Cascao 2007 Chroniques Egyptiennes

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New Nile Treaty: A Threat to Egyptian
Hegemony on the Nile?

ANA ELISA CASCÃO1

This article aims to analyze and understand the hydropolitical relations between
Egypt and the neighboring Nile riparian states during the year 2007. Particular
attention is given to a potential new Nile agreement, for which negotiations involving
all ten Nile riparian states were concluded in June 2007. Through the assessment
of the Egyptian and regional media coverage of the issue, as well as interviews with
main actors in the negotiations, the article attempts to cast light on the negotiations
for the Nile “Cooperative Framework Agreement.” It includes analysis of the details
of the negotiations, the contents of the draft agreement and its possible consequences
on Egypt’s access to the Nile water resources in the future.

Cet article analyse les relations hydropolitiques entre l’Égypte et les
États riverains du bassin du Nil au cours de l’année 2007. Une attention
particulière est portée au nouvel accord de partage des eaux du Nil dont
les négociations entre les dix pays du bassin ont été conclues en juin
2007. À partir de l’étude de la couverture médiatique des négociations
en Égypte et dans la région, et d’entretiens avec les principaux acteurs,
cette contribution examine les enjeux du « nouvel accord cadre de
coopération » et expose le détail des négociations, le contenu de l’accord
préalable et ses conséquences potentielles sur l’accès de l’Égypte aux
eaux du Nil.

Ana Elisa Cascão is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Geography at King’s College –
University of London (UK), and has been conducting research about water resources management in
the Nile River Basin. She is also a member of the LSE/KCL London Water Research Group.
Contact: [ana.cascao@kcl.ac.uk]

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CHRONIQUES ÉGYPTIENNES 2007

T
HIS ARTICLE aims at understanding the hydropolitical
relations between Egypt and the Nile riparian countries during
the year 2007. In that year, the draft of a new Nile treaty was
concluded involving all the riparian states. What has been
negotiated, which are the contents
© Johan Resele

CARTOGRAPHY
of this new agreement and the
OF THE NILE
potential consequences for Egypt’s
access to water resources, will be
discussed further. The draft treaty
is a classified and top-secret
document, where access is restricted
to the negotiators and top-level
politicians. Hereby, the analysis will
be based on the information
available in the media and in
interviews conducted in Egypt,
Sudan, and Ethiopia.
The initial goal of the article was
to analyze Egyptian media coverage
to understand what is and is not
debated in the public domain in
Egypt concerning negotiations over the Nile waters. Insufficient coverage
of this issue by the Egyptian media, in particular from independent
newspapers, made this evaluation impossible. Instead, this article analyses
the developments in the Basin negotiations based on a collection of
reports from Egyptian as well as international newspapers, magazines,
online news agencies, reports, and interviews with official and non-
official stakeholders. The article follows a chronological order of the
events and available public information, which puts in evidence the
thriller-style of the negotiations.

Egypt’s Positionality in the Nile River Basin

Egypt is a desert country bisected by the longest river in the world
– the Nile River – which is its main source of water. Egypt has historically
developed the Nile waters for several economic purposes, from agriculture
to hydropower production, industry, services, and tourism. Despite the
fact that Egypt shares the Nile River with other nine African countries,

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NEW NILE TREATY: A THREAT TO THE EGYPTIAN HEGEMONY ON THE NILE?

it is indisputably the main user of its waters. The management and
allocation of Nile water resources is embedded in a complex
hydropolitical chessboard.
The Nile is a transboundary river shared by ten countries – Egypt,
Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi,
and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In the past, the Nile Basin has
experienced several diplomatic conflicts due to these shared waters.
Alarmist analysts predicted “water wars” between Egypt and the upstream
countries.2 However, since 1999 the ten Nile countries are involved in
a cooperative process, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), whose goal is to
achieve common management and shared allocation of the Nile waters.
Under the auspices of the NBI, long and tough negotiations defining
a Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) have taken place in the
last decade.3 In June 2007, the riparians have reached a final draft
framework that can eventually turn into the first Nile Treaty including
all riparians. The agreement includes provisions on equitable use of
water resources and introduces a new and ambiguous hydropolitical
concept – “water security.” The CFA postulates that “all states,” not
just the downstream states, have the right to achieve and sustain “water
security.” Does this agreement downplay the “acquired rights” of the
downstream riparian and put an end to the Egyptian hegemony in terms
of Nile waters utilization? The media coverage of the negotiations and
its outcomes put in evidence an initial optimism of the Egyptian
authorities followed by a strategic silence in the public domain, and by
late 2007 a strong criticism toward the Egyptian negotiators.

New Nile Treaty – A Threat to Egypt’s Hegemony on the
Nile?

On June 26, 2007, in Entebbe-Uganda, the nine Nile riparian
countries4 concluded a draft document of the Cooperative Framework
Agreement – a comprehensive legal agreement on the Nile water
resources. The agreement has been negotiated under the auspices of
the Nile Basin Initiative and lasted ten years (1997–2007), involving the
Ministries of Water Resources of the Nile riparians, legal and technical
national negotiators, and external advisors on international water law.
According to the NBI official Web site “once ratified, this historic
agreement will be the first Nile Treaty to include all riparian states of the

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Nile River Basin.”5 What will happen to the previous water agreements,
such as the sacrosanct 1959 Agreement, which protects the current
Egyptian and Sudanese water allocations, is the crux of the matter and
will be analyzed in the following sections.

