An archetype for european security 27 april 1993 - ramon martinez

An Archetype for European Security
Lt Col Ramon Martinez
U. S. Air Force National Defense Fellow
Graduate School of International Studies
IIniversity of Miami
April 27, 1993
i
i
e
E
`[
eI~
L

AN ARCHETYPEFOREUROPEANSECURITY
.:SUMMARY
This paper examines the causes and solutions to the problem of
military security in Europe. Specifically, the thesis is that a
modified North Atlantic Treaty Organization using a "Resilient
Defense" strategy serves as a transitional scheme while a
Federation for European Military Security is a desirable, feasible,
and long term scheme for resolving the problems of uncertainty and
a just peace in Europe.
Presenting empirical data compiled by noted warfare research
analysts, this paper discusses general trends associated with war.
Next, presented and discussed are the following proposed military
schemes: i) end all alliances while nation-states maintain
military forces only at the necessary level for defending its
political sovereignty and territorial integrity; 2) a North
Atlantic Treaty Organization using a "Resilient Defense" strategy
to manage the North Atlantic Treaty Organization irony; 3) the
Western European Union; and 4) the Pan-European Army. Although not
an exhaustive list, these four schemes are paradigmatic of a
'.multitude of proposed schemes.
'Proposing a thought experiment, derived is a method evaluating
.any proposed military scheme. Imagining an original position while
imposed restrictions under a veil of ignorance, the principles of
liberty, truth, and equality are selected in devising a desirable
and feasible scheme. Lastly, a Federation for European Military
Security is selected as the scheme promoting development within the
context of an uncertain European future while maintaining a free,
..secure, just, and relatively peaceful Europe.
The views and opinions expressed in this document represent
the personal views of the author ottly, and should not in any way be
construed to reflect any endorsement or confirmation by the
Department of Defense, the Department of the Air Force, or any j
other agency of the United 6tates Government.
4

TABLE OF CONTENTS
An Uncertain Europe.. 1
A Scientific Analysis of War.. 2
International Wars.. 2
Alliances..... .12
'Polarization........ .15
Systems of Power.. 19
The Reliability of Alliances.. 19
Major Power Intervention.. 21
Universalist and Particularist
Policies.. .... .22
Factors and Consequences of War............ 26
'.Population and Revenue.. 26
The Distribution of Power
and Growth Rate.. ..... 28
Summary of the Scientific
'Analysis of War.. .. 28
End Alliances.. 30
The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.. .32
The Western European Union.. 37
The Pan-European Army................ 39
The Original Position and the
..'Federation.. .41
Conclusion.. ...46

AN iTN('F.RTAiN F.iTRnPF.
In a short span of time, Europe has witnessed a myriad of
changes. While the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is replaced
by the Commonwealth of Independent States, East and West Germany
'.:achieved reunification. The Warsaw Pact is dissolved and the
4Baltic Republics are independent. Czechoslovakia is granted a
velvet divorce and Yugoslavia is fragmented and consumed by brutal
armed conflicts between powerfully irreconcilable ethnic groups.
With innumerable changes rapidly occurring in Europe during the
1990s, it is not clear what national military security policy
President Clinton's administration should develop for this region.
This paper intends to display that both short and long term
policies can be coherently developed to provide for a relatively
peaceful Europe.
The mutable conditions currently manifested in Europe suggest
a dynamically complex process introducing immense uncertainties in
European military security. Since these alterations import risks,
they pose a danger within the region. Europe presently consists of
established and stable democracies and constitutional monarchies
alongside new and fragile democracies. Federationalism and
national and ethnic affiliation claim foreground attention as a
.prevailing political principle of legitimacy; political and
`economic concerns fluctuate between integration and disintegration;
and military security structures experience vicissitudes of
supranational, national, and multipolar networks.
These changes, although filled with uncertainties and danger,
provide the context for challenging Unites States' and Europe's
foreign policy makers to use their imagination in developing
military security schemes that adequately deal with the uncertainty
of a European future, while maintaining a free, secure, just, and
relatively peaceful Europe.
The issue confronting policy makers is whether the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) can perform this function well.
In approaching this issue, some general trends will be identified
using compiled empirical data concerning wars in Europe. Next,
four proposed military schemes for resolving this issue will be
presented and discussed. Then, proposing a thought experiment to
determine whether all security schemes for Europe have been
exhausted, a method for deciding which military scheme to implement
provided. Finally, deriving certain principles from this
thought experiment, a different military security scheme emerges.
Upon analyzing the empirical data and the dynamically complex
phenomenon of European security, it is possible to develop
alternatives that may appear contradictory. Each alternative has
a kernel of truth and struggles to dominate the foreground of
reality; however, if we momentarily step back and look at the
1

background, a new picture emerges and each truth gains meaning in
relation to the picture. It is the thesis of this paper that NATO
should be modified and treated as a transitional military scheme,
and that a desirable and feasible cooperative security structure
can be developed for resolving the long term .problems of
uncertainty and a just peace in Europe.
A SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF WAR
As a preliminary to analyzing the four proposed European
military security schemes, it is best to present empirical data
compiled by noted warfare research analysts. The objective is to
identify and briefly discuss some regularities of behavior
associated with international war, particularly European wars.
Then, we will test the proposed military security schemes with the
existing data to reveal their meaning.
A plethora of empirical war studies have been generated;
therefore, to properly analyze the proposed schemes, we must focus
our attention on Europe. Due to the availability and
comprehensiveness of the compiled empirical data, with few
exceptions, the time-frame is limited to the period of 1815-1980.
INTERNATIONAL WARS
We begin the study using data compiled by historian Melvin
Small and political scientist J. David Singer on the "Patterns in
International Warfare, 1816-1980.° I Table 1 presents data
regarding systemic and extra systemic wars. Systemic wars are
`those fought between legitimately recognized members of an
international system, and comprising a population of at least
'500,000.2 Extra-systemic wars are those fought between members of
the international system against independent or colonial entities
rwhich did not qualify for membership in the system.3 Inter-state
wars have at least one major power actively participating with each
'side sustaining at least 1,000 battle-connected fatalities.°
~ Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "Patterns In International
Warfare, 1816-1980," in International War: An Anthology, ed. M.
Small and J. D. Singer (Pacific Grove, CA., 1988), pp. 28-30.
z Ibid., p. 27.
3 Ibid.
° J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, ~~Capability
Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1829-1965," in The
Scientific Study of Peace and War: A Text Reader, ed. J. A. Vasquez I
and M. T. Henehan (New York, 1992), p. 43.
2
t
f

Batt3e De~dtYle
per
Nat£ern MonY_hs
1D7.
59.5
93.:0
65,-0
57::1!
45.;5
3f1.0
A~3..0
58:5
44.:D
52.0
106.0
78>:0
39.;11
101.:0
S5.Q
83.0
5~.0
24.ti
89.0
45.E
61.E
53.0
1'7.0
4.;~1
5.0
41.:0
2~.0
43.0
b~.0
75.0
91.€s
59.D
31.0
X2.0
3$.O
11.Q
34.p
26,0
~.:
6.0
42.:8
109.q
SO,p
105.0
TABLE 1 International War, 183i~-19$O (C4ntinuedJ'
Battle Nation
3dame crf --~Wat Deatha Months
Pacific:11879-1883) 4610 6.A
Brikish-Sulu {1$79)I 7~fl 84.4
Franca~ndochinese (1882-1$84)I 70iQ 35.0
Mandist:(1882-1685)C 33q 24.11
S.zno-French {I884-1885)' h7 D 95.t7
C"entxal American (1885):: 1C1~.~ 102.5
Serbo-Bulgariam (1885)T 84;5 99.4
S.ino-Sapanese (1894-1895) 42;5 53.5.
E`ramco-klac~agasaan (1894-1895) 63>{7 ?Z.0
Cuban (1895-1895)C 22<0 ?7.Q
~tala-Ethippiarc-.:(1895-189b)2 58:9 68.0
P'irat Philippine (189{x-1898)C 8415 37.L3
fi>reco-Tyrl~ish I1897) 84;5 82.5.
Spanish-,~Lnerican (189~)< 53,'5 75.t#
Sacnn~ Philippine {1899-:-14D2yC; TD<~ 22.0.
Boex (1899-1902}C 29.fl 92.13
8wrer Rehellieni,(19Dtf) _ 79id 66.x:
I15,nden(1903~C 84,5 92.0
Kusso-Japanese (19045405) 11.:0 2b.0
G'~r7tY'a3 llrttex.i.can (19Db).: 1(14!5 &6.6.
cen~rai 11merican {19D7) 104::5 $2.5
Spanish lHorAccan {1909-].910J 5~;.~ 49.5
Z'~a10-Turkish {1911-1912) 33.Q 36.0:
Fi.t~st .14a~ka~ {x,912-7.413;) 17.:0 43.p;
Seaand Balkan (1913) 18 0 88.0:
World War Z (1914-1918); 2 f1 3.0':
Russian Nationalj.ta.e$ {1917-1421aC 22.:0 25.!3::
Itusso~Pa2ish {1914-320} Y3.5 23.Q
tlunJdzian-A2lies (1919): 48.;5 ~~~~
Greco-Turkish (1919-1922 ~2;U 1~.0
Itfffian_:~1921-i9~6)C 26.:6 14.x:.
Druze {1925,592?)C 72.;5 39.0
S.ino-Soviet (1929) 78.:0 7G.0:`:
Manchurian (1931-1933) 19,:0 31,D
Chaacr {29321935) 11 b 17.0
Ita10-Ettf.iopiarlI1935-1~33ft) 330 59.0;
Sirto-~Tapar~ese (1937-1541~ "~.0 14.b
Chanykrafen~ (1938) 91.0 192.5:.
Nomoha~ {1939) 270 £,4,~i
Woz~ld Wad I3 (1939-1~1AS} 1 ;0 1.,0
Russo-~`innish (1939-19AC?~ 1C.'~ ?9.4
E'xanao-Thai (1940-1941).'. 9fi.:-5 40.0::
Indonesian (1945-19+15jC, 96.5 4Q.D'+
Indochinese (1945-1954)c 15.D 11,0';
Madagas~a~ I1947-1948)C; 9~.:Q 42.0`
'4
I
i
i
t
{

