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© Agnel2012
“You could spend a fortune purchasing
technology and services...and your
network infrastructure could still
remain vulnerable to old-fashioned
manipulation.”

-Kevin Mitnick




      @AgN
   Uses Psychological Methods
   Exploits human tendency to trust
   Goals are the Same as Hacking




              @AgN
   Easier than technical hacking
   Hard to detect and track




              @AgN
   More like actors than hackers
   Learn to know how people feel by observing
    their actions
   can alter these feelings by changing what
    they say and do
   make the victim want to give them the
    information they need


             @AgN
   Carelessness
   Comfort Zone
   Helpfulness
   Fear




            @AgN
   Victim is Careless
     Does not implement, use, or enforce proper
     countermeasures
   Used for Reconnaissance
   Looking for what is laying around




               @AgN
   Dumpster Diving/Trashing
     Huge amount of information in the trash
     Most of it does not seem to be a threat
     The who, what and where of an organization
     Knowledge of internal systems
     Materials for greater authenticity
     Intelligence Agencies have done this for years




                 @AgN
   Building/Password Theft
     Requires physical access
     Looking for passwords or other information left
      out in the open
     Little more information than dumpster diving




               @AgN
   Password Harvesting
     Internet or mail-in sweepstakes
     Based on the belief that people don’t change their
     passwords over different accounts




               @AgN
   Victim organization members are in a
    comfortable environment
     Lower threat perception
   Usually requires the use of another approach




               @AgN
   Impersonation
     Could be anyone
      ▪   Tech Support
      ▪   Co-Worker
      ▪   Boss
      ▪   CEO
      ▪   User
      ▪   Maintenance Staff
     Generally Two Goals
      ▪ Asking for a password
      ▪ Building access - Careless Approach



                    @AgN
   Shoulder Surfing
   Direct Theft
     Outside workplace
     Wallet, id badge, or purse stolen
   Smoking Zone
     Attacker will sit out in the smoking area
     Piggy back into the office when users go back to
     work


                @AgN
   Insider Threats
     Legitimate employee
     Could sell or use data found by “accident”
     Result of poor access control
     Asking for favors from IT staff for information
      ▪ Usually spread out over a long period of time




                @AgN
   People generally try to help even if they do
    not know who they are helping
   Usually involves being in a position of obvious
    need
   Attacker generally does not even ask for the
    help they receive



              @AgN
   Piggybacking
     Attacker will trail an employee entering the
      building
     More Effective:
      ▪ Carry something large so they hold the door open for
        you
      ▪ Go in when a large group of employees are going in
     Pretend to be unable to find door key



                 @AgN
   Troubled user
     Calling organization numbers asking for help
     Getting a username and asking to have a
     password reset




               @AgN
   Usually draws from the other approaches
   Puts the user in a state of fear and anxiety
   Very aggressive




              @AgN
   Conformity
     The user is the only one who has not helped out
      the attacker with this request in the past
     Personal responsibility is diffused
     User gets justification for granting an attack.




                @AgN
   Time Frame
     Fictitious deadline
     Impersonates payroll bookkeeper, proposal
      coordinator
     Asks for password change




                @AgN
   Importance
     Classic boss or director needs routine password
      reset
     Showing up from a utility after a natural
      occurrence (thunderstorm, tornado, etc)




               @AgN
   Offering a Service
     Attacker contacts the user
     Uses viruses, worms, or trojans
     User could be approached at home or at work
     Once infected, attacker collects needed
     information




               @AgN
   Reverse Social Engineering
     Attacks puts themselves in a position of authority
     Users ask attacker for help and information
     Attacker takes information and asks for what they
     need while fixing the problem for the user




               @AgN
   User Education and Training
   Identifying Areas of Risk
     Tactics correspond to Area
   Strong, Enforced, and Tested Security Policy




               @AgN
 Security Orientation for new employees
 Yearly security training for all employees
 Weekly newsletters, videos, brochures, games and
  booklets detailing incidents and how they could
  have been prevented
 Signs, posters, coffee mugs, pens, pencils, mouse
  pads, screen savers, etc with security slogans (I.e.
  “Loose lips sink ships”).