Egypt’s “Lion Share” of the Nile Waters

Egypt has a leadership position in the Nile Basin. Since pharaonic
times, Egypt had been using the Nile waters for the country’s
development. A systematic use of the river, through the construction
of canals and expansion of irrigation, was initiated under Muhammad
‘Alî rule at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Later, the completion
of the Aswan High Dam in 1971 allowed for the massive extension of
Egypt’s irrigated land. The construction of this giant hydraulic
infrastructure was preceded by tough negotiations with Sudan during the
1950s. In 1959, the two Nile downstream riparians signed a legal
agreement called the Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile
Waters,6 which established the water allocations between the two countries
– 55.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) for Egypt and 18.5 bcm for Sudan
(75 per cent and 25 per cent respectively). The 1959 Agreement has
replaced the previous bilateral agreement of 1929 signed between Egypt
and the British administration on behalf of Sudan, which just included
a “partial utilization” of the Nile waters.7
On the other hand, the upstream riparians were not part of these
agreements and have continuously refused to acknowledge it, considering
it a “colonial agreement” based on inequity.8 Ethiopia and some of the
Equatorial Nile countries have previously denounced the 1959
Agreement. Besides upstream countries have no legal entitlement to
specific allocations of the Nile waters, and have not systematically
developed the Nile water resources in their national territories. Therefore,
the 1959 Agreement had been the recurring source of the diplomatic
conflict between downstream and upstream riparians during the last
decades. Upstream countries have repeatedly accused the downstream
countries, in particular Egypt, of monopolizing the common water
resources. Moreover, upstream countries want to make use of the Nile
water resources for their own economic development, which would
increase competition for Nile resources.

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Cooperation on the Nile

After decades of diplomatic conflicts, threats of water wars, hot
debates concerning the existent and potential uses of Nile waters, and
disputes about the legitimacy of the existing legal agreements, the Nile
riparians are allegedly cooperating on the management of common
water resources. In 1999, the Nile Basin Initiative was created to include
all the ten Nile riparians and gathering a lot of political and financial
support from the international community.9 The NBI comprises several
medium- and long-term water projects to be implemented in all the Nile
countries including hydropower generation, irrigation, watershed
management, enhancement of water expertise, and capacity-building.10
However, the NBI is a provisional mechanism and not yet a river basin
organization. To become a permanent institution, the NBI will need to
have a legal status, thus a comprehensive legal framework must be
adopted. Negotiations for a new legal framework have been running in
parallel with the NBI process, managed by the Panel of Experts (PoE)
composed by representatives of all Nile riparians and facilitated by the
international community. These legal negotiations were a conditionality
of the Ethiopian government to participate in the Basin cooperation.11
All the other riparians, including Egypt, have accepted the conditionality
for the sake of a comprehensive cooperative process. Nevertheless, for
Egypt this potential new agreement was not intended to supersede the
1959 Agreement but rather to acknowledge it, according to the Egyptian
authorities interviewed.
The negotiations for this new legal and institutional framework
started in 1997, firstly under the designation of D3 Project and later
renamed Cooperative Framework Agreement. These legal negotiations
take into account the customary international water law, such as the
1997 UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Use of International
Watercourses.12 Indeed the Convention has been very influential in the
treaty negotiations and in the Draft Cooperative Framework Agreement
itself, according to Stephen McCraffrey,13 the main international legal
advisor to the negotiations. Once signed, adopted by the national
governments and ratified, the new treaty will enter into force and the Nile
Basin Commission will be created.14 Once the Commission will be
established as a river basin organization, it “might contribute to increased
funding for development projects and programmes”15 and projects on
the ground can move forward.

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New Agreement – Positions and Secrecy

Volumetric water allocations and legal agreements have always been
one of the most conflictive issues in the Nile Basin hydropolitics. The
1959 Agreement represents the status quo situation that Egypt and Sudan
want to maintain, and the “acquired and historic rights” are considered
nonnegotiable. The Egyptian position is based on the argument of
“prior use” of the Nile waters.16 The Egyptian bargaining position in
these negotiations has been consistent with this argument. On the other
hand, upstream riparians regard the 1959 Agreement as unacceptable and
consider that cooperation is possible only if a new and comprehensive
water agreement supersedes the 1959 Agreement. Upstream riparians
claim the development of the Nile water resources should foster national
as well as regional economic development. In the last decades, antagonist
public positions have been adopted by the respective governments,
although they have been camouflaged by a diplomatic veil since the
creation of the NBI. Nevertheless, the status of the previous agreement
is still the major obstacle to reaching a cooperative framework agreement.
The negotiations and the draft agreement concluded in June 2007 reflect
these apparently incompatible positions.
An analysis of the media coverage puts in evidence the confidentiality
and political sensitivity of the issue. The governments have beforehand
decided to safeguard the confidentiality of the negotiations. Public
information and debate about the negotiations are scarce, although the
issue concerns all the citizens of the Basin. The analysis will be based
in the coverage of the negotiations by the Egyptian media and online
information, but also external sources, such as newspapers from other
countries. Personal interviews with stakeholders from the Basin will also
be used.17

Negotiations – Constant Delays

Negotiations for the new Cooperative Framework Agreement were
expected to be concluded some years ago. Already in 2004, Al-Ahram
Weekly mentioned that “Nile Basin countries are trying hard to reach
an agreement to establish a new legal framework governing the sharing
of Nile waters.”18 But it was not until mid-2006 that the Nile negotiations
for a new agreement gained momentum. An article in the Daily News
Egypt19 highlighted the main issues at stake from the Egyptian perspective.

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According to Mahmûd Abû-Zîd, the Egyptian Minister of Water
Resources and Irrigation, there was no conflict between Egypt and
Ethiopia and negotiations were moving forward. Ayman ‘Abd al-Wahhâb,
from Al-Ahrâm Center for Political and Strategic Studies, reinforced
the idea that currently Egypt and Ethiopia understand better the water
needs of the neighbors and that an agreement was expected to be ratified
in 2006. An idea highlighted in this article was that Egypt would continue
to fight “strongly to maintain its quota of at least 55.5 billion cubic
meters per year” but nowadays considers that hydraulic projects in
Ethiopia will not affect the Egyptian water quota. Despite the good
relations between the negotiators from the Nile riparians, the article
mentions that negotiations were postponed to September, due to
“expected hot weather […] and for no other reason,” according to the
Egyptian Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation. In December, the
Egyptian Ambassador to Uganda, Redâ Bîbars, reiterates “the sincere
will of all member-states to conclude the [Nile] agreement.”20
Nevertheless, the negotiations would be postponed again several times
during the following months due to divergences between upstream and
downstream riparians, rather than weather conditions, as later analysis
will show.
Flattering and public declarations about cooperation on the Nile,
and the NBI in particular, have since 1999 replaced the talks about water
conflicts in the Nile region. Egyptian media and official sites about the
Nile hydropolitics often praise good hydropolitical relations in the Basin,
even considering that this “spirit of cooperation [is] a result of Egypt’s
leadership.”21 Since the 1990s, hydro-diplomacy became a tool of the
Egyptian leadership in the Basin. However, the legal agreements remain
the most conflictive issue. But what have been reported about the would-
be Nile agreement? And what does this future agreement mean in terms
of management and allocation of the Nile water resources among the
Nile neighbors?

