1. RUSSIAN INTREST IN CENTRAL ASIA AFTER 9/11
CONTENT
 ABSTRACT
 Background
 Introduction
 Russian Interests in central Asia
 Russia and Central Asia’ Energy Resources
 Russia’s Oligarch Power Plays
 Russian Interest in Central Asian Water
 Russia’s Involvement in the Central Asia’ Security and Economy
 Recent developments
 Conclusion
 References
ABSTRACT

2. This Research paper deals with the fluctuating relationship of Russia with its
neighboring central Asian states in the early 19th century the great Soviet Union
collapsed, and its relationship with its former compartments (the central Asian states)
was quite restrained. Earlier the soviet had complete control over the region’s
resources, now it was a country rife with political instability and confusion. In the
early 19th century due to internal instability Russia did not play the big brother role in
central Asia, as was required of a country with such political, economic strength.
In these years the need to form regional treaties in the field of defense and trade were
not given much important by the Russians. Central Asia was also opening to new
markets ahead. But in the late nineties, the threat of Chechen and Afghanistan Islamite
grew and threatened Russia as well. That is why Russia decided to buckle up and
work to protect itself from the potential threat of radical Islam. Russia decided to take
control of the region once again, but this once it decided to use diplomatic techniques.
This research paper explains how U.S.A and Russia share the same interest in the
central Asia.
The central Asian states are the second range of buffer zones for the two countries
after Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Route is also essential for trade to them. This
paper then talks of the techniques that Russia implied to gain it’s regional supremacy
back. It uses oil, gas and minerals as strong economic tools, and signed treaties with
neighboring states for expansion of trade along these lines, also security of the states
was an essential component and Russia signed treaties with neighboring nations on
drugs trafficking, arms trafficking, curbing terrorism. Russia also aims at improving
and expanding its hydroelectric power through treaties by asking access to the water
resources of central Asian countries.
Finally Russian plans to expand its banking and financing
system to central Asian states, starting from Kazakhstan. In short this paper is based
upon the growing role of Russia in the region after 9/11 and how Russia is trying to
gain its past glory on the diplomatic front instead of fighting on the borders.

3. Background:
From the time the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 to the mid-1990s, Russia was
preoccupied with revolutionary internal reforms and deeply focused on joining
Europe. Russia’s tired security, economic, and political policies toward Central Asia
during this period exemplify its annoyance; a summary of the results of these policies
reveals that Russia reaped what it sowed.
Russia’s security and military cooperation with Central Asia in the early 1990s was
typified by very limited expression and even less action. Russia became compelled to
several Central Asian states via the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty of 1992, but in
practice drastically downsized its military cooperation. Russia’s regional border
troops and Tajikistan-based 201st Motor Rifle Division were obvious exceptions; that
said, these remnants could neither prevent civil war in Tajikistan nor curb the flow of
drugs traveling north from Afghanistan. Thus, despite Moscow’s announcement of a
new regional “Monroe Doctrine. Yeltsin’s early economic policies toward Central Asia
were even more destructive than his dissolution of Russia’s southern defense buffer
zone. The proverb “no gardener, no garden!” rightly describes the results of Russia’s
policy of indifference toward Central Asia in the early 1990s. Due to Russia’s virtually
missing cultivation in the security, economic, and political realms, it effectively lost
the region. The states of Central Asia, lacking military and economic strength and
rapidly losing faith in Russia, actively sought “external guarantors of regional security
and foreign assistance.”In 1994 the countries enrolled in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization’s (NATO) Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. In 1995 the defense
ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan formed a joint council to assist
in coordinating their PFP efforts and constituted the Tsentrazbat (Central Asian
Battalion) to conduct PFP training. Russia’s significantly reduced level of access to
Central Asian natural resources something it had taken for granted in Soviet days and
heightened awareness that the nations were throwing off the mantle of the ‘little
brother soon convinced Russia that this garden needed a gardener.

