Este artículo habla sobre como planificar una idea de negocio

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314 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY
able over time.
Therefore, as the Defense Department begins the pro-
cess of preparing next’s years Fiscal Year 2012 budget re-
quest, I am directing the military services, the joint staff,
the major functional and regional commands, and the
civilian side of the Pentagon to take a hard, unsparing
look at how they operate—in substance and style alike.
The goal is to cut our overhead costs and to transfer
those savings to force structure and modernization with-
in the programmed budget. In other words, to convert
sufficient “tail” to “tooth” to provide the equivalent of
the roughly two to three percent real growth—resources
needed to sustain our combat power at a time of war and
make investments to prepare for an uncertain future.
Simply taking a few percent off the top of everything on
a one-time basis will not do. These savings must stem
from root-and-branch changes that can be sustained and
added to over time.
What is required going forward is not more study.
Nor do we need more legislation. It is not a great mystery
what needs to change. What it takes is the political will
and willingness, as Eisenhower possessed, to make hard
choices—choices that will displease powerful people both
inside the Pentagon and out.
I say this fully aware of the fact that I am not the first
in this office to make this case and or call for this effort.
Indeed, one of my predecessors said the following: “A
person employed in a redundant task is one who could be
countering terrorism or nuclear proliferation. Every dollar
squandered on waste is one denied to the warfighter.” That
was Secretary Rumsfeld on September 10th
, 2001. Some
progress has been made since then, as well as since the
days of $800 hammers. But the proverbial wall has been
brought to our back. What might have been considered a
noble or worthy endeavor in the past is now a task that can
no longer be denied or postponed.
It is a task, in the final analysis, to defend the secu-
rity, prosperity, and freedom of the American people in
this complex and dangerous new century. It is a calling
to uphold the spirit of sacrifice of the men whose ser-
vice and triumphs we honor. And it is a mission worthy
of the son of Kansas who led our forces to victory 65
years ago, and whose legacy continues to sustain and
protect us today.
The Surge of Ideas
THE CHANGES WE MADE IN OUR ARMY
Address by DAVID H. PETRAEUS, Commander, United States Central Command
Delivered in acceptance of the American Enterprise Institute’s 2010 Irving Kristol Award, National Building Museum,
Washington, D.C., May 6, 2010
Good evening to you all. Thanks for that warm welcome.
And thanks, Arthur, for that very kind introduction.
Earlier today, as I was talking with my wife about to-
night’s speech, she reminded me of a story about a young
school boy’s report on Julius Caesar. “Julius Caesar was
born a long time ago,” the little boy explained. “He was a
great general. He won some important battles. He made
a long speech. They killed him...” I’ll try to avoid Caesar’s
fate. But this is the Irving Kristol lecture--and I do need to
say something meaningful.
Well, needless to say, it’s an enormous honor to be with
you this evening especially given the many distinguished
guests here this evening--Vice President Cheney, Governor
Allen, Members of Congress, Ambassadors, serving and
former cabinet officials, and many, many others—including
a number of wounded warriors as well.
Indeed, I’m particularly pleased to have this opportunity
because it gives me a chance to express my respect for AEI,
an organization whose work I know not just by reputa-
tion—but also through first-hand experience.
One recent AEI effort, of course, stands out in particular.
In the fall of 2006, AEI scholars helped develop the concept
for what came to be known as “the surge.” Fred and Kim
Kagan and their team, which included retired General Jack
Keane, prepared a report that made the case for additional
troops in Iraq. As all here know, it became one of those rare
think tank products that had a truly strategic impact.
A key question they addressed was how many addi-
tional forces were needed. After rigorous analysis involving
complex war gaming, Team Kagan recommended five ad-
ditional Army brigades. Now, I’m sure it was pure coinci-
dence that the number of brigades in our Army available
for deployment at that time was precisely five.
At about the same time Team Kagan was authoring its
study, President Bush’s senior assistant on Iraq, Meghan
O’Sullivan, called me at Fort Leavenworth. “What do you
think is needed in Iraq?” she asked. “Everything you can
get your hands on,” I said. On reflection, it would have
been a bit more impressive for me to say that, based on
complex analysis, precisely five more brigades were re-
quired. It might have made my subsequent Senate confir-
mation hearings a bit easier, too!
