1. Case study: From imitation to
innovation at Zongshen Industrial
Group
Carles Gonzalez Debart
Innovation Management, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK
Introduction
The case study we are analysing is based in the development of Zongshen Industrial Group
since its creation in the 80s until nowadays. In these almost 30 years of life, Zongshen has
grown from a small assembler of motorcycle engines to an important global player in the small
gasoline engine and motorcycle industry. Ironically, what was the main trigger of first year’s
fast and prosperous development has turned into a big threat that has had to be addressed
through a change of the organisation culture: from imitation to innovation.
The trigger we are talking about is not other than change in the Chinese regulations. In the
early 80s, and due to the slowing down of the Cold War, the area of Chongqing (were
Zongshen industrial group was settled) changed the productive model from defence to more
civilian products. Chinese government fostered this change by allowing some state-owned
enterprises (SEOs) to be reconverted into parts manufacturers. Recently, other changes in
regulations such increasing tax laws and emission requirements have made Zongshen walking
in the tightrope. But these are not the only problems that the company owned by Zuo
Zongshen has had to face recently. One of his main concerns is where to find the talent to be
able to drive the company in a more globalised, innovative and competitive world.
First years
To start with, we are reviewing the birth and the first year’s development of Zongshen
Industrial Group. The area of Chongqing, situated in central south-western of China, was one
of the centres of the Chinese defence industry, especially for vehicles. Chongqing was rapidly
recognized through the 80s as the chinese centre of motorcycle production. This productive
model was focused on producing copies, concretely from Japanese brands. As it has been
introduced above, that was possible thanks to the change on the regulations and concretely to
the fact that in 1979, the opening policy promoted by Deng Xiaoping allowed people to go into
business for themselves. Before that, only SOEs could obtain business licenses.
Thanks to that change, Zuo quit his job in a production line and set his own repairing business.
Over those 10 years he acquired a solid experience in repairing motorcycles so when changes

2. in regulations were introduced again in 1992 and individuals were allowed to set up private
companies, Zuo used this know-how to successfully develop a company focused in assembling
motorcycle engines from purchased parts.
Zuo took advantage of that and selected the best components that SOEs produced, normally in
big quantities and low quality, for his motors. He encountered some problems though: as he
was a private company, sometimes SOEs refused to sell him in the quantity and quality he was
expecting. Zuo became dependant of “red envelopes” to get what he needed for his company.
To solve these problems, Zuo envisaged a new approach for his business: in-house
manufacturing and differentiation. Because of his experience, he knew that all the suppliers
where delivering similar parts, with similar quality standards and only competing in price that
made the final motorcycles of private owned companies’ products look the same. Zuo started
the path of differentiation by producing parts in-house, which also brought him positive side-
effect such as not being dependable of delays when the demand was high. He focused in
existing technologies that were already implemented successfully overseas, like CAD, CAM,
CNC, Pro-Engineer etc. and he even hired manufacturing consultants (mainly retired Honda
employees) and paid visits to other companies to “import” knowledge. All of these strategies
developed by Zuo at the early stages are a clear example of reverse-engineering. In addition,
he also took advantage of WIP inventory, which consisted in the fact that private companies
didn’t have to pay for parts until they had assembled them into motorcycles and sold them. In
conclusion, these above mentioned facts brought Zongshen the capabilities to produce ready-
to-sell motorcycles.