4. Developing its minor revival toward Central Asia in the latter half of the 1990s, Russia
made limited attempts to boost security and defense cooperation with Central Asia.
During this time, Islamic radicals had taken control of the Chechen Republic and the
Taliban had gained control in Afghanistan, so Russia had become more aware of
radical Islam’s threat to its national security.
Russian efforts to achieve the Primakov doctrine in the economic realm were aimed
primarily at hydrocarbon transport. Moscow asserted its right to transport Central
Asian hydrocarbons across Russian territory and opposed efforts to bypass Russia.
But other than limited oil-export partnership with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan,
Russia did not concentrate on strengthening economic cooperation in fact, overall
trade volume decreased below the level of the early 1990s.
Relations became strictly bilateral since the CIS had become ineffective after
accomplishing its purpose of conducting the former republics civilized divorce.
Russia’s only multilateral success story was the resolution of the Tajik civil war in
cooperation with Iran and Uzbekistan.
In sum, despite new leadership in the Foreign Ministry, Russia failed to strengthen its
position in Central Asia in the late 1990s. Scholars attribute Russian shortfalls to lack
of consensus among senior leadership, numerous policy inconsistencies and
contradictions due to the rapid turnover of prime ministers late in Yeltsin’s tenure,
and economic and military weakness. Russia did not fully grasp the importance of the
region to its long-term security or economic interests.
They did not appreciate how Russia’s superior pronouncements regarding its
intentions for Central Asia were rarely converted into sensible actions; furthermore,
they recognized Russia’s economic and military weakness and continued to rely on
their own limited internal resources and external relationships.
IntroductIon:

5. For Russia, relations with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan are not a new Great Game, along the lines of the mid 19th century struggle
between the British Empire and Imperial Russia. But nor are they business as usual.
The Georgian war in August showed that Russia has a clear direct sphere of influence
that is marked by actual borders, those of the Soviet Union, excluding the Baltic States.
As a result of Russia’s tough stand in Georgia, it is likely that the European Union and
the United States will devote increased attention to Eastern Europe and the Southern
Caucasus, but also to Central Asia. After the break-up of the Soviet Union when Russia
was struggling to position itself internationally and aiming to integrate into western
structures, interest in its southern neighbors was extremely low. Central Asia’s newly
independent states were regarded as a annoyance that controlled Moscow, which, in
turn, felt obliged to show some leadership in the region. In the second half of the
1990s, Yeltsin’s foreign policy slowly started to take a greater interest in Central Asia,
mainly in reaction to these countries’ efforts to look for new partners out of necessity.
Only Kazakhstan succeeded partially to develop an independent multi-vector foreign
policy and attract foreign interest. When Putin came to power in 2000, Russia started
taking a keener interest in its neighbors. Although a clear foreign policy strategy was
never defined for Central Asia, all developments pointed to Moscow making the five
republics a priority and not wishing to risk losing them. After all, Central Asia was
part of Imperial Russia, later the Soviet Union, while the 1990s were considered as a
brief interval of lack of influence.
russIa’s Interests In central asIa:
Russia's interests in Central Asia are unusually similar to those of the United States.
Central Asia has lost its former importance to Russia as a military buffer zone first
between the Russian and British Empires, and then between the USSR and U.S. client
states in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and between the USSR and China. After the Soviet
Union's collapse, Russian troops were withdrawn from all the Central Asian states
apart from Tajikistan and some token forces on the Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan

6. borders with China. Today, Russia's chief concern is also one of security. Russia's own
territory has been threatened by the overflow from Afghanistan through Central Asia
of Islamic militancy, terrorism, and drug trafficking. Indeed, from the beginning of his
presidency in January 2000, Russia's President, Vladimir Putin, pushed the idea of a
concerted campaign against terrorism with American as well as European leaders. He
was one of the first to raise the alarm about terrorist training camps in Afghanistan,
and to warn of linkages between these camps and well-financed terrorist networks
operating in Europe and Eurasia. In December 2000, Moscow joined Washington in
supporting United Nations sanctions against the Taliban, and later appealed for
additional sanctions against Pakistan for aiding the Taliban all a precursor to
cooperation with the United States in the war against terrorism after September 11.
In addition, Moscow seeks the restoration of Soviet-era communications and trade
infrastructure between Russia and Central Asia, and some capacity for increasing
Russian private sector investment in the region beyond the energy sector. In line with
this interest, Russia has initiated a major project to revive and revitalize the former
North-South transportation corridor from Russian Baltic ports down the Volga River,
across the Caspian to Central Asia and Iran, and from there to Pakistan and India. In
the Soviet period, this served as a major freight route and an alternative to the
transportation of goods from Europe to Asia through the Mediterranean and Suez
Canal. All of this makes for a primary focus on economic rather than military and
strategic issues for Russia in the region and, therefore, an increased interest in Central
Asia's stability and development.
russIa and central asIa’s energy resources:
For its own stability and Central Asia to Russia for energy imports active participation
in East Asia is very important. Russia's federal budget revenues and about two-thirds
of its exports of oil and gas accounts for 60% of exports. The fact that Russia, despite
the rich oil and gas resources, Oil and gas from Central Asia in bulk at lower prices on

