This document discusses Russia's interests in Central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It outlines that in the 1990s, Russia was preoccupied with internal reforms and lost influence in the region. However, after 9/11, security became a greater priority for Russia. The document discusses Russia's key interests as being security issues like terrorism, energy interests as Central Asia has significant oil and gas resources, and economic cooperation to strengthen ties.

1. RUSSIAN INTREST IN CENTRAL ASIA AFTER 9/11
CONTENT
 ABSTRACT
 Background
 Russian Interests and Policy
 Russia and the West, Russia’s foreign policy, Central Asia
 Russia’s interests in Central Asia
 Russia and Central Asia’ Energy Resources
 Democratic Central Asia and Russia’s Interests
 US Presence in the Region and Russia’s Strategy
 Recent developments
 Conclusion
ABSTRACT

2. Background:

3. From the time the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 to the mid-1990s, Russia was
preoccupied with revolutionary internal reforms and deeply focused on joining
Europe. Russia’s tired security, economic, and political policies toward Central Asia
during this period exemplify its annoyance; a summary of the results of these policies
reveals that Russia reaped what it sowed.
Russia’s security and military cooperation with Central Asia in the early 1990s was
typified by very limited expression and even less action. Russia became compelled to
several Central Asian states via the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty of 1992, but in
practice drastically downsized its military cooperation. Russia’s regional border
troops and Tajikistan-based 201st Motor Rifle Division were obvious exceptions; that
said, these remnants could neither prevent civil war in Tajikistan nor curb the flow of
drugs traveling north from Afghanistan. Thus, despite Moscow’s announcement of a
new regional “Monroe Doctrine,” Russia was neither welcome as a big brother nor
capable of playing the role of the regional hegemony. Further representing policy
incoherence, Russia assumed the USSR’s treaty obligations toward Afghanistan but
turned its back on the “Afghan problem,” setting the stage for civil war.
Yeltsin’s early economic policies toward Central Asia were even more destructive
than his dissolution of Russia’s southern defense buffer zone. Shock therapy architect
Yegor Gaidar forced the Central Asian impediment out of the ruble zone in 1993,
leaving the fledgling countries without currency. While such Russian state practices
wreaked havoc, newly formed private Russian companies vigorously pursued
business arrangements in Central Asia, especially in the area of natural resources.
The proverb “no gardener, no garden!” rightly describes the results of Russia’s policy
of indifference toward Central Asia in the early 1990s. Due to Russia’s virtually
missing cultivation in the security, economic, and political realms, it effectively lost
the region. The states of Central Asia, lacking military and economic strength and
rapidly losing faith in Russia, actively sought “external guarantors of regional security
and foreign assistance.”In 1994 the countries enrolled in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization’s (NATO) Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. In 1995 the defense

4. ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan formed a joint council to assist
in coordinating their PFP efforts and constituted the Tsentrazbat (Central Asian
Battalion) to conduct PFP training. Russia’s significantly reduced level of access to
Central Asian natural resources—something it had taken for granted in Soviet days
and heightened awareness that the nations were “throwing off the mantle of the ‘little
brother’ ” soon convinced Russia that this “garden” needed a “gardener.”
During the mid-1990s, Russia’s foreign policy took a new direction under new foreign
minister Yevgeny Primakov, appointed in 1996. His aim of restoring Russia’s regional
influence took preference over integration with the West. Russia gradually took more
interest in the region, perhaps in reaction to the Central Asian nations’ ongoing efforts
to build new international relationships out of necessity. In fact, Primakov wrote that
the West was actively working to prevent Russia from having a special role in the
former Russian republics and accused the West of blocking Russian attempts at a
rapprochement with the region.
Developing its minor revival toward Central Asia in the latter half of the 1990s, Russia
made limited attempts to boost security and defense cooperation with Central Asia.
During this time, Islamic radicals had taken control of the Chechen Republic and the
Taliban had gained control in Afghanistan, so Russia had become more aware of
radical Islam’s threat to its national security. The link between Russia and Tajikistan
grew slightly stronger when the Tajiks informally granted Russia a basing agreement
for the 201st Motor Rifle Division. By the end of 1999, however, border guards were
virtually phased out of Kyrgyzstan, and Russian advisers had left Turkmenistan.
Adding insult to injury, Uzbekistan pulled out of the Collective Security Treaty, feeling
that Russia had not helped stem the Taliban tide. On the whole, Russia’s security role
declined and mainly centered on the sale of military supplies, a peace-keeping
contingent and coordination with these states over anti-terrorist measures.
Russian efforts to achieve the Primakov doctrine in the economic realm were aimed
primarily at hydrocarbon transport. Moscow asserted its right to transport Central
Asian hydrocarbons across Russian territory and opposed efforts to bypass Russia.

