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Disaster Data Recovery method for HDD 
by Dai Shimogaito 
January, 17th, 2014 
 at CODEBLUE in Tokyo
What is Disaster Recovery ? 
1.To Recover Computer System 
which had suffered from natural disaster, like 
tsunami, river flood, storm, and earthquake 
Platter Surface Damage 
2.To Protect Computer System and get Ready 
for a large scale crash. 
AFTER 
Disaster 
The most difficult 
problem for data 
recovery 
BEFORE 
Disaster 
Physical Damage caused by Software 
HDD Customization for Platter Damage
Three Failures Lead to Data Loss 
• Logical Failure 
• System failure 
• Data corruption 
• Deletion of data. 
• Electronic Failure 
• Printed Circuit Board (PCB) 
• On or more of the PCB components 
• ROM or the System Area data is damaged. 
• Physical Failure 
• Sticktion 
• Spindle bearing is frozen 
• Head crash (dropped hard drive).
Features of HDD which suffered from natural disaster 
1. Chips on PCB are gone 
2. HDD falls down and gets stong shock 
3. Dirt comes inside HDD 
4. Water comes inside HDD 
Severe Damage ! 
Normal Data Recovery Process is useless, because the damage level is extremely high
After a Natural Disaster, HDD can look like this
What is Data Recovery ? 
Trying to image data from non-accessible HDD sector by sector. 
アクセス不能なHDDから、できるだけ多くのデータをクローンコピー取得を試 
みる 
Copy 
Broken 
No access to data 
(故障でアクセス不能) 
Good 
Full Access to data 
(正常動作するHDD)
What is Data Recovery ? 
Basically, parts replacement is the way for temporary repair. 
基本的には、故障した部品を交換して、一時的にHDDを復活させます。 
Fire Accident
What is Data Recovery ? 
100% clone is always preferrable, but the result depends on the type of damage to HDD 
and the data recovery process. 
できれば100%クローンコピーの作成が望ましいのですが、故障の種類や損傷の 
強弱、そして復旧プロセスの違いによっては、回収率が低くなることがあります 
。 
←  
Low 
High →
Replaceability with Donor Part (ドナー部品との置換性) 
HSA YES [ Head Stack Assembly ] 
Head Map, Capacity, Architecture Family, Microjog 
SPM YES [ Spindle Motor ] 
Seizure Problem, Lubricating oil 
PCB YES 
[ Printed Circuit Board ] 
Serial ROM, NV-RAM, Fuse, Resister, Diode, 
Capacitor, Coil, Microchip / Repairment is also useful 
FW YES & NO 
[ Firmware ] 
Unique module, Non-unique module, Regeneratable 
module, Essential Module 
Disk NO [ Platter ] 
Bad Sector, Scratch, particules on surface
Replaceability with Donor Part (ドナー部品との置換性) 
HSA YES 
SPM YES 
PCB YES 
FW YES & NO 
Disk NO
Replaceability with Donor Part (ドナー部品との置換性) 
HSA YES 
SPM YES 
PCB YES 
FW YES & NO 
Disk NO 
スラスト軸受 
回転方向 
ジャーナル軸受 
回転方向 
潤滑油 
溝 
ディスク
Replaceability with Donor Part (ドナー部品との置換性) 
HSA YES 
SPM YES 
PCB YES 
FW YES & NO 
Disk NO
Replaceability with Donor Part (ドナー部品との置換性) 
HSA YES 
SPM YES 
PCB YES 
FW YES & NO 
Disk NO 
SA 
Service Area 
UA 
User Area 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA SA SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
Firmware = Service Modules 
SA Modules are located on platters
Replaceability with Donor Part (ドナー部品との置換性) 
HSA YES 
SPM YES 
PCB YES 
FW YES & NO 
Disk NO 
Data is recorded into platters. 
Replacement means nothing.
Replaceability with Donor Part 
HSA YES [ Head Stack Assembly ] 
Head Map, Capacity, Architecture Family, Microjog 
SPM YES [ Spindle Motor ] 
If unique parts are corrupt, Seizure Problem, there Lubricating is no way oil 
to recover data 
PCB YES 
[ Printed Circuit Board ] 
Serial ROM, NV-RAM, Fuse, Resister, Diode, 
Capacitor, Coil, Microchip / Repairment is also useful 
FW YES & NO 
[ Firmware ] 
Unique module, Non-unique module, Regeneratable 
module, Essential Module 
Disk NO [ Platter ] 
Bad Sector, Scratch, particules on surface
The Most Difficult problem is Platter Damage 
3.5inch PATA
The Most Difficult problem is Platter Damage 
2.5inch SAS
The Most Difficult problem is Platter Damage
The Most Difficult problem is Platter Damage
The Most Difficult problem is Platter Damage
For a long time, DR from scratched disk has been impossible 
If the surface is partially damaged, there should be 
recoverable data in the areas which were not 
damaged. 