Well, I’ve been looking forward to tonight for some
time—and not just because it means I no longer have to

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keep tinkering with this speech!
Indeed, I’ve thought long and hard about what to discuss
this evening. I thought, for example, I might provide an up-
date on the Central Command area of responsibility, a region
that clearly encompasses many challenges. But I’ve given the
“CENTCOM 101” pitch far too many times in this city, and I
thought tonight’s event called for something different.
So tonight, I’m going to speak about a period in our
Army’s recent history near and dear to my heart—and to the
hearts of some in this room as well. This period has not re-
ceived anywhere near the attention given to that of the surge
in Iraq. Nonetheless, what we did during this period proved
critical to the progress that we ultimately achieved in Iraq.
The period in question—late 2005 through 2006—pre-
dates the surge. Indeed, it was during this period that we
developed the intellectual underpinnings that proved so
critical when additional forces were deployed to Iraq in
2007. Indeed, as I have noted on a number of occasions,
the most important surge in Iraq was not the surge of forces;
rather, it was the surge of ideas that guided the employment
of our forces in Iraq. Without these ideas on the conduct of
counterinsurgency operations, we would not have achieved
the gains that were made during the surge and beyond.
So tonight, I want to talk about the effort that developed
and institutionalized those ideas—ideas that ushered in a
generational transformation that touched all aspects of our
Army, from the doctrinal manuals that describe our opera-
tional concepts to the education of our leaders, from the
training of our forces and the conduct of actual operations
to the ways we sought to capture and share lessons identi-
fied in training and on the battlefield. Similar transforma-
tions, of course, took place during this time in our sister
services; indeed, much of what the Army did was done
in concert with the other services, especially the Marine
Corps. And each service has changed significantly in recent
years. However, this evening, I’d like to focus on the trans-
formation in our Army, as it has had far-reaching implica-
tions for the conduct of our operations in Iraq and, more
recently, in Afghanistan.
Tribute to Irving Kristol
This topic—the ideas that helped transform our Army—
is one that I think would have appealed to Irving Kristol. He
was, after all, a man who believed deeply in the importance
of ideas and who understood that ideas precede action.
“The truth is that ideas are all-important,” Irving Kristol
observed over three decades ago. “The massive and seem-
ingly-solid institutions of any society” he continued, “are
always at the mercy of the ideas in the heads of the people
who populate these institutions.”
I couldn’t agree more. And that is why I feel particularly
honored to receive an award that bears Irving Kristol’s name
and why I welcome the opportunity to talk about ideas be-
fore an organization that is devoted to their development.
As Bill reminded us earlier, this is the first time the
Irving Kristol Award has been presented since his father
passed away. And I know that all of us here tonight join
me in expressing our sympathy to Bea, Irving’s intellectual
companion and best friend for more than sixty years, and
to Bill and his sister Elizabeth.
But while Irving Kristol may be gone, his influence will
be felt for generations to come. He was, of course, one of
our Nation’s foremost thinkers on a host of topics, from
economics and religion to social welfare and foreign policy.
He was a man of staggering intellect who possessed a view
of human nature and American politics that has, in many
respects, stood the test of time. And, he was a man who
loved his country deeply and who served it admirably—in
uniform as a combat infantryman in Europe during World
War II and, subsequently, as a scholar, editor, founder of
journals, and perennial contributor to the most important
debates of the day. Again, in all that he did, he was a man
who believed deeply in the power of ideas and who con-
tributed enormously to their development.
So I am deeply honored to receive an award named
for Irving Kristol, though I note that I can accept it only
insomuch as I do so on behalf of the more than 210,000
Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen
deployed throughout the CENTCOM area of responsibility
and the hundreds of thousands of coalition and Iraqi troop-
ers with whom I was privileged to serve in my nearly four
years in Iraq. These are, after all, the men and women who
have turned big ideas from guys like me into reality on the
ground, in the air, and at sea. They are the true heroes. And
likely to be serving in their ranks soon is Irving’s grandson,
Joseph M. Kristol, whom I had the privilege of commission-
ing a Second Lieutenant in the United States Marine Corps
at Harvard last spring. Irving had to be very proud.
