The US policy elite sees both internal and external challenges facing Pakistan in the short to medium term. However, they view internal challenges as more significant, with 10 out of 36 respondents naming the economy as the top challenge and 6 naming both energy and extremism. The external challenges cited most were Afghanistan, India, and securing Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Overall, the US elite sees Pakistan's domestic economic situation as the most critical factor for the country's stability as well as stability in the region.

1.
Realism
Meets
Nation
Building
The
US
policy
elite’s
critique
of
US
foreign
policy
in
Pakistan
Alicia
Mollaun
3rd
year
PhD
student
POGO

2. Research
Project
• Examina:on
of
US
and
Pakistan
elite
percep:ons
of
US
foreign
and
aid
policy
in
Pakistan
in
the
post
9/11
era.
• 38
face-­‐to-­‐face
interviews
conducted
in
Washington
D.C.
and
New
York
in
March
2012.
• 40
face-­‐to-­‐face
interviews
conducted
in
Islamabad
and
Lahore
between
October
2011
and
October
2013.

3. Research
themes/chapters
•
•
•
•
•
1.
US
elite
views
of
US
foreign
policy
in
Pakistan
2.
US
elite
views
of
US
aid
to
Pakistan
3.
Pakistan
elite
views
of
US
foreign
policy
in
Pakistan
4.
Pakistan
elite
views
of
US
aid
to
Pakistan
5.
Comparison
of
US
and
Pakistani
views

4. Research
Questions
–
this
chapter
• Does
the
US
elite
think
that
the
main
challenges
facing
Pakistan
are
internal
or
external?
• Does
the
US
elite
think
that
US
policy
in
Pakistan
is
mainly
guided
by
realist
or
by
na:on
building
objec:ves?
• How
sa:sfied
overall
is
the
US
elite
with
US
foreign
policy
in
Pakistan?

5. Literature
• Proponents:
US
responsibility
to
na:on
build
(see
Dobbins
(2003)
(2007);
Lesser
(1999))
• Argue
that
despite
limited
success
–
worthy
policy.
• Fukuyama
(2004):
threats
come
from
weak
states
–
in
the
US
interest
to
teach
people
to
be_er
govern
themselves.
• Realist
Cri0cs:
See
Morrell
et
al
(1999);
Pei
and
Kasper
(2003);
Dempsey
and
Fontaine
(2001);
Dempsey
(2002).
• Not
the
job
of
the
US
to
na:on
build
–
par:cularly
as
a
means
to
counter
terrorism.
• Dempsey
argues
that
na:on
building
won’t
combat
terrorism
–
CT
hinges
on
policy
of
‘victory
and
credible
deterrence’.

6. Literature
• Large
case
study
based
literature
of
US
na:on
building:
• Post
9/11,
majority
of
literature
focused
on
Iraq
and
Afghanistan,
li_le
on
US
na:on
building
in
Pakistan.
• Afghanistan
and
Iraq:
Fukuyama
(2006)
• Iraq:
Dodge
(2003),
Diamond
(2006)
• Afghanistan:
Goodson
(2005),
Rubin
(2003)
• Pakistan/Afghanistan/Central
Asia:
Rashid
(2008)
• Li_le
considera:on
of
Pakistan
-­‐
(Rashid
(2008)
a
journalis:c
excep:on),
or
on
possible
trade-­‐offs/tensions
between
realist
and
na:on-­‐building
objec:ves.
• This
research
fills
a
gap
on
the
literature
on
Pakistan
and
na:on
building;
and
on
US
elite
percep:ons
of
US
policy
more
broadly.

7. Obama’s
nation
building
strategy
in
Pakistan
Af-­‐Pak
Strategy
2009:
“Today,
it
is
clearer
than
ever
before
that
we
must
expand
our
rela:onship
with
Pakistan
beyond
security
issues,
and
lead
the
interna:onal
community
in
helping
the
Pakistani
people
overcome
poli:cal,
economic,
and
security
challenges
that
threaten
Pakistan’s
stability,
and
in
turn
undermine
regional
stability.”