部分的にしかキズが付いていないなら、 
それ以外の部分にはデータは残っている 
はず、、、、、、
Why is it so difficult to read damaged surface ? 
Let’s take an extreme close look at 
Disk & Head !
Disk Surface & Slider 
Flying Height 
1-3 nm 
Lubricant Layer               1nm 
    潤滑層Diamond Like Carbon Coating Layer   コーティング 
層 
Magnetic Layer                 
   磁性層 
3nm 
Disk Rotation Direction → 
1 ~3nm 
Slider 
スライダ 
R/W Head
The gap between Head and Disk is very small 
Slider 
Flying 
Height 
1-3nm 
PPaarrttiiccllee SSiizzee ooff 
CCiiggaarreettttee SSmmookkee 
110000--11000000nnmm
How head crash damages the surface 
Slider R/W 
Lubricant Layer 
DLC Layer 
Magnetic Layer 
Head 
Slider R/W 
Lubricant Layer 
DLC Layer 
Magnetic Layer 
Head 
Slider R/W 
Lubricant Layer 
DLC Layer 
Magnetic Layer 
Head
Cause of malfunction of HSA when reading damaged surface 
1. Scratch is not the main cause of 
the bad operation of Head Stack 
Assembly 
2. Particles on the surface stick to 
sliders. 
3. Slider’s flying becomes 
unstable because of the particles 
on the surface of the disk and 
the sliders. 
So, Let’s clean the surface !
Disk Burnishing Process
NO DUST 
NO PROBLEM
The 1st step of the research completed with a good result 
94% 
UP ! 
0.02% 
Newspaper : Nikkei Business Daily, 
26th Septempber 2013
Precise surface analyzing is required for better recovery 
Optical Surface Analyzer
July 2012, research was started by Prof.Hiroshi Tani 
Prof. Hiroshi Tani 
@ Kansai Univ.
What we can do BEFORE disater occurs 
Physical Damage caused by Software ??? 
ソフトウェアがハードウェアを壊す???
What is the HDD’s Boot Sequence ? 
Let’s go to the finish line 
together with everyone ! 
Start Finish
HDD’s Boot Sequence 
Needs to complete each sequence, 
then can reach to “Ready” mode 
PowerON Ready
User Area & Service Area 
SA 
Service Area 
UA 
User Area 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA SA SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA SA 
SA 
SA 
SA
SA Modules 
• P-List : Primary Defect List 
• G-List : Growth Defect List 
• Translator : LBA access ⇔ PBA access 
• S.M.A.R.T. 
Self-Monitoring Analysis and Reporting Technology
Defects 
× × 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
Defects info = Position of Bad Sectors in PBA
Defects info is Unique to each disk 
× × 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× × × 
× 
× 
× × 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× × 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
×
Defects info is Unique to each disk 
P-List : Primary Defect List 
× × × × 
× × × × 
G-List : Growth Defect List 
× × 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
× 
×××
Number of Defects
PBA(物理アドレス)とLBA(論理アドレス) 
LBA exists logically upon PBA. The following shows good sectors from address 0. 
通常、“アドレス”や“セクタ”が指す対象は論理アドレスのこと。 
下図は、欠陥セクタが無い正常なセクタが連続している領域の状態を示していま 
す。 
Physical Block Address 物理アドレス → 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Logical Block Address 論理アドレス → 
0 1 2 3 4 5
Defects Controlling (不良物理セクタの管理) 
物理アドレス → 
P-List Table 
2・・・ 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
論理アドレス → 
0 1 2 3 4
Translator 
Converter function between LBA and PBA 
If the translator is broken, no data is accessible. One of the most important module. 