The following data from table 2 displays selected national
performances in total international war participation and, in bold
print, identifies the nine nations comprising the major powers
during 1815-1980.
i) France, 1815-1940 and 1945-1980: 22
international wars, 14 systemic wars
2) England, 1815-1980: 19
3) Russia, 1815-1917 and 1921-1980: 18
4) Turkey/Ottoman Empire: 18
international wars, it systemic wars
5) Italy/Sardinia, 1860-1943: 12
6) China, 1950-1980: 11 international
wars, 10 systemic wars
7) ...Spain, 10 international .wars, 5
systemic wars
8) Japan, 1895-1945: 9 international
wars, 9 systemic wars
9) United States, 1899-1980: 8
international wars, 7
systemic wars
10) Austria/Hungary, 1815-1918: 8
11) Greece: 7 international wars, 7
systemic wars
12) .Germany/Prussia, 1815-1918 and 1925-
1945: 6 international wars, 6
systemic wars
Table 2 reveals major powers have a propensity to become j
involved in international war. The major powers place five of the [
first six positions and nine of the twelve in total international
war participation. Corroborating the propensity hypothesis,
political scientists Charles S. Gochman and Zeev Maoz adduce
additional evidence on "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816- E
i`
g
t
E

Yet, while reverting to a pre-nineteenth century alliance pattern
and experiencing a dramatic increase in minor power conflicts, the
twentieth century has been characterized by a balance of power
system. Since empirical data shows alliance formations are
generally followed by war, then the hypothesis that the balance of
'power maintained peace is highly suspect. Attempting to save the
hypothesis, balance of power theorists contend polarized alliance
systems are associated with war. These polarized alliance systems
contribute to the difference between nineteenth and twentieth
''century alliance-war correlation. Balance of power theorists
center the debate on whether multipolarity or bipolarity is
conducive to a peaceful world.
POLARIZATION
'The classic polarity debate focuses on two sides of the same
coin, the balance of power theory. As the proponent of the
bipolarity theory, Kenneth N. Waltz avows bipolarity provides the
necessary conditions for a peaceful and stable world.14 Waltz
reasons that an international nation state system, dominated by two
superpowers with their respective blocs of allies, provides a great
degree of certainty about the consequences of foreign policy.
Additionally, Waltz proposes that since two superpower blocs deter
'attacks against each other, facilitate crisis management in
controlling ally deviations, and inhibit misjudgments by reducing
the amount of international actors, the international .system
creates stability by introducing certainty.
Countering with the thesis that multipolarity is conducive to
stability, Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer claim an increasing
number of interacting international actors generate a great degree
i of uncertainty.ls Since multiple interactions are both complex and
diverse, foreign policy makers would have to render cautious,
deliberate, and rational decisions. As support, Deutsch and Singer
aver that multipolarity introduces intermediaries as mediators,
arbitrators, and offer neutral meeting grounds. Thus, introducing
conflict reducing agents, multipolarity fosters a congenial
'atmosphere for managing crises. Lastly, Duetsch and Singer claim
multipolarity is a more desirable international system because
incremental international agents divert .attention .and expend
`resources for each nation-state.
14 Frank Whelon Wayman, "Bipolarity and War: The Role of
Capability Concentration and Alliance Patterns Among Major Powers,
1816-1965," in the Scientific Study of Peace and War: A Text
Reader, ed. J. A. Vasquez and M. T. Henehan (New York, 1992),
p. 186.
~s Ibid., 186.
15

Attempting to clarify the classic polarity debate, Frank
Whelon Wayman asseverates the concept of polarity has different
meanings in different contexts. Essentially, the polarity debate
xevolves around the differences in the power nation-states wield
and the set of relationships developed in the international system.
iIllustrating that power concentration and alliance (cluster)
'configuration are conceptually distinct, Wayman .provides the
following definitions:
Definition 1: A system is power bipolar when capabilities are
`so distributed that two dominant hostile powers are more
powerful than other actors to a degree that give the dominant
powers autonomy in self-defense.16
Definition 2: A system is power multiaolar when capabilities
are more evenly distributed than in the .power bipolar
countries, and when .hostility is high."
Definition 3: A system is cluster bibolar when most or all of
the states in the system are tightly packed into two political
clusters, with high mutual hostility, and very few or no
states play intermediate or cross-cutting roles. In the
perfect form of tight cluster bipolarity, the members are all
mutually closer to each other than any of them are to any
member of the other cluster.1e
Definition 4: A system is cluster multipolar when the states
are more evenly distributed throughout the space, with many
opportunities for intermediaries and .many cross-cutting
loyalties to moderate hostility.19
Using historical data between 1919-1975, Wayman provides table
8 further explaining the conceptual distinctions.Z°
As seen in table 8, the European state system was power and
cluster multipolar during 1919-1939. During 1941-1945, with Allied
and Axis powers juxtaposed, the European state system reflected
cluster bipolarity but contained power multipolarity. The Cold War
period of 1948-1955 manifested both power and cluster bipolarity.
The period of detente evinced power bipolarity and cluster
multipolarity during 1965-1975. .Concluding power bipolarity and
~a Wayman, p. 181.
17 Ibid.
is Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid, p. .182.
16

general war; however, in contrast to the twentieth century, wars
:..were low in magnitude, severity, and duration. In discussing the
differences between the nineteenth and twentieth century, J. David
Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey present some enlightening
material.
SYSTEMS OFPOWER
In their article entitled, "Capability Distribution,
Uncertainty, and Major Power, 1820-1965," Singer, Bremer, and
Stuckey claim two power systems operated during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries.''' The preponderance of power system operates
under the assumption "there will be less war when there is: (a) a
preponderance of power concentrated in the hands of a very few
nations: (b) change, if any, toward greater concentration; and (c)
a relatively stable rank order among, and intervals between, the
major powers."25 In contrast, a parity and fluidity power system
assumes "there will be less war when there is: (a) approximate
parity among the major nations; (b) change toward parity rather
than away from it: and (c) a relatively fluid power hierarchy."26
Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey discover that the preponderance of
power system is associated with high magnitude war in the
nineteenth century and the parity and fluidity power system is
`associated with less war. Additionally, finding that the
.:preponderance of power system is associated with less war in the
twentieth century, the parity and fluidity power system is
associated with high magnitude war. Since high magnitude war is
.associated with specific power distributions in wars fought during
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey
conclude that power distribution influences the type of war that
will be fought and is not a cause of war.
THE RELIABILITY OF ALLIANCES
The findings produced in the Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey study
xeveal a dramatic change between the nineteenth and twentieth
century regarding the effect of the concentration of power in the
international system. Alan Ned 5abrosky provides an explanation of
this change in his article entitled, "Interstate Alliances: Their
?^ Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, pp. 37-66.
~s Ibid., p. 64. i
i
E
ze Ibid. 'r
19
E
t
f