5. But other than limited oil-export partnership with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan,
Russia did not concentrate on strengthening economic cooperation in fact, overall
trade volume decreased below the level of the early 1990s.
Similarly, Russia made very little effort in the realm of multilateral cooperation with
Central Asia during this period. Relations became strictly bilateral since the CIS had
become ineffective after accomplishing its purpose of conducting the former republics
civilised divorce. Russia’s only multilateral success story was the resolution of the
Tajik civil war in cooperation with Iran and Uzbekistan.
In sum, despite new leadership in the Foreign Ministry, Russia failed to strengthen its
position in Central Asia in the late 1990s. Scholars attribute Russian shortfalls to lack
of consensus among senior leadership, numerous policy inconsistencies and
contradictions due to the rapid turnover of prime ministers late in Yeltsin’s tenure,
and economic and military weakness. Russia did not fully grasp the importance of the
region to its long-term security or economic interests. Regional experts Vladimir
Paramonov and Aleksey Strokov assert that Russian leaders essentially had it
backwards by thinking that in order to strengthen its position in Central Asia, Russia
first needed to recover its international status. Not surprisingly, the Central Asian
nations continued to lose faith in Russia. They did not appreciate how Russia’s lofty
pronouncements regarding its intentions for Central Asia were rarely converted into
sensible actions; furthermore, they recognized Russia’s economic and military
weakness and continued to rely on their own limited internal resources and external
relationships.
IntroductIon
For Russia, relations with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan are not a new Great Game, along the lines of the mid 19th century struggle
between the British Empire and Imperial Russia. But nor are they business as usual.
The Georgian war in August showed that Russia has a clear direct sphere of influence
that is marked by actual borders, those of the Soviet Union, excluding the Baltic States.

6. As a result of Russia’s tough stand in Georgia, it is likely that the European Union and
the United States will devote increased attention to Eastern Europe and the Southern
Caucasus, but also to Central Asia. After the break-up of the Soviet Union when Russia
was struggling to position itself internationally and aiming to integrate into western
structures, interest in its southern neighbours was extremely low. Central Asia’s
newly independent states were regarded as a annoyance that controlled Moscow,
which, in turn, felt obliged to show some leadership in the region. In the second half of
the 1990s, Yeltsin’s foreign policy slowly started to take a greater interest in Central
Asia, mainly in reaction to these countries’ efforts to look for new partners out of
necessity. These new partners foremost the EU member states, the US and China
reacted slowly or almost not at all in the case of Brussels, to the political and
economic vacuum in Central Asia. Only Kazakhstan succeeded partially to develop an
independent multi-vector foreign policy and attract foreign interest. When Putin came
to power in 2000, Russia started taking a keener interest in its neighbours. Although a
clear foreign policy strategy was never defined for Central Asia, all developments
pointed to Moscow making the five republics a priority and not wishing to risk losing
them. After all, Central Asia was part of Imperial Russia, later the Soviet Union, while
the 1990s were considered as a brief interval of lack of influence. This transitional
period – it is not concluded yet – resulted in the need to acknowledge and allow other
players in the region. Nonetheless, Russia still has clear geographical, 71 economic,
social and cultural advantages through its legacy in Central Asia. It will need these
assets to make sure that the interdependence between Moscow and its southern
neighbours remains strong, especially now that other players will be more alert to
Russia’s actions in its near abroad.
Russia’s interests in Central Asia:

