Practical Measures for Measuring Security
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Security is often a frustrating field for business and IT decision makers. It can be difficult to quantify, difficult to get visibility, and it’s difficult to know when you have “enough”. Do you really need that latest threat feed subscription or state of the art malware protection device? Do you need to add another security analyst to your team? And if so, how can you understand, in business terms, the value these investments bring to the business? This session will explore practical methods for the application of metrics in security to support business decision making, and provide a framework to implement straightforward security metrics, whether inside your wall or at a service provider.
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Practical Measures for Measuring Security
- 2. WELCOME TO SECURE360 2012 Did you remember to scan your badge for CPE Credits? Ask your Room Volunteer for assistance. Please complete the Session Survey front and back (this is Room 7), and leave on your seat. Note: “Session” is Tuesday or Wednesday Are you tweeting? #Sec360
- 3. AGENDA Are you Ready? The Problem of Measuring Security Metric Myths Characteristics of Effective Metrics Defining Your Metrics The Process of Measurement Sample Metrics Implementing Metrics Presenting Metrics A Mature Metrics Program Page 3
- 4. WHY HAVEN’T YOU SOLVED THIS YET? Is the Organization ready? What’s the Tone from the Top? Is it Security someone’s Job? Do you have Policy in place? Are resources allocated to identify and detect issues? Are resources allocated to remediate issues? Are you Level 4? Page 4
- 5. Page 5
- 6. TYPICAL PROBLEMS OF MEASURING SECURITY Risk is difficult to define precisely Attack Surface Current Environment Asset Value Measures not linked to action Measures often focus on outcomes Page 6
- 7. METRIC MYTHS 7 Myths that hold people back 92.467% of the time. 1. Metrics must be Objective and Tangible 2. Metrics must have discrete values 3. Metrics must be absolute 4. Metrics are costly 5. You can’t manage what you can’t measure 6. It’s essential to measure outcomes 7. You need precise, accurate data Page 7
- 8. CHARACTERISTICS OF A GOOD METRIC (This is probably NOT a good example) Attackability Computation. An Attack Surface Metric, Carnegie Mellon University, 2005 Page 8
- 9. CHARACTERISTICS OF A GOOD METRIC 1. Directly Relates to an objective 2. Should have a logical stakeholder 3. Collection should be inexpensive, simple and standardized 4. Should have a resolution appropriate for maturity 5. Should be phase appropriate 6. Should have applicability defined 7. Should have an indicated action Page 9
- 10. DEFINING YOUR METRICS Page 10
- 11. DEVELOPING YOUR METRICS Metrics Relating to Security Controls 1. Should map directly to a defined control 2. Use data describing the security control’s implementation to generate required measures 3. Characterize the measure as applicable to system categorization (low, med, high) Page 11
- 12. DEVELOPING YOUR METRICS Metrics Relating to Security Program Performance 1. Map to InfoSec Goals & Objectives that encompass performance 2. Use the data describing the information security program performance to generate required measures Page 12
- 13. NOW THAT YOU HAVE YOUR METRICS On your Mark, get Set… Document in a standard format See 800-55 for an excellent template Prioritize and Select Establish Performance Targets Evaluate Metric performance and relevance periodically, incorporate feedback Page 13
- 14. SAMPLE METRICS • Percentage of the agency’s information system budget devoted to information security • Percentage of “high” vulnerabilities mitigated within defined time periods after discovery • Percentage of remote access points used to gain unauthorized access • Percentage of information system security personnel that have received security training • Average frequency of audit records review and analysis for inappropriate activity Page 14
- 15. SAMPLE METRICS (CONTINUED) • Percentage of new systems that have completed certification and accreditation (C&A) prior to their implementation • Percentage approved and implemented configuration changes identified in the latest automated baseline configuration • Percentage of information systems that have conducted annual contingency plan testing • Percentage of users with access to shared accounts Page 15
- 16. SAMPLE METRICS (CONTINUED) • Percentage of incidents reported within required time frame per applicable incident category • Percentage of system components that undergo maintenance in accordance with formal maintenance schedules • Percentage of media that passes sanitization procedures • Percentage of physical security incidents allowing unauthorized entry into facilities containing information systems Page 16
- 17. SAMPLE METRICS (CONTINUED) • Percentage of employees who are authorized to access information systems only after they sign an acknowledgement that they have read and understood rules of behavior • Percentage of individuals screened before being granted access to organizational information and information systems • Percentage of vulnerabilities remediated within organization- specified time frames Page 17
- 18. SAMPLE METRICS (CONTINUED) • Percentage of system and service acquisition contracts that include security requirements and/or specifications • Percentage of mobile devices that meet approved cryptographic policies • Percentage of operating system vulnerabilities for which patches have been applied or that have been otherwise mitigated Page 18
- 19. IMPLEMENTING METRICS Page 19
- 20. EXAMPLE: A METRIC IN ACTION Page 20
- 21. PRESENTING METRICS Do you REALLY have to use Excel? Page 21
- 22. WHEN YOU GET BACK TO THE OFFICE ON MONDAY: 1. Are you ready? 2. Engage Stakeholders 3. Identify Your Metrics - Leverage CIS, NIST 800-55 4. Automate collection & reporting 5. Act on what you find 6. Make it look good! 7. Document the value 8. Re-evaluate periodically Page 22
- 23. REFERENCES / CREDITS CMMI: http://www.sei.cmu.edu/cmmi/ http://www.noticebored.com/html/metrics.html Center for Internet Security Consensus Security Metrics: http://benchmarks.cisecurity.org/en-us/?route=downloads.metrics NIST 800-55: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-55-Rev1/SP800-55-rev1.pdf http://www.geckoboard.com/ Page 23
Notes de l'éditeur
- 1. It’s ok to measure subjective factors, such as “security awareness”, as long as you don’t measure subjectively.2. It’s easy to measure the number of people that attended security awareness training, but it’s more difficult to measure the effectiveness of that training. That doesn’t mean it’s impossible or not worthwhile, though. And survey and statistical theory can be applied to extract very useful information, especially when applied to a continuous scale.3. The number of security incidents this month, or the number of vulnerabilities patched are both absolute numbers, but without a good deal of context such as the total number of vulnerabilites, the size of the environment, the number of staff available to patch, etc – it makes it very hard to understand the real meaning behind these numbers. Surveying your staff to ask “Is security better or worse this month versus last month” is probably a much more telling number, measured over team, even though it has not absolute value.4. It can be costly measure, but this should be a function of your metric design. We’ll talk more about this in the next section.5. This is related to all of the previous myths. You can absolutely improve security and reduce risk without being able to measure.6. Just because your house did not burn down this month doesn’t mean that no one piled a stack of oily rage next to the gasoline can in the garage. With real world security, meauring outcomes is like talking about the need to keep the barn door closed after the horses are gone. Outcomes can be useful however, so don’t throw them out completely.7. A recent survey showed that 87.663% of security metrics were a load of hooey. The more decimal places you see, the more suspect you should be.
- Show vuln scan resultsSo what?Actions?Resources required?Business case?