Laying the Groundwork for the Engine of Change
Well, let me take you back some four and a half years.
Our effort in Iraq was beginning to struggle. Despite prog-
ress in a number of areas, the insurgency was spreading.
Levels of violence were escalating. Political progress was at
a virtual standstill. And in the wake of the February 2006
bombing of the Samarra Mosque, one of the holiest sites in
Shi’a Islam, sectarian violence, in particular, began to grow
at an alarming rate. A sense of fear and terror grew through
the summer as the violence began to tear apart the very
fabric of Iraqi society. And while new operations periodi-
cally arrested the downward spiral at various intervals, in
their wake the violence grew even more.
In truth, by late 2005, a number of us—including my
Marine counterpart, General Jim Mattis—had felt it was
important to produce a doctrinal manual on counterinsur-
gency operations. The developments in 2006 heightened
the imperative to identify what changes might be necessary
in Iraq as well. Indeed, as events marched on in 2006, we
increasingly came to recognize the need for change if the
forces in Iraq were to arrest a steadily deteriorating situ-

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316 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY
ation and help the Iraqis knit back together the fabric of
their society.
Now here I want to emphasize the word “we” in that last
sentence. What I’m about to describe was not a task I un-
dertook alone. Indeed, you don’t change an organization as
large as the US Army by yourself. Quite the opposite. I may
have been the front man for a good bit of our work, but
this was the effort of a team of teams comprised of people
who were passionate about transforming our Army. I just
happened to be the coach of some of those teams after I left
Iraq in the fall of 2005 following a second tour there and in
September 2005 became the Commander of the Combined
Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
The position at Fort Leavenworth brought with it
considerable influence over the organizations capable of
changing the Army as an institution. Indeed, the Com-
bined Arms Center Commander’s responsibilities included
developing the Army’s doctrinal manuals, which are the
repositories of our big ideas; supervising some 15 schools
and centers across the US that educate all of the Army’s
leaders; disseminating the big ideas and fostering debate
about them through various additional organizations; over-
seeing the scenarios at the combat training centers where
big ideas are put into practice by units preparing to deploy;
and, finally, capturing lessons that need to be learned about
the application of the big ideas. And that’s why the folks at
Leavenworth have long claimed to have their hands on the
controls of the Army’s “Engine of Change.”
That notwithstanding, when my assignment to Fort
Leavenworth was announced, some suggested I was be-
ing sent out to pasture. Indeed, as those of you who have
visited that historic post know, it is located in the middle
of America’s heartland on the west bank of the Missouri
River, that wonderful body of water that farmers describe
as being too thick to drink and too thin to plow. Some
observers—particularly some in this fair city, which report-
edly likes to see itself at the center of every map—felt that
Fort Leavenworth was a place where you went to think
deep thoughts and never be seen again. That, obviously,
was not the case.
Now, some additional context. By the time I arrived at
Fort Leavenworth in late 2005, the Chief of Staff of the
Army, General Pete Schoomaker, had already launched a
number of transformational initiatives. Under his leader-
ship, the Army had begun migrating from a division-cen-
tric force configured for fighting one or two major-theater
wars to a brigade-centric, modular force more appropriate
for the operations we were conducting in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Accompanying this initiative were a number of other
significant changes in how we equipped, managed, and
deployed Army forces. So, by the fall of 2005, substantial
change was already underway.
But General Schoomaker wanted even more change,
as he, too, was beginning to recognize the urgency of the
situation in Iraq. And so, when he sent me to Fort Leaven-
worth, he gave me some simple, direct guidance. “Shake
up the Army, Dave,” he told me. I was delighted to salute
and help do just that.
So there we were. The Army had just put an insurgent at
the controls of its Engine of Change. The Chief of Staff had
ordered me to shake things up. And that’s what our team
set out to do. Irving Kristol would have loved it…
Process of Change
When I arrived at Fort Leavenworth, I’d been in the
Army for over three decades. During that time, I’d spent
thousands of hours executing change. I’d spent countless
hours more thinking about how one should plan for it and
carry it out.