Throughout the entire period, empirical data manifest that 61%
of alliance constituents are disposed to remain neutral when a
member country becomes embroiled in war. Although displaying a 66%
neutrality rate in the nineteenth century, the 1900-1945 era
displays the lowest neutrality rate of 56~. While table 11
exhibits this era containing the highest alliance violation,
Sabrosky adds "the apparently greater willingness of states in
alliances to take sides in a war was not necessarily beneficial to
their alliance partners."30 The 1946-1965 era indicates a 76$
neutrality rate. Demonstrating an unwillingness to get involved
either alongside of or against their allies during the post 1945
war performance opportunities, Sabrosky infers that a 76%
neutrality rate reflects a diminished importance and support of
alliance networks, which coincides with the degeneration of the
balance of power system in that same post 1945 period.31
Sabrosky discloses additional information on the reliability
of alliances. Ascertaining that both major/major power alliances
and minor/minor power alliances are generally reliable, major/minor
power alliances are frequently violated. Clarifying his findings,
Sabrosky avows that a major power intervening to assist a minor
power acts as a contagion mechanism.
MAJORPOWERINTERVENTION
Corroborating yet adding to Sabrosky's analysis, Randolph M.
Siverson and Joel King demonstrate that "a nation having an
alliance with a belligerent is five times more likely to become
'involved in war."'Z Expatiating the two previous discourses, Manus
I. Midlarsky states that combining major/major power conflicts with
major/minor power conflicts have historically demonstrated
instability within the international system during the twentieth
century.33 Uniting the two distinct sets of conflicts mutually
connects each discrete conflict issue into a grand conflict issue.
Since the grand conflict issue prevents compromise over discrete
issues, .conflict resolution is exacerbated, if not almost
so Ibid., p. 178.
31 SabroskY, p. 197.
3Z Randolph M. Siverson and Joel Kinq, "Alliances and the
Expansion of War," in the Scientific Study of Peace and War: A Text
Reader, ed. J. A. Vasquez and M. T. Henehan (New York, 1992),
p. 168
33 Manus 2. Midlarsky, "Preventing Systemic War: Crisis
Decision-Making Amidst a Structure of Conflict Relationships," in
the Scientific Study of Peace and War: A Text Reader, ed. j
J. A. Vasquez and M. T. Henehan (New York, 1992), p. 215.
21 F
e
t
II
Ee

impossible.
Supporting and amplifying the hypothesis that alliances act as
a contagion mechanism, Yoshinobu Yamamoto and Stuart A. Bremer
affirm that 1816-1965 witnessed eight wars involving major power
interventions.34 While three wars experienced only one major power
':intervention, only two wars comprised two major power
interventions; however, the severest, largest, and longest wars
:involved major powers intervening on both sides of the war. These
three wars were: (1) World War I, 1914-1918; (2) World War II,
1939-1945; and (3) the Korean War, 1950-1953.
Although major power interventions remained low during the
nineteenth century (the Crimean War and the War of Italian
Unification being the exceptions), Yamamoto and Bremer demonstrate
twentieth century major powers manifested a proclivity to intervene
in war. A major power's initial decision to intervene increases
the probability of other major powers intervening. Since a major
power's decision encourages other major powers to follow, Yamamoto
and Bremer infer opposing major power interventions expand war and
increase the severity, size, and duration of war. However, history
'illustrates major power intervention on only one side rapidly ends
war.
Summarizing the previous analyses, once a major power having
an alliance with a belligerent major or minor power decides to
intervene in war, then it is highly probable other major powers
will intervene. Furthermore, knowing that a major power
intervening to assist a minor power expands war, destructive wars
occur when major powers intervene on both sides of a war.
Combining resources, coordinating strategies, maintaining a
multipolar power distribution with equal power between the
belligerents, and sustaining an increasing polarization of
alliances into two blocs, creates large, severe, and long wars.
These general wars commonly occurred during the twentieth century.
ITNIVER5ALIST AND PARTICULARIST.POLICIES
Although most of the studies reviewed propound political
realism, one cannot conclude political realists' practices produce
peace. Not attributing war to the immutability of native forces
fixed in the human constitution, political realists accurately
reveal that war is a function of social institutions. The
practices of the political realist exhibit a process by which
national leaders, concerned with establishing security, develop and
34 Yoshinobu Yamamoto and Stuart A. Bremer, "Wider Wars and
Restless Nights: Major Power Intervention in Ongoing War," in the
Correlates of War: II, Testing Some Realpolitik Models, ed.
J. D. Singer .(New York, 1980), II, p. 226.
22

execute foreign policies which subsequently threaten the security
of foreign nations. The actions and reactions of foreign and
domestic nations generate conditions ripe for a war. As the noted
American philosopher, John Dewey, aptly states, "History does not
prove the inevitability of war, but it does prove that customs and
institutions which organize native powers into certain patterns in
politics and economics will also generate the war-pattern.i3s
Global history has marshaled evidence showing major power wars
have been eschewed during certain epochs. Major powers have
established and applied rules of behavior organizing constructive
relations among themselves. Reviewing these epochs provides
considerable knowledge in establishing social institutions and
.;practices generating the peace paradigm.
Adducing empirical evidence, Peter Wallensteen identifies two
,predominant major power policies implemented in different periods
during 1816-1976. Table 12 illustrates universalist and
particularist policy periods which organized major power relations
during 1816-1976,36
Wallensteen defines universalist policies as ~~concerted
'efforts among major powers to organize relations between themselves
to work out acceptable rules of behavior (general standards).j37
Table 12 reveals four universalist policy periods. Exhibiting four
particularist policy periods, Wallensteen defines them as "policies
which emphasize the special interest of a given power, even at the
price of disrupting existing organizations or power
relationships."38 Illustrating distinct policy patterns, table 13
provides significant revelations concerning both major and minor
power relations.39
Table 13 shows that ten major/major power wars transpired
lduring particularist periods. No major/major power wars occurred
during universalist periods. Clarifying these findings,
3s John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York, 1930),
p. 115.
36 peter Wallensteen, ° Universalism vs. Particularism: On the
Limits of Major Power Order," in The Scientific Study of Peace and
War: A Text Reader, ed. J. A. Vasquez and M. T. Henehan (New York,
1992), p. 232. [Contributing author in an edited work]
3~ Ibid., p. 230.
3a Ibid.
s9 Ibid., p. 234.
23
7
i
i
i
i

Wallensteen asserts, "the record suggests that the pursuit of such

confrontations in general and among the major powers in
particular.j40 Although universalists and particularist periods
'account for few major/minor confrontations escalating into
major/minor powers wars, 38.5 and 61.5% of major/minor wars
occurred during the universalist and particularist periods,
respectively. These findings suggest universalist policies
coordinated constructive and cordial relations among the major
powers; however, universalist and particularist policies encouraged
interventions against minor powers.
Universalist policies were generally established after major
power wars. Major powers devised universalist policies to:
maintain their status as the victors of war; inhibit defeated major
powers from recovering; and coordinate major powers' foreign
policies. Wallensteen avers universalist policies provided the
added benefit of installing friendly regimes and creating new
constitutions in the vanquished countries. Thus, universalist
policies reduced the threat of friendly and vanquished countries'
domestic policies and created a perceived notion of certainty.
When major powers accept certain rules of behavior as binding
and act according to those rules, history shows there are periods
with an absence of major/major power wars. Differences among major
powers are reconciled without force and the autonomy of the major
powers are recognized, respected, and maintained. Wallensteen's
'study reveals universalist policies have been successful in
developing cooperative foreign relations and implementing
reconciling mechanisms for major powers. Although universalist
periods redirected major power efforts toward increasing
intervention in minor power affairs, this does not conceal the fact
that universalist policies were partially applied. Instead of
developing cooperative international relations and using
reconciling mechanisms for all nations, the major powers intended
to establish a world order specifically benefiting the major
powers. Refusing to alter existing arrangements, universalist
'policies assigned minor powers a subordinating relation to major
powers. Thus, while preventing major/major power confrontations,
'universalist policies attained limited success.
Universalist policies did not recognize nor respect the
autonomy of minor powers. Excluding minor powers in global
security issues, the threat and use of force persisted as the
preferred method of attaining foreign policy goals. Predicating
the term discrete universalist policies, major powers devised
practices establishing constructive relations amid the prevailing
powers and collectively benefitted. Using discrete universalist
policies, prevailing major powers regulated a specific world order
based on accepted rules guiding their relations; however, minor
powers and defeated major powers were relegated particularist
ao Wallensteen, p. 246.
25
r
I
j:.
f