2007 – High Expectations for a New Nile Treaty

A new phase of negotiation took place in several capitals of the Nile
countries during 2007. Negotiations in which only ministers and advisors
have participated have been closed-door sessions and little information
about the terms of the agreement has been given to the public. However,

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generalized optimism characterized the declarations of the Egyptian
Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, such as:
“Eastern Nile Basin countries including Egypt, Sudan, and
Ethiopia are about to agree on the legal and institutional
framework of the Nile Basin countries comprehensive
agreement (…) the three countries approved 99 percent of
the agreement’s terms.”22

Several interviews with water experts in Egypt and Sudan during
this period also indicated that an agreement was to be reached soon.
Extraordinary ministerial talks in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, during January
were considered by Minister Abû-Zîd as “fruitful and constructive [and]
extremely important in coordinating the stances of Egypt, Ethiopia and
Sudan on the very few controversial points in the new draft agreement.”23
The Ministers of Water Resources of all Nile riparians (Nile-COM)
were expected to meet in Rwanda, in February, for the celebrations of
the Nile Day and to conclude the Cooperative Framework Agreement.
“Riparians have agreed on 99 percent of the articles” had been a
common answer from the regional water experts and national negotiators,
but detailed information about the articles was never provided. In January,
Minister Abû-Zîd disclosed that the discord was about the article on
“water security” and that Ethiopia demanded explanation on the term.24
Indeed “water security” is not a concept of customary international
water law25 and the wording has surprised several water analysts in the
region.26 It is also unknown who has suggested the “innovative” and
controversial terminology, which supposedly could accommodate the
divergent positions of upstream and downstream riparians and facilitate
a compromise.

Lost Opportunities but Still Optimism

On February 22, celebrations of the ﬁrst Nile Day, organized by the
NBI and financed by the World Bank, took place in Kigali, Rwanda,
and “have been the occasion to reiterate the vital importance of the
river for the 10 riparians.”27 The article highlights the festive environment,
including dance shows, exhibitions, and debates involving Nile citizens.
Nevertheless, “stakeholders beyond the national governments,” i.e., civil
society, have not been included in interstate negotiations.28 Negotiations
have been restricted to governmental officials. Alan Nicol, a technical

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adviser to the Nile Basin Discourse,29 questions whether or not the
negotiations and documents should be open to the concerned Basin
populations, concluding that “time is ripe for a more public debate on
the nature of the document being negotiated.”30
Despite the high expectations that a new Basin-wide would be signed
in Kigali, no draft agreement was reached. Allegedly the riparians were
not able to reach a consensus. The results from the high-level negotiations
on the new agreement, as well as the documentation under discussion,
have again been kept secret. Nevertheless NBI experts, negotiators, and
World Bank representatives have maintained optimism in the progress
of the negotiations toward the achievement of an historical agreement
in the short-term.31 During the months following February 2007, the
Egyptian media focused on the continuation of the negotiations with
the same previous optimism.
In March, Minister Abû-Zîd demonstrated confidence “that a final
agreement could be expected within months [and] the majority of the
treaty’s articles have been endorsed by all sides, although a handful of
outstanding issues have yet to be settled.”32 In May, Redâ Bîbars, the
Egyptian ambassador to Uganda reinforced the optimism, stating “the
legal agreement is almost ready. We are 98 percent ready, but the
2 percent is very important.”33 Newspapers in Cairo also reflected the
generalized optimism of the Egyptian negotiators and try to calm
down old fears that upstream countries, in particular Ethiopia, can
threaten the Egyptian water quota. Al-Akhbâr mentioned “all the
pending issues among the Nile countries will be settled [and] final
agreement is expected to be declared in Uganda in June”34 and quoted
Sudanese Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources Kamâl ‘Alî
Muhammad saying “we are on our way to set a historical agreement
that will settle and regulate future relations between the Nile Basin
countries.”35 It was also reported that “the Eastern Nile countries
achieve progress in examining their joint projects [such as] floods
forecasting, watershed management and hydropower trade.”36 New
public releases reaffirmed that these projects were under Egyptian
coordination and that there are no conflicts between Ethiopia and
Egypt, confirming that a new agreement would be signed in June37
under a “unified vision for the Nile.”38
At the same time, top officials of the Egyptian Ministry of Water
Resources denied suggestions that Nile water storage in the Ethiopian
highlands would be replace the Lake Nasser storage, or that these projects

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were part of the cooperation negotiations.39 In a common press
conference at the beginning of May, the Ethiopian Minister of Water
Resources stated that “Ethiopia doesn’t aim to harm the Egyptian water
share” and Minister Abû-Zîd reaffirmed that Eastern Nile riparians are
“settling many issues regarding the formalization of the new
agreement.”40

Beyond Optimism – Ambiguity and Discord on “Water Security”

