3. 13
Editor's Note: An issue with determining IO effectiveness
is the relationship between operations and intelligence. This
affects both planning, and assessment. The following article
discusses a concept to improve the symbiotic relationship
between operations and intelligence in IO through selective
use of IRCs during exercises to determine the reactions of
adversary leaders.
The Concept:
Information Operations (IO) is an offensive capability used
“…to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-
making of adversaries and potential adversaries….”
(Joint Publication 3-13, 2012, p. 66). The definition
suggests that as an offensive capability, or a combination of
information-related capabilities (IRCs), that the intelligence
community (IC) must provide critical information to the
planners and operators who employ the IRCs. In addition,
the IC must provide timely feedback on the results of the
operation. With the cognitive and behavioral focus of IO,
it is understandable that requesting the IC to provide useful
cognitive based analysis is a difficult task. This is not to
suggest that the IC is unable or unwilling to accomplish the
requirements, but the two communities have yet to develop
a symbiotic relationship at the operational and strategic level
that results in a successful operation in the same way that
targets, air defense systems, and enemy aircraft capabilities
are all largely accounted for prior to D-day when planning
an airstrike. Creating this relationship between IO and the
IC requires an adjustment to current approach that includes
using IRCs to probe adversaries for intelligence gain and
analytical confidence.
Much of the success of the IC can be attributed to
understanding of friendly actions and capabilities relative to
an adversary. Constant wargaming and exercise scenarios,
improved coordination between the tactical forces and the
analysts, and an established doctrine all provide military
commanders with a degree of confidence in the analysis prior
to conducting a mission. However, the field of IO presents
a twist on the established protocols. For instance, a military
deception officer (MDO) requires a thorough understanding
of the adversary commander and his or her decision making
process; who provides the information; how it is transmitted;
relationships with peers, superiors, subordinates, friends, and
family members; and the daily routines. These requirements
are difficult to ascertain even when there is total access to a
leader, and extremely difficult when that leader does not want
the US to know. An approach to remedy this shortcoming is
to preemptively use IO capabilities to gain this information
through experimentation.
The IC conducts active offensive intelligence operations
through counter-intelligence (CI), human intelligence
(HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and so on.
However, IO is largely absent in trying to provoke responses
that provide analysts with the cognitive dimension of an
adversary. Baker (2007) conveys the need for the two
communities to cooperate by stating, “…[the] more adept
we become at conducting IO and influencing the population,
the more information the population will provide to enable
us to target the insurgents and terrorists. It’s a win-win
dynamic….” (p. 21). One way to assist in this respect is
to conduct IO support to intelligence during peacetime
and training events. For example, during a field training
exercise IRCs can be used to elicit responses from the
opposition forces (OPFOR) for the sole purpose of gaining
an understanding of their cognitive processes. This could
be accomplished by sending digital and radio messages that
are nothing more than an experiment to test responses. If the
OPFOR acts on the message by redirecting assets then the
analyst can reasonably assume that they have an additional
piece of the intelligence picture that pertains to the cognitive
domain. If the OPFOR fails to act on the message, then that
experiment can be cataloged as a message that does not
resonate, or at least not in the given context. The result of
these experiments does not translate to what would cause
future adversaries to act, but it does provide the IC insight into
what IO can do and what is required for offensive operations.
The concept of cooperation and experimentation can be
further expanded to test the commander’s critical information
requirements (CCIRs). Outside of the training environment,
the intelligence analyst is tasked with determining important
aspects of an adversary that allow a commander to make
a decision. This requires sifting through raw and finished
intelligence to provide the best qualitative assessment
possible of an adversary’s intentions. Being able to test
the adversary’s decision process would provide valuable
insight and could act to either refute or confirm existing
intelligence estimates. To be clear, using IO does not replace
existing methods of collection and analysis, but it can add
a degree of fidelity to estimates by expanding beyond mere
collection. For instance, Shultz and Beitler (2004) discuss
how Al-Qaeda relies on deception to plan and organize
their operations, and how the means used for deception are
largely dependent on information age technologies (p. 57).
By applying IO methods the IC can “probe” terrorist network
communications to determine which communication lines are
being utilized by the leaders and begin to understand their
decision-making conduits and processes.
