SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 26
The Tao of GRC
Danny Lieberman
CTO – Software Associates, Israel
2
I have heard of military operations that
were clumsy but swift, but I have never
seen one that was skillful and lasted a long
time.
Master Sun
(Chapter 2 – Doing Battle, the Art of War)
The Tao of GRC
• Practical
• Any business can cook
• Protect customers and
comply more
effectively with
regulation.
3
Agenda
• The flavors of GRC
• Why GRC 1.0 is broken
• The Tao of GRC
• Why it works
4
3 flavors of GRC
• Government
• Industry
• Vendor-neutral standards
5
Government
• SOX, GLBA, HIPAA, EU Privacy, FDA
• Protect consumer
• Top-down risk analysis
6
Industry
• PCI DSS 1.2
• Protect card associations
• No risk analysis
7
Vendor-neutral standards
• ISO2700x
• Protect information assets
• Audit focus
8
GRC 1.0
• Big Enterprise Software
• “automate the workflow and documentation
management associated with costly and complex GRC
processes”
Sword, Oracle, CA, Gartner, Forrester
9
Why GRC 1.0 is broken
10
Fixed control structures
Focusing on yesterday’s threats
4 mistakes CIOS make
11
1. Focus on process while ignoring that
hackers attack software
2. Label vendors as partners
3. Confuse business alignment with risk
reduction
Both attackers and defenders have
imperfect knowledge in making
their decisions.
12
Mobile clinical assistants
• Mobile medical devices
used by hospital radiologists
had unplanned Internet
access.
• Over 300 devices infected
by Conficker and taken out
of service.
• Regulatory
requirements mandated
that the impacted
hospitals would have to
wait 90 days before the
systems could be
modified to remove the
infections and
vulnerabilities.
13
The Tao of GRC
14
Step 1 - Adopt a standard language
15
The threat analysis base class
People Threats Methods
People entities
16
Decision makers
• Encounter threats that
damage their assets
• Risk is part of running a
business
Attackers
• Create threats & exploit
vulnerabilities
• Fame, fortune, sales
channel
Consultants
• Assess risk, recommend
countermeasures
• Billable hours
Vendors
• Provide countermeasures
• Marketing rhetoric,
pseudo science
Threat entities
17
• An attacker may
exploit vulnerabilities
to cause damage to
assets.
• Security
countermeasures
mitigate
vulnerabilities and
reduce risk.
Asset
Vulnerability
Counter
measures
Attacker
Threat T3 – Malicious code may be used in order to exploit
OS vulnerabilities and obtain patient information from
mobile medical devices
Vulnerability V3 – Unnecessary devices may be enabled
Countermeasure C4 – Hardware toggle USB on
Countermeasure C5 – Network isolation
Countermeasure C6 – Software security assessment
Example threat scenario
18
Attackers
ePHI
Weak or well-
known
passwords
Software
defects
OS
vulnerabilities
Methods
• SetThreatProbability
– estimated annual rate of occurrence of the threat
• SetThreatDamageToAsset
– estimated damage to asset value as a percentage
• SetCountermeasureEffectiveness
– estimated effectiveness as a percentage
• SetAssetValue , GetValueAtRisk
– in Dollars/Euro/Rupee
19
Step 2 - Learn to speak fluently
20
Learn on the job
Vis-à-vis the regulator
• Understand what audit
requirements count
Vis-à-vis your business
• Understand what
threats count
• Prioritize
• Increase profits
21
Understand what threats count
22
Prioritize countermeasures
Step 3 Go green
• Measure risk reduction in money
• Attention to root causes
• Recycle controls & policies
24
Why the Tao of GRC works
• Threat models are
transparent and
recyclable.
• Transparency means
more eyeballs can look at
issues.
• Recycling & more eyeballs
reduces cost.
• More eyeballs means
safer products.
• Safer products means
more revenue.
25
Acknowledgements
26
1. Michel Godet, for sharing his work
reducing silos and creating reusable
risk building blocks
2. Wlodek Grudzinski, for sharing his
insights as a bank CEO and
introducing me to Imperfect
Knowledge Economics
3. My clients ,for giving me the
opportunity to teach them the
language of threats.
4. My colleagues at PTA Technologies
for doing a great job.