論理アドレスと物理アドレスの変換テーブル 
このデータが読めなければ、プラッタ上の全ての磁気データを読み出すことができたとしても、ファイル 
やフォルダは一切復旧できません。SAモジュールの中でもトップクラスの重要度です。 
PBA 
物理アドレス 
LBA 
論理アドレス 
0001 
0687 
1968 
3786 
9821 
0001 
0508 
3544 
9871 
0051 
Access Request 
From Host 
ホストからの 
Access to the physically アクセス要求 
Assigned position 
プラッタ上の指定 
エリアにアクセス
SA Modules are loaded into PCB 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
Complete 
(^o^)
When SA Modules loading completes fine 
PowerON Ready 
Wow , I did it ! 
I have access to all 
data ! 
やった! 
LBA全域アクセス 
できるぞー! 
LBA Zone
Damage of SA Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
Error! 
Can’t Read 
Or 
Module is 
corrupted 
ABORT
Damage of SA Module : No LBA Access 
PowerON Ready 
I can’t access LBA zone, 
because there was a SA module 
error. 
The data should be in LBA Zone, 
but I can not access LBA 0 
SAモジュールに異常があった 
から、LBA領域にアクセスで 
きない。HDDにはデータある 
はずなのにな。 
LBA Zone
NO SA 
NO DATA
If the SA module error was caused intentionally by ,,,,, 
もし、誰かがわざとSAモジュールに異常を生じさせたら、、、
Intentional Damage to SA module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module
Intentional Damage to SA module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module
Damage of SA Module : No LBA Access 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
Error! 
Can’t Read 
Or 
Module is 
corrupted
Intentional Damage to SA module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
Error! 
Can’t Read 
Or 
Module is 
corrupted
Damage of SA Module : No LBA Access 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
SA 
Module 
Error! 
Can’t Read 
Or 
Module is 
corrupted 
ABORT
BARUSER 
Let’s see what happens to HDD 
さあ、実際にやってみましょう
BARUSER 
BARUSER = BARUSU + ER
Main Concept of HiDR ( High Integrity Data Recovery ) 
SAモジュールは百種以上! 
このサンプル事例では、 
WD10EADS-22M2B0 を使用。 
SAモジュール数は全部で397 種
Main Concept of HiDR ( High Integrity Data Recovery ) 
このサンプル事例では、 
WD10EADS-22M2B0 を使用。 
SAモジュール数は全部で397 種 
必須かつユニークなのは7 種 
7 ÷ 397 ≒  1.76%
Main Concept of HiDR ( High Integrity Data Recovery ) 
Only 1.76%
Hot Swap Method : ホットスワップ手法 
通電した状態のまま、PatientにPCBを付け替えます。 
通電したまま
Main Concept of HiDR ( High Integrity Data Recovery ) 
未開封、ヘッド交換なしでID認 
識しないHDDでもデータが読め 
る 
必要最低限のモジュールアクセス 
だけで済む 
障害部位を確実かつ詳細に把握し 
、尚且つデバイスの特徴を予め研 
究調査しておくことで、より安全 
かつ多くのデータを回収すること 
ができる。 
クリーンエア環境下とはいえ、開 
封時には異物が混入することは避 
けられない。クリーンルームが絶 
対にキレイとは限らない。 
Non-Destructive Method even for 
HDD which doesn’t give its device ID. 
The least access to the magnetic disk 
for its booting is enough for data 
recovery. 
It is good to know the details of SA 
modules because the integrity of data 
recovery process becomes very high. 
Do not rely too much upon clean 
rooms because inside of the clean room 
is not always clean.
Security or Utility 
Hacked Cracked 
Good for 
Data leakage preventing 
VS Bad for 
Future data use
HDD customization against Future SA Damage 
Head Platter 
Head 5 
Head 4 
Head 3 
Head 2 
Head 1 
Head 0 
Head Map
HDD customization against Future SA Damage 
Head 5 
Head 4 
Head 3 
Head 2 
Head 1 
Head 0 
System Head 
Head Platter
HDD customization against Future SA Damage 
Head 5 
Head 4 
Head 3 
Head 2 
Head 1 
Head 0 
System Disk 
Head Platter
HDD customization against Future SA Damage 
SA exists only on the system disk, h0 and h1 
SA Region for h2,h3,h4,h5 are empty 
Head Platter 
Head 5 
Head 4 
Head 3 
Head 2 
Head 1 
Head 0
HDD customization against Future SA Damage 
Utilize the empty zone for SA backup ! 
Head Platter 
Head 5 
Head 4 
Head 3 
Head 2 
Head 1 
Head 0
http://www.disaster-data-recovery.com/ 
Initial Response Guideline 
For Disaster Effected HDD 
1. Do NOT Power ON ! 
電気を入れない! 
2.Do NOT Dry before cleaning ! 