Intelligence estimates are typically rated on a degree of
confidence based on the reliability of the collection. The
rating would be more valid if the analysis included not only a
collection confidence, but also a result from an experimental
probing capability. For instance, if a HUMINT and SIGINT
based estimate suggests that an adversary will deploy an
asset in a given situation then it would be beneficial to the US
decision makers to know how serious the adversary is. This
could be determined through disseminating messages and
signals using computer network operations (CNO) making
the adversary think that particular situation is imminent.
If done effectively, the collection mechanisms could track
related adversarial movements and correlate it to the use of
the IRCs. In this case, the IC expands collection and analysis
to include an offensive IO capability, and more importantly,
Reversing the Relationship:
IO Support to Intelligence
by
Major William R. Orkins, USA

4. 14 Fall 2015
two disparate institutions learn how to support each other.
Anecdotally, there are instances of this occurring at the
tactical level, but does not consistently appear at the strategic
level of decisions.
The second aspect to this relationship is the requirement
to understand measures of effectiveness (MOE). IO is
questioned on the effectiveness of an operation relative to
the capabilities employed. For example, did radio messages
cause an increase in the amount of insurgent activity reported
by the populace? Or, did the increase in reports stem from
some other event or motivation? More interdependence
between the IC and IO communities could help create a
better understanding of the variables. Although determining
cause and effect will continue to be difficult, it is possible
to determine other useful correlational metrics. Knowing
the difference between cause and effect and correlation
requires that both the IC and IO understand the requirements,
procedures, and capabilities organic to each other.
Third, this proposed relationship requires a modification
to the existing analytical processes. Existing intelligence
analysis can fall victim to cognitive biases (Heuer, 1999).
The use of IO in understanding a particular target through
hypothesis testing acts as a filter to reduce cultural and
individual biases. For example, a qualitative analysis of
the Free Syrian Army (FSA) may indicate that there is a
willingness to work with the US to reduce the violence in
certain regions of the country. However, even with the best
qualitative assessment it still fails to give policy makers the
necessary certainty to commit resources to the conflict. An
alternative approach is to state the assessment as a hypothesis
and through the use of IRCs determine if the supporting
evidence accepts or rejects the hypothesis. This provides the
analyst with the ability to include experimental quantitative
analysis within the qualitative context of the estimate.
Acquiring knowledge of the FSA through experimental and
quantitative analysis reduces the propensity of mirror imaging
and the misuse of analogies from situations that appear
similar, but where the environment and context are largely
different. Furthermore, using a traditional offensive capability
for intelligence purposes provides the IC with the ability to
further professionalize the field that includes social science
and statistical methods to test assumptions. It is unlikely there
will ever be a complete understanding of a situation, but it
is reasonable to claim fewer analytical errors. The greatest
benefit to this approach is the delineation between intelligence
analysis and offensive operations are minimized.
For IO to be an effective force multiplier there must be a
venue to hone the skills of the operators. The information
and intelligence environments cannot be seen as separate
given the expansion of communications technology.As such,
the relevant IRCs should be incorporated during all shaping
operations, and more importantly, in conjunction with all
the intelligence related capabilities used to understand the
environment. There is risk associated with attempting to
Figure 1: Sociogram of political and military opposition groups. Bridges and brokers operating at the local level are circled.
Source: Lucente, Wilson, Schroeder, & Freeman, 2013

5. 15
manipulate the behavior of a target prior to an authorized
offensive operation, but testing how the target will behave and
how to increase force protection during an operation mitigates
risk. This is particularly true when the operation concerns a
high value target and any operational mishap can have serious
strategic consequences. To minimize uncertainty IO must be
practiced and executed as often as a special operations task
force trains and rehearses for a sensitive mission. The IC
provides this venue.
IO and the IC are continuously critiqued on the effectiveness
of operations and analysis. Apart from the critics, both
are considered highly important to prevent war, reduce
casualties, or accelerate a conflict to a favorable conclusion.