More Related Content

What's hot

TIC-TOC: Ransomware: Help your Customers be Prepared with Dominique Singer an...
TIC-TOC: Ransomware: Help your Customers be Prepared with Dominique Singer an...TIC-TOC: Ransomware: Help your Customers be Prepared with Dominique Singer an...
TIC-TOC: Ransomware: Help your Customers be Prepared with Dominique Singer an...SaraPia5
 
Why Zero Trust Yields Maximum Security
Why Zero Trust Yields Maximum SecurityWhy Zero Trust Yields Maximum Security
Why Zero Trust Yields Maximum SecurityPriyanka Aash
 
Luncheon 2015-06-18 Security Industry 2.0: Survival in the Boardroom by David...
Luncheon 2015-06-18 Security Industry 2.0: Survival in the Boardroom by David...Luncheon 2015-06-18 Security Industry 2.0: Survival in the Boardroom by David...
Luncheon 2015-06-18 Security Industry 2.0: Survival in the Boardroom by David...North Texas Chapter of the ISSA
 
You can't detect what you can't see illuminating the entire kill chain
You can't detect what you can't see   illuminating the entire kill chainYou can't detect what you can't see   illuminating the entire kill chain
You can't detect what you can't see illuminating the entire kill chainFidelis Cybersecurity
 
Hardware Security on Vehicles
Hardware Security on VehiclesHardware Security on Vehicles
Hardware Security on VehiclesPriyanka Aash
 
Security Monitoring using SIEM null bangalore meet april 2015
Security Monitoring using SIEM null bangalore meet april 2015Security Monitoring using SIEM null bangalore meet april 2015
Security Monitoring using SIEM null bangalore meet april 2015n|u - The Open Security Community
 
Jump Start Your Application Security Knowledge
Jump Start Your Application Security KnowledgeJump Start Your Application Security Knowledge
Jump Start Your Application Security KnowledgeDenim Group
 
Malware evolution and Endpoint Detection and Response
Malware evolution and Endpoint Detection and Response Malware evolution and Endpoint Detection and Response
Malware evolution and Endpoint Detection and Response Adrian Guthrie
 
DC970 Presents: Defense in Depth
DC970 Presents: Defense in DepthDC970 Presents: Defense in Depth
DC970 Presents: Defense in DepthIceQUICK
 
Outpost24 webinar: The state of ransomware in 2021 and how to limit your expo...
Outpost24 webinar: The state of ransomware in 2021 and how to limit your expo...Outpost24 webinar: The state of ransomware in 2021 and how to limit your expo...
Outpost24 webinar: The state of ransomware in 2021 and how to limit your expo...Outpost24
 
Vulnerability Management – Opportunities and Challenges!
Vulnerability Management – Opportunities and Challenges!Vulnerability Management – Opportunities and Challenges!
Vulnerability Management – Opportunities and Challenges!Outpost24
 
GDPR: The Application Security Twist
GDPR: The Application Security TwistGDPR: The Application Security Twist
GDPR: The Application Security TwistSecurity Innovation
 
Security Consulting Services - Which Is The Best Option For Me? - Diego Sor, ...
Security Consulting Services - Which Is The Best Option For Me? - Diego Sor, ...Security Consulting Services - Which Is The Best Option For Me? - Diego Sor, ...
Security Consulting Services - Which Is The Best Option For Me? - Diego Sor, ...Core Security
 
Time Traveling: Adapting Techniques from the Future to Improve Reliability, J...
Time Traveling: Adapting Techniques from the Future to Improve Reliability, J...Time Traveling: Adapting Techniques from the Future to Improve Reliability, J...
Time Traveling: Adapting Techniques from the Future to Improve Reliability, J...Digital Bond
 
Slide Deck - CISSP Mentor Program Class Session 1
Slide Deck - CISSP Mentor Program Class Session 1Slide Deck - CISSP Mentor Program Class Session 1
Slide Deck - CISSP Mentor Program Class Session 1FRSecure
 
Bridging the Gap Between Threat Intelligence and Risk Management
Bridging the Gap Between Threat Intelligence and Risk ManagementBridging the Gap Between Threat Intelligence and Risk Management
Bridging the Gap Between Threat Intelligence and Risk ManagementPriyanka Aash
 
Security Operations and Response
Security Operations and ResponseSecurity Operations and Response
Security Operations and Responsexband
 