As I saw it then—and as I still see it now—there are four
steps to institutional change. First, you have to get the big
ideas right—you have to determine the right overarching
concepts and intellectual underpinnings. Second, you have
to communicate the big ideas effectively throughout the
breadth and depth of the organization. Third, you have to
oversee implementation of the big ideas—in this case, first
at our combat training centers and then in actual opera-
tions. And fourth, and finally, you have to capture lessons
from implementation of the big ideas, so that you can refine
the overarching concepts and repeat the overall process.
Now, as anyone who has been involved in transformation
knows, change can be hard. It can be challenging. And it can
be frustrating. Inevitably, all institutions resist change to some
degree—even when all recognize that change is needed.
Our effort to change the Army fit all those descriptions.
But, it was also fun—and even exciting. It was, in essence,
a retooling of important aspects of our cherished institu-
tion, with the full support and encouragement of our
Chief, General Schoomaker, and my boss at Training and
Doctrine Command Headquarters, General Scott Wallace.
Here’s how the process unfolded.
Step 1: Getting the Big Ideas Right
Change starts, again, with getting the big ideas right.
Developing the proper constructs is essential to having the
right intellectual foundation for all that follows. And doing
so typically requires an ability to think creatively and criti-
cally about complex challenges, constantly testing one’s as-
sumptions and often embracing new concepts.
In my experience, big ideas don’t fall out of a tree and
hit you on the head like Newton’s apple. Rather, they start
as seeds of little ideas that take root and grow. The growth
takes place primarily in discussion—spirited, freewheel-
ing, challenging discussion of the kind that Irving Kristol
would have enjoyed.
In early 2006, we set about capturing the big ideas on
counterinsurgency operations. This most famously in-
volved drafting the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, but
it also entailed developing the overarching concepts for
full spectrum operations and for what we call “Pentathlete”

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leadership, as well as guidelines for human intelligence
operations and a host of other subjects. But the counter-
insurgency—or COIN—manual was our principal focus,
and working with our Marine partners, we published it in
under a year, a timeline unprecedented for the publication
of a major manual—and just in time to inform the surge of
ideas that would guide us in Iraq in 2007.
Mindful of the invaluable experience I’d had in grad
school, which provided a truly out-of-my-intellectual-com-
fort-zone experience, we sought to broaden the usual pool
of participants involved in drafting a doctrinal manual. In
so doing, we engaged not just members of our military and
partner militaries, but also diplomats, aid workers, repre-
sentatives of NGOs and human rights groups, think tank
members, journalists, and, also, of course, those with ex-
perience in Iraq and Afghanistan. These individuals formed
something of a guiding coalition for the development of the
manual and our overall process of change. Pundits even de-
veloped a phrase for those who contributed to the manual
and embraced its concepts. They called us “COINdinistas.”
The collaboration and discussions spurred by the COIN-
dinistas created a good bit of debate—and, periodically,
some healthy discord. For example, one early and promi-
nent critic of a preliminary draft, Ralph Peters, felt pas-
sionately that it was overly non-kinetic. Conversely, other
commentators, including several of our drafters, felt we
were being too kinetic. Similar debates ensued over wheth-
er to include recommended force densities in the manual,
over the emphasis on various historical cases, and even on
whether money was the best ammunition in the conduct of
counterinsurgency operations—a debate I ended quickly
by pointing out that, while money can be very valuable,
when you’re actually being shot it, the best ammunition has
a full metal jacket. As each discussion evolved, we sought
to create situations in which individuals could thrash out
different views—after which my West Point classmate Dr.
Conrad Crane, the lead author, and then I would adjudi-
cate by editing the final drafts, in close coordination with
my Marine wingman for this endeavor, General Jim Mattis.
Ultimately, the various debates resulted in a sharper, more
thoughtful product, and they also likely helped with the ul-
timate communication and implementation of the concepts
when we completed the project.
The resulting Counterinsurgency Manual proved to be very
timely and important. Following its publication in December
2006, it received such an enthusiastic response—to include
1.5 million downloads in the first month—that it was pub-
lished not only in the normal military manner, but also by
the University of Chicago Press. It even became the first field
manual to be reviewed in the New York Times Book Review. I
just wish we’d been the ones to publish it commercially.