policies. Since, in many instances, major powers divided or
'controlled vanquished powers, they unfairly distributed burdens and
benefits, and excluded non-predominating powers in global security
issues. Therefore, the non-predominating powers concluded the
.:arrangements were unjustified. Not being privy to the
arrangements, the non-predominating powers initiated unilateral
actions invariably resulting in war.
FACTORS AND. CONSEQUENCES OF WAR
Analysts are concentrating on war's economic consequences and
the distribution of power. Since most wars occur because opposing
belligerent powers anticipate different results in realizing their
goals by conducting war, then what factors are critical in
realizing the goals of war? Once war ends, what is the long term
impact on the power of the states involved? Discerning the
critical factors and the long term consequences of war provides a
practical organon for reducing war and diminishing its effect.
POPULATION AND REVENUE
Stephen Rosen investigates the conditions associated with
triumphant war termination. Using Singer and Small's list of
international wars, Rosen determines that the side attaining the
.'lowest population percentage loss won 30 out of 40 (75~)
international wars.' Table 13 illustrates that countries
initiating war with larger populations than .their .opposing
'countries won 27 out of 30 (90~) cases.42
Although 18 (600) cases show defeated powers losing more
lives, victorious powers had larger populations and sustained
higher population losses in 12 cases (40%). Population loss rates
derive their importance because of the population size of
belligerent nations. Presumably a nation maintaining a larger
population may lose more lives yet become victorious.
Selecting wealth as measuring a nation's destructive
potential, Rosen divulges government revenue is the definitive
factor in winning war. Presenting in table 14 a "Summary of Data
on Correlates of War Performance," Rosen shows that revenue
provides 79~ (31 out of 39 cases) probability of victory.43
Nations possessing wealth and lower population loss won 26 out of
41 Steven Rosen, "War Power and the Willingness to Suffer," in
The Scientific Study of Peace and War: A Text Reader, ed. J. A.
Vasquez and M. T. Henehan (New york, 1992), p. 266.
az Ibid., p. 267.
a3 Ibid. '~ P. 271. 4
26

1'~~ DISTRIBUTION OFPOWER AND GROWTIiRATE
A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler investigate the distribution
of power in the international system after World War I and II.44
Organski and Kugler use gross national product to measure national
capabilities. They find all 18 nations involved in World War I or
World War II returned to their prewar national capabilities within
twenty years.
Organski and Kugler ascertain that following an end to war
victorious and neutral nations are minimally affected in the near
future, but defeated nations incur severe short-term losses. In
the long run, victorious and neutral nations display a period of
slow recovery and attain a prewar growth rate, but defeated nations
manifest the phoenix factor. Exhibiting and maintaining an acutely
accelerated recovery period, defeated nations renew their expected
prewar growth rate and typically surpass victorious nations within
18-20 years. Thus, the distribution of power and the growth rate
return to a pattern as if war had never been initiated. Two world
wars have not significantly . altered national growth .nor the
distribution of power.
Organski and Kugler claim that nations receiving the most
United States foreign assistance after World War II experience the
worst recovery rates.45 Although a victorious nation may inhibit
'a defeated nation's recovery, their findings suggest recovery and
foreign assistance are independent. Their claim contradicts the
hypothesis stating recoveries of defeated nations are a result of
victorious nations providing substantial foreign assistance.
Si:fNIMARY OF THE SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF WAR
The purpose of this research is to find, present, and explain
some regularities of behavior associated with international wars,
particularly European wars. Ea the quest to devise a desirable and
feasible military security scheme, reviewing a multitude of
':statistical research on war provides the opportunity to identify
the factors associated with war and peace. Attempting to provide
an integrated explanation of the current knowledge of war, this
';paper uses that cumulation to test the proposed European military
`security schemes.
'Studies on the patterns of international warfare, 1816-1980,
44 A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kuqler, "The Cost of Major Wars:
The Phoenix Factor," in The Scientific Study of Peace and War: A
Text Reader, ed. J. A. Vasquez and M. T. Henehan .(New York, 1992),
PH. 279-305.
as organski and Kugler, p. 303.
28

` reveal that international wars are neither increasing nor
decreasing. Although international wars remain a constant human
activity, major powers exhibit the highest propensity to engage in
international war. Major powers maintain the greatest number of
enduring rivalries and display the highest incidence of extra
regional rivalries. Since over half the nations comprising the
international system avoided international war, one can safely
conclude it is highly probable international war is not endemic to
the entire system.
Research shows that alliance formation suggests nation states
anticipated war because of underlying political, economic,
diplomatic, social, and military events. Empirical evidence
illustrates that the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries and
the twentieth century manifested alliances being followed by war
within five years. Appearing as an aberration, the nineteenth
century exhibits a negligible amount of alliances followed by war.
Contrasting with the alliance followed by war phenomenon, few wars
were preceded by alliances. Thus, data shows alliances are not a
cause of war.
Although political realist theorists contend balance of power
I rsystems are associated with peace, twentieth century wars are
,.'characterized by balance of power systems. Disclosing power
concentration and alliance (cluster) configuration are conceptually
`distinct and statistically independent, adduced evidence exhibits
twentieth century war is associated with alliance bipolarity while
cluster multipolarity is followed by peace. The twentieth century
characterized by two world wars of great magnitude, severity,
and duration, and delineated by a multiple distribution of power
polari2ed into two alliance blocs. The nineteenth century is
1 depicted without general wars.
"Identifying two distinct power systems operating in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the international system's
distribution of power influences the type of war to be fought, but
is not a cause of war. In the twentieth century balance of power
`;systems are associated with high magnitude wars, but parity and
fluidity systems are associated with less war. The converse
relationship occurs in the nineteenth century.
Research illustrates major/minor power alliances are the most
:frequently violated alliances. Additionally, combining major/major
power conflicts together with major/minor power conflicts
historically exhibits marked instability during the twentieth
century. Major powers intervening to assist minor powers act as a
contagion mechanism. Since a major power's decision encourages
other major power to follow, opposing major powers assisting minor
powers increases war's severity, size, and duration.
War is a function of social institutions; however, history
provides testimony illustrating major powers using universalist
29

policies avoided major/major power wars. Established after
;major/major wars, universalist policies coordinated constructive
and cordial relations among the major powers. While particularist
policies emphasize the special interest of a given power,
universalist and particularist policies encouraged and produced
'major power interventions. against minor. powers.
Employing discrete universalist policies, major powers created
' practices intentionally benefiting the prevailing powers, unfairly
extending burdens to the vanquished major powers, and assigning
'minor powers subordinating relations. Since defeated major powers
and minor powers considered these practices unjustified, they
initiated unilateral actions using particularist policies.
Economic and demographic factors are the principal elements
contributing to winning or losing wars. While government revenue
and lower population loss rates are two essential elements, total
government revenue is the decisive factor in winning wars.
World wars do not alter the long term impact of economic
growth and the distribution of power. Defeated nations manifest
the phoenix factor. They renew their expected prewar growth and
surpass the victorious nations within 18-20 years.
'This paper has identified and discussed general trends
associated with international war, particularly European wars.
Next, this paper will present and discuss four proposed European
'..military security schemes. Then, this paper uses the general
trends associated with war to test the proposed military security
schemes and reveal their meaning.
END ALLIANCES
Proposing to end all European alliances, the first scheme
recommends each nation-state maintain military forces only at the
level necessary for defending its political sovereignty and
territorial integrity. This scheme identifies the necessary
'functions of the state as providing security for its citizens,
;upholding its legal authority, and preserving a shared perspective
on a particular way of life.
This scheme assumes a European future with no military
security threats nor rivalries. Shortly after the termination of
the Napoleonic War and the Congress of Vienna settlement, Europe
conformed to this proposed scheme during 1820-1825, called the
unipolar period. Wayman states, "a system is unipolar if none of
the states in the system are hostile enough to each other to induce
mutual fear and aggressive designs.j46 The Great Powers attempted
46 Wayman, p. 182.
30