7. imports to supply the lucrative European markets. Exploit its position as a transit
Country for energy supplies to Europe, Central Asia with Russia in energy sector have
signed various agreements. For six years from 1994 to 2000, Russia did not buy gas,
Gazprom, as the vast Russian energy (20% of world gas deal), it cost him to buy it
from Turkmenistan thought. In a dispute with Turkmenistan, the European market in
1997, Moscow cut off the flow pipe to the new state in an effort to achieve high energy
prices, supply shortages. In September 2006, Gazprom 1000 cubic meters of gas per
100 dollars for maternity costs for a 50% price increase agreed. Consensus already
cost $ 65 / m thick was 1000. In exchange, Gazprom and Turkmenistan's rich Yolo tan
access to natural gas sector. Export routes Gazprom and Turkmenistan in 2009.11 in
November 2007 until the actual control efficiency achieved .Turkmenistan with China
also signed agreements on energy imports. Chinese officials every year for 30 years in
2009, Turkmenistan began exporting gas to 30 signed an agreement with
Turkmenistan also exports gas to Iran. Regional gas export agreements signed with
countries, like Turkmenistan with Russia and other energy-hungry states. The
strategy worked, Turkmenistan increased its gas prices in recent years have been able
to export to Russia.
Afghanistan - Pakistan (NULL) and pipeline (TCP), the Central Asian oil and gas
export routes vowing to help. Under an agreement with Gazprom, Uzbekneftegaz for
the same amount of gas to southern Kazakhstan and 3.5 million m thick Karachaganak
gas supplies from Russia, Uzbekistan's state-owned oil and gas company Vostok
Limited Soyuzneftegaz the Russian gas company. Central Asia through the
development of nuclear energy, Russia is protecting its interests. If nuclear energy is
increased in Central Asia, there is less loss of energy, nuclear energy as an energy
shortage in the domestic market of Central Asia can serve, If Russia does not invest in
this area, China, India and other states like Iran against Russian interests in sensitive
areas that could be invested. At the end of December 2007, a dangerous level of -137
material from Kyrgyzstan to Iran aboard a freight train was searched Central Asia to
Russia in the nuclear sector participation is important not only for Central Asia, but
also for regional countries. Russia's nuclear sector and U.S. shares common interests.

8. russIa’s olIgarch Power Plays:
Russia has also successfully managed to use the commercial sphere to consolidate its
influence and power in Central Asia. This has been especially evident in Kazakhstan
possibly Russia’s only direct link to the other republics. Russia has made its initial
inroads in the Kazakh banking system through state-owned banks both through the
direct and indirect gaining of shares. In theory, this policy will allow Moscow to put
influence on the Kazakh economy by controlling access to loans, and decisions on
commercial debt. Vnesheconombank, for example, gave Astana a U.S. $3.5 billion loan
to be used solely to purchase Russian products. It is also likely that Kazakh BTA Bank
will follow a restructuring path that involves a possible sale to Russia’s Sberbank.
Both China and Russia, in following commercial strategies to gain influence in the
region, have inadvertently contributed to securing the current political status quo.
Investigating various business deals that have included Chinese or Russian interests
has confirmed that in many instances the rule of law, corporate governance, and
transparency of beneficial ownership are considered to be luxuries and thus
dispensable. State involvement in commercial transactions thus has little to do with
contributing to the creation of sustainable economic growth. In fact, several
commercial transactions have merely worked to sustain the ‘shadow state’, ensuring
that income generation is not tied to economic development but to securing regime
survival.
russIan Interest In central asIan water:
Russia’s increasing interest in Central Asia’s water resources. former Soviet republics
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan an added element
in the environment is water, used by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan largely to generate
hydroelectric power, while the downstream states of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan view it as a resource for supporting agriculture rather than an energy
source.