The wide dissemination was very helpful, as the COIN
manual filled a critical doctrinal gap. It captured those big
ideas that had been used in previous counterinsurgencies
and were still relevant, many of which had already been
employed successfully, if unevenly, in Iraq. These ideas
highlighted, for example, the importance of:
focusing on security of the population;
•
living among the people to do so;
•
holding and building in areas that have been cleared;
•
promoting reconciliation—while pursuing the ir-
•
reconcilables relentlessly;
achieving civil-military unity of effort;
•
living our values;
•
being first with the truth;
•
fostering initiative; and
•
learning and adapting.
•
Many of these ideas derived from the critical recognition
that, in counterinsurgency operations, the human terrain is
the decisive terrain. Even as we were drafting the manual,
that recognition and the emerging big ideas guided the
overhaul of all our courses for our Army’s leaders, the train-
ing of our units, and, ultimately, the employment of our
forces during the surge.
Step 2: Communicating the Big Ideas
Now, while getting the big ideas right is critical, simply de-
veloping them is not enough. The big ideas must also be com-
municated effectively throughout the organization. And this is
the second step in the four-step process I described earlier.
Communication should flow in multiple directions to be
effective. In the military, it involves communicating down-
ward through leaders and units, upward through the chain
of command, and outward through coalition partners,
interagency elements, and the press. The most important
of these directions is downward—communicating the big
ideas throughout the breadth and depth of the organiza-
tion, and then ensuring they’re understood, operational-
ized, and, ideally, embraced by leaders at all levels.
To enable rapid dissemination of the emerging big ideas
on counterinsurgency in the institutional Army, we pursued
a variety of initiatives. Many of them focused on changing
the curricula at the various military schools where leaders
learned their trade. To facilitate that, we hosted gatherings
for the branch school commandants and combat training
center commanders. We visited each of the schools and
centers where the Army’s commissioned, warrant, and
noncommissioned officers were educated. And we used the
Center for Army Leadership, located at Fort Leavenworth,
to issue instructions on curriculum development.
One of the places where changes were made was the US
Army Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The
process there was particularly interesting. While running
with several young captains one morning during a visit
there in early 2006, I learned that a fair amount of the ma-
terial they were studying in the Captains Career Course was
outdated. This was not entirely surprising, as at that time,
the instructors at the school generally had far less time
deployed than did the captains who were their students.

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318 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY
When I shared my concerns with the Field Artillery School
Commandant, a sharp Major General, he got it immedi-
ately. In fact, he called me a few weeks later to tell me that
he’d shut down the course, engaged the captains in an in-
tensive review of the curriculum, and overhauled the entire
program. This was the kind of initiative we needed, and I
told our Army Chief about it shortly afterward. “Excellent!”
he responded. “In fact,” he observed, “there are three great
aspects to the Commandant’s actions. First, he made the
changes needed. Second, he didn’t ask permission. And,
third, he didn’t ask for more people or more money.”
We also used a number of other means to disseminate
our big ideas. We funded the creation of virtual communi-
ties to enable online discussion of branch-specific issues.
We established a Counterinsurgency Center at Fort Leaven-
worth. A number of us traveled around the country to dis-
cuss the big ideas at military bases, think tanks, universi-
ties, and even on The Daily Show with Jon Stewart (though
I left that latter task to COINdinista LTC John Nagl). We
worked closely with the Counterinsurgency Academy that
General Casey had developed in Iraq to help reinforce the
big ideas to leaders as they began their deployments. And
many of us wrote articles for military journals and encour-
aged others to do the same.
One article that was published in the journal published
at Leavenworth, Military Review, confirmed for us that
the Army Chief of Staff really did want us to shake up
the Army. A month into my tenure at Fort Leavenworth,
one of the COINdinistas sent me an article by a British
officer named Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster, who hap-
pened to have been my deputy in the so-called “Train and
Equip Mission” Iraq in 2004. His piece was quite critical
of how US forces had conducted counterinsurgency in
Iraq, arguing that our forces were, and I quote, “weighed
down by bureaucracy, a stiflingly hierarchical outlook, a
predisposition to offensive operations, and a sense of duty
that required all issues to be confronted head-on.” He also
described our soldiers as “culturally insensitive.” This was,
in short, an unflattering assessment—and one that I didn’t
agree with in all respects. But it was also an assessment that
I thought would stimulate discussion among the majors at
the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leaven-
worth, in particular. And so I directed its publication.