An introduction to Cyber Essentials
An introduction to Cyber EssentialsAn introduction to Cyber Essentials
An introduction to Cyber EssentialsJisc
 
Cyber security series advanced persistent threats
Cyber security series   advanced persistent threats Cyber security series   advanced persistent threats
Cyber security series advanced persistent threats Jim Kaplan CIA CFE
 
Chapter 15 incident handling
Chapter 15 incident handlingChapter 15 incident handling
Chapter 15 incident handlingnewbie2019
 

What's hot (20)

TIC-TOC: Ransomware: Help your Customers be Prepared with Dominique Singer an...
TIC-TOC: Ransomware: Help your Customers be Prepared with Dominique Singer an...TIC-TOC: Ransomware: Help your Customers be Prepared with Dominique Singer an...
TIC-TOC: Ransomware: Help your Customers be Prepared with Dominique Singer an...
 
Why Zero Trust Yields Maximum Security
Why Zero Trust Yields Maximum SecurityWhy Zero Trust Yields Maximum Security
Why Zero Trust Yields Maximum Security
 
Luncheon 2015-06-18 Security Industry 2.0: Survival in the Boardroom by David...
Luncheon 2015-06-18 Security Industry 2.0: Survival in the Boardroom by David...Luncheon 2015-06-18 Security Industry 2.0: Survival in the Boardroom by David...
Luncheon 2015-06-18 Security Industry 2.0: Survival in the Boardroom by David...
 
You can't detect what you can't see illuminating the entire kill chain
You can't detect what you can't see   illuminating the entire kill chainYou can't detect what you can't see   illuminating the entire kill chain
You can't detect what you can't see illuminating the entire kill chain
 
Hardware Security on Vehicles
Hardware Security on VehiclesHardware Security on Vehicles
Hardware Security on Vehicles
 
Security Monitoring using SIEM null bangalore meet april 2015
Security Monitoring using SIEM null bangalore meet april 2015Security Monitoring using SIEM null bangalore meet april 2015
Security Monitoring using SIEM null bangalore meet april 2015
 
Jump Start Your Application Security Knowledge
Jump Start Your Application Security KnowledgeJump Start Your Application Security Knowledge
Jump Start Your Application Security Knowledge
 
Malware evolution and Endpoint Detection and Response
Malware evolution and Endpoint Detection and Response Malware evolution and Endpoint Detection and Response
Malware evolution and Endpoint Detection and Response
 
DC970 Presents: Defense in Depth
DC970 Presents: Defense in DepthDC970 Presents: Defense in Depth
DC970 Presents: Defense in Depth
 
Outpost24 webinar: The state of ransomware in 2021 and how to limit your expo...
Outpost24 webinar: The state of ransomware in 2021 and how to limit your expo...Outpost24 webinar: The state of ransomware in 2021 and how to limit your expo...
Outpost24 webinar: The state of ransomware in 2021 and how to limit your expo...
 
Vulnerability Management – Opportunities and Challenges!
Vulnerability Management – Opportunities and Challenges!Vulnerability Management – Opportunities and Challenges!
Vulnerability Management – Opportunities and Challenges!
 
GDPR: The Application Security Twist
GDPR: The Application Security TwistGDPR: The Application Security Twist
GDPR: The Application Security Twist
 
Security Consulting Services - Which Is The Best Option For Me? - Diego Sor, ...
Security Consulting Services - Which Is The Best Option For Me? - Diego Sor, ...Security Consulting Services - Which Is The Best Option For Me? - Diego Sor, ...
Security Consulting Services - Which Is The Best Option For Me? - Diego Sor, ...
 
Time Traveling: Adapting Techniques from the Future to Improve Reliability, J...
Time Traveling: Adapting Techniques from the Future to Improve Reliability, J...Time Traveling: Adapting Techniques from the Future to Improve Reliability, J...
Time Traveling: Adapting Techniques from the Future to Improve Reliability, J...
 