9. In the 17 years since the Soviet Union collapsed, the Central Asian nations emerging
from the debris have yet to resolve the issue of an equitable distribution of the arid
region’s most precious resource. The most significant amounts of oil and gas are
found in the westerly “Stans” of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan; the region’s aquatic
reserves are largely under the control of the most easterly (and poor) mountainous
states, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which between them account for more than 85
percent of the region’s groundwater reserves, primarily in the form of alpine glacial
runoff that feeds the region’s two largest rivers, the Syr Darya and Amu Darya.
Earlier this week Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, during a state visit to
Uzbekistan, weighed in on the issue, telling journalists: “The construction of
hydropower stations in Central Asia should meet the interests of all neighboring
countries and should correspond to international rights norms of transboundary
rivers usage. It is impossible to act in isolation. It can cause tensions which can only be
solved not by economic but by political means.
“Hydroelectric power stations in the Central Asian region must be built with
consideration of the interests of all neighboring states,” he said, adding, “If there is no
common accord of all parties, Russia will refrain from participation in such projects.”
Medvedev’s comments delighted his hosts, who have argued that if Tajikistan
proceeds with constructing its planned Rogun hydroelectric cascade, which would be
Central Asia’s largest, it would severely impact the water needs of downstream states.
Uzbek President Islam Karimov stated: “I would like to especially speak on one issue.
Uzbekistan counts on Russia’s well thought-out and considered position on issues
relating to the implementation of hydropower projects in the Central Asian region.”
Medvedev’s statements caused Tajikistan to deliver a diplomatic protest, fearing that
Moscow was favoring Tashkent’s position over its own. There are, however,
alternatives to gigantic Soviet-legacy projects like Rogun, first begun in 1976, such as
smaller, more numerous hydroelectric facilities that would alleviate many of the
downstream nations’ concerns and have been advocated by Western specialists with

10. such institutions as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the
Asian Development Bank.
russIa’s Involvement In the central asIa’
securIty and economy:
A Quest for Retaining Power in Central Asia, Russia economic security, and political
interests in East Asia's. Russian drug trafficking, arms trafficking, international crime
and terrorism in Central Asia that caters to the international threat is received. To
their area of influence in Central Asia, Russia, Central Asia is to maintain its presence.
For this purpose, the deployment of Russian military bases and lease them to the
various agreements signed with Central Asia. Russian troops on +14000 Armenia,
Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Georgia, mulduua, Russia and Tajikistan in the 201
Motorized Rifle Divisions in the garage Ukraine.20 deployed outside their borders is
the largest Russian deployment. More than 5,000 Russian soldiers dsaby, Kurgan-Tube
and Kulab areas are posted. Maintain its strong presence in Central Asia to Russia,
Central Asia and Russia's strategy for providing economic assistance to Central Asia
dyndaryu used as a bone.to recover, it was decided in April 1996 Russia Russia from
Kyrgyzstan to the Kyrgyz outstanding debt as a share in the industry will get. Deferred
payment of Kyrgyz debt to Russia in 2002.
Bill Agreement with Tajikistan in 1993, Russia signed the situation, and amended in
April 1999. But many problems Russia.25 Tajikistan Tajikistan Soviet Russian troops
in Tajikistan also spend 50% of funding was $ 300 million loan for up to writing full
time and then woke up. Under the agreement, Russian troops in Tajikistan for 1993
50:50 Russia and Tajikistan through money should be shared. However, Tajikistan
maximum 5% of costs not yet paid. In 2004, under the influence of Russia, Tajikistan,
Russia ownership of a space control center confirmed. In June 2004, Russia, Tajikistan
reach an agreement with Russia on a permanent basis was able to change the military
deployment. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Tajik President Imomali