Despite all the enthusiasm of the Egyptian authorities reflected in
the national media, personal interviews with experts from the Basin
revealed that downstream and upstream countries were not able to agree
on the article on “water security” due to its ambiguity and lack of clear
formulation in legal terms. From an Egyptian perspective, “water security”
must include the protection of the historical agreements and the current
water allocations, and regarded as defining Egyptian’s national water
security. The emphasis is on the legal principle of “no significant harm”
as defined by the ILC Convention.41 Egyptian water experts interviewed
underlined that the 1959 Agreement is not to be superseded by the new
Framework Agreement, and both agreements can co-exist. The argument
goes that the 1959 Agreement is a bilateral agreement concerning water
allocations, and the CFA is a multilateral agreement concerning “win-
win” solutions for the Nile water management and “sharing of benefits”
resulting from joint projects.
On the other hand, upstream countries consider that the “water
security” provision is acceptable only if it endorses specifically the legal
principle of “equitable and reasonable utilization”42 of water resources.
Some analysts in the upstream countries consider that volumetric
allocations need to be included in a second phase of negotiations, which
would in the future replace the current allocations established by the
1959 Agreement. These opposing positions confirm that the status of
the previous agreements is still the major impediment for wider
cooperation, i.e., the “2 percent” of discord mentioned by the Egyptian
ambassador. It also confirms the previous apprehension that the draft
agreement is still “marred by square brackets”43 and it persistently reflects
the enduring divergence between riparians.
The public reactions of the upstream countries concerning the new
agreement differ. For example, Maria Mutagambwa, Minister of Water
and Environment in Uganda, declared enthusiastically that “Egypt has

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no problem with the Commission. They are willing to share river Nile
reasonably with all the partner states.”44 The Kenyan Minister for Water
and Irrigation, Mutua Katuku, also believed on “a new Nile River Basin
Commission being adopted soon”45 although “countries were yet to
decide on the deﬁnitions of some contentious terms, like the meaning
of water security.”46 The Ethiopian press was more careful with the
generalized optimism, considering that “there is a high reverberation in
the NBI that the New Nile Water Agreement will be signed soon, good
news for Ethiopia [but] still now, Egypt vehemently sticks to its age-
old policy and claims the natural and historical right over the Nile waters.
Sadly, Sudan follows the same path.”47
Another article in the same newspaper alerted: “The Nile countries
cannot decide on a Commission or Initiative [because of] contentious
points.”48 Tesfaye Wolde Mihiret, the NBI’ National Project Coordinator
for Ethiopia, also highlighted that there are remaining problems
concerning the deﬁnition of some of the articles, namely the one on water
security, because “for the Egyptians, it is a big deal, but for other countries
the concept is not even clear…we can not have an article or proclamation
with any ambiguity.”49
The negotiations’ outcome seems far from the Ethiopian expectations
of an “equitable entitlement of the Nile Waters to all the riparian States”
as expressed by Lemma,50 the former Director-General for Legal Affairs
of the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Egyptian position
seems at odds with the Ethiopian position. Indeed, in the last two years,
the Egyptian negotiators stated clearly that Egypt’s interest in the
negotiations was to maintain the historic rights and furthermore to
search for “additional water.” In 2006, Abû-Zîd stated:
“The largest challenge has been to agree that the 55.5
billion cubic meters is assured for Egypt. This took so
long. We had to show that the potential for additional water
is great and that we can increase the yield of the Nile
through this or that project, for everyone.”51

The search for additional Nile water has been always an important
factor for the Egyptian participation in the NBI. As mentioned in the
Egyptian National Water Resources Master Plan, published in 2005,
“cooperation with the riparian countries of the Nile Basin is expected
to lead to additional inflow into Lake Nasser,” through the
implementation of upstream water conservation projects, mainly in

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Sudan and Ethiopia.52 Several reports from the Egyptian media during
2007 have even alleged that “as agreed with the Nile river countries,
Egypt will have an extra share of the Nile waters (…) in order to enable
Egypt to expand its agricultural projects.”53 Egypt water authorities
seem more interested to reap extra-benefits from the cooperation process
rather than to make concessions to the other Nile riparians in terms of
allocation of water resources.

June 26, 2007 – A Final Draft Agreement Was Concluded

On the June 26, 2007, the Nile Council of Ministers (Nile-COM)
concluded its negotiations on the Nile River Basin Cooperative
Framework Agreement in Entebbe, Uganda. According to the NBI,
“this achievement brings close to conclusion a 10-year process of analysis
and negotiation to establish the institutional structure and legal basis
for cooperation in the management and development of the Nile River.”54
Unfortunately, the NBI has not provided any public information on the
adopted document or details about the provisions of the draft framework.
The public opinion has remained uninformed about how the pitfalls
were overcome (if they have) and which were the final positions of the
upstream and downstream riparians. At the same time the Egyptian
media, which seemed so concerned with the issue during the previous
months, have completely disregarded the fact that a final draft was
achieved in Uganda. What is the justification of this silence? Is the
silence justified by reasons of confidentiality and lack of information
made public? Or the achieved draft agreement has not pleased the
Egyptian authorities?
What happened in Entebbe? What has been the final formulation
of the thorny provision on “water security”? Could Egypt and Sudan
guarantee the protection of the 1959 Agreement? Or, on the other hand,
does this new agreement represent a threat to the downstreams’
hegemony in the Nile Basin? Does this new agreement really challenge
the status quo in the Nile Basin? What will then happen to this draft
agreement? Can we expect the creation of the Nile Basin Commission
soon? Or will the NBI continue to be a provisional mechanism without
a legal framework? Officials and press have not provided clarification
of these questions during 2007. The new Nile agreement remains
(partially) a secret of the gods! However, the silence was broken in mid-

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2007, when a Kenyan newspaper, The Standard, published an article
ironically suggesting that Egypt and Sudan were against the equitable
sharing of the Nile waters. This article was then republished by the
Sudan Tribune. According to the source,
“Egypt and Sudan have failed to agree with other countries
on equitable sharing of the Nile River basin waters. But the
ten States sharing the water resource have finally come up
with a new framework that allows equitable development
and use of the basin.” 55

