Dr. Andreas Kornelakis, School of Business, Management & Economics, University of Sussex, UK presented this seminar "Liberalization, Flexibility and Employment Relations Change in Southern European Telecoms since the 1990s" as part of the Visiting Fellows Seminar Series at the Whitaker Institute on 11th September 2012.

1. 1
Liberalization, Flexibility and Employment Relations
Change in Southern European Telecoms since the
1990s
Dr. Andreas Kornelakis
Lecturer in HR Management
a.kornelakis@sussex.ac.uk
11 September 2012
IBSSPP/ J.E.Cairnes Business School
Seminar NUI Galway

2. 2
Plan of Presentation
l Background/Introduction
l Research Design
l Liberalisation in IT & GR Telecoms
l Flexibility in IT & GR Telecoms
l Wage Bargaining: Divergent Trajectories
l Concluding Remarks

3. 3
Background and Introduction
l Convergence to Anglo-Saxon model of industrial relations is
not borne out (Wallerstein et al, 1997; Ferner & Hyman, 1998;
Thelen, 2009)
l Wage Bargaining Centralization remains more or less stable
across Europe (EC Industrial Relations in Europe 2010)
l Instead, case evidence of different trajectories of change
(Crouch, 2000; Ferner & Hyman, 1998; Traxler, 1995):
l Research Question: How do we explain divergent trajectories
of change in wage bargaining, despite similar pressures ?

4. 4
Research Design: ‘Most similar systems’ comparison
l Similar Cases: Italian & Greek Telecoms
Sectors
– Common Pressures/Challenges
– ‘Mediterranean model’ of capitalism
l Divergent Outcomes
– Centralisation of Wage Bargaining in Italian
telecoms
– Decentralised Bargaining in Greek telecoms
l Why?

5. 5
Liberalisation of Italian Telecoms
l Telecom Italia born in 1994 (merger btw SIP,
Telespazio, Italcable, SIRM, Iritel) IRI owned
since the 1960s
l Privatised in 1997, three hostile takeovers
thereafter, now owned by Spanish Telefonica &
Italian banks
l Market Opened up in 1998 according to EU
requirements

6. The Erosion of Telecom Italia Market Share
(retail revenue)
6
New entrants (fixed telephony operators): Albacom
(now BT Italia), Infostrada (now Wind), Teletu (now
Vodafone)

7. 7
Liberalisation of Greek Telecoms
l OTE (Greek telecoms operator) state-owned
since 1950s
l Privatisation (shares issuing) started in 1996
and was completed in 2008 with a takeover
by Deutsche Telekom
l Market Opened up in 2001 (EU exception)

8. The Erosion of Hellenic Telecom(OTE) Market
Share (retail revenue)
8
New fixed telephony operators: Tellas (now Wind),
Hellas Online (now strategic alliance with Vodafone);
Forthnet (currently in merger negotiations with Wind)

9. 9
The Search for Flexibility in Italian Telecoms
l Revised job descriptions (in response to changes in
technology); flatter job classifications
l Downsizing of ex-monopoly operators (early retirement,
voluntary exit, part-time work); lower wages for new
entrants (work-entry contracts) in Telecom Italia
l Flexibility for core employees: annualised hours, part-time;
teleworking; on-call work.
l Flexibility for peripheral employees: immense growth of
precarious (freelance) work contracts (co.co.pro)

10. The Search for Flexibility in Greek Telecoms
l Performance-based pay systems for marketing staff
(sales) and technical staff (network speed)
l Downsizing of ex-monopoly operators (early
retirement, voluntary exit); abolishing job security
(tenure) for new recruits
l Flexibility for peripheral employees: immense growth
of spurious self-employment (project-based) contracts
(blokaki) Precariousness also for highly skilled
engineers
10

11. 11
Centralization of Bargaining in IT Telecoms (I)
l CGIL, CISL, UIL strategy of centralization since
mid-1990s; Telecom Italia unions transformed into
sectoral federations (SLC, FISTEL, UILCOM);
National Strikes for single contract
l 1996: Intersind (IRI employer association) absorbed
by Confindustria, and transformed into network
services employer association
l 1998: Tripartite Accord, includes commitment on
‘fair competition’ in liberalized network services
l 2000: First Agreement for Telecoms Sector between
peak-level unions and Confindustria; low common
standards and negotiated flexibility’

12. 12
Centralization of Bargaining in IT Telecoms (II)
l 1998-2002: Confederal unionists go ‘on the ground’ and
organise workers in new firms; firm-level workers able to
speak with a single voice via ‘RSUs’
l 2002: Confindustria establishes ASSTEL, including all
telecoms/IT companies; Lucrative compromise: getting
the ‘best of both worlds’common standards at sector
level and flexibility at firm-level
l 2005-6: Unions forge a ‘labour-state coalition’& put
pressure to resisting call-centre firms to abide by
agreement; extend coverage of national contract & press
for transformation of ‘spurious self employment’into
regular open-ended contracts (even if part-time); call
centre firms join ASSTEL
l 2005-2009: centralisation of bargaining solidifies

13. 13
Wage Bargaining in Italian Telecoms
Mid 1990s Late 2010s
• Liberalization
• Flexibility
Centralization
Coverage
Decentralized
Bargaining
Unions ‘Single
Voice’
Employer
Associability
Labour-State
Coalition

14. 14
Decentralized Bargaining in Greek Telecoms (I)
l Mid-90s: OTE company union strategy to resist
privatization & liberalization; no plan for sectoral
contract; Strikes and protest against independent
regulator & government because ‘national
champion loses market share’ => (implicit union-management
alliance)
l 1995: SEPE trade association (OTE & big mobile
telecoms); no legal competence to negotiate
agreements; 2003: SATPE association created by
small telephone operators => small/lg firms divide
l 2003-2008: Company unions established ‘bottom-up’
in WIND, Vodafone, Forthnet despite anti-union
management; no assistance from OME-OTE;
they negotiate rudimentary firm-level agreements to
specify wages; but very suspicious/if not hostile to
OME-OTE unionists

15. 15
Decentralized Bargaining in Greek Telecoms (II)
l 2005-6: OME-OTE union convinces right-wing
government to get compensation for internal
restructuring; extremely generous severance package
€1.6 billion for 5,000 senior employees who get early
retirement (up to 8 years earlier) => some of them
become OTE sub-contractors after retiring
l Small union (SMT) requests centralisation from
SEPE => request is of course rejected
l 2006-9: OTE Exclusivist strategy: call-centre union
wants to be affiliated with OME-OTE, but OTE are
excluding call-centre employees on the basis that
they do not have‘full-time permanent contracts’

16. 16
Wage Bargaining in Greek Telecoms
Mid 1990s Late 2010s
• Liberalization
• Flexibility
Centralization
Coverage
Decentralized
Bargaining
Unions ‘Single
Voice’
Employer
Associability
Labour-State
Coalition

17. 17
Concluding Remarks
l Despite common pressures from Liberalisation,
no simple convergence => path dependence
l Domestic actors’ critical role for shaping wage
setting institutions
l Do these insights hold in the context of the
current Eurozone crisis?
l Domestic actors (unions, employers) vs.
International actors (IMF, EU)? Multi-level
games?

18. 18
Thank you!