7. Russia's interests in Central Asia are unusually similar to those of the United States.
Central Asia has lost its former importance to Russia as a military buffer zone first
between the Russian and British Empires, and then between the USSR and U.S. client
states in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and between the USSR and China. After the Soviet
Union's collapse, Russian troops were withdrawn from all the Central Asian states
apart from Tajikistan and some token forces on the Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
borders with China. Today, Russia's chief concern is also one of security. Russia's own
territory has been threatened by the overflow from Afghanistan through Central Asia
of Islamic militancy, terrorism, and drug trafficking. Indeed, from the beginning of his
presidency in January 2000, Russia's President, Vladimir Putin, pushed the idea of a
concerted campaign against terrorism with American as well as European leaders. He
was one of the first to raise the alarm about terrorist training camps in Afghanistan,
and to warn of linkages between these camps and well-financed terrorist networks
operating in Europe and Eurasia. In addition, Russia actively supported the Northern
Alliance in its struggle with the Taliban in Afghanistan. In December 2000, Moscow
joined Washington in supporting United Nations sanctions against the Taliban, and
later appealed for additional sanctions against Pakistan for aiding the Taliban all a
precursor to cooperation with the United States in the war against terrorism after
September 11.
Russia's other major interest in the region is in Central Asian energy development,
with a new focus on gas as markets expand in Europe and Asia. Together, Russia, Iran,
and the Central Asian states hold more than half of world gas reserves. Gas is not as
mobile as oil and is destined for regional rather than world markets. Retaining a
major role in Central Asian gas production and export is a key issue for Russia's
energy industry. Energy analysts doubt that Russia can both meet its domestic
demand and growing ambitions for gas exports in the coming decades without having
access to and influence over the flow of Central Asian gas.
In addition, Moscow seeks the restoration of Soviet-era communications and trade
infrastructure between Russia and Central Asia, and some capacity for increasing

8. Russian private sector investment in the region beyond the energy sector. In line with
this interest, Russia has initiated a major project to revive and revitalize the former
North-South transportation corridor from Russian Baltic ports down the Volga River,
across the Caspian to Central Asia and Iran, and from there to Pakistan and India. In
the Soviet period, this served as a major freight route and an alternative to the
transportation of goods from Europe to Asia through the Mediterranean and Suez
Canal. All of this makes for a primary focus on economic rather than military and
strategic issues for Russia in the region and, therefore, an increased interest in Central
Asia's stability and development.
russIa and central asIa’ energy resources:
For its own stability and Central Asia to Russia for energy imports nrbad active
participation in East Asia is very important. Russia's federal budget revenues and
about two-thirds of its exports of oil and gas accounts for 60% of exports. The fact that
Russia, despite the rich oil and gas resources, Oil and gas from Central Asia in bulk at
lower prices on imports to supply the lucrative European markets. Exploit its position
as a transit Country for energy supplies to Europe, Central Asia with Russia in energy
sector have signed various agreements. For six years from 1994 to 2000, Russia t
‫ك‬rmyn did not buy gas, Gazprom, as the vast Russian energy (20% of world gas deal),
it cost him to buy it from Turkmenistan labh‫ه‬yn thought. In a dispute with
Turkmenistan, the European market in 1997, Moscow cut off the flow pipe to the new
state.In an effort to achieve high energy prices, supply shortages. In September 2006,
Gazprom t‫ك‬rmyn 1000 cubic meters of gas per 100 dollars for maternity costs for a
50% price increase agreed. Consensus already cost $ 65 / m thick was 1000.
In exchange, Gazprom and Turkmenistan's rich Yolotan access to natural gas sector.
Export routes Gazprom and Turkmenistan also adsys 2009.11 in November 2007 until
the actual control efficiency achieved .Turkmenistan with China also signed
agreements on energy imports. Chinese officials every year for 30 years in 2009,
Turkmenistan began exporting gas to 30 bysyym signed an agreement