Slide Deck - CISSP Mentor Program Class Session 1
Slide Deck - CISSP Mentor Program Class Session 1Slide Deck - CISSP Mentor Program Class Session 1
Slide Deck - CISSP Mentor Program Class Session 1
 
Bridging the Gap Between Threat Intelligence and Risk Management
Bridging the Gap Between Threat Intelligence and Risk ManagementBridging the Gap Between Threat Intelligence and Risk Management
Bridging the Gap Between Threat Intelligence and Risk Management
 
Security Operations and Response
Security Operations and ResponseSecurity Operations and Response
Security Operations and Response
 
An introduction to Cyber Essentials
An introduction to Cyber EssentialsAn introduction to Cyber Essentials
An introduction to Cyber Essentials
 
Cyber security series advanced persistent threats
Cyber security series   advanced persistent threats Cyber security series   advanced persistent threats
Cyber security series advanced persistent threats
 
Chapter 15 incident handling
Chapter 15 incident handlingChapter 15 incident handling
Chapter 15 incident handling
 

Similar to Grc tao.4

The myth of secure computing; management information system; MIS
The myth of secure computing; management information system; MISThe myth of secure computing; management information system; MIS
The myth of secure computing; management information system; MISSaazan Shrestha
 
Your cyber security webinar
Your cyber security webinarYour cyber security webinar
Your cyber security webinarEmpired
 
RMS Security Breakfast
RMS Security BreakfastRMS Security Breakfast
RMS Security BreakfastRackspace
 
Today's Breach Reality, The IR Imperative, And What You Can Do About It
Today's Breach Reality, The IR Imperative, And What You Can Do About ItToday's Breach Reality, The IR Imperative, And What You Can Do About It
Today's Breach Reality, The IR Imperative, And What You Can Do About ItResilient Systems
 
Today's Cyber Challenges: Methodology to Secure Your Business
Today's Cyber Challenges: Methodology to Secure Your BusinessToday's Cyber Challenges: Methodology to Secure Your Business
Today's Cyber Challenges: Methodology to Secure Your BusinessJoAnna Cheshire
 
Your cyber security webinar
Your cyber security webinarYour cyber security webinar
Your cyber security webinarIntergen
 
Lessons Learned Fighting Modern Cyberthreats in Critical ICS Networks
Lessons Learned Fighting Modern Cyberthreats in Critical ICS NetworksLessons Learned Fighting Modern Cyberthreats in Critical ICS Networks
Lessons Learned Fighting Modern Cyberthreats in Critical ICS NetworksAngeloluca Barba
 
Too Small to Get Hacked? Think Again (Webinar)
Too Small to Get Hacked? Think Again (Webinar)Too Small to Get Hacked? Think Again (Webinar)
Too Small to Get Hacked? Think Again (Webinar)OnRamp
 
IBM QRadar Security Intelligence Overview
IBM QRadar Security Intelligence OverviewIBM QRadar Security Intelligence Overview
IBM QRadar Security Intelligence OverviewCamilo Fandiño Gómez
 
IBM QRadar Security Intelligence Overview
IBM QRadar Security Intelligence OverviewIBM QRadar Security Intelligence Overview
IBM QRadar Security Intelligence OverviewCamilo Fandiño Gómez
 
Incident Response in the age of Nation State Cyber Attacks
Incident Response in the age of Nation State Cyber AttacksIncident Response in the age of Nation State Cyber Attacks
Incident Response in the age of Nation State Cyber AttacksResilient Systems
 
How to Raise Cyber Risk Awareness and Management to the C-Suite
How to Raise Cyber Risk Awareness and Management to the C-SuiteHow to Raise Cyber Risk Awareness and Management to the C-Suite
How to Raise Cyber Risk Awareness and Management to the C-SuiteSurfWatch Labs
 
INFRAGARD 2014: Back to basics security
INFRAGARD 2014: Back to basics securityINFRAGARD 2014: Back to basics security
INFRAGARD 2014: Back to basics securityJoel Cardella
 
Protecting health and life science organizations from breaches and ransomware
Protecting health and life science organizations from breaches and ransomwareProtecting health and life science organizations from breaches and ransomware
Protecting health and life science organizations from breaches and ransomwareCloudera, Inc.
 