8.
But
with
a
hint
of
realism
Obama:
“Pakistan
must
demonstrate
its
commitment
to
roo:ng
out
al
Qaeda
and
the
violent
extremists
within
its
borders.
And
we
will
insist
that
ac:on
be
taken
-­‐-­‐
one
way
or
another
-­‐-­‐
when
we
have
intelligence
about
high-­‐level
terrorist
targets.”
(2009)

9. So
what
does
the
US
policy
elite
think
about
US
policy
in
Pakistan?

10. What
is
the
major
short-­‐
to
medium-­‐term
challenge
facing
Pakistan?
• Wide
range
of
challenges
iden0fied:
• 34
different
challenges
named;
83
responses
given.
• Number
of
respondents
=
36
• 14
of
36
elite
respondents
(39%)
name
at
least
one
external
challenge
• 30
of
36
elite
respondents
(83%)
name
at
least
one
internal
challenge

11. What
is
the
major
short-­‐
to
medium-­‐term
challenge
facing
Pakistan?
Most
popular
responses
and
number
of
respondents:
External
(25%
of
total
responses)
Afghanistan
(5)
India
(5)
Securing
Nukes
(3)
Internal
(75%
of
total
responses)
Economy
(10)
Energy
(6)
Extremism
(6)

12. What
is
the
major
short-­‐
to
medium-­‐term
challenge
facing
Pakistan?
“The
domes:c
situa:on
in
Pakistan
will
be
cri:cal.
It
is
going
to
be
the
economic
problems
that
will
be
the
driver,
which
will
out
of
necessity
force
Pakistan
into
rethinking
its
regional
rela:onships.
The
US
obviously
has
a
great
interest
in
this
because
an
unstable
Pakistan
is
not
going
to
help
in
crea:ng
a
stable
Afghanistan
or
a
stable
South
Asia.”
Interview:
Shuja
Nawaz,
The
Atlan:c
Council.

13. What
does
the
US
want
most
from
Pakistan?
• 18
different
‘wants’
iden:fied;
63
total
responses
(average
of
two
per
respondent)
•
Number
of
respondents
=
32
Na0on
Building
Don’t
know
Realist
63%
(total
responses)
27%
10%
Afghanistan
(17)
Stability
(7)
US
doesn’t
know
what
it
wants
(4)
Counterterrorism
(non-­‐state
actors)
(6)
Extremism
(social
phenomenon)
(5)
US
has
too
many
conflic:ng
goals
(2)
Nuclear
Security
(5)
Governance
(2)

14. Realist
perspectives
“Why
are
we
giving
Pakistan
this
aid?
It
is
Nigeria
with
nuclear
weapons.
That
is,
it
is
a
poor
country
that
cannot
meet
its
budget,
but
it
doesn’t
have
oil.
So
in
a
sense
it
is
a
form
of
blackmail…
Pakistanis
know
that
we
regard
their
survival
as
important
to
us.”
Interview:
Stephen
Cohen,
Brookings
Ins:tu:on
2013

15. Nation
building
perspectives
“There
are
more
extremists,
a
more
religiously
conserva:ve
popula:on
–
that
is
what
the
trend
is.
Part
of
the
problem
is
that
there
are
always
things
to
mul:ply
that
–
a
lack
of
educa:on,
lack
of
jobs,
lack
of
a
stable
economy.
We
don’t
have
programs
to
address
it
[extremism]
at
all
…
it
is
too
much
of
a
band-­‐
aid
approach”
Interview:
Poli:cal
Staffer,
Washington
D.C.