9. with.Turkmenistan also exports gas to Iran. Regional gas export agreements signed
with countries, like Turkmenistan with Russia and other energy-hungry states
sudybajy whilst putting. The strategy worked, Turkmenistan increased its gas prices
in recent years has been able to export to Russia.
U.S. Baku - tybls - sy‫ه‬an (BTC), Trans - Afghanistan - Pakistan (NULL) and pipeline
(TCP), the Central Asian oil and gas export routes vowing to help. This aurqzaqstan
Western and Asian markets, Russia and Turkmenistan to separate will be able to
export their energy. But it is clear that considerable oil and gas pipelines aurqzaqstan
and Turkmenistan to Russia as Central Asia's energy resources are imported through
these pipes do not have.In 2004, Russian oil production company lyu‫ك‬ul syyrg as $ 1
billion for 35 years (pyysy) natural gas reserves of Uzbekistan signed with Uzbekistan.
Under pyysy, lyu‫ك‬ul Kandym, Khauzak and southern regions of Uzbekistan have
agreed to partner in the shade. Uzbekneftegaz lyu‫ك‬ul Uzbeki state gas firm, with a
90% stake acquired in the project.Uzbekistan in the early part of the development of
Karakal Ustyurt which borders Pakistan's western autonomous region of Aral Sea.
Under an agreement with Gazprom, Uzbekneftegaz for the same amount of gas to
southern Kazakhstan and 3.5 million m thick Karachaganak gas supplies from Russia,
Uzbekistan's state-owned oil and gas company Vostok Limited Soyuzneftegaz the
Russian gas company with an aide of Soyuzneftegaz pyysy announced. A five-year
joint research project and a 36-year South Western Madhya Ustyurt is Guisar ‫ه‬adru
‫ك‬arbn agreed to submit a development program. There is agreement that was signed
between the British ayujy 2001 Uabekneftegaz pyysy UzPEC.14 registered all its
natural gas exports to Uzbekistan and Central Asia more than half of Russia is sending
to the rest. Russian President Vladimir Putin and 6 July 2005, President Nursultan
njrbayyu Kurmangazy oil field offshore production of a joint agreement signed 55
years. That same year, Russia and Kazakhstan also a Khvalynskoye agreed to develop
the oil sector.
According to press reports, for 2009, Russia cut off gas from Turkmenistan will
annually from bysyym 60-70. That supply a large part (42-51 per year bysyym) is to

10. go ahead for Ukraine. Turkmen gas supplies to Ukraine in 2006 were not directly, but
rather energy company RosUkrEnergo, the Russia - Ukraine gas deal is a mediator.
RosUkrEnergo Turkmenistan, 8.5 / aurqzaqstan and Uzbekistan each year for 2007
with 7 bysyym bysyym with 42 years of gas per year for imports of bysyym signed.
Even Russia's nuclear sector investment in East Asia is doing. Russia in February 2002
for a nuclear power plant construction, approximately 400 kilometers north of Almaty
offered to revive the project.Total costs for these institutions is estimated atabout 10 $
billion.17 with Uzbekistan, Russia (M o U) understand about 4500 tonnes of uranium
resources estimated Aktan uranium deposit with the development of Uzbekistan has
signed a Memorandum of Agreement.
Central Asia through the development of nuclear energy, Russia is protecting its
interests. If nuclear energy is increased in Central Asia, there is less loss of energy,
nuclear energy as an energy shortage in the domestic market of Central Asia can
serve. So, Russia and Central Asian oil and gas more easily be able to achieve. Russian
nuclear industry investment in uranium enrichment, the uranium imports from East
Asia can benefit. If Russia does not invest in this area, China, India and other states
like Iran against Russian interests in sensitive areas that could be invested. There are
also prohibited from providing nuclear materials to other neighboring countries in
Central Asia is a possibility. At the end of December 2007, a dangerous level of -137
syzym rydyudrmy material from Kyrgyzstan to Iran aboard a freight train was
searched. In your search, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) If an
application for managing details.19 Kyrgyz government for the development of
uranium resources, lack of money, such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are forced to
sneak away to the poor garage sales Can any other country. Central Asia to Russia in
the nuclear sector participation is important not only for Central Asia, but also for
regional countries. Russia's nuclear sector, and U.S. shares common interests.
Russia’s Oligarch Power Plays