Little did I know that this essay would receive attention
far beyond the gates of Leavenworth, thanks, in large part,
to an article Tom Ricks wrote about it in the Washington
Post. Once again, the Army Chief’s response was hearten-
ing: instead of questioning my decision to publish such a
critical essay, he applauded the decision and sent the article
to all our general officers, noting that it would be a good
piece to discuss with subordinate officers. Needless to say, I
was relieved to learn of his reaction.
In truth, when one thinks of the big ideas we were com-
municating—ideas like securing and serving the people
and performing tasks across the full spectrum of opera-
tions—what we were really conveying was a significant
change in our approach to thinking. In the past we had
tended to teach leaders what to think, and we generally
gave them a finite number of conventional missions and
enemy approaches on which to focus. Now, we were striv-
ing to teach them how to think and telling them that they
had to be prepared for anything from conventional opera-
tions to stability and support operations, and everything in
between. Above all, we sought to encourage young leaders
to think for themselves, to improvise, to exercise initiative,
and to challenge the conventional wisdom.
A year after I returned to Iraq to command the surge,
after completing a patrol with a company in western Bagh-
dad, I noticed a sign that the company commander had
posted on the wall of his command post. “In the absence
of guidance or orders,” the sign said, “figure out what they
should have been and execute aggressively.”
I realized then that we’d begun to achieve our desired
effect. And I brought the sign back to the headquarters,
shared it with our commanders, and incorporated it into
my counterinsurgency guidance.
Step 3: Overseeing Implementation of the Big Ideas
Well, having gotten the big ideas right and having com-
municated them throughout the organization, the next re-
sponsibility of leaders in the process of change is to oversee
their implementation. This meant spending time with those
turning the big ideas into reality on the ground. And, in 2006
in the United States, it meant, in particular, overhauling the
process of how we prepared our units for deployment.
Now, careful oversight should not be taken to imply
micromanagement. Indeed, micromanagement is impos-
sible when one is leading large organizations with many
subordinate elements, as was the case in which I found
myself in 2006. Instead, what we sought were leaders at all
levels who understood the big ideas and then exercised the
initiative needed to make changes in how their organiza-
tions helped prepare units getting ready to deploy. And so,
the only sensible approach was to have a light hand on the
reins and to encourage everyone involved to get on with it
and do what they thought was necessary given the intent
we’d mapped out.
Our overarching intent was to provide more realistic
training for the units preparing to deploy, to ensure that
units were schooled on and then able to practice execution
of the ideas that were being codified in the COIN manual
before those units headed to Iraq (or Afghanistan). Our
overhaul included creation in January 2006 of a week-long
counterinsurgency seminar to properly launch units down
the road to deployment. We added numerous additional
leader and staff training opportunities to help units follow-
ing the seminar. And we focused particular efforts on the
capstone pre-deployment exercise, a brigade-size, multi-
week event at the Army’s combat training centers in the
Mojave Desert, central Louisiana, and Germany. Essentially,

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the commanders at those critical training centers trans-
formed the so-called “mission rehearsal exercises” from
a series of traditional, offensive and defensive force-on-
force engagements to the kind of the continuous, complex
counterinsurgency missions units were going to conduct
downrange. They made these new exercises as realistic as
possible, creating replicas of Iraqi villages; bringing in hun-
dreds of native-speaking Iraqi-Americans to role-play local
nationals; incorporating civilian counterparts; and using
soldiers to replicate IED emplacers, car bombers, host na-
tion forces, and suicide vest attackers. In short, we devel-
oped very realistic scenarios in which units could test their
mastery of the counterinsurgency ideas we were develop-
ing and communicating.
Of course, after developing and communicating the
big ideas and then changing how we trained on them, our
units in Iraq were faced with an even more daunting task:
executing the big ideas during combat operations. That
task began in earnest in early 2007 with the commence-
ment of the surge, though, to be sure, some of the ideas
had been employed previously in Iraq by certain units at
various times. But we needed all our units to employ them.