to establish a new international order based on the principles of
compensation, legitimacy, and a balance of power. The Great Powers
compensated their expensive efforts through territorial
aggrandizement. The Great powers restored and maintained the pre-
Napoleonic rules of Europe by conveniently claiming the principle
of legitimacy. Discouraging unilateral aggression among
themselves, the Great Power maintained a balance of ,power....
Although the Great Powers did not wage war among themselves
during the unipolar period, this paper has shown the Great Powers
have intervened in minor power affairs. The Great Powers adopted
the Troppau Protocol of October 1820 and declared they would not
accept revolutionary action as legally binding. They intervened in
revolutions occurring in Naples, the Piedmont, and Spain; however,
When perceived as to their advantage, the Great Powers encouraged
Balkan independence and intervened on behalf of the Greeks in their
revolt against the Ottoman Empire. Identifying unipolar periods as
extremely unstable and indubitably the most war prone, Jack S. Levy
affirms, unipolar periods exhibit the majority of general or
n na7
hegemonic wars producing the highest duration and magnitude.
Contradistinguishing the unipolar period, the 1990s are
characterized by a monopolar power system. In a speech broadcasted
by CNN, President Bill Clinton asseverated, "We are the world's
only superpower."'$ Presently, the United States represents this
monopolar power system with its status as the world's only military
superpower. Possessing nuclear weapons, France, Great Britain, and
Russia have the ability of unduly influencing the behavior of
nation-states not possessing nuclear weapons. Thus, without the
nuclear umbrella of the United States, non-nuclear European nation-
states remain unprotected and the transatlantic link is not
preserved. This scheme disregards the fact the United States is
historically, politically, and culturally tied to Europe, and
sustains vital economic and military interests in Europe. Without
United States involvement, Europe will maintain a highly unstable
multipolar power and alliance configuration.
This scheme does not adequately address national rivalries,
military threats, nor social, ethnic, and economic deterioration.
Maintaining a military force is a function of: a) the size of the
territory, population, and revenue; b) lines of trade and
communication; c) natural resources; d) technological capacity; e)
perceived threats; and f) the extensiveness of national political
obligations. Considering these factors, European major powers
would still maintain large military forces. For example, Russian
defense requires maintaining a large military force while BeNeLux
a~
LevY~ P. 356.
48 President Bill Clinton, CNN, television network, 23 April
1993.
'31

defense requires small military forces.
Table 4 illustrates Europe has supported 12 enduring regional
rrivalries with 185 disputes and seven extra-regional rivalries with
98 disputes. Since history suggests continued European rivalries
and wars, neither unipolarity nor necessary military force levels
inhibit war without universalist policies. Unfortunately,
discrete universalist policies historically redirect major power
efforts toward increasing intervention in minor power affairs;
therefore, it is highly probable minor power leaders will respond
to long term security issues by augmenting their military power
through alliances. These alliances will: lead to a multipolar
distribution of power; tighten the alliance configuration;
encourage particularist policies among minor powers; increase
security threats; escalate arms; and prepare nations for war.
Crises will escalate into a large, long, and severe war. With
major powers sustaining negligible long term impacts through the
phoenix factor, minor power conditions scarcely improve.
This military security scheme aptly captures the notion that
state must remain independent, equal, secure, and control its own
.;possessions to perform its function well. States are not to be
acquired, controlled by other states, nor interfered with in their
internal affairs. Maintaining large armed forces increases
insecurity and produces arms escalation. Accumulating a
:prohibitively large national debt diverts resources and burdens
citizens during peace and war. This scheme lacks universalist
policies constructively regulating relations amid all European
states. Confidence building measures need to be developed.
Technology must be shared and verification procedures are needed to
extend warning time. Lastly, a forum encouraging cooperation and
dialogue is needed to establish and direct these practices. The
second scheme proposes the North Atlantic Treaty organization is
the relevant forum.
TIIE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGA1vIZATION
Taking effect on August 24, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) is an alliance formulated to preserve
international peace, justice, and security, and promote the
stability and well-being of independent, sovereign, and democratic
states. Assigned this mandate, as an inter-governmental
organization, NATO attempts to peacefully settle international
disputes, and refrain from threatening or using force in any way
inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations. In the event
it cannot deter war, NATO countries treat an attack against any of
its member countries as an attack against all. In accordance with
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, each member
country reserves the right to exercise individual and/or collective
self-defense to restore and maintain peace, justice, and security.
Fostering cooperation instead of competition among its members,
32

'NATO established mechanisms eliminating conflicting international
economic policies, and promoted political, economic, and military
collaboration. Thus, the intent of the alliance is: i) convincing
communism it could not feasibly attain its goals; 2) containing
West Germany; and 3) ensuring the United States abandoned
isolationism by maintaining a transatlantic link.
Committed to defending the territorial integrity of each
member state, NATO uses the strategy of flexible response and
forward defense. NATO developed this strategy during a divided
Europe containing a threatening Warsaw Treaty Organization and
offensively oriented Soviet armed forces. This strategy requires
deterring war or transgression by deliberately linking conventional
war with an escalating nuclear war. Positioning defensive forces
along the length of the inter-German border, NATO forces would use
deep-strike weapons extending a zone by which Warsaw Treaty and
Soviet second echelon forces would be attacked, disrupted, and
delayed in East Europe before engaging the main NATO defensive
forces; therefore, NATO strategy manifested an offensive defense.
Impelled by dramatic social, political, and economic
"imperatives, the European security landscape is radically altered.
One must determine whether NATO still provides the necessary
framework for establishing peace, justice, and security, .during
this perplexing epoch.
'Under the tutelage of former Soviet President Mikhail
Gorbachev, the former Soviet Union acquiesced in 1990 to a united
Germany with NATO membership. The key to persuading the Soviet
Union relinquishing its prohibition was illustrating that an
isolated united Germany was unpredictable and more dangerous to
'European stability than a united Germany within NATO. Assuaging
1Soviet apprehension, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl proposed
to: "limit German forces to 370,000 within three or four years
after reunification;49 "refrain from producing, holdin~, or
commanding atomic, biological, and chemical weapons;i 0 and
"contribute tens of billions of Deutsche marks to further the
economic reconstruction of East Germany and the Soviet Union."sl
After the Soviet Union agreed to drop its veto, President Gorbachev
'and Chancellor Kohl agreed to negotiate removing 360,000 Soviet .
troops out of Germany.
With a reunified Germany, dissolved Warsaw .Treaty
49 Charles Lane, Melinda Liu, and Elizabeth Tucker, "A Bitter
Homecoming,° .Newsweek, (July 30, 1990), p. 26.
so Ibid.
sl Scott Sullivan, "Can Germany be Contained?," Newsweek,
(July 30, 1990), p. 28.
33

forces."SZ
National security issues will be primarily resolved through
political means. Former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev
averred, "The character of contemporary weapons leaves no country
any hope of safeguarding itself solely with military and technical
means, for example by building up a defense system, even the most
powerful one. The task of ensuring security is increasingly a
political problem, to be resolved only by political means."s3
The impacts of Russian crises remain tenuous at best. If
Russia perceives itself surrounded by hostile powers, then it will
1 likely justify a siege mentality; it will subsequently initiate an
arms build-up and be coupled with nationalistic fervor. Since
Russian troops are within Russian territory and tables 1 and 2
reveal Russia has a propensity to engage in European wars, then
i;NATO's new roles are reassuring West European nations and deterring
Russian aggression against the democratically elected governments
of Eastern Europe.
French independence from the NATO integrated military command
significantly contributes to instability during a multipolar power
and alliance configuration. As depicted in tables 1 and 2, French
bellicosity is illustrated by its greatest propensity to engage in
international wars and its historical role in minor power
interventions. Maintaining nuclear and conventional forces
independent of the NATO integrated military command conjoined by
'their bellicose propensity serves as an intimidating national
instrument for influencing the behavior of European nations. Since
`France has the highest propensity for engaging in international
wars and interventions, NATO's additional role is minimizing French
bellicosity and ensuring French commitment to European defense.
Confronted with the NATO irony, NATO~s military threat is
significantly abated yet altered. In an article entitled "Is NATO
So Successful It Deserves to Die?," Fen Osler Hampson asserts,
"NATO's strategy of forward defense that is based on the scenario
`of surprise attack across a front that no longer exists and in a
world in that total surprise is no longer possible, is neither
sZGeneral Makmut Gareyev, "Novaia Voennaia Politika," Krasnaia
Zvezda (February 8, 1988), p. 1, english translation found in S
Nelson Drew and others, The Future of NATO (New York, 1991), p. 27.
s3 Mikhail Gorvachev, Address to the Twenty-Seventh Communist
Party Congress, S. Nelson Drew and others, The Future of NATO:
Facing an Unreliable Enemy in an Uncertain Environment, (New York,
1991). pp. 26-27.
35