It is difficult for both communities to explain their analysis
without experimental findings to commanders and policy
makers in a way that is free of individual bias. Each institution
has significant capabilities, but they are also a part of large
bureaucratic structures. The IC consists of many different
organizations, and within each organization the requirement
is to provide the most accurate analysis possible (Lowenthal,
2006). The value of using IO to support intelligence
collection and analysis is that IO is not competing with other
IO organizations for funding and relevancy; rather, the IO
community is constantly trying to improve how the IRCs are
employed. The end result of this relationship is an additional
set of methods and experts to enhance existing intelligence
procedures and IO capabilities.
The Approach:
How can this proposal work? One particular model
currently exists for offensive capabilities to be used for
improved intelligence known as special reconnaissance
(SR). Special reconnaissance operations are “reconnaissance
and surveillance actions conducted by SF [special forces],
unilaterally or through surrogate or indigenous forces” (Field
Manual 3-05.20, 2001, pp. 2-15). In other words, SF uses
various tactics and techniques to obtain a visual observation
of a target and pass the information to the intelligence
community and subsequently to key decision makers. The
importance of SR is that it can provide decision makers with
real-time, or near-real-time, information on the battlefield.
This information can be as simple as confirmation of a
weapon storage depot, or complex as a tracking the movement
of adversarial leaders. The importance is that an individual
soldier or surrogate can monitor an event and interpret the
situation in relation to the context.
The SR model is useful for IO support to Intelligence in that it
can be used in sensitive national security situations where SR
may not be feasible. For example, analysis was conducted on
Free SyrianArmy (FSA) operations and their communication
via social media (Lucente, Wilson, Schroeder, & Freeman,
2013). The purpose of the research was to identify, through
open source information, who the key members of the FSA
were and to whom they were connected. Interestingly, the
research identified the political and military opposition and
which individuals were communicating between the two
groups. In effect, this was a modern type of SR that provided
policy makers with useful information on the conflict in
Syria. The element of the analysis that was missing was the
experimentation.
FSA operations and intentions are of strategic importance
to national security. In particular, Syria is known to possess
WMD and a complete collapse of the government leaves
the storage sites vulnerable to Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, or any
other rogue actors. Using the sociogram in Figure 1 (Lucente,
Wilson, Schroeder, & Freeman, 2013), IO could probe the
nodes in the network via social media or special technical
means to psychologically test the intentions of the actors.
In effect, the discovery of the FSAnetwork is an evolution of
traditional intelligence using information age means.Through
the analysis it was determined that the important actors were
those that brokered information between the political and
military elements. The logical follow-on to the analysis is to
use various IRCs to determine 1) if the highlighted members
really are key to the opposition, 2) what their intentions are,
3) can they be co-opted to secure WMD sites if the Syrian
government falls, and 4) are they likely to accept support
from groups like Al Qaeda. These are questions likely to be
asked by policy makers prior to authorizing support to the
FSA, or conducting conventional military actions. Those
questions remain unanswered.
Part of the difficulty to answering the questions is that Syria
is a denied environment. This means that US forces cannot
openly enter the country and conduct SR.All efforts must be
conducted clandestinely or covertly, which puts operators and
the US at risk. Using IRCs through known communication
channels can help produce the intelligence required without
risking the lives of operators, and more importantly, can be
applied using the experimental methods to test hypotheses.
To simplify the concept there are five steps to conduct IO
support to intelligence. These are first, develop a set of
hypotheses; second, conduct target audience analysis; third,
develop IRC tasks; fourth, employ the IRCs; and fifth monitor
and assess the feedback. The proposed steps are not vastly
different from existing targeting and intelligence doctrine, but
the steps are broadly described in a manner that facilitates
their integration into doctrine. The first is to develop a set
of hypotheses about the situation, and is arguably the most
important. In the case of the FSA, each of the four questions
mentioned could be reworded as 1) the key decision makers of
the opposition are circled in the sociogram, 2) their intentions
are to expand the power of the FSA to overthrow the Syrian
government, 3) they can be co-opted to secure WMD sites if
the Syrian government falls, and 4) they are likely to accept
support from terrorist groups likeAl Qaeda. By changing the
questions to testable statements, the IC and IO community
can look at the problem from a social science perspective.
Moreover, the problem is defined by rejecting or failing
to reject the hypotheses and correlating the results against
existing intelligence estimates to reduce error (Heuer, 1999).