Defending Your IBM i Against Malware
Defending Your IBM i Against MalwareDefending Your IBM i Against Malware
Defending Your IBM i Against MalwarePrecisely
 

Similar to Grc tao.4 (20)

The myth of secure computing; management information system; MIS
The myth of secure computing; management information system; MISThe myth of secure computing; management information system; MIS
The myth of secure computing; management information system; MIS
 
Managing security threats in today’s enterprise
Managing security threats in today’s enterpriseManaging security threats in today’s enterprise
Managing security threats in today’s enterprise
 
Cyber Security for Non-Technical Executives (SC GMIS) Columbia, SC
Cyber Security for Non-Technical Executives (SC GMIS) Columbia, SCCyber Security for Non-Technical Executives (SC GMIS) Columbia, SC
Cyber Security for Non-Technical Executives (SC GMIS) Columbia, SC
 
Your cyber security webinar
Your cyber security webinarYour cyber security webinar
Your cyber security webinar
 
RMS Security Breakfast
RMS Security BreakfastRMS Security Breakfast
RMS Security Breakfast
 
Today's Breach Reality, The IR Imperative, And What You Can Do About It
Today's Breach Reality, The IR Imperative, And What You Can Do About ItToday's Breach Reality, The IR Imperative, And What You Can Do About It
Today's Breach Reality, The IR Imperative, And What You Can Do About It
 
Today's Cyber Challenges: Methodology to Secure Your Business
Today's Cyber Challenges: Methodology to Secure Your BusinessToday's Cyber Challenges: Methodology to Secure Your Business
Today's Cyber Challenges: Methodology to Secure Your Business
 
Your cyber security webinar
Your cyber security webinarYour cyber security webinar
Your cyber security webinar
 
Lessons Learned Fighting Modern Cyberthreats in Critical ICS Networks
Lessons Learned Fighting Modern Cyberthreats in Critical ICS NetworksLessons Learned Fighting Modern Cyberthreats in Critical ICS Networks
Lessons Learned Fighting Modern Cyberthreats in Critical ICS Networks
 
Too Small to Get Hacked? Think Again (Webinar)
Too Small to Get Hacked? Think Again (Webinar)Too Small to Get Hacked? Think Again (Webinar)
Too Small to Get Hacked? Think Again (Webinar)
 
IBM QRadar Security Intelligence Overview
IBM QRadar Security Intelligence OverviewIBM QRadar Security Intelligence Overview
IBM QRadar Security Intelligence Overview
 
IBM QRadar Security Intelligence Overview
IBM QRadar Security Intelligence OverviewIBM QRadar Security Intelligence Overview
IBM QRadar Security Intelligence Overview
 
Incident Response in the age of Nation State Cyber Attacks
Incident Response in the age of Nation State Cyber AttacksIncident Response in the age of Nation State Cyber Attacks
Incident Response in the age of Nation State Cyber Attacks
 
How to Raise Cyber Risk Awareness and Management to the C-Suite
How to Raise Cyber Risk Awareness and Management to the C-SuiteHow to Raise Cyber Risk Awareness and Management to the C-Suite
How to Raise Cyber Risk Awareness and Management to the C-Suite
 
INFRAGARD 2014: Back to basics security
INFRAGARD 2014: Back to basics securityINFRAGARD 2014: Back to basics security
INFRAGARD 2014: Back to basics security
 
Protecting health and life science organizations from breaches and ransomware
Protecting health and life science organizations from breaches and ransomwareProtecting health and life science organizations from breaches and ransomware
Protecting health and life science organizations from breaches and ransomware
 
CRI Cyber Board Briefing
CRI Cyber Board Briefing CRI Cyber Board Briefing
CRI Cyber Board Briefing
 
Cyber Security # Lec 3
Cyber Security # Lec 3 Cyber Security # Lec 3
Cyber Security # Lec 3
 
Defending Your IBM i Against Malware
Defending Your IBM i Against MalwareDefending Your IBM i Against Malware
Defending Your IBM i Against Malware
 
Secure Iowa Oct 2016
Secure Iowa Oct 2016Secure Iowa Oct 2016
Secure Iowa Oct 2016
 

More from Flaskdata.io

Flaskdata - Observability for clinical data
Flaskdata - Observability for clinical dataFlaskdata - Observability for clinical data
Flaskdata - Observability for clinical dataFlaskdata.io
 
The travel industry does real-time. Why doesn't clinical research?
The travel industry does real-time. Why doesn't clinical research?The travel industry does real-time. Why doesn't clinical research?
The travel industry does real-time. Why doesn't clinical research?Flaskdata.io
 
Flaskdata.io automated monitoring for clinical trials
Flaskdata.io automated monitoring for clinical trialsFlaskdata.io automated monitoring for clinical trials
Flaskdata.io automated monitoring for clinical trialsFlaskdata.io
 