Thus, as the first of the surge forces arrived in Baghdad,
we focused on securing the population; doing so by living
with the people, rather than by commuting to the fight
from big bases; fostering reconciliation where possible
while relentlessly pursuing Al Qaeda and the other irrec-
oncilables; achieving civil-military unity of effort; and so
on, all enabled, of course, by the additional forces being
deployed as part of the surge. It got harder before it got
easier, as you’ll recall, and we experienced tough fight-
ing and many difficult days. But ultimately, coalition and
Iraqi forces were able to reduce the level of violence by
well over 90% and to achieve a level of security that, while
not without periodic horrific attacks, allowed the repair of
infrastructure, revival of the economy, investment by inter-
national firms, and the conduct of elections—all of which
gave rise to new hope in the Land of the Two Rivers.
In large part, this hope was created as a result of the
changes our Army, together with the other services, made
in the United States in 2006 that enabled the subsequent
implementation of our big ideas on counterinsurgency in
Iraq in 2007.
Step 4: Capturing and Sharing Lessons and Refining the
Big Ideas
The final step of the change process is to capture and
share lessons and best practices, to use them to refine the
big ideas, and to then begin the process all over again.
Enabling this in 2006 was the fact that all of us in uni-
form had worked hard over the years to ensure that our
services were “learning organizations.” For example, we’d
established lessons learned centers in our organizational
structures, routinely conducted after action reviews in the
wake of exercises and operations, and developed formal
processes to capture and share best practices. These initia-
tives had long been hugely important to the long term ef-
fectiveness of our organizations. And they were—and con-
tinue to be—especially important in Iraq and Afghanistan.
After all, war requires constant learning and adaptation,
and that is particularly true in the conduct of counterinsur-
gency operations. As the COIN Manual observed, the side
that learns and adapts the fastest often prevails.
So, in 2006 and 2007, we tried to speed our learning
process. We deployed additional personnel from our Les-
sons Learned Center at Fort Leavenworth to the combat
training centers and to Iraq and Afghanistan. We sup-
ported a new organization, the Asymmetric Warfare Group,
that embedded experienced combat leaders with deployed
units. We created web-based virtual communities to link
those in combat with those preparing to deploy. We funded
the network administrators for a virtual band of bloggers
from all our Army’s branches and communities to support
the actual bands of brothers deployed in Iraq. And, after
we launched the surge, I ensured that each of our com-
manders’ gatherings in Iraq included time for leaders to
share best practices and lessons of general interest. Over
time, these and other initiatives enabled us to rapidly refine
the big ideas, communicate the refinements, and oversee
their implementation, first in the States, and then in Iraq.
And, so, there you have it. That’s what we oversaw from
the pastures of Kansas in 2006 and how it helped us in
Iraq in 2007. This was the process that enabled the real
surge in Iraq, the surge of ideas. Armed with, and trained
on, these ideas, leaders and troopers who “got it” about
counterinsurgency deployed to Iraq and enabled the con-
siderable progress that we have seen there over the past
three years. This was an exciting endeavor and one that
was, needless to say, of enormous importance not just to
the effort in Iraq but to our efforts in Afghanistan and in a
host of other difficult missions around the world. It goes
without saying that Irving Kristol would have enjoyed be-
ing a COINdinista.
Well, my goal tonight was two-fold: first, to explain
the changes we made in our Army in 2006; and, second,
to give a speech that I’d like to think Irving Kristol might
have enjoyed.
As I noted earlier, I accept the Irving Kristol award this
evening on behalf of the more than 210,000 troopers de-
ployed at sea, in the air, and on the ground in the CENT-
COM area of operations. As all of you know, these troopers
endure long separations from their loved ones; operate in
cultures vastly different than our own; confront ruthless,
barbaric enemies; and carry out complex missions under
tough conditions. And I know that this audience agrees
that they—and their families—deserve enormous support
and admiration.
I can remember a time when members of our military
did not always receive the support they deserved. Two
generations ago, we were engaged in war in Southeast Asia.

7. VSOTD.COM
320 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY
American men and women in uniform fought with skill
and valor for the sake of the country they loved and took
an oath to defend. Many of them bled, and more than
58,000 of them died. With every one of those casualties,
a family and a community were heartbroken, mourning a
loss that could never be recovered, whose grief could never
fully be assuaged.