The second step in the process is to conduct a thorough Target
AudienceAnalysis (TAA) on the individuals associated with
each of the hypotheses. This includes analyzing current
behaviors, conditions that facilitate or restrain behavior,
vulnerabilities, susceptibilities, accessibility to the actors,
and sociocultural aspects of the individuals (Field Manual
3-05.301, 2007). Initial intelligence analysis and hypothesis
development frames the problem, while TAA refines the
problem to specific individuals. The output provides a virtual
roadmap on how to target the individuals and through what
means.
Once the problem is adequately defined and the targets
are refined through TAA the next step is to develop IRC
tasks. This is a point where the IC and IO community must
collaborate very closely. The IC has hypotheses that require
specific information, and the IRCs have specific capabilities
that can elicit that information from the target. For instance,
combining linguists and targeting specialists from the IC and
cultural and behavior expertise from the IO community the

6. 16 Fall 2015
two communities craft a series of culturally astute messages
for delivery to the intended target. The series is developed to
cause the target to respond in a way that refutes or confirms
elements of the hypotheses. It is unlikely that one message
or one series will provide all the feedback necessary to
make a decision, but the information garnered from each
delivery provides additional understanding of the cognitive
and behavioral characteristics of the target in relation to the
context. In the case of the FSA, an expected outcome can be
whether or not the FSA leadership has intentions, or can be
co-opted, to secure WMD sites.
Currently, IO has difficultly in measuring the effect of
offensive operations, which is partly due to inadequate
coordination with the IC. However, by synchronizing IO and
IC efforts in step three the ability to elicit feedback is greatly
increased in step four. The IC has capabilities to monitor the
dissemination and feedback through certain mediums. The
IRCs used to disseminate the messages should be restricted
to only those mediums. For example, by knowing who the
leaders of the FSAare, it is determined what communication
channels those individuals use. Subsequently, all the message
series are disseminated within those channels where the
IC can monitor for feedback. This produces at least two
positive outcomes 1) if no response is heard from the target
then adjustments can be made to the messages or channels
used, and 2) if responses are heard from the target then the
channel can be used for intelligence collection and offensive
operations in the future. If the initial analysis, message
development, and appropriate channels are used then the
feedback should provide the evidence to refute or confirm
the hypotheses.
Finally, the information gathered from influencing the target
can be correlated with existing intelligence analysis. Not
only can a number of statistical methods be used to test the
hypotheses, but also the results of the hypotheses can be used
to provide additional context for the intelligence estimate.
The corroboration of qualitative analysis and quantitative
experimental testing will greatly assist policy makers with
what options are available for situations like that seen in
Syria.
The approach outlined here is intended to begin the discussion
on how to improve IO through supporting intelligence. The
information age creates opportunities where both fields are
mutually supported by one another, and the collaboration
increases the ability to understand situations in denied areas
where sending SR operators is high-risk and any mishap
could have negative strategic consequences. This paper
considered FSA as an instructive example, but the same can
be considered for examining Russian hybrid operations in
Eastern Ukraine, Iranian nuclear ambitions, or the intentions
of Boko Haram. Using IO to support intelligence has risk,
but if done effectively the gains far outweigh the potential
pitfalls. As technological capabilities improve there will
inevitably be more opportunities to determine intentions
through experimentation. For IO to advance with the growth
in technology it is vital to have a venue to hone the skills of
the operators, and that venue resides in the realm of
intelligence.
William Orkins is psychological operations officer serving
as a planner at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center
at Hohenfels, Germany. He is a graduate of the Naval
Postgraduate School with a M.S. in Information Strategy
and Political Warfare
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actionable intelligence in the urban counterinsurgency envriornment.
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Field Manual 3-05.20. (2001, June). Special Forces Operations.
Washington D.C.: Department of the Army.
Field Manual 3-05.301. (2007, August). Psychological Operations
Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Washington D.C.:
Department of the Army.
Heuer, R. J. (1999). Psychology of IntelligenceAnalysis.Washington
D.C.: Center For The Study Of Intelligence.
Joint Publication 3-13. (2012, November 27). Information
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Lowenthal, M. M. (2006). Intelligence: from secrets to policy (3rd
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