How to write secure code
How to write secure codeHow to write secure code
How to write secure codeFlaskdata.io
 
The insights that will help your medtech clinical trial succeed
The insights that will help your medtech clinical trial succeedThe insights that will help your medtech clinical trial succeed
The insights that will help your medtech clinical trial succeedFlaskdata.io
 
2017 02-05 en-eu-data-security_v2
2017 02-05 en-eu-data-security_v22017 02-05 en-eu-data-security_v2
2017 02-05 en-eu-data-security_v2Flaskdata.io
 
Quick user guide to the Clear Clinica Cloud EDC system
Quick user guide to the Clear Clinica Cloud EDC systemQuick user guide to the Clear Clinica Cloud EDC system
Quick user guide to the Clear Clinica Cloud EDC systemFlaskdata.io
 
Killed by code 2015
Killed by code 2015Killed by code 2015
Killed by code 2015Flaskdata.io
 
Killed by code 2015
Killed by code 2015Killed by code 2015
Killed by code 2015Flaskdata.io
 
Pathcare: Patient-issue oriented healthcare
Pathcare: Patient-issue oriented healthcarePathcare: Patient-issue oriented healthcare
Pathcare: Patient-issue oriented healthcareFlaskdata.io
 
Will Web 2.0 applications break the cloud?
Will Web 2.0 applications break the cloud?Will Web 2.0 applications break the cloud?
Will Web 2.0 applications break the cloud?Flaskdata.io
 
Killed by code - mobile medical devices
Killed by code - mobile medical devicesKilled by code - mobile medical devices
Killed by code - mobile medical devicesFlaskdata.io
 
Data Security For Compliance 2
Data Security For Compliance 2Data Security For Compliance 2
Data Security For Compliance 2Flaskdata.io
 
Data Security For SMB - Fly first class on a budget
Data Security For SMB - Fly first class on a budgetData Security For SMB - Fly first class on a budget
Data Security For SMB - Fly first class on a budgetFlaskdata.io
 
Data Security Metricsa Value Based Approach
Data Security Metricsa Value Based ApproachData Security Metricsa Value Based Approach
Data Security Metricsa Value Based ApproachFlaskdata.io
 
Homeland Security - strengthening the weakest link
Homeland Security - strengthening the weakest linkHomeland Security - strengthening the weakest link
Homeland Security - strengthening the weakest linkFlaskdata.io
 
Selling Data Security Technology
Selling Data Security TechnologySelling Data Security Technology
Selling Data Security TechnologyFlaskdata.io
 
Writing An Effective Security Procedure in 2 pages or less and make it stick
Writing An Effective Security Procedure in 2 pages or less and make it stickWriting An Effective Security Procedure in 2 pages or less and make it stick
Writing An Effective Security Procedure in 2 pages or less and make it stickFlaskdata.io
 

More from Flaskdata.io (19)

Flaskdata - Observability for clinical data
Flaskdata - Observability for clinical dataFlaskdata - Observability for clinical data
Flaskdata - Observability for clinical data
 
The travel industry does real-time. Why doesn't clinical research?
The travel industry does real-time. Why doesn't clinical research?The travel industry does real-time. Why doesn't clinical research?
The travel industry does real-time. Why doesn't clinical research?
 
Flaskdata.io automated monitoring for clinical trials
Flaskdata.io automated monitoring for clinical trialsFlaskdata.io automated monitoring for clinical trials
Flaskdata.io automated monitoring for clinical trials
 
How to write secure code
How to write secure codeHow to write secure code
How to write secure code
 
The insights that will help your medtech clinical trial succeed
The insights that will help your medtech clinical trial succeedThe insights that will help your medtech clinical trial succeed
The insights that will help your medtech clinical trial succeed
 
2017 02-05 en-eu-data-security_v2
2017 02-05 en-eu-data-security_v22017 02-05 en-eu-data-security_v2
2017 02-05 en-eu-data-security_v2
 
Quick user guide to the Clear Clinica Cloud EDC system
Quick user guide to the Clear Clinica Cloud EDC systemQuick user guide to the Clear Clinica Cloud EDC system
Quick user guide to the Clear Clinica Cloud EDC system
 
Killed by code 2015
Killed by code 2015Killed by code 2015
Killed by code 2015
 
Killed by code 2015
Killed by code 2015Killed by code 2015
Killed by code 2015
 
Pathcare: Patient-issue oriented healthcare
Pathcare: Patient-issue oriented healthcarePathcare: Patient-issue oriented healthcare
Pathcare: Patient-issue oriented healthcare
 
The Tao of GRC
The Tao of GRCThe Tao of GRC
The Tao of GRC
 
Will Web 2.0 applications break the cloud?
Will Web 2.0 applications break the cloud?Will Web 2.0 applications break the cloud?
Will Web 2.0 applications break the cloud?
 