11. Russia has also successfully managed to use the commercial sphere to consolidate its
influence and power in Central Asia. This has been especially evident in Kazakhstan
possibly Russia’s only direct link to the other republics. Russia has made its initial
inroads in the Kazakh banking system through state-owned banks both through the
direct and indirect gaining of shares. In theory, this policy will allow Moscow to put
influence on the Kazakh economy by controlling access to loans, and decisions on
commercial debt. Vnesheconombank, for example, gave Astana a U.S. $3.5 billion loan
to be used solely to purchase Russian products. It is also likely that Kazakh BTA Bank
will follow a restructuring path that involves a possible sale to Russia’s Sberbank.
Despite a focus on cornering the financial market, Russia is also gaining influence in
the energy and mining sectors. Companies including Polyus Gold and Polymetal have
gained considerable leverage over gold and copper deposits; and LUKoil continues to
expand its presence. For example, Moscow offered capital at a time of crisis to ensure
that LUKoil could purchase BP’s stake in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium project. It is
also worth noting that LUKoil was invited to sit on Kazakhstan’s Foreign Investments
Council in 2003 by President Nursultan Nazarbayev.
Both China and Russia, in following commercial strategies to gain influence in the
region, have inadvertently contributed to securing the current political status quo.
Investigating various business deals that have included Chinese or Russian interests
has confirmed that in many instances the rule of law, corporate governance, and
transparency of beneficial ownership are considered to be luxuries and thus
dispensable. State involvement in commercial transactions thus has little to do with
contributing to the creation of sustainable economic growth. In fact, several
commercial transactions have merely worked to sustain the ‘shadow state’, ensuring
that income generation is not tied to economic development but to securing regime
survival.
russIan Interest In central asIan Water:

12. Russia’s increasing interest in Central Asia’s water resources. former Soviet republics
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan an added element
in the environment is water, used by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan largely to generate
hydroelectric power, while the downstream states of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan view it as a resource for supporting agriculture rather than an energy
source.
In the 17 years since the Soviet Union collapsed, the Central Asian nations emerging
from the debris have yet to resolve the issue of an equitable distribution of the arid
region’s most precious resource. The most significant amounts of oil and gas are
found in the westerly “Stans” of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan; the region’s aquatic
reserves are largely under the control of the most easterly (and poor) mountainous
states, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which between them account for more than 85
percent of the region’s groundwater reserves, primarily in the form of alpine glacial
runoff that feeds the region’s two largest rivers, the Syr Darya and Amu Darya.
Earlier this week Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, during a state visit to
Uzbekistan, weighed in on the issue, telling journalists: “The construction of
hydropower stations in Central Asia should meet the interests of all neighboring
countries and should correspond to international rights norms of transboundary
rivers usage. It is impossible to act in isolation. It can cause tensions which can only be
solved not by economic but by political means.
“Hydroelectric power stations in the Central Asian region must be built with
consideration of the interests of all neighboring states,” he said, adding, “If there is no
common accord of all parties, Russia will refrain from participation in such projects.”
Medvedev’s comments delighted his hosts, who have argued that if Tajikistan
proceeds with constructing its planned Rogun hydroelectric cascade, which would be
Central Asia’s largest, it would severely impact the water needs of downstream states.
Uzbek President Islam Karimov stated: “I would like to especially speak on one issue.