For the first time, the public was informed that the new version of
the agreement would include 39 articles but that a disagreement on
“water security” Article 14 was still remaining. Nevertheless, the article
has not explained the contents of the articles included in the draft
agreement. Finally, The Standard stated that “the cooperative framework
is [now] to be presented to the governments for consideration and
ratification.”56 The information that the draft agreement is currently in
the hands of the heads of government for political consideration and
possibly adoption and ratification, was later confirmed by regional and
international experts during personal interviews. However, no information
was given about the time frame for a final decision. At the end of 2007,
there was still no feedback from the heads of government about the
would-be adoption and ratification of draft agreement.
In August 2007, Uganda’s newspaper East African Business Week57
unraveled some specific details about the draft agreement signed in
Kampala in June. The newspaper acknowledged that the negotiations
of the CFA had been concluded but highlighted that “the agreement
reached by the water ministers falls short of the most fundamental
provision that would guarantee a safe passage out of poverty for the
upstream countries,” i.e., the equitable sharing of the water. The newspaper
reconfirmed that 39 articles had been deliberated by the ministers and
negotiators, but one remains unresolved –Article 14 on “water security.”
For the first time, the wording of the thorny article was revealed.
According to the newspaper, Article 14 states:
“Having due regard for the provisions of Articles 4 and
5, Nile Basin States recognize the vital importance of water
security to each of them. The States also recognize that
cooperative management and development of the waters
of the Nile River system will facilitate achievement of

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water security and benefits. Nile Basin States therefore
agree, in a spirit of cooperation, to work together to ensure
that all states achieve and sustain water security and not
to significantly affect the water security of any other Nile
Basin State.”58

Apparently the article includes provisions on both “equitable
utilization” and “no significant harm,” as indicated by the ILC 1997
Convention.59 However, the newspaper emphasizes that all states agreed
on this provision except Egypt and Sudan, which would prefer the
following wording “[…] not to adversely affect the water security and
current uses and rights of any other Nile Basin States.”60 The definition
of the provision on “water security” remains the major pending issue.
In brief, Egypt and Sudan wanted a version of the new agreement that
would protect and acknowledge the previous agreements (1929 and 1959
Agreements). According to this newspaper storyline, the Egyptian and
Sudanese version was not accepted by all the other Nile riparians, and the
downstream countries expressed reluctance concerning Article 14.
Interviews with several national negotiators and regional experts, already
at the beginning of 2008, confirmed that the CFA maintained the initial
wording, and only Egypt and Sudan included reservations. Gordon
Mumbo, Project Manager of the NBI – CBSI (Confidence Building and
Stakeholders) program, also “regretted that Egypt and Sudan had refused
to adhere to the new terms stipulating the utilization of the Nile waters.”61
Does this explain the silence of the Egyptian authorities and press
since June? The draft agreement seems to represent a diplomatic defeat
for the Egyptian negotiators. A potential ratification of the draft
agreement by the upstream riparians alone might jeopardize the
downstream riparian sacrosanct 1959 Agreement or even cancel the
current Egyptian and Sudanese water entitlements. The future scenarios
are difficult to predict, nevertheless this new draft agreement represents
at least a strong political message from the upstream countries to Egypt.

Egyptian Reactions to the Nile Draft Agreement and
Cooperation

The Egyptian reactions to the draft agreement are enigmatic, and
emphasize how the issue of water security is still framed in terms of

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national security. On August 13, the media office of the Egyptian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs,62 reported a meeting in Addis Ababa between
Egyptian, Sudanese, and Ethiopian officials and parliamentarians
concerning the Nile waters. The report of the MFA focused on the
diplomatic development of the cooperation process in the Nile Basin,
the potential for projects on the ground and the involvement of several
donors in the NBI activities. Nevertheless, the report of the MFA is
not so explicit on the legal and institutional concerns in the draft
agreement. It mentioned that during the meeting Mekuria Tafesse, the
Executive Director of the NBI stressed “the importance of adopting
it as soon as possible” and that the Ambassador Muhammad ‘Alî, Chief
of the Defense, Foreign, and Security Affairs Committee at the Ethiopian
parliament, “requested more information on the controversial issue of
water security, and called for determining the countries which have voted
against it, and the current negotiations status in this regard.”63
More intriguing are the declarations of Ambassador Girma Amare,
Special Advisor to the Ethiopian Foreign Minister, stating that:
“Water security has been reached to resolve the most
sensitive issues in the draft framework cooperation
agreement, which is the relation between the new
framework agreement and the existing ones. However, no
precise deﬁnition has been agreed upon yet for this term.
[…] the Ministers of Water Resources, in their last meeting
in Entebbe in June 2007, did not reach an agreement on
this article since seven countries have agreed on the text
of the proposed article while two countries have voted
against it [the countries were not named].”64

The report has not included the Egyptian declarations during the
meeting neither did it include the positions of Egypt with regard to the
draft agreement. The report has not denied or confirmed if the two
countries who voted against the agreement are Egypt and Sudan.
The information in the Kenyan and Ugandan newspapers makes it
possible to presume that it was Egypt and Sudan that voted against the
document. Such an outcome would make it clear that Egypt and Sudan
are not yet prepared for a comprehensive framework including all the
Nile riparian countries. Nor are they willing to renounce the 1959
Agreement, considered illegitimate, unfair, and unsustainable by the
upstream countries. The maintenance of the status quo is still the main

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option for the two downstream countries, as public declarations of the
Egyptian Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation highlight. According
to Minister Abû-Zîd “there is no problem to secure Egypt’s current
share” and “the only remaining point is the most difficult one; it is the
point related to handling of the old agreements between Egypt and
some of the Nile Basin countries.”65 Abû-Zîd had even been more
incisive stating that “we made it clear for them during the previous
phases of negotiations… We insist, and no one can touch the current
share, the 55.5 billion cubic meters.”66 Moreover, Minister Abû-Zîd
reaffirmed Egypt’s capacity to maintain cooperation with its Nile
neighbors, confirming that “Egypt is maintaining good relations with all
the Nile Basin countries and we are currently establishing several
development projects in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Kenya, and the fact that
confirms the strong Egyptian presence in the African region.”67 Egyptian
water analysts interviewed during 2007, reinforced the idea that the
Egyptian stake on the Nile is not in danger. The interviews also confirmed
the disseminated long-lasting thought of Hasanayn Heikal that “the
first consideration of any Egyptian government is to guarantee that
Nile waters are not threatened.”68
Nevertheless, not all Egyptian observers share the same optimism
of the Minister of Water Resources concerning the relations with the
Nile upstream countries. In an article published at the end of June, Al-
Ahram Hebdo mentioned that the Nile countries were concluding a new
agreement on the management and distribution of the Nile waters and
questioned if “a water war is on the horizon” whereas Egypt will have
to negotiate the water quantities with its neighbors.69 The same newspaper
had previously published an interview with Rushdî Sa‘îd, the most
renowned Egyptian geologist, who stated that conclusions about current
regional hydropolitical relations are difficult to take because “there in no
transparency” concerning the NBI process. Sa‘îd also considered “it is
hard to get information about it,” concluding that “this initiative is
impossible to be materialized at the present time.”70
Other experts raised their critical voices against the Egyptian
authorities and the cooperative process in the Nile Basin. For example,
Maghâwary Diâb, water expert and former Dean of Menûfiyya University
considered that “President Abdel Nasser successfully managed to build
strong relations with the Nile countries, which granted Egypt a hegemonic
situation. However, during the regimes of Sadat and Mubarak, things went
strongly out of control.”71 Similar concerns were expressed by Hasan