16. What
is
the
one
key
factor
you
would
change
in
US
policy
towards
Pakistan?
• 74%
of
responses
advocated
for
a
complete
overhaul
of
US
policy
• 24
different
policy
changes
advocated,
total
responses
34
• Number
of
respondents
=
26
• Wide
range
of
changes
suggested,
most
popular
Complete
Policy
Overhaul
(74%)
Take
a
longer
term
approach
(5)
Discrete
Reforms
(26%)
Make
aid
pay
as
you
go
(2)
Reset
rela:ons
(3)
Promote
peace
with
India
(2)
Improve
US
credibility
(2)
Reduce
drone
strikes
(1)

17. What
is
the
one
key
factor
you
would
change
in
US
policy
towards
Pakistan?
“The
US
has
no
long-­‐term
strategy
for
its
rela:onship
with
Pakistan.
They
have
a
strategy
based
on
the
war
in
Afghanistan.
If
you
read
the
strategic
documents
the
Obama
Administra:on
puts
out,
the
purpose
of
the
rela:onship
with
Pakistan
is
to
defeat
and
dismantle
AQ,
prevent
safe
havens
and
nuclear
issues.
It
is
all
limited
to
that
agenda.
This
is
the
problem.”
Interview:
Shamila
Chaudhary,
New
America
Founda:on

18. How
satisDied
overall
is
the
US
elite
with
US
foreign
policy
in
Pakistan?
• Very
dissa:sfied.
• Dissa:sfac:on
expressed
in
very
general
terms
–
“take
a
longer
term
approach”.
• Indicates
dissa:sfac:on
with
US
policy
on
the
whole
(both
military
and
civilian).
• Lack
of
‘discrete’
or
specific
policy
ideas
tells
us
that
there
are
no
easy
fixes
for
the
US
in
Pakistan.

19. Why
the
dissatisfaction?
• It
is
difficult
to
achieve
realist
and
na:on
building
goals
in
Pakistan:
• Messaging
gets
lost
–
US
asks
too
much
of
Pakistan
–
the
elite
think
there
are
too
many
goals/unclear
goals.
• Pakistan’s
weak
government
and
civil-­‐military
tension.
• Over
the
past
decade
the
US
has
go_en
li_le
bang
for
its
buck
in
Pakistan
–
aid
for
na:on
building
has
yielded
poor
results
in
terms
of
Pakistan
assis:ng
the
US
with
security
goals
(realist
goals)
–
so
why
keep
pursuing
this
policy?
“I
am
not
quite
sure
the
US
knows
what
it
wants.
American
policy
is
in
the
midst
of
transi:on,
from
a
near
myopic
focus…on
the
war
on
terror…the
Obama
Administra:on
sustained
many
aspects
of
the
Bush
approach
and
tried
to
add
civilian
aid…but
never
really
broke
the
narra:ve
-­‐
a
principle
objec:ve
of
the
Obama
Administra:on’s
engagement
was
the
outcome
of
its
investments
in
Afghanistan.”
Interview:
Steve
Coll,
New
America
Founda:on

20. Why
the
dissatisfaction?
• There
is
disconnect
between
US
goals
and
Pakistan’s
priori:es
• Many
elite
believe
there
is
li_le
convergence
of
na:onal
interests,
especially
regarding
the
Taliban
and
Pakistan’s
strategic
use
of
terrorist
networks.
“We
want
things
Pakistan
does
not
want
to
do
or
cannot
deliver
on.
There
is
a
direct
correla:on,
the
security
apparatus
knows,
that
if
they
extend
their
CT
opera:ons
beyond
the
Pakistan
Taliban,
they
are
invi:ng
a
world
of
hurt.
So
they
can’t
deliver
or
don’t
want
to
deliver.
I
don’t
see
it
changing.
They
are
promising
less
and
delivering
li_le.
Except
for
against
those
guys
[terrorists]
that
are
aiming
at
them.”
Interview,
Michael
Krepon,
S:mson
Centre