Organization, demised Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, emerging
Commonwealth of Independent States, and French independence of NATO
integrated military command, NATO is confronting the NATO irony:
Russian troops are deployed within a NATO member state; NATO's new
purpose is deterring Russian aggression against the democratically
elected East European governments; and NATO~s additional purpose is
minimizing French bellicosity while ensuring French commitment to
European Defense.
At the time of this writing, Russia maintains ten divisions
deployed in a reunified Germany; however, President Boris Yeltsin
asseverated Russia will withdraw its troops from German soil by the
end of 1993.
Emerging democratic governments, free market economies, and
East European nationalism dissolved the political cohesion between
East European nations and the Commonwealth of Independent States,
particularly Russia. The demise of the Warsaw Treaty Organization
created East European demands of Russian troop withdrawals. While
.'maintaining 2.7 million troops, Russia completed troop withdrawals
from the Czech Republic, the Republic of Slovakia, and Hungary.
Russia is presently withdrawing troops from Poland, and will
withdraw troops from the Baltic Republics after completing
withdrawal from Germany. This indicates the .end of Russian
hegemony in Eastern Europe.
Russia is focusing inward to rebuild itself after experiencing
`political, economic, and social turmoil. The Commonwealth of
Independent States is fragmented and many member states are
displaying antagonistic behavior toward Russia. Russia, therefore,
is using troop withdrawals to protect its political sovereignty and
territorial integrity..
Russia has eliminated the threat of a surprise attack on NATO.
Russia's troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe has removed
,Operational Maneuver Groups, Independent Tank Regiments, and
assault crossing units. The military front is at the Russian
'border; this increases the warning time of an impending Russian
'attack and logistically impedes sustaining Russian offensive
capabilities against West European nations.
The Russian military changed its doctrine from the
inevitability and subsequent winning of international war to its
prevention. General Makhmut Gareyev asseverated, "What is new here
is the fact that, whereas military doctrine used to be defined as
a system of views of the preparation of war and the waging of war,
its substance is now based on the prevention of war. The tasks of
preventing war is becoming the supreme goal, the nucleus of
military doctrine, the basic function of the state and the armed
34

strategically necessary nor politically viable.j54 The premises
establishing forward defense are no longer true. Given the NATO
irony is associate with decreasing defense budgets and force
reductions, NATO must establish a new strategy to remain relevant
'for European military security. The authors of the book entitled,
"The Future of NATO: Facing an Unreliable Enemy in an Uncertain
`Environment," claim a "Resilient Defense" strategy appropriately
manages the NATO irony within the presently imposed political and
fiscal constraints.
Providing conventional stability in Europe during this epoch,
Resilient Defense is a strategy providing NATO the capability of
:defending Europe with a 50 percent NATO force level reduction;
'however, through early detection and reaction to belligerent
advances and additional reserve reinforcements, NATO can deter and
defeat a belligerent nation. Using force on force maneuvers and
relying on rapid reserve forces mobilization and deployment, this
strategy presents a defensive defense. Since NATO forces would
'maintain a defensive orientation and not present a credible
offensive threat, Resilient Defense countervails an unstable
multipolar power and alliance configuration.
Using light and maneuverable military forces, Resilient
Defense conducts defensive operations in forward, maneuver, and
rear area belts. As envisioned by the authors, the first, second,
and third belts are described as followed:
The first belt is a modified area
:defense with a depth of approximately 50
'.kilometers. Once the Soviets complete the
withdrawal of their forces from eastern
Germany, this belt could be extended
significantly eastward. It is designed to
meet the initial thrust of an enemy attack
with sufficient combat power to canalize
the enemy and force him to reveal his main
axes of attack. No token force, this first
belt has the capability to inflict serious
flamage and cause attrition in enemy forces,
thereby requiring them to commit their
second echelon forces. In some sectors
this could involve delaying tactics similar
to those employed in a covering force
mission, or mobile defense techniques, ouch
as repositioning to subsequent defensive
positions, but it is fundamentally an area
defense throughout the depth of the belt.
The defense would have to accept enemy main
force attacks, but should hold the
shoulders of any penetration, in essence
positioning the enemy .force far
54 Fen Osler Hampson, "Is NATO So Successful it Deserves to
Die?," ed. W. F. Danspeckgruber (Boulder, CO, 1991), p. 246.
36

The second belt, with a depth up to
150 kilometers from the front, contains
highly mobile counterattack forces. The
mission of the forces in this belt is to
blunt the penetration by severing the
attacking force's logistical support,
destroying its combat forces, rejecting the
.'attack, and restoring the defensive line.
The final belt consists of rear area
security forces, theater combat service
support, and operational reserves.ss
Since France and Russia maintain nuclear forces outside the
NATO structure, deterring war would still require a flexible
response strategy. Until nuclear weapons are significantly
reduced, nuclear deterrence remains an element of NATO strategy.
Without the United States link to European security, excluding
monopolar power system provides the necessary conditions for
creating a regional multipolar power and alliance configuration.
Table 8 reveals the European state system manifested multipolar
power and alliance configuration system in the period after World
War I and before Hitler's pinnacle as the Fuhrer of Germany. This
highly unstable international system lead to World War II.
NATO provides a frame work for ensuring security during this
rapidly changing European environment. Although NATO can provide
European security in the short term, NATO does not address future
European security needs and challenges. While NATO is coordinating
political and military activities among member nations, Eastern
'Europe and Russia are painfully experiencing political, economic,
social, and military upheaval in their transition to democracy.
Without universalist policies constructively regulating relations
amid all European states, NATO lacks the comprehensive mandate for
realizing European security. Maintaining restricted membership,
NATO does not provide a forum for encouraging cooperation and
dialogue among all European nations. Thus, maintaining a modified
NATO is provisional until a new scheme can help define, develop,
and maintain a free, secure, just, and relatively peaceful Europe.
THE WESTERN EUROPEAN iTNION
The resuscitation of the Western European Union (WEU) appears
as the appropriate forum for providing a free, secure, just, and
relatively peaceful Europe. Adopting its "Platform on European
Security Interests" in October 1987, the WEU declared to defend the
signatories at its borders. .The WEU promotes the strategy of
S. Nelson Drew and others, "The Future of NATO: Facing an
Unreliable Enemy in an Uncertain Environment,".(New York, 1991),
pp. io6-io7.
37

'posing an unacceptable risk to a belligerent nation. It employs a
r mix of nuclear and conventional forces in developing a coherent
European defense structure.
The WEU provides the benefit of including France in European
security structure. France wishes to remain independent from U.S.
military domination in Europe and refuses to participate in the
NATO integrated military command. The WEU reassures and displays
French commitment to defending Europe, particularly Germany.
Additionally, since the WEU is designed to coordinate European
security policies the WEU could check French national interests.
Reminiscent of the Concert of Europe, the WEU attempts to
establish a particular European order by solely coalescing the
interest of its small membership. Since it contains less
membership than NATO, the WEU does not adequately address the
military security issues of Europe in general nor all of Western
Europe.
Despite the fact troops were deployed under the auspices of
the WEU to the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Storm, troop
employment was decided on an independent and sovereign nation-state
'basis. Since the WEU does not plan, coordinate, or direct military
operations, each signatory must still decide when military
engagement is appropriately justified. The WEU is simply a forum
'for expressing and coordinating signatory views on .European
military security.
Since the WEU contains British and French nuclear forces, the
WEU would provide nuclear deterrence without the U.S. link;
however, the WEU, with its limited membership, would become a
British and French dominated forum. The smaller member states and
non-WEU states (except possibly Russia) would be unable to
adequately protect or pursue their national interests under the
threat of nuclear blackmail. Bjorn Moller states, "although a
stronger WEU would lead to genuine change by creating a truly
lindependent European deterrent, the resulting multipolarization in
the West might also promote nuclear proliferation and destabilize
'the entire international system."sb
In summary, the United States would provide a monopolar power
';system in a multipolar European alliance configuration. History
demonstrates that without a monopolar power system, Europe would
develop into a multipolar power system and a tightening of the
multipolar alliance configuration would trigger an arms race. An
arms race would develop into a bipolar alliance configuration. The
WEU's limited membership and nuclear emphasis promotes a
competitive instead of cooperative European .military security
sb
Bjorn Moller, "A New Security System for Europe?," ed. W. F.
Danspeckgruber, (Boulder, CO), p. 255.
38