洗浄前に乾燥させない! 
3.Sea Water should be removed ASAP ! 
海水で腐食は待ったなし! 
ガイドラインを多言語化(英語・日本語・ロシア語・中国 
語)

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Preventing hard disk firmware manipulation attack and disaster recovery by Dai Shimogaito

  • 1. Disaster Data Recovery method for HDD by Dai Shimogaito January, 17th, 2014  at CODEBLUE in Tokyo
  • 2. What is Disaster Recovery ? 1.To Recover Computer System which had suffered from natural disaster, like tsunami, river flood, storm, and earthquake Platter Surface Damage 2.To Protect Computer System and get Ready for a large scale crash. AFTER Disaster The most difficult problem for data recovery BEFORE Disaster Physical Damage caused by Software HDD Customization for Platter Damage
  • 3. Three Failures Lead to Data Loss • Logical Failure • System failure • Data corruption • Deletion of data. • Electronic Failure • Printed Circuit Board (PCB) • On or more of the PCB components • ROM or the System Area data is damaged. • Physical Failure • Sticktion • Spindle bearing is frozen • Head crash (dropped hard drive).
  • 4. Features of HDD which suffered from natural disaster 1. Chips on PCB are gone 2. HDD falls down and gets stong shock 3. Dirt comes inside HDD 4. Water comes inside HDD Severe Damage ! Normal Data Recovery Process is useless, because the damage level is extremely high
  • 5. After a Natural Disaster, HDD can look like this
  • 6. What is Data Recovery ? Trying to image data from non-accessible HDD sector by sector. アクセス不能なHDDから、できるだけ多くのデータをクローンコピー取得を試 みる Copy Broken No access to data (故障でアクセス不能) Good Full Access to data (正常動作するHDD)
  • 7. What is Data Recovery ? Basically, parts replacement is the way for temporary repair. 基本的には、故障した部品を交換して、一時的にHDDを復活させます。 Fire Accident
  • 8. What is Data Recovery ? 100% clone is always preferrable, but the result depends on the type of damage to HDD and the data recovery process. できれば100%クローンコピーの作成が望ましいのですが、故障の種類や損傷の 強弱、そして復旧プロセスの違いによっては、回収率が低くなることがあります 。 ←  Low High →
  • 9. Replaceability with Donor Part (ドナー部品との置換性) HSA YES [ Head Stack Assembly ] Head Map, Capacity, Architecture Family, Microjog SPM YES [ Spindle Motor ] Seizure Problem, Lubricating oil PCB YES [ Printed Circuit Board ] Serial ROM, NV-RAM, Fuse, Resister, Diode, Capacitor, Coil, Microchip / Repairment is also useful FW YES & NO [ Firmware ] Unique module, Non-unique module, Regeneratable module, Essential Module Disk NO [ Platter ] Bad Sector, Scratch, particules on surface
  • 10. Replaceability with Donor Part (ドナー部品との置換性) HSA YES SPM YES PCB YES FW YES & NO Disk NO
  • 11. Replaceability with Donor Part (ドナー部品との置換性) HSA YES SPM YES PCB YES FW YES & NO Disk NO スラスト軸受 回転方向 ジャーナル軸受 回転方向 潤滑油 溝 ディスク
  • 12. Replaceability with Donor Part (ドナー部品との置換性) HSA YES SPM YES PCB YES FW YES & NO Disk NO
  • 13. Replaceability with Donor Part (ドナー部品との置換性) HSA YES SPM YES PCB YES FW YES & NO Disk NO SA Service Area UA User Area SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA Firmware = Service Modules SA Modules are located on platters
  • 14. Replaceability with Donor Part (ドナー部品との置換性) HSA YES SPM YES PCB YES FW YES & NO Disk NO Data is recorded into platters. Replacement means nothing.
  • 15. Replaceability with Donor Part HSA YES [ Head Stack Assembly ] Head Map, Capacity, Architecture Family, Microjog SPM YES [ Spindle Motor ] If unique parts are corrupt, Seizure Problem, there Lubricating is no way oil to recover data PCB YES [ Printed Circuit Board ] Serial ROM, NV-RAM, Fuse, Resister, Diode, Capacitor, Coil, Microchip / Repairment is also useful FW YES & NO [ Firmware ] Unique module, Non-unique module, Regeneratable module, Essential Module Disk NO [ Platter ] Bad Sector, Scratch, particules on surface
  • 16. The Most Difficult problem is Platter Damage 3.5inch PATA
  • 17. The Most Difficult problem is Platter Damage 2.5inch SAS
  • 18. The Most Difficult problem is Platter Damage
  • 19. The Most Difficult problem is Platter Damage
  • 20. The Most Difficult problem is Platter Damage
  • 21. For a long time, DR from scratched disk has been impossible If the surface is partially damaged, there should be recoverable data in the areas which were not damaged. 部分的にしかキズが付いていないなら、 それ以外の部分にはデータは残っている はず、、、、、、
  • 22. Why is it so difficult to read damaged surface ? Let’s take an extreme close look at Disk & Head !