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Nâf‘a, professor of political science at Cairo University. According to
this analyst the recent events confirm the impression that “Egypt no
longer carries a portion of its former weight in the Nile Basin.”72
The Al-Akhbâr went further in the analysis, alerting its readership
that the “new agreement for the water distribution cancels Egypt
hegemony and control over the water use,” and further highlights the
fact that “finalizing the agreement will spontaneously cancel the 1959
agreement that gives Egypt a complete control on the water use,”73
according to sources of the Tanzanian Ministry of Water Resources. In
the same article Magdî Subhî, water expert at the Al-Ahram Center for
Strategic Studies laments that “the Egyptian official and political actions
in the Nile Basin regions is very weak.”74 These warnings drew attention
to the legitimacy crisis that Egyptian water authorities might have to
face in hydropolitical relations with other Nile riparians, and that the
notion of Egypt’s “historic rights” to the Nile waters might be waning.

Preliminary Conclusions on the New Nile Agreement

On the basis of this analysis, it is possible to assume that Egypt and
Sudan might not see a Nile Treaty as such an urgent priority as the other
riparians. As ‘Abd al-Fattâh Metawi, chairman of Egypt’s Nile Water
Sector at the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, highlighted
“these issues [agreements] could take many years (…) but we will reach
agreement, even if it takes many years. There is plenty of water. The
problem is managing it.”75 Egypt and Sudan have a bilateral legal
agreement and several hydraulic infrastructures that have protected
hitherto their current uses of the Nile water resources. On the other
hand, the upstream riparians have no agreement and few hydraulic
infrastructures, and are the countries more keen to reach an international
legal agreement, which would open the doors for external investment
in water projects in their national territories. Moreover, experts from
the donor community have also expressed their strong will to provide
funding for hydraulic projects once the Nile riparians agree on the legal
framework, thus creating a safer environment for international investment.
However, for an international treaty to enter into force, the
Cooperative Framework Agreement must first be accepted and adopted
by the heads of states of the Nile Basin countries and then ratified by
the respective national parliaments. The Nile Basin Initiative will then
be replaced by the Nile Basin Commission, a river basin organization

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with legal status. At the end of 2007, when this article is being written,
it is still uncertain when (and if) there will be a treaty in the near future.
It is also unclear if an agreement can be adopted and ratified by just
some of the Nile riparians, and what consequences of such a decision
would be in diplomatic and cooperative terms.

Conclusion

At the beginning of 2008, Nile negotiations remain in suspense. It
is still unknown if the new Nile agreement will be adopted and ratified
by the Nile Presidents and Parliaments. Although the negotiations were
concluded in June 2007, the signature of agreement is still pending. The
lack of decision represents the postponement of the challenges to 2008
or beyond. A second phase of negotiations, including water allocations,
cannot start without the ratification of the Cooperative Framework.
Meanwhile the Nile riparians are under pressure of the international
institutions and the bilateral donors that require a ratified agreement
and the creation of a Basin Commission as a sign of trust to continue
investment in the Basin.
But is Egypt prepared to relinquish the status quo and its “historical”
entitlement to the Nile waters, and to allow upstream countries also to
use the water resources for their own economic development? Or will
Egypt take the risk that the upstream riparians develop the water resources
unilaterally? Egyptian authorities seem to be in a catch-22 situation. The
new cooperative framework agreement does not seem to put an
immediate threat to the Egyptian status quo as it does not imply redefinition
of volumetric allocations, however a second phase of negotiations is
not desirable because it will confront the provisions of the 1959
Agreement. Egypt had been accused of blocking the adoption of the
framework in an attempt to gain time. Simultaneously, Egyptian
authorities seem aware that cooperation with the neighbors might be
the best way to contain unplanned and unilateral hydraulic development
upstream, which would certainly affect the Nile flows. However, at the
present time, cooperation in the Nile Basin might collapse if the
Cooperative Framework Agreement is not adopted. Nevertheless, Egypt
maintains its long-standing position – cooperation is acceptable only if
the “historical rights” of Egypt will be acknowledged or, in the best
scenario, if it will provide additional water resources.

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The events of 2007 provide evidence that the Nile waters question
is still a highly politically sensitive issue in the region and in Egypt in
particular. The treatment of the Nile issues in the media is of extreme
importance for the Ministry of Water Resources and the president
himself. This political sensitivity of the Nile negotiations has been
reflected in the Egyptian media during the year. In general, debates in
the public domain about the negotiations were not welcomed and the
draft treaty remained a classified document. The analysis presented here
has only been possible combining different sources of information,
both from Egypt and from the other riparian countries.
Finally, management of transboundary water resources involves
challenging technical, economical, social, environmental, and primarily
political decisions. The present hydropolitical relations in the Nile River
Basin demonstrates that countries have to come together if the aim is
the best utilization of shared water resources. Time is an important
factor to take into account. Agreements can take years to negotiate and
more years to implement. The ideal agreement tends to be postponed.
But the economical and social challenges caused by the scarcity of water
resources and the manner of its allocation and distribution are already
serious problems that need to be tackled soon. The establishment of a
comprehensive legal framework appears to be a crucial element in the
promotion of good hydropolitical relations in the Nile Basin. An
agreement encourages essential institutionalization of the cooperative
processes and promotion of international investment in the region. At
the end of the day, a comprehensive legal framework might be the key
to the success of water resources management at the Basin level, and
the way to avoid the failures of previous attempts at cooperation.