environment. Europe manifests dynamically complex political,
economic, and social conditions. Crises easily escalate into war
in these conditions. The contagion of war will be nurtured without
universalist policies constructively regulating relations among all
European states. As an alternative to three suggested schemes, Jim
Hershberg proposes developing a Pan-European Army.s~
THEPAN-EUROPEAN ARMY
The Pan-European Army, whose primary mission is removing
military force from European political conflicts, would be
4 comprised of military forces from each European nation, Russia,
Canada, and the United States. The integrated military force would
be deployed in each European nation; however, the composition of
'the integrated military force would meet or exceed the national
military force of each nation hosting the integrated army. The
Pan-European Army, according to Mr. Hershberg, would be an
`effective security institution replacing antagonistic alliances,
.'the Western European Union, and the monolithic NATO alliance
presently accepted by Canada, the United States, Russia, and
Germany. The integrated military force would: i) secure national
`borders by minimizing precarious military build-ups; 2) provide
rpro-democratic and anti-communist representation; 3) reduce the
misapprehension of German unification by dispersing German military
forces in Europe and subordinating German military forces under the
Pan-European Army infrastructure; 4) replace Russian occupation
armies and allow the former Warsaw Pact nations to join the rest of
'Europe; and 5) ensure immediate and reliable mutual verification.sa
The Pan-European Army questions the right to political
sovereignty and territorial integrity. As Michael Walzer contends,
shared experiences and values, and the free cooperative
relationship of society lead to the creation of a state.59
'Relating these essential elements to society, a state is an
association of human beings dedicated in a cooperative venture of
establishing the juridical conditions of its society. This
'definition enables one to see that a state incurs moral obligations
derived directly from the consent of free, equal, and independent
human beings united in the pursuit of a better way of life. In
particular, the state has the obligations of protecting the freedom
'and life of its members, and maintaining a just order. These
57 Jim Hershberg, "A Pan-European Military?: Combining Blocs
Could Answer Everyone's Security Needs," The Washington Post, June
17, 1990, Section D, p. 3.
'sa Hershberg, p. D3.
s9 Michael Walzer, "Just and Unjust Wars," .(New York, 1977)
p. 54.
39

obligations are not limited to each individual, but also to society
as a whole. As a result of its obligations, the moral standing of
a state is judged by how well it performs its functions with its
members, its society, and against the competing claims of other
states.
The shared experiences and values, and the free cooperative
relationship of society require that an association with assigned
basic rights and duties be responsible and accountable to a
particular society. However, this association must occur in a
particular area of land with a boundary drawn explicitly
delineating this free association. Hannah Arendt claims, "To be a
citizen means among other things to have responsibilities,
obligations, and rights, all of which make sense only if they are
territorially limited."~ Thus, to perform its functions well,
political sovereignty and territorial integrity are essential
elements for a state.
A state uses different means to perform its functions. As an
instrument of the state, the function of the military is using
'force or the threat of force to preserve the highest human values
of society, i.e., to preserve a way of life.b~ Thus, for society
to exist, it must be able to defend itself through the reasonable
use of force to: 1) protect the innocent from unjust attack; 2)
restore rights wrongfully denied; and 3) reestablish a just order.
Essentially, the military profession performs its function in
response to a constituted authority within a delineated area to
preserve a way of life. Sir John Winthrop Hackett states, "until
man is a great deal better than he is, or is ever likely to be, the
requirement will persist for a capability which permits the ordered
application of force at the insistence of a properly constituted
authority."62
Maintaining an integrated military force equaling or exceeding
the national military force of each hosting nation jeopardizes the
political sovereignty and territorial integrity of a state. A
national military force is responsible and accountable to a
particular state and its society. The integrated military force is
not responsible nor accountable to the hosting nation; it is
responsible and accountable to the international organization
'maintaining the force. Mr. Hershberg~s Pan- European Army does not
`:clearly draw the line between, on the one hand, removing military
bo Hannah Arendt, "Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy,"
ed. and trans. by Ronald Beiner,(Chicago, IL., 1982), p. 44.
61 Malham M. Wakin, "War, Morality, and the Military
Profession,° ed. M. M. Wakin, {Boulder, CO., 1986), p. 8
62 Sir John Winthrop Hackett, "The Military in the Service of
the State," ed. M. M. Wakin, (Boulder, CO., 1986) p. 105.
40

force from European political conflicts, and on the other hand,
permanently maintaining an integrated military force in an
independent nation-state. In the former case, you are trying to
lcontain violence. In the latter case, you are occupying a nation-
state.
"This then, is the weakness of the Pan European Army. The
distinction between removing military force from European political
conflicts and occupying a nation-state becomes an extremely fine
line and is easily converted into a slippery slope argument. The
;test of the rightfulness of the Pan European Army is to ask if each
nation constituting the integrated military force would agree
:hosting it. Not only East European nations and Germany should
agree hosting the Pan-European Army, but as constituents the United
States, Canada, Russia, Britain, France and each West European
nation should be willing to host the integrated military force.
For if a nation-state is not willing to host the Pan-European Army,
it is uttjust.
1'HE ORIGINAL POSITION AND TIIE FEDERATION
This paper presented four schemes providing European military
:'security. However, presenting rebuttals to the schemes is merely
expressing empty platitudes with nothing to offer in its place.
Have we exhausted all measures of military security schemes for
Europe? How do we decide which is the proper military security
scheme to institute in Europe? John Rawls in his book entitled, "A
`.:Theory of Justice," provides the initial response. It is the
'military security scheme "that free and rational persons concerned
to further their own interests would accept in an initial position
of equality as defining the fundamental terms of .their
association."63
'Amending Rawls' idea to incorporate our present theme, imagine
hypothetical situation called the original position, in which
delegates of nations choose together, in one joint act, the
military security scheme for :Europe. Assume we impose the
following restrictions:
1. Each delegate is responsible with making a rational
'selection for an appropriate European military security
scheme;
2. Each delegate is responsible for maximizing the security
and/or welfare of a nation; however, each delegate does
not know which nation he is representing;
63 John Rawls, "A Theory of Justice,° ,(Cambridge, MA., 1971),
p. il.
41

3. Each delegate does not know whether the nation he is
representing has been "dealt a high (rich, strong nation)
or low (poor, weak nation) card;"~
4. .All delegates are 'equal and have the same rights in the
procedure for choosing the European military scheme; each
can make pro~osals, submit reasons for their acceptance,
and so on;..s and
5. The delegates must reach a unanimous decision in
selecting the European military security scheme.
In the original position the delegates accomplish their
'selection under a veil of ignorance, thus, ensuring no nation is
advantaged or disadvantaged in selecting a military security system
':through chance or the contingency of geographic or social
circumstances. Since all the delegates are under similar
circumstances and unable to design military security schemes
favoring a particular nation-state, the delegates would arrive at
a fair agreement because they would select a military security
:scheme "which free and equal persons would assent to under
circumstances that are fair.p67
Assume the delegates in this bargaining game have a general
sense of humanity but know only that we live in smaller
distributive communities called nations. In an original position
and under a veil of ignorance, the delegates would agree to the
following principles:
a) ..Basic rights and duties apply equally to each nation and
allow the most extensive liberty compatible with a like
liberty for all.ba That is, the policies and actions of
each nation must coexist with the policies and actions of
all the other nations,69
b) Declarations of intent and action, and rules assigning
~ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Nuclear Ethics,".(New York, 1986),
p. 38.
bs J. Rawls, p. 19.
66 IY~1CI. ~ p. 12.
6~ Ibid., p. 13.
68 Ibid.. pp. 63-64.
69 Ibid., pp. 63-64.
42
l
I

rights and duties are to be publicly avowed.70
c) Burdens and benefits are to be arranged so that they are
both: 1) to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged; and 2) attached to offices and positions open
to all under ..conditions of fair equality of
opportunity."
In developing a European military security scheme under a veil
of ignorance, the delegates would realize that a cooperative system
both fairly assigning rights and duties and distributing burdens
and benefits would ensure each nation could achieve its own goals.
After establishing the principles under which each nation would
willingly act upon, the delegates would promulgate the following
rules•
a) Each nation may maintain a military force, but only to
defend its people, political sovereignty and territorial
integrity.
b) Each nation's military force is to manifest a defensive
defense force structure with a credible limited troop
'1eve1 reflecting its mission of defending its people,
..`political sovereignty, and territorial integrity.
c) Establish a Military Security Federation with the primary
mission of planning for the collective self-defense of
'Europe. Peace, containing violence, and the security of
Europe are its primary goals.
d) Each nation is to have only one vote with no veto power
authorized to any nation.
e) ..Any plan or recommendation affecting the collective self-
`defense of Europe requires a two-thirds majority vote.
f) No independent and sovereign nation may acquire another
independent and sovereign nation.
g) No independent and sovereign nation shall forcibly.
interfere in the constitution and government of another
nation.
In the original position, the delegates use their knowledge of
the world in developing a cooperative practice. Instead of
functioning as a decontextualization or abstract theory, the
70 Immanuel Kant, "Kant's Political Writing," ed. Hans Reiss,
(New York, 1983), p. 23.
~~ Arendt, pp. 48-49.
43
i

