A5/1 is the strongest version and is used widely in
Western Europe and America, while the A5/2 is
commonly used in Asia.
• As a stream cipher, A5 works on a bit by bit basis (and
not on blocks). So, an error in the received cipher text
will only result in the corresponding plaintext bit being in
error.
A5 Algorithm
• Kc is the key which was produced by A8 algorithm. Plaintext is
the data which is wanted to transmit. Fn is the frame bits
which come from LFSR (Linear Feedback Shift Register)
process.
Authentication and Encryption Scheme
Mobile Station
12
A3
Radio Link GSM Operator
A8
A5
A3
A8
A5
Ki Ki
Challenge RAND
KcKc
mi Encrypted Data mi
SIM
Signed response (SRES)
SRESSRES
Fn Fn
Authentication: are SRES
values equal?
Thank
You

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Gsm security by usman zulfqar

  • 2. GSM Security • Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) Card • It is operator dependent smart card which contains A3/8 algorithms, IMSI and Ki. • Mobile Equipment (ME) • It contains A5 algorithm. It never sees A3/8 algorithms and Ki. • Authentication Centre (AuC) • It is used by a HLR to generate random challenges (RAND) and to store secret key information (Ki) relating to each of its MS. • The AuC database contains; International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI), Location Area Identity (LAI), Authentication Key (Ki).
  • 3. Mobile Station • Every GSM mobile phone has a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM). The SIM provides the mobile phone with a unique identity through the use of the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI). • It stores security related information such as the A3 authentication algorithm, the A8 ciphering key generating algorithm, the authentication key (Ki) and IMSI. • The mobile station stores the A5 ciphering algorithm. • The SIM can be protected with a Personal Identification Number (PIN) chosen by the subscriber. The PIN is stored on the card and if entered incorrectly thrice, the card blocks itself. At this point, you’ll have to contact your cellular provider who can unblock your mobile phone, by entering an eight digit Personal Unblocking Key (PUK), which is also stored on the card.
  • 4. Equipment Identity Register (EIR) • It stores all the International Mobile Equipment Identities (IMEI) of mobile equipment and their rights on the network. • The EIR maintains a white, gray and black list. • Those on the white list are permitted on the network. • Those on the black list are blocked from the network. • The gray list consists of faulty equipment that may pose a problem on the network but are still permitted to participate on the network.
  • 5. Authentication Center (AuC) • The Authentication Center (AuC) is a protective database that houses the KI, the A3 authentication algorithm, the A5 ciphering algorithm and the A8 ciphering key generating algorithm. • It is responsible for creating the sets of random numbers (RAND), Signed Response (SRES) and the Cipher key (KC), though the created sets are stored in the HLR and VLR.
  • 6. Security Mechanisms The main security measurements of GSM security can be written in 4 principles; • Authentication of a user; it provides the ability for mobile equipment to prove that it has access to a particular account with the operator. • Ciphering of the data and signaling; it requires that all signaling and user data (such as text messages and speech) are protected against interception by means of ciphering. • Confidentiality of a user identity; it provides IMSI’s (international mobile subscriber identity) security. GSM communication uses IMSI rarely, it uses TMSI (Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity) to provide more secure communication and to avoid disclosing of user’s identity. • Using SIM as security module; Incase SIM card was taken by opponent, there is still PIN code measurement.
  • 7. A3 Algorithm • It provides authentication to the user that it has privilege to access the system. • Firstly, a 128 bit random number (RAND) is transmitted to the mobile station over the air interface. • The RAND is passed to the SIM card, where it is sent through the A3 authentication algorithm together with the KI. • The output of the A3 algorithm, the signed response (SRES) is transmitted via the air interface from the mobile station back to the network. • On the network, the AuC compares its value of SRES with the value of SRES it has received from the mobile station. If the two values of SRES match, authentication is successful and the subscriber joins the network.
  • 9. A8 Algorithm • Once the user is authenticated, the RAND (delivered from the network) together with the Ki (from the SIM) is sent through the A8 ciphering key generating algorithm, to produce a ciphering key (Kc). • The A8 algorithm is stored on the SIM card. • The Kc created by the A8 algorithm, is then used with the A5 ciphering algorithm to encipher or decipher the data. • The A5 algorithm is implemented in the hardware of the mobile phone, as it has to encrypt and decrypt data on the air.
  • 10. A5 Algorithm • A5 is a stream cipher which can be implemented very efficiently on hardware. • There exist several implementations of this algorithm, the most commonly used ones are A5/0, A5/1 and A5/2 (A5/3 is used in 3G systems). • A5/1 is the strongest version and is used widely in Western Europe and America, while the A5/2 is commonly used in Asia. • As a stream cipher, A5 works on a bit by bit basis (and not on blocks). So, an error in the received cipher text will only result in the corresponding plaintext bit being in error.
  • 11. A5 Algorithm • Kc is the key which was produced by A8 algorithm. Plaintext is the data which is wanted to transmit. Fn is the frame bits which come from LFSR (Linear Feedback Shift Register) process.
  • 12. Authentication and Encryption Scheme Mobile Station 12 A3 Radio Link GSM Operator A8 A5 A3 A8 A5 Ki Ki Challenge RAND KcKc mi Encrypted Data mi SIM Signed response (SRES) SRESSRES Fn Fn Authentication: are SRES values equal?