“I saw a river: it was made of water and time. And then I saw another river.”
Jorge Luís Borges

Notes
1 With the collaboration and translations of Heba Naiem.
2 J.R. Starr, “Water Wars,” Foreign Policy, 82, Spring 1991, pp. 17–36; J. Bulloch

and A. Darwish, Water Wars: Coming Conflicts in the Middle East, London, Victor

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Gollancz, 1993; P.H. Gleick, P. Yolles, and H. Hatami, “Water, war and peace
in the Middle East,” Environment, 36(3), April 1994, pp.6–15; T. Homer-Dixon,
Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999.
3 The aim of achieving a Cooperative Framework Agreement had been

included in the Nile Basin Initiative Act, February 14, 2002. See
[http://www.kituochakatiba.co.ug/nbiact.htm].
4 Eritrea is just an observer in the negotiations for the Cooperative

Framework Agreement.
5 “Ministers agree on a Cooperative Framework for the Nile Basin,” NBI

News, June 23, 2007,
[http://www.nilebasin.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=50
&Itemid=83].
6 See “United Arab Republic and Sudan Agreement for the Full Utilization

of the Nile Waters (1959),”
[http://teaching.law.cornell.edu/faculty/drwcasebook/docs/1959%20nile%20tre
aty.pdf].
7 For details of 1929 and 1959 Nile Agreements see “Transboundary

Freshwater Dispute Database,”
[http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/treaties.php?GET=tfdd&BCODE=NILE].
8 Tanzania and Kenya have often claimed the Nyerere Doctrine (1961),

which challenges the legitimacy of agreements signed during the colonial period.
9 World Bank, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and

the UNDP have been involved in the process since the beginning. Nowadays
several international and bilateral agencies are supporting ﬁnancially the NBI
projects. See “Nile Basin Trust Fund” in the World Bank Web page,
[http://go.worldbank.org/V0QNBV7WP0].
10 For details on Shared Vision Programs see [http://www.nilebasin.org/],

and for details on Subsidiary Action Programs see Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action
Program (ENSAP), [http://ensap.nilebasin.org/], and Nile Equatorial Lakes
Subsidiary Action Program (NELSAP), [http://nelsap.nilebasin.org/].
11 In the past, Ethiopia has refused to be a member of the cooperative

initiatives, such as Hydromet, Undugu and TeccoNile, because they have not
addressed the legal aspects of cooperation. Ethiopia had participated in these
past initiatives solely as an observer.
12 See “Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of

International Watercourses 1997,”
[http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_3_1997.pdf].
13 S. McCafrey, The Law of International Watercourses, 2nd edition, New York,

Oxford University Press, 2007, p.271; S. McCaffrey, The 1997 UN Watercourses

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Convention: Retrospect and Prospect, presentation to the Symposium on the
Brundtland Commission’s Report at 20 and the UN Watercourses Convention
at 10, Institute for Sustainable Development University of the Pacific, McGeorge
School of Law, November 17, 2007. See also “McCaffrey Goes To Africa
Again,” May 19, 2006, in [http://www.mcgeorge.edu/x1015.xml].
14 NBI News, June 23, 2007 (see footnote 3).
15 Stockholm International Water Institute (SIWI), “Transboundary Water

Management as a Regional Public Good – Financing development – an example
from the Nile Basin,” SIWI Report 20, 2007.
16 D. Phillips, “Sanctioned Discourses as an Element of Hydro-hegemony:

The Arguments of Israel and Egypt Concerning ‘Prior Use’,” presentation
given in Amman, November 13, 2007.
17 Due to the confidentiality of the issue mentioned above, the interviewed

personalities are not identified.
18 “Fresh Water Talks,” Al-Ahram Weekly, June 11, 2004.
19 “Egypt to protect its quota of Nile water,” Daily News Egypt, August 8,

2006.
20 “Africa drying up,” The New Vision (Kampala, Uganda), December 13, 2006.
21 “Drop in the ocean,” Al-Ahram Weekly, March 29–April 4, 2007, n°838.
22 “Eastern Nile Basin Countries Agree On 99% Of Comprehensive Water

Agreement’s Terms,” IPR –Strategic Business Information Database (Cairo), January
25, 2007.
23 “Minister of Irrigation: Nile Basin Initiative vital for sustainable economic,

social development,” Egypt State Information Service (SIS), February 21, 2007.
24 Ibid.
25 The main principles of international water law, as defined by the ILC

1997, are “no significant harm” (Article 7 of the UN 1997 Convention) and
“equitable and reasonable utilization” of the water resources.
26 Details about the controversial article would just been made public later

in a Ugandan newspaper.
27 “Un don à partager,” Al-Ahram Hebdo, February 28–March 7, 2007, n°651.
28 Kameri-Mbote, Patricia, “2007. Water, Conflict, and Cooperation: Lessons

From the Nile River Basin”, in Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,
January 2007, n°4, pp.1–6.
29 The Nile Basin Discourse is a network of civil society organizations from

the Nile Basin countries that seek to achieve critical impact on the Nile Basin
Initiative. See [www.nilebasindiscourse.net].
30 A. Nicol, “Whose Cooperative Framework?,” Nile Basin Discourse Newsletter,

June 2, 2007.