11. Rakhmanov, 4 June 2004 meeting and decided that Russia without pay and will use
Tajik bases. In return, Russia and Uzbekistan advanced navigation system will provide
air defense weapons.Era.27 Soviet Russian influence in Kyrgyzstan that was equal to
that system will be relived.
In a September 2003 agreement between Russia and Kyrgyzstan, Russia launched 23
October 2003 Spin for 15 years, took control of the air base, the foundation allotted $
35 million for expansion. In various public statements by Russian President Vladimir
Putin as Russia's foreign policy that was to be subordinated to domestic economic
interests. 26 January 2001 in a speech, Putin stressed that Russia's strategic goal of
working within a community are interlinked. In an era of globalization, promoting the
interests of economic policy.29 Russian Minister of Foreign Investment in countries
like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan key column, and its effects should be expanded; Russia
has tried to influence other Central Asia, and presented himself as the chief option for
East Asia and its resources for infrastructure development.
recent develoPments:
Putin protege Medvedev took up his mentor’s layer in May 2008. Putin has played an
active role in foreign policy from his current position as prime minister, so Russia’s
ongoing activist stance toward Central Asia can be seen simply as a continuation of
the policies of his presidency. Since the Medvedev presidency is still arguably in its
infancy, it is too early to fully analyze the results of Russian policy toward Central Asia
under his leadership. Nonetheless, a brief examination of his “Foreign Policy Concept”
(FPC) and an assessment of Russia’s recent unsure posture toward operations in
Afghanistan will prove useful to US policy makers.
The July 2008 FPC, a document similar in nature to the US national security strategy,
resounds with Russia’s perceived resurgence in both global aspirations and
responsibilities near abroad.

12. Another primary objective, according to the FPC, is to pursue partnerships aimed at
stability the essence of Putin’s multilateral efforts, discussed above. The CSTO,
Eurasec, and SCO are specifically mentioned as instruments for ensuring mutual
security and combating widespread threats such as “terrorism, extremism, drug
trafficking, transnational crime, and illegal migration” in the CIS.
Recent developments indeed confirm Russia’s reassertion of a zone of influence in
this portion of the former Soviet Union. Andrei Serenko, cofounder of a Russian think
tank focused on Afghanistan, confirms that Russia wants to be the only master of the
Central Asian domain and to the maximum extent possible make things difficult for
the U.S. in making the transfer of American forces into Afghanistan be dependent on
the will of the Kremlin. Exhibiting its penchant for having the last word in the region,
in the wake of the eventual Manas-eviction rollback, Russia rattled Uzbekistan by
announcing plans to open a CSTO base at Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan.
conclusIon:
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russian policy toward Central Asia has
progressed from passive and annoyed to active and engaged. Early in the Yeltsin
years, Russia concentrated on conducting domestic reforms and integrating with the
West; the new Central Asian nations, in turn, lost confidence in Russia and pursued
new partnerships. Russia paid slightly more attention to Central Asia during the late
1990s, but economic weakness and policy inconsistencies prevented meaningful
progress. Medvedev’s FPC and recent actions in Central Asia confirm both Russia’s
hegemonic aspirations and its intense focus on security and energy interests. Mindful
of the evolution of Russia’s Central Asia policies, armed with an appreciation for
Russia’s historic sense that the region is in its zone of influence, and attentive to
Russia’s zero-sum thinking regarding areas near abroad, US leaders and airpower
practitioners will be better prepared to craft and implement mutually agreeable,

13. contextually sound strategic policy for Central Asia. Russia's interests, economy,
energy sector and the governments of Central Asia for a rapid reaction between
separate deal between Russia and Central Asia need to be implemented. Bureaucratic
rulers of Central Asia states that are growing in Russia for help in protecting the
interests are therefore, democracy is not in the interest of Russia in Central Asia.
Militarily weak Russia in Central Asia will provide an opportunity to present a security
risk to our troops deployed in Central Asia and Russia for influence will endure
forever. East Asian economies with weak internal always happen according to Russian
interests. Russia with the European Union-style integration in East Asia does not want
It's always for their safety, economic development and supply of energy to try to rely
on Central Asia.