13. Uzbekistan counts on Russia’s well thought-out and considered position on issues
relating to the implementation of hydropower projects in the Central Asian region.”
Medvedev’s statements caused Tajikistan to deliver a diplomatic protest, fearing that
Moscow was favoring Tashkent’s position over its own. There are, however,
alternatives to gigantic Soviet-legacy projects like Rogun, first begun in 1976, such as
smaller, more numerous hydroelectric facilities that would alleviate many of the
downstream nations’ concerns and have been advocated by Western specialists with
such institutions as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the
Asian Development Bank.
russIa’s Involvement In the central asIa’ securIty
and economy:
A Quest for Retaining Power in Central Asia, Russia economic security, and political
interests in East Asia's. Russian drug trafficking, arms trafficking, international crime
and terrorism in Central Asia that caters to the international threat is received. To
their area of influence in Central Asia, Russia, Central Asia is to maintain its presence.
For this purpose, the deployment of Russian military bases and lease them to the
various agreements signed with Central Asia. Russian troops on +14000 Armenia,
Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Georgia, mulduua, Russia and Tajikistan in the 201
Motorized Rifle Divisions in the garage Ukraine.20 deployed outside their borders is
the largest Russian deployment. More than 5,000 Russian soldiers dsaby, Kurgan-Tube
and Kulab areas are posted. Maintain its strong presence in Central Asia to Russia,
Central Asia and Russia's strategy for providing economic assistance to Central Asia
dyndaryu used as a bone.to recover, it was decided in April 1996 Russia Russia from
Kyrgyzstan to the Kyrgyz outstanding debt as a share in the industry will get. Deferred
payment of Kyrgyz debt to Russia in 2002. Kyrgyzstan and Russia $ 170 million after a
20-year extension was provided financial assistance for Kyrgyz debt service.Russia
agreed to import wheat for the 1996 loan.

14. Bill Agreement with Tajikistan in 1993, Russia signed the situation, and amended in
April 1999. But many problems Russia.25 Tajikistan Tajikistan Soviet Russian troops
in Tajikistan also spend 50% of funding was $ 300 million loan for up to writing full
time and then woke up. Under the agreement, Russian troops in Tajikistan for 1993
50:50 Russia and Tajikistan through money should be shared. However, Tajikistan
maximum 5% of costs not yet paid. In 2004, under the influence of Russia, Tajikistan,
Russia ownership of a space control center confirmed. In June 2004, Russia, Tajikistan
reach an agreement with Russia on a permanent basis was able to change the military
deployment. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Tajik President Imomali
Rakhmanov, 4 June 2004 meeting and decided that Russia without pay and will use
Tajik bases. In foreign currency, it was concluded that Tajikistan emaining $ 250
million debt will be written off.26 16 June 2004, Putin visited Uzbekistan and a
strategic partnership agreement was signed between Uzbekistan and Russia. Both
countries pledged to cooperate against terrorism. Was agreed that Russia and
Uzbekistan sthapnau bases can be used if necessary. Russia has the responsibility to
protect Uzbek air space. Russia also used Navai Uzbek airspace. Russia in case of
emergency always has the right to use. In return, Russia and Uzbekistan advanced
navigation system will provide air defense weapons.Era.27 Soviet Russian influence in
Kyrgyzstan that was equal to that system will be relived.
In a September 2003 agreement between Russia and Kyrgyzstan, Russia launched 23
October 2003 Spin for 15 years, took control of the air base, the foundation allotted $
35 million for expansion. Central Asia in October 2005, Russian Foreign Minister
Sergey lauruu your visit, including Russia Iran, which includes troops from all coastal
states to establish a connection to the imposition of a military group NATO has tried to
reduce foreign influences. In various public statements by Russian President Vladimir
Putin as Russia's foreign policy that was to be subordinated to domestic economic
interests. 26 January 2001 in a speech, Putin stressed that Russia's strategic goal of
working within a community are interlinked. In an era of globalization, promoting the
interests of economic policy.29 Russian Minister of Foreign Investment in countries
like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan key column, and its effects should be expanded; Russia