Getting ahead
In 2000, Zongshen realised that setting a company group structure would be the next big step
to compete globally. Due to the Chinese law limitations, only companies listed publicly were
able to play in capital markets. Zuo applied the strategy of “reverse merging”, which consisted
in acquiring a shell company that would be already listed and with minimal assets or liabilities
(failed company). Zongshen acquired a company in Chengdu and another in Canada to boost
their capabilities to enter into the green energy businesses (growing by buying). The
acquisition of another subsidiary in Jiangsu, made the industrial group count with an annual
production capacity of 350,000 units of e-bikes. Zuo tried to get technology, know-how and
capabilities by the acquisition of other companies, and if that was not possible in China due the
lack of advanced technology, partners abroad were targeted. This strategy was deployed
successfully and between 2006 and 2008, Zongshen Industrial group increased its sales from
50,000 units to 220,000. In 2009, and due to the decline of international markets and the
extremely competitive market in China, the demand of Zohgshen products went down
dramatically, implying negative profit for the company. That was the moment when Zuo
realised that to successfully compete in such aggressive markets a movement towards
innovation and differentiation was needed. Zuo recognised the importance of the following 3
key factors where to invest in innovation: energy storage systems, power control systems and
integrated design. It was time to get ahead through innovation. The main challenge expressed
by Zuo was where to find the talent to drive this innovative path.

3. Towards innovation
In a more mature market, the users would search for a better quality instead of the traditional
low-end segment motorcycles, which were the norm in Chongqing brands. Most of these low-
quality models where just copies of those coming mainly from Japan. Thus, differentiation was
foreseen by Zuo as the way to overcome and gain market share. To achieve this, the Cyclone
project was started in 2005 to offer innovative products of which Zongshen had the intellectual
property. That was a big step in the organizational mind: from producing cheap copies and
later on improving this copies through investment in technology and partnerships, to really
focus in own R&D. The first output of this new era was launched in the market in 2007. They
were not sold very well. The main reason for that is that people found hard to believe such a
radical step in design and quality could have been made by a company like Zongshen, people
didn’t trust the new products at all. This is the typical case of a failed design due to not taking
into account user’s requirements. This problem was addressed by merging the quality of this
new products with the old ones, so an above-the-average quality new line was launched
instead of state-of-the-art one, making it very profitable. Zongshen made use of the strategy of
applying the know-how of the high segments to improve the low ones.
The role of the partners
As it has been explained before, Zuo tried to get expertise and know-how from other
companies. Piaggio entered the Chinese market and, despite the promising volume of sales in
coastal (rich) areas, failed in the strategy of maintaining a profitable number of sales across the
country. The restrictions in big cities forced to change the strategy and focus on rural areas,
where Piaggio products were too expensive and not designed according to the user
requirements. Was then when they looked for a local partner and found Zongshen the right
one. The joint venture was profitable for both parts, Piaggio outsourced a significant amount
of parts to Zongshen, saving costs. It also took advantage from the Zongshen production
management and sales. For its part, Zongshen benefited from a new engine manufacturing
facility, imported technology and international export market knowledge. But the main benefit
of all, was the fact that for the first time, Zongshen was applying quality controls to meet
European standards.
Recommendations for the e-bike challenge
For Zuo was relatively easy to get experienced professionals in R&D, manufacturing, finance or
marketing from other Chinese companies. He also hired people from government
organizations and even more, as it has been commented before, he hired retired Japanese
experts. However he found difficult to find real big talent, individuals with the global view and
the set of skills needed to lead projects. He tackled this problem in several ways by
establishing: agreements with engineering universities, partnerships with overseas companies
(like Piaggio), and engagement of talented employees within via incentives or even importing
talents from outside. One of the main problems addressed by Zuo was the fact that, due to the

4. Chinese culture, management positions where those highly desired by technical staff,
preventing in that way that they could reach a deep level of expertise to become real leaders
in their field. Zuo pointed out that issue didn’t take place in countries like Germany or Japan,
because the lead engineers there can make as much money as a general manager.
He found real talent in Phd students in the US, students from the best universities, highly
qualified and with an entrepreneurial spirit. They wanted to develop powerful drive trains that
eventually would surpass what was possible with internal combustion engines. Zuo knew that
not only the e-bike industry was seeking for talents like them, but the automotive as well.
Zuo’s concern how they would join a company like Zongshen and once they would be there,
will they fit in the organizational culture? Zuo though that the west way to import this talent
was to invest in their start up and become a manufacturing partner in the future. To decide
whether this is the correct route to follow to become self-sufficient in technology, the e-bike
sector will be analysed using the Porter five forces analysis:
1. Level of competition: High. Over 1000 firms where the largest one only had the 5% of the
market share. Almost 20 million electric motorbikes, scooters and variants are produced in
China each year. The e-bike industry in china is extremely competitive.