But those returning from Vietnam often were not treated
as the heroes they were. Recalling that, those of us in the
military today are thankful beyond words that the Ameri-
can people seem to have such high regard and affection for
their men and women in uniform.
Working with those men and women every day, seeing
them perform missions in the toughest of circumstances
imaginable, I can tell you that the regard and affection ac-
corded our troopers are fully merited.
In truth, the members of this audience are foremost
among those who recognize and support those in uniform
and their families. And so, tonight, I’d like to close by
thanking all of you on behalf of all of us who wear the uni-
form for that tremendous support.
It has, needless to say, been the greatest of privileges for
me to have served with our men and women in uniform
for nearly 36 years. Indeed, I can imagine no greater honor
in life than serving with them in defense of America and
our interests around the world.
Our first president once captured very eloquently the
feelings of those who serve our nation: “I was summoned
by my country,” he said, “whose voice I can never hear but
with veneration and love.”
And so it has been my great privilege this evening to ac-
cept the Irving Kristol Award on behalf of all those deployed
in the CENTCOM area of responsibility—individuals who
likewise have been summoned by their country, whose
voice they can never hear but with veneration and love.
Thank you very much.
“We See Your Sense of Duty”
“IN THESE QUIET HILLS, YOU’VE COME TOGETHER TO PREAPRE FOR THE MOST DIFFICULT TEST OF OUR TIME”
Address by BARACK OBAMA, President, United States of America
Delivered as commencement address for the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, West Point, N.Y., May 22, 2010
It is wonderful to be back at the United States Military
Academy—the oldest continuously occupied military
post in America—as we commission the newest officers
in the United States Army.
Thank you, General Hagenbeck, for your introduc-
tion, on a day that holds special meaning for you and the
Dean, General Finnegan. Both of you first came to West
Point in the Class of 1971 and went on to inspire soldiers
under your command. You’ve led this Academy to a well-
deserved recognition: best college in America. And today,
you’re both looking forward to a well-deserved retirement
from the Army. General Hagenbeck and Judy, General
Finnegan and Joan, we thank you for 39 years of remark-
able service to the Army and to America.
To the Commandant, General Rapp, the Academy staff
and faculty, most of whom are veterans, thank you for your
service and for inspiring these cadets to become the “lead-
ers of character” they are today. Let me also acknowledge
the presence of General Shinseki, Secretary McHugh, the
members of Congress who are with us here today, includ-
ing two former soldiers this Academy knows well, Senator
Jack Reed and Congressman Patrick Murphy.
To all the families here—especially all the moms and
dads—this day is a tribute to you as well. The decision to
come to West Point was made by your sons and daughters,
but it was you who instilled in them a spirit of service that
has led them to this hallowed place in a time of war. So on
behalf of the American people, thank you for your example
and thank you for your patriotism.
To the United States Corps of Cadets, and most of all,
the Class of 2010—it is a singular honor to serve as your
Commander-in-Chief. As your Superintendent indicated,
under our constitutional system my power as President is
wisely limited. But there are some areas where my power
is absolute. And so, as your Commander-in-Chief, I hereby
absolve all cadets who are on restriction for minor conduct
offenses. I will leave the definition of “minor” to those who
know better.
Class of 2010, today is your day—a day to celebrate all
that you’ve achieved, in the finest tradition of the soldier-
scholar, and to look forward to the important service that
lies ahead.
You have pushed yourself through the agony of Beast
Barracks, the weeks of training in rain and mud, and, I’m
told, more inspections and drills than perhaps any class be-
fore you. Along the way, I’m sure you faced a few moments
when you asked yourself: “What am I doing here?” I have
those moments sometimes.
You’ve trained for the complexities of today’s missions,
knowing that success will be measured not merely by per-
formance on the battlefield, but also by your understand-
ing of the cultures and traditions and languages in the
place where you serve.
You’ve reached out across borders, with more interna-
tional experience than any class in Academy history. You’ve
not only attended foreign academies to forge new friend-
ships, you’ve welcomed into your ranks cadets from nearly
a dozen countries.

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