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31
“Ethiopia: NBI Permanent Cooperative Framework Progressing,” The
Ethiopian Herald (Addis Ababa), February 23, 2007.
32 “World Water Day: Nile Bounty Not Enough to Supply Egypt with

Water,” IPS – Inter Press Service (Cairo), March 22, 2007.
33 “Nile Commission to Succeed Nile Basin Initiative,” NBI News, July 12,

2007,
[http://cbsi.nilebasin.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=19&
Itemid=28].
34 Al-Akhbâr, May 1, 2007.
35 “Optimism prevails on the ministerial meeting of the Eastern Nile,” Al-

Akhbâr, May 1, 2007.
36 “The Eastern Nile countries achieve progress in examining their joint

projects,” Al-Ahrâm, May 2, 2007.
37 “The Eastern Nile countries settle future cooperation issues,” Al-

Jumuhûriyya, May 2, 2007.
38 “A unified vision for the Eastern Nile Counties regarding the new

agreement,” Daily Rûz al-Yûsif, May 3, 2007.
39 “The Ministry of Irrigation negates the American suggestion of storing

the Nile water in Ethiopia,” Daily Rûz al-Yûsif, May 7, 2007.
40 “Ministers of the Eastern Nile give a press conference,” Al-Akhbâr,

May 7, 2007
41 United Nations, Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of

International Watercourses, 1997, p5,
[http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_3_1997.pdf].
Article 7: Obligation not to cause significant harm (1997 UN Convention):
1. Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in their
territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant
harm to other watercourse States.
2. Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another watercourse
State, the States whose use causes such harm shall, in the absence of agreement
to such use, take all appropriate measures, having due regard for the provisions
of articles 5 and 6, in consultation with the affected State, to eliminate or
mitigate such harm and, where appropriate, to discuss the question of
compensation.
42 Article 5: Equitable and reasonable utilization and participation (1997

UN Convention):
1. Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an
international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In
particular, an international watercourse shall be used and developed by

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watercourse States with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable
utilization thereof and benefits there from, taking into account the
interests of the watercourse States concerned, consistent with adequate
protection of the watercourse.
2. Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and
protection of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable
manner. Such participation includes both the right to utilize the
watercourse and the duty to cooperate in the protection and development
thereof, as provided in the present Convention.
43 L. Seifeselassie, “Cooperating on the Nile not a Zero-Sum Game,” United

Nations Chronicle, September–November 2001,
[http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2001/issue3/0103p65.html].
44 “Egypt accepts new Nile arrangement,” The New Times (Kampala, Uganda),

April 3, 2007.
45 Speech by John Mutua Katuku, Minister for Water and Irrigation, during

the official release of the IEG Report, March 28, 2007, Nairobi.
46 “Nile Basin states agree to ruling body on water use,” Reuters, March

28, 2007.
See also “New panel to govern Nile water use,” Al-Jazeera, March 29, 2007,
[http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/4A8FD728-F068-482A-B237-
53DBFB55BEE8.htm].
47 “Untapped Water Resources Potential,” Addis Fortune, March 25, 2007.
48 “Commission or Initiative: Nile Countries Cannot Decide,” Addis Fortune,

March 25, 2007.
49 “An Abbay issue (interview with Ato Tesfaye Wolde Mihiret),” Capital

(Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), June 4, 2007.
50 L. Seifeselassie, op.cit.
51 “Banks on upstream projects to yield more water,” Daily News Egypt, June 8,

2006.
52 Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI – Egypt), National

Water Resources Plan for Egypt – 2017, Cairo, January 2005.
53 “As agreed with the Nile River countries, Egypt will have an extra share,”

Al-Jumuhûriyya, August 1, 2007. See also “World Water Day: Nile Bounty Not
Enough to Supply Egypt with Water,” IPS – Inter Press Service, March 22, 2007;
“The Eastern Nile countries settle future cooperation issues,” Al-Jumuhûriyya,
May 2, 2007; “The Nile Basin Initiative is a step for developing the River
resources,” Al-Akhbâr, November 20, 2007; “95% of Nile water is wasted,”
Al-Ahrâr, November 24, 2007.
54 NBI News, June 23, 2007 (see footnote 3).

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55
“Egypt, Sudan against equitable sharing of Nile water,” The Standard
(Nairobi, Kenya), June 29, 2007; “Egypt, Sudan against equitable sharing of
Nile water,” Sudan Tribune (Khartoum, Sudan), June 30, 2007.
56 Ibid.
57 “River Nile Agreements – No Change for Poorer Downstream Countries,”

East African Business Week (Kampala, Uganda), August 20, 2007.
58 Ibid. See also “Rift Widens Over Nile Basin Pact as Egypt, Sudan Remain

Reluctant,” The New Times (Kigali, Rwanda), February 29, 2008.
59 See footnotes 41 and 42.
60 Ibid.
61 “Country Blocked From Tapping Nile 9 Waters,” The New Vision (Kampala,

Uganda), July 30, 2007.
62 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Egypt), “First Nile Meeting of the Nile

countries,” August 13, 2007, [http://www.mfa.gov.eg/MFA_Portal/en-
GB/Foreign_Policy/International_Relations/Egypt_Africa/13_8_ﬁrst_meeting
_nile_countries.htm].
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 “The Minister of irrigation discuss vital issues essential for the every

citizen’s life,” Al-Akhbâr, 30 July 2007. See also “The amount of the flood
cannot be calculated before mid August,” Al-Ahrâm, July 1, 2007.
66 Ibid.
67 “95% of the water is wasted,” Al-Ahrâm, November 24, 2007. See also

“As long as the High Dam exists, there is no need to fear of ﬂoods or drought,”
Al-Ahrâm, July 1, 2007.
68 M.H. Heikal, “Egyptian Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 58, n°4, July

1978, pp. 714–727.
69 “La guerre de l’eau à l’horizon 2025?,” Al-Ahram Hebdo, June 27–July 3,

2007, n°668.
70 “Ce qui nous reste à faire, c’est d’essayer de diriger Tochka vers un autre

objectif, interview with Rushdî Sa‘îd,” Al-Ahram Hebdo, May 2–8, 2007, n°660.
71 “The International Forum of the Nile Basin countries warns against the

Israeli presence in the African continent,” Al-Misrî al-Yawm, November 7, 2007.
72 “Egypt must turn,” Al-Ahram Weekly, November 1–7, 2007, n°869.
73 “A new agreement for the water distribution cancels Egypt hegemony and

control over the water use,” Al-Akhbâr, November 22, 2007.
74 Ibid.
75 “The Waters of Life,” Time, April 23, 2007.

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