  • 23. Disk Surface & Slider Flying Height 1-3 nm Lubricant Layer               1nm     潤滑層Diamond Like Carbon Coating Layer   コーティング 層 Magnetic Layer                    磁性層 3nm Disk Rotation Direction → 1 ~3nm Slider スライダ R/W Head
  • 24. The gap between Head and Disk is very small Slider Flying Height 1-3nm PPaarrttiiccllee SSiizzee ooff CCiiggaarreettttee SSmmookkee 110000--11000000nnmm
  • 25. How head crash damages the surface Slider R/W Lubricant Layer DLC Layer Magnetic Layer Head Slider R/W Lubricant Layer DLC Layer Magnetic Layer Head Slider R/W Lubricant Layer DLC Layer Magnetic Layer Head
  • 26. Cause of malfunction of HSA when reading damaged surface 1. Scratch is not the main cause of the bad operation of Head Stack Assembly 2. Particles on the surface stick to sliders. 3. Slider’s flying becomes unstable because of the particles on the surface of the disk and the sliders. So, Let’s clean the surface !
  • 28. NO DUST NO PROBLEM
  • 29. The 1st step of the research completed with a good result 94% UP ! 0.02% Newspaper : Nikkei Business Daily, 26th Septempber 2013
  • 30. Precise surface analyzing is required for better recovery Optical Surface Analyzer
  • 31. July 2012, research was started by Prof.Hiroshi Tani Prof. Hiroshi Tani @ Kansai Univ.
  • 32. What we can do BEFORE disater occurs Physical Damage caused by Software ??? ソフトウェアがハードウェアを壊す???
  • 33. What is the HDD’s Boot Sequence ? Let’s go to the finish line together with everyone ! Start Finish
  • 34. HDD’s Boot Sequence Needs to complete each sequence, then can reach to “Ready” mode PowerON Ready
  • 35. User Area & Service Area SA Service Area UA User Area SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA SA
  • 36. SA Modules • P-List : Primary Defect List • G-List : Growth Defect List • Translator : LBA access ⇔ PBA access • S.M.A.R.T. Self-Monitoring Analysis and Reporting Technology
  • 37. Defects × × × × × × × × Defects info = Position of Bad Sectors in PBA
  • 38. Defects info is Unique to each disk × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × ×
  • 39. Defects info is Unique to each disk P-List : Primary Defect List × × × × × × × × G-List : Growth Defect List × × × × × × × × × × × ×××
  • 41. PBA(物理アドレス)とLBA(論理アドレス) LBA exists logically upon PBA. The following shows good sectors from address 0. 通常、“アドレス”や“セクタ”が指す対象は論理アドレスのこと。 下図は、欠陥セクタが無い正常なセクタが連続している領域の状態を示していま す。 Physical Block Address 物理アドレス → 0 1 2 3 4 5 Logical Block Address 論理アドレス → 0 1 2 3 4 5
  • 42. Defects Controlling (不良物理セクタの管理) 物理アドレス → P-List Table 2・・・ 0 1 2 3 4 5 論理アドレス → 0 1 2 3 4
  • 43. Translator Converter function between LBA and PBA If the translator is broken, no data is accessible. One of the most important module. 論理アドレスと物理アドレスの変換テーブル このデータが読めなければ、プラッタ上の全ての磁気データを読み出すことができたとしても、ファイル やフォルダは一切復旧できません。SAモジュールの中でもトップクラスの重要度です。 PBA 物理アドレス LBA 論理アドレス 0001 0687 1968 3786 9821 0001 0508 3544 9871 0051 Access Request From Host ホストからの Access to the physically アクセス要求 Assigned position プラッタ上の指定 エリアにアクセス
  • 44. SA Modules are loaded into PCB SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module Complete (^o^)
  • 45. When SA Modules loading completes fine PowerON Ready Wow , I did it ! I have access to all data ! やった! LBA全域アクセス できるぞー! LBA Zone
  • 46. Damage of SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module Error! Can’t Read Or Module is corrupted ABORT