              @AgN
   Certain areas have certain risks
   What are the risks for these areas?
     Help Desk, Building entrance, Office, Mail Room,
     Machine room/Phone Closet, Dumpsters,
     Intranet/Internet, Overall




               @AgN
   Management should know the importance of
    protecting against social engineering attacks
   Specific enough that employees should not
    have to make judgment calls
   Include procedure for responding to an attack




              @AgN
   Social Engineering is a very real threat
   Realistic prevention is hard
   Can be expensive
   Militant Vs. Helpful Helpdesk Staff
   Reasonable Balance




              @AgN

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Social engineering

  • 2. “You could spend a fortune purchasing technology and services...and your network infrastructure could still remain vulnerable to old-fashioned manipulation.” -Kevin Mitnick @AgN
  • 3. Uses Psychological Methods  Exploits human tendency to trust  Goals are the Same as Hacking @AgN
  • 4. Easier than technical hacking  Hard to detect and track @AgN
  • 5. More like actors than hackers  Learn to know how people feel by observing their actions  can alter these feelings by changing what they say and do  make the victim want to give them the information they need @AgN
  • 6. Carelessness  Comfort Zone  Helpfulness  Fear @AgN
  • 7. Victim is Careless  Does not implement, use, or enforce proper countermeasures  Used for Reconnaissance  Looking for what is laying around @AgN
  • 8. Dumpster Diving/Trashing  Huge amount of information in the trash  Most of it does not seem to be a threat  The who, what and where of an organization  Knowledge of internal systems  Materials for greater authenticity  Intelligence Agencies have done this for years @AgN
  • 9. Building/Password Theft  Requires physical access  Looking for passwords or other information left out in the open  Little more information than dumpster diving @AgN
  • 10. Password Harvesting  Internet or mail-in sweepstakes  Based on the belief that people don’t change their passwords over different accounts @AgN
  • 11. Victim organization members are in a comfortable environment  Lower threat perception  Usually requires the use of another approach @AgN
  • 12. Impersonation  Could be anyone ▪ Tech Support ▪ Co-Worker ▪ Boss ▪ CEO ▪ User ▪ Maintenance Staff  Generally Two Goals ▪ Asking for a password ▪ Building access - Careless Approach @AgN
  • 13. Shoulder Surfing  Direct Theft  Outside workplace  Wallet, id badge, or purse stolen  Smoking Zone  Attacker will sit out in the smoking area  Piggy back into the office when users go back to work @AgN
  • 14. Insider Threats  Legitimate employee  Could sell or use data found by “accident”  Result of poor access control  Asking for favors from IT staff for information ▪ Usually spread out over a long period of time @AgN
  • 15. People generally try to help even if they do not know who they are helping  Usually involves being in a position of obvious need  Attacker generally does not even ask for the help they receive @AgN
  • 16. Piggybacking  Attacker will trail an employee entering the building  More Effective: ▪ Carry something large so they hold the door open for you ▪ Go in when a large group of employees are going in  Pretend to be unable to find door key @AgN
  • 17. Troubled user  Calling organization numbers asking for help  Getting a username and asking to have a password reset @AgN
  • 18. Usually draws from the other approaches  Puts the user in a state of fear and anxiety  Very aggressive @AgN
  • 19. Conformity  The user is the only one who has not helped out the attacker with this request in the past  Personal responsibility is diffused  User gets justification for granting an attack. @AgN
  • 20. Time Frame  Fictitious deadline  Impersonates payroll bookkeeper, proposal coordinator  Asks for password change @AgN
  • 21. Importance  Classic boss or director needs routine password reset  Showing up from a utility after a natural occurrence (thunderstorm, tornado, etc) @AgN
  • 22. Offering a Service  Attacker contacts the user  Uses viruses, worms, or trojans  User could be approached at home or at work  Once infected, attacker collects needed information @AgN
  • 23. Reverse Social Engineering  Attacks puts themselves in a position of authority  Users ask attacker for help and information  Attacker takes information and asks for what they need while fixing the problem for the user @AgN
  • 24. User Education and Training  Identifying Areas of Risk  Tactics correspond to Area  Strong, Enforced, and Tested Security Policy @AgN
  • 25.  Security Orientation for new employees  Yearly security training for all employees  Weekly newsletters, videos, brochures, games and booklets detailing incidents and how they could have been prevented  Signs, posters, coffee mugs, pens, pencils, mouse pads, screen savers, etc with security slogans (I.e. “Loose lips sink ships”). @AgN
  • 26. Certain areas have certain risks  What are the risks for these areas?  Help Desk, Building entrance, Office, Mail Room, Machine room/Phone Closet, Dumpsters, Intranet/Internet, Overall @AgN
  • 27. Management should know the importance of protecting against social engineering attacks  Specific enough that employees should not have to make judgment calls  Include procedure for responding to an attack @AgN
  • 28. Social Engineering is a very real threat  Realistic prevention is hard  Can be expensive  Militant Vs. Helpful Helpdesk Staff  Reasonable Balance @AgN