15. has tried to influence other Central Asia, and presented himself as the chief option for
East Asia and its resources for infrastructure development.
recent developments
Putin protege Medvedev took up his mentor’s layer in May 2008. Putin has played an
active role in foreign policy from his current position as prime minister, so Russia’s
ongoing activist stance toward Central Asia can be seen simply as a continuation of
the policies of his presidency. Since the Medvedev presidency is still arguably in its
infancy, it is too early to fully analyze the results of Russian policy toward Central Asia
under his leadership. Nonetheless, a brief examination of his “Foreign Policy Concept”
(FPC) and an assessment of Russia’s recent unsure posture toward operations in
Afghanistan will prove useful to US policy makers.
The July 2008 FPC, a document similar in nature to the US national security strategy,
resounds with Russia’s perceived resurgence in both global aspirations and
responsibilities near abroad. The FPC asserts a “real capacity to play a well-deserved
role globally” as one of the “influential centers in the modern world.” One of Russia’s
chief foreign policy objectives, per the FPC, is “to promote good neighborly relations
with bordering States, to assist in eliminating the existing hotbeds of tension and
conflicts in the regions adjacent to the Russian Federation and to prevent emergence
of the new ones.”
Another primary objective, according to the FPC, is to pursue partnerships aimed at
stability the essence of Putin’s multilateral efforts, discussed above. The CSTO,
Eurasec, and SCO are specifically mentioned as instruments for ensuring mutual
security and combating widespread threats such as “terrorism, extremism, drug
trafficking, transnational crime, and illegal migration” in the CIS. In its section on
“International Economic and Environmental Cooperation,” the FPC describes Russia’s
interest in energy security and its goal of strengthening “strategic partnership with

16. leading producers” in order to ensure secure transit. Such verbiage is consistent with
Russia’s demonstrated willingness to play hardball in the energy domain.
Recent developments indeed confirm Russia’s reassertion of a zone of influence in
this portion of the former Soviet Union. Andrei Serenko, cofounder of a Russian think
tank focused on Afghanistan, confirms that Russia wants to be the only master of the
Central Asian domain and to the maximum extent possible make things difficult for
the U.S. in making the transfer of American forces into Afghanistan be dependent on
the will of the Kremlin. Exhibiting its penchant for having the last word in the region,
in the wake of the eventual Manas-eviction rollback, Russia rattled Uzbekistan by
announcing plans to open a CSTO base at Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan.
conclusIon:
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russian policy toward Central Asia has
progressed from passive and annoyed to active and engaged. Early in the Yeltsin
years, Russia concentrated on conducting domestic reforms and integrating with the
West; the new Central Asian nations, in turn, lost confidence in Russia and pursued
new partnerships. Russia paid slightly more attention to Central Asia during the late
1990s, but economic weakness and policy inconsistencies prevented meaningful
progress. Under Putin, Russia demonstrated its “ultimate intention” for the Central
Asian nations namely, to limit their sovereignty and expand control over their foreign
policies.” Medvedev’s FPC and recent actions in Central Asia confirm both Russia’s
hegemonic aspirations and its intense focus on security and energy interests. Mindful
of the evolution of Russia’s Central Asia policies, armed with an appreciation for
Russia’s historic sense that the region is in its zone of influence, and attentive to
Russia’s zero-sum thinking regarding areas near abroad, US leaders and airpower
practitioners will be better prepared to craft and implement mutually agreeable,
contextually sound strategic policy for Central Asia. Russia's interests, economy,
energy sector and the governments of Central Asia for a rapid reaction between

17. separate deal between Russia and Central Asia need to be implemented. Bureaucratic
rulers of Central Asia states that are growing in Russia for help in protecting the
interests are Therefore, democracy is not in the interest of Russia in Central Asia.
Militarily weak Russia in Central Asia will provide an opportunity to present a security
risk to our troops deployed in Central Asia and Russia for influence will endure
forever. East Asian economies with weak internal always happen according to Russian
interests. Russia with the European Union-style integration in East Asia does not want
It's always for their safety, economic development and supply of energy to try to rely
on Central Asia.