2. Threats of substitutes: Moderate. Although new regulations were clearly forcing the
manufacturers to shift to electric engines, the traditional combustion ones have still a specific
weight in China. Although not mentioned in the paper, other substitutes can be gasoline cars
or even e-cars.
3. Threat of new entrants: High. The e-bike segment can be targeted by any of the current bike
manufacturers or even by new companies with no experience in bikes but with know-how of
electrical engines and batteries.
4. Bargaining power of buyers: High. As the buyers of the e-bike products are mainly the
distributors, and due to the fact that the level of competition is very high, they can play a main
role in the possible success or failure of Zongshen e-bikes.
5. Bargaining power of suppliers: Low. Zongshen is an industrial group that has integration as
the main characteristics. They almost produce all the components needed for the final
assembling. Zongshen tries to get expertise and talent to manufacture the new generation of
batteries and powertrains in-house, even if the know-how comes from outside the company.
6. Value chain analysis: We don’t have enough information about the last part of the product
lifecycle (marketing, sales and customer service). However, we can assess as positive the
competitive advantage of innovation and differentiation that Zongshen wants to deploy.
In that point, we need to evaluate the viability of the change in the Zongshen organizational
culture (from imitation to innovation) in the e-bike project by identifying internal and external
factors that could lead into success or failure. SWOT analysis is provided:

5. Internal factors Strengths Weaknesses
 manufacturing know-how  Heavy investments to support R&D
 Low dependence from suppliers  Difficulty to attract talent from abroad
 Acquired knowledge by buying  Damaged imaged because cyclone project
high specialized companies  Financial position due to 2009 crisis
 Knowledge of chines market  HR regarding Chinese culture
Opportunities Threats
 High growing e-bike segment  Zongshen investment in R&D can be copied
External factors
 Change in regulations can boost e- by other manufactures
bike industry  Perception from the market, Zongshen still
 Size of Chinese market seen as low-quality product maker
 Small manufacturers cannot  Competitiveness of the market
compete in quality nor quantity  Fast changing regulations can bring new
threats in the future.
 Barrier of entrance is relatively low
The outcome of the analysis is clear. In a very competitive market like the chines e-bikes,
innovation and differentiation are the key factors to succeed. Zongshen lack of capabilities on
R&D are supplied by a great buy force, that enables them to buy or to make partnerships with
other small but high advanced technology companies. But the way that Zongshen is
approaching this challenge on R&D may be not sustainable in long term. Competitors can
follow the same path and buy acquire technology to catch up, what could lead into a buying
race. Zongshen should develop and invest in own R&D, trying to supply the lack of talent of
their employees with continuous improvement and training strategies. The agreements with
universities and partnerships with other companies are beneficial. The approach of hiring high
talented individuals is a solution as well, but as Zuo expressed, it is unlikely that world-top
engineers want to develop a career in China. And even in the case of successfully attracting
them, Zongshen should apply strategies to avoid knowledge spill over in the likely case they
want to leave after some time.
In a market with more than 1000 small manufacturers, as it has been said before,
differentiation is absolutely necessary. But this doesn’t mean that innovation has to be applied
at any cost. User requirements should be put in first position, relegating radical innovation in
the foreground. Zongshen has to learn from mistakes in this sense, as it happened with the
cyclone project. The products were ahead the expectations and needs of the users and that led
into poor sells. Another interesting learning that Zongshen should take into account for the
future is role of distributors. It is not only necessary to convince the final customer that your
product is the best; distributors have a last word as well. If the solution is to change from a
high-volume and low-quality products to medium-volume but high-quality products, changes
in distribution and marketing can be beneficial. One possible approach can be brand stores,
where only Zongshen products would be sold. These stores are normally deployed to achieve
three goals: to strengthen costumer awareness with the product, improve the retail
experience and learn more about consumer demands and requirements.