original position begins its inquiry in a particular context
creating principles to evaluate established practices.
Witnessing the turbulent Thirty Years' War, the "Quest for
Certainty" became the political, social, philosophical,
theological, and military preoccupation of Europe; it is still
manifested in the twentieth century. The Treaty of Westphalia
imposed a system based on stability and hierarchy from what was
perceived as a world of chaos. The treaty created the sovereign
1 nation-states system. In his book entitled, "Cosmopolis," Stephen
Toulmin states, "Those who reconstructed European society and
culture after the Thirty Years' War took as guiding principles
stability in and among the different sovereign nation-states, and
hierarch within the social structures of each individual
states."Z Assuming immutable truths and universal laws underlie
the world of appearances, the Europeans disregarded changing human
conditions and created an international system reflecting
conformity and predictability. Thus, the four schemes seek
',preserving stability and permanence and realizing fixed goals.
John Dewey avers, "Love of certainty is a demand for guarantees in
advance of action. Ignoring the fact that truth can be bought only
';by the adventure of experiment, dogmatism turns truth into an
insurance company. Fixed ends upon one side and fixed
~~principles"-that is authoritative rules-on the other, are props
for a feeling of safety, the refuge of the timid and the means by
which the bold prey upon the timid.X73 Since the delegates are
placed in an original position under a veil of ignorance, the
delegates cannot lay claim to certainty; they must proceed from the
assumption that the world is filled with uncertainty, ambiguity,
and disagreement. Thus, the delegates create a practice
encouraging diversity and adaptability to evolving human problems.
Perceiving the world as if history had ended and attained a
set of fixed relationships among nation-states, the four schemes
omit the fact that Europe has a stake in the future of emerging
'European nations, called non-state nations. Since the four schemes
limit membership to sovereign nation-states in a hierarchical
system, non-state nations upset the delicate balance of the
international system. Thus, perceived as a threat, non-state
nations are either disregarded, cleansed, or eradicated. Donald
Dewey declares, "Common to all of them is the daily reality of
being enclosed within a state that, at best shares a contingent
history and culture, and that, in the worst of cases, has sought to
n Stephen Toulmin, "Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of
Modernity," ..(New York, 199.0), p. 128.
73 J. Dewey, p. 237.
44
'.I
I

overwhelm their history and eradicate their culture.i74
The four proposed schemes seek restoring the status quo ante
the German reunification, Warsaw Treaty Organization demise, and
Soviet Union dissolution. These schemes attempt legitimizing a
world order firmly entrenched in the international system; they
accomplish little that would result in upsetting the nation-state
system.
The delegates in the original position use the principles of
'. liberty, truth, and equality to transform the practices of the old
international system. They establish a practice adapting to
rdiverse peoples, cultures, and traditions. By including all
nations having a stake in the security and future of Europe, the
delegates address the issues of equality and the limits of power.
Stephen Toulmin asseverates, "The task is not to build new, larger,
and yet more powerful powers, let alone a "world state" having
absolute, worldwide sovereignty. Rather, it is to fight the
inequalities that were entrenched during the ascendancy of the
nation-state, and to limit the absolute sovereignty of even the
best-run nation-states.j75
The original position forces the delegates not to judge a
';practice in isolation from the rest of human life, but from the
rinterests of all those affected. In the original position the
delegates establish a practice providing fair treatment and
opportunity for each nation, enabling each nation to develop within
their own context, and creating a long term forum publicly
'recognized for resolving conflicts in Europe.
The four proposed schemes extrapolate from present conditions
and postulate socio-politico-military and economic trends
continuing unabated. The venerable philosopher, Immanuel Kant,
once declared, "the imagination is the ability to make present what
is absent.j76 Upon imagining a hypothetical situation called the
original position, the delegates project the future and attend to
non-state nations as well in developing a military security scheme.
Since extrapolating excludes the future and non-state nations, the
four proposed schemes' preoccupations with preserving stability
devises unadaptable schemes incapable of responding to evolving
human problems. Placed under a veil of ignorance, the delegates
pursue justice, progress, and resolving conflicts through dialogue
and not merely through the threat or use of force.
04 Donald Dewey, "The Hidden Nations of Western Europe," in
Global Studies: Western Europe, ed. Dr. Henri J. Warmenhoven
(Guiford, CT., 1991), p. 186.
~s Toulmin, Pp. 192-193.
~s Kant, p. 65. i
45
l

When seeking to establish the appropriate military security
scheme, the delegates must determine both the desirability and
'feasibility of each scheme. A desirable scheme identifies those
values or goals which will realize and maintain the conditions
necessary for the well-being of its citizens. In the original
:position, the veil of ignorance "identifies the most desirable of
the alternative arrangements since it picks out the arrangement
that we would select under a regime of enforced impartiality."~
A feasible scheme selects the option which efficiently and
effectively achieves its goals. With the constraints placed in the
original position, "the arrangement we would choose there, assuming
that we choose sensibly, must be one that would seem feasible in
the light of that general information."7e The most desirable and
:feasible scheme creates a Federation for European Military
Security. The federation is the long term military security
.structure capable of dealing with the uncertainty of a European
:'future while maintaining a free, secure, just, and relatively
peaceful Europe.
CONCLUSION
Intending to demonstrate that both short and long term
policies can be coherently developed, this paper has discussed for
four schemes proposed for maintaining a relatively peaceful Europe...
Proposing to terminate all European alliances, the first
scheme recommends each nation-state maintain military forces at the
level necessary only for defending its political sovereignty and
territorial integrity. Incorrectly assuming a European future with
no military threats nor rivalries, history demonstrates this scheme
is destabilizing, heightens the risk of conflict, and does not
provide a mechanism for avoiding war.
Confronted with the NATO irony, NATO's military threat is
significantly abated yet altered. With decreasing defense budgets
and force reductions, the Resilient Defense strategy countervails
an unstable multipolar power and alliance configuration; however,
without universalist policies constructively regulating relations
amid all European states, NATO lacks the comprehensive mandate for
realizing European security. Thus, a modified NATO is provisional
until a new scheme defines, develops, and maintains a free, secure,
just, and relatively peaceful Europe.
Declaring to defend the signatories at its borders, the
resuscitated Western European Union uses the strategy of posing an
~ Chandran Kukathas and Philip Pettit, "Rawls: A Theory of
Justice and its Critics," (CA., 1990), pp. 58.
~a Ibid., p. 20.
46

unacceptable risk to a belligerent nation by using a mix of nuclear
and conventional forces. Providing the benefit of including France
in a military security scheme of Europe, the Western European Union
checks French national interests. Insisting on French and British
dominated nuclear forces, excluding Russian, United States and
Canadian membership, and containing less membership than NATO, the
Western European Union promotes a competitive military security
environment and does not adequately address the military security
issues of Europe.
Comprised of military forces from European nation-states,
Russia, Canada, and the United States, the Pan-European Army's
mission would be removing military force from European political
conflicts. Maintaining a Pan-European Army questions the political
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the participating nation-
states. This particular concept of an integrated military force
,ambiguates the distinction between the justification of containing
violence in political conflicts and the excuse of occupying
European nation-states. If all nation-states of the integrated
military force are not willing to host the force on their own soil,
then this institution is unjust.
This paper proposes a thought experiment to determine whether
security schemes have been exhausted, and provides a method for
deciding which military scheme to implement. Imagining an original
position while imposed restrictions under the veil of ignorance,
convention delegates would devise a fair European military security
scheme. Agreeing to comply to the principles of liberty, truth,
and equality, the delegates select a desirable and feasible scheme
called the Federation for European Military Security. The
'delegates establish a practice promoting development within the
context of an uncertain European future, while maintaining a free,
secure, just, and relatively peaceful Europe.
47

An archetype for european security 27 april 1993 - ramon martinez

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

Similar to An archetype for european security 27 april 1993 - ramon martinez

Similar to An archetype for european security 27 april 1993 - ramon martinez (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

An archetype for european security 27 april 1993 - ramon martinez