Killed by code - mobile medical devices
Killed by code - mobile medical devicesKilled by code - mobile medical devices
Killed by code - mobile medical devices
 
Data Security For Compliance 2
Data Security For Compliance 2Data Security For Compliance 2
Data Security For Compliance 2
 
Data Security For SMB - Fly first class on a budget
Data Security For SMB - Fly first class on a budgetData Security For SMB - Fly first class on a budget
Data Security For SMB - Fly first class on a budget
 
Data Security Metricsa Value Based Approach
Data Security Metricsa Value Based ApproachData Security Metricsa Value Based Approach
Data Security Metricsa Value Based Approach
 
Homeland Security - strengthening the weakest link
Homeland Security - strengthening the weakest linkHomeland Security - strengthening the weakest link
Homeland Security - strengthening the weakest link
 
Selling Data Security Technology
Selling Data Security TechnologySelling Data Security Technology
Selling Data Security Technology
 
Writing An Effective Security Procedure in 2 pages or less and make it stick
Writing An Effective Security Procedure in 2 pages or less and make it stickWriting An Effective Security Procedure in 2 pages or less and make it stick
Writing An Effective Security Procedure in 2 pages or less and make it stick
 

Grc tao.4

  • 1. The Tao of GRC Danny Lieberman CTO – Software Associates, Israel
  • 2. 2 I have heard of military operations that were clumsy but swift, but I have never seen one that was skillful and lasted a long time. Master Sun (Chapter 2 – Doing Battle, the Art of War)
  • 3. The Tao of GRC • Practical • Any business can cook • Protect customers and comply more effectively with regulation. 3
  • 4. Agenda • The flavors of GRC • Why GRC 1.0 is broken • The Tao of GRC • Why it works 4
  • 5. 3 flavors of GRC • Government • Industry • Vendor-neutral standards 5
  • 6. Government • SOX, GLBA, HIPAA, EU Privacy, FDA • Protect consumer • Top-down risk analysis 6
  • 7. Industry • PCI DSS 1.2 • Protect card associations • No risk analysis 7
  • 8. Vendor-neutral standards • ISO2700x • Protect information assets • Audit focus 8
  • 9. GRC 1.0 • Big Enterprise Software • “automate the workflow and documentation management associated with costly and complex GRC processes” Sword, Oracle, CA, Gartner, Forrester 9
  • 10. Why GRC 1.0 is broken 10 Fixed control structures Focusing on yesterday’s threats
  • 11. 4 mistakes CIOS make 11 1. Focus on process while ignoring that hackers attack software 2. Label vendors as partners 3. Confuse business alignment with risk reduction
  • 12. Both attackers and defenders have imperfect knowledge in making their decisions. 12
  • 13. Mobile clinical assistants • Mobile medical devices used by hospital radiologists had unplanned Internet access. • Over 300 devices infected by Conficker and taken out of service. • Regulatory requirements mandated that the impacted hospitals would have to wait 90 days before the systems could be modified to remove the infections and vulnerabilities. 13
  • 14. The Tao of GRC 14
  • 15. Step 1 - Adopt a standard language 15 The threat analysis base class People Threats Methods
  • 16. People entities 16 Decision makers • Encounter threats that damage their assets • Risk is part of running a business Attackers • Create threats & exploit vulnerabilities • Fame, fortune, sales channel Consultants • Assess risk, recommend countermeasures • Billable hours Vendors • Provide countermeasures • Marketing rhetoric, pseudo science
  • 17. Threat entities 17 • An attacker may exploit vulnerabilities to cause damage to assets. • Security countermeasures mitigate vulnerabilities and reduce risk. Asset Vulnerability Counter measures Attacker
  • 18. Threat T3 – Malicious code may be used in order to exploit OS vulnerabilities and obtain patient information from mobile medical devices Vulnerability V3 – Unnecessary devices may be enabled Countermeasure C