  • 47. Damage of SA Module : No LBA Access PowerON Ready I can’t access LBA zone, because there was a SA module error. The data should be in LBA Zone, but I can not access LBA 0 SAモジュールに異常があった から、LBA領域にアクセスで きない。HDDにはデータある はずなのにな。 LBA Zone
  • 48. NO SA NO DATA
  • 49. If the SA module error was caused intentionally by ,,,,, もし、誰かがわざとSAモジュールに異常を生じさせたら、、、
  • 50. Intentional Damage to SA module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module
  • 51. Intentional Damage to SA module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module
  • 52. Damage of SA Module : No LBA Access SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module Error! Can’t Read Or Module is corrupted
  • 53. Intentional Damage to SA module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module Error! Can’t Read Or Module is corrupted
  • 54. Damage of SA Module : No LBA Access SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module SA Module Error! Can’t Read Or Module is corrupted ABORT
  • 55. BARUSER Let’s see what happens to HDD さあ、実際にやってみましょう
  • 56. BARUSER BARUSER = BARUSU + ER
  • 57. Main Concept of HiDR ( High Integrity Data Recovery ) SAモジュールは百種以上! このサンプル事例では、 WD10EADS-22M2B0 を使用。 SAモジュール数は全部で397 種
  • 58. Main Concept of HiDR ( High Integrity Data Recovery ) このサンプル事例では、 WD10EADS-22M2B0 を使用。 SAモジュール数は全部で397 種 必須かつユニークなのは7 種 7 ÷ 397 ≒  1.76%
  • 59. Main Concept of HiDR ( High Integrity Data Recovery ) Only 1.76%
  • 60. Hot Swap Method : ホットスワップ手法 通電した状態のまま、PatientにPCBを付け替えます。 通電したまま
  • 61. Main Concept of HiDR ( High Integrity Data Recovery ) 未開封、ヘッド交換なしでID認 識しないHDDでもデータが読め る 必要最低限のモジュールアクセス だけで済む 障害部位を確実かつ詳細に把握し 、尚且つデバイスの特徴を予め研 究調査しておくことで、より安全 かつ多くのデータを回収すること ができる。 クリーンエア環境下とはいえ、開 封時には異物が混入することは避 けられない。クリーンルームが絶 対にキレイとは限らない。 Non-Destructive Method even for HDD which doesn’t give its device ID. The least access to the magnetic disk for its booting is enough for data recovery. It is good to know the details of SA modules because the integrity of data recovery process becomes very high. Do not rely too much upon clean rooms because inside of the clean room is not always clean.
  • 62. Security or Utility Hacked Cracked Good for Data leakage preventing VS Bad for Future data use
  • 63. HDD customization against Future SA Damage Head Platter Head 5 Head 4 Head 3 Head 2 Head 1 Head 0 Head Map
  • 64. HDD customization against Future SA Damage Head 5 Head 4 Head 3 Head 2 Head 1 Head 0 System Head Head Platter
  • 65. HDD customization against Future SA Damage Head 5 Head 4 Head 3 Head 2 Head 1 Head 0 System Disk Head Platter
  • 66. HDD customization against Future SA Damage SA exists only on the system disk, h0 and h1 SA Region for h2,h3,h4,h5 are empty Head Platter Head 5 Head 4 Head 3 Head 2 Head 1 Head 0
  • 67. HDD customization against Future SA Damage Utilize the empty zone for SA backup ! Head Platter Head 5 Head 4 Head 3 Head 2 Head 1 Head 0
  • 68. http://www.disaster-data-recovery.com/ Initial Response Guideline For Disaster Effected HDD 1. Do NOT Power ON ! 電気を入れない! 2.Do NOT Dry before cleaning ! 洗浄前に乾燥させない! 3.Sea Water should be removed ASAP ! 海水で腐食は待ったなし! ガイドラインを多言語化(英語・日本語・ロシア語・中国 語)

Notes de l'éditeur

  1. HDD製造時に既に検出されており、ユーザが使用することのない不良領域がある場合にはその位置情報がP-List(Primary Defect List)に記録されます。尚、P-Listに記載されたセクタは論理アドレスを有しません。
  2. Mod02がID&SN用
  3. Mod02がID&SN用
  4. Mod02がID&SN用