21. Why
the
dissatisfaction?
• The
pursuit
of
realist
objec:ves
undermines
na:on
building
goals:
• The
elite
are
cognisant
that
the
US’s
transac:onal
approach
to
the
rela:onship
and
pursuing
short-­‐term
policy
is
not
in
the
US’s
long-­‐term
interests
in
building
a
stable
and
secure
Pakistan.
• The
elite
argue
that
the
US
rela:onship
with
Pakistan
is
viewed
through
the
lens
of
Afghanistan
–
this
damaged
US-­‐Pak
rela:ons
and
has
undermined
na:on
building
goals
given
Pakistan
thinks
the
US
is
helping
Pakistan
in
exchange
for
security
coopera:on.
“I
would
want
to
take
a
much
longer
approach…This
idea
of
thinking
about
Pakistan
in
the
long-­‐term
rather
than
the
short-­‐term
should
be
front
and
centre.
Think
about
the
10-­‐20
year
:me
frame,
not
what
you
want
out
of
Pakistan
next
year…
The
threat
of
another
9/11
hangs
over
every
poli:cians
head.
That
overwhelms
every
other
policy
decision.
If
doing
something
slightly
increases
the
chance
that
we
will
have
another
a_ack
–
no
one
wants
to
touch
it,
even
if
it
is
just
the
percep:on.”
Interview:
Danny
Cutherell,
Centre
for
Global
Development

22. Conclusion
• Looking
at
elite
responses
across
all
three
research
ques:ons,
some
interes:ng
pa_erns
emerge
with
regards
to
elite
percep:ons:
• Pakistan
needs
help
primarily
with
its
internal
challenges
–the
elite
are
more
likely
to
nominate
internal
rather
than
external
challenges
when
asked
what
Pakistan’s
main
problems
are.

23. Conclusion
• US
primary
goals
in
Pakistan
are
realist
ones
–
despite
the
Obama
rhetoric,
the
elite
think
that
when
it
comes
to
Pakistan,
realist
goals
are
more
important
than
na:on
building
for
the
US.

24. Conclusion
• US
policy
in
Pakistan
needs
to
be
overhauled
–
Most
of
the
elite
advocate
a
complete
overhaul
or
reset
rather
than
more
specific
reforms.

25. Conclusion
• I
argue
that
this
dissa:sfac:on
with
US
policy
reflects:
• the
difficulty
of
achieving
either
realist
or
na:on
building
goals
• the
disconnect
between
Pakistani
needs
and
US
priori:es
• the
fact
that
the
pursuit
of
realist
objec:ves
undermines
the
achievement
of
na:on
building.

26. Concluding
remarks
• In
context
of
this
broader
research
project,
US
elite
views
are
not
too
dissimilar
to
Pakistan
elite
views.
• Pakistan
elite
also
emphasise
internal
challenges
–
though
there
is
greater
agreement
on
what
the
internal
challenges
are.
• Both
have
a
realist
perspec:ve.
Some
of
the
elite
argue
that
US
aid
to
Pakistan
should
be
scaled
back;
many
elite
in
Pakistan
advocate
cancelling
it
altogether.
• The
Pakistan
elite,
however,
is
less
dissa:sfied
with
the
way
its
government
is
conduc:ng
policy
vis-­‐à-­‐vis
the
US
–
and
collec:vely
blame
the
US
for
many
of
its
country’s
woes.

27. Concluding
remarks
Important
applica:ons
of
this
research:
• Ul:mately,
the
US
will
have
a
greater
probability
of
success
in
Pakistan
if
its
broad
geopoli:cal
interests
dovetail
with
those
of
both
the
elite
and
the
people
in
the
target
na:on
–
and
if
the
US
can
be_er
understand
the
perspec:ves
of
the
elite.
• This
research
adds
to
the
large
body
of
literature
on
elite
opinion
and
fills
a
gap
with
respect
to
Pakistan.
There
is
li_le
in-­‐depth
research
on
the
foreign
policy
views
of
the
elite
in
Pakistan,
or
the
US
elite
concerning
US
policy
in
Pakistan.

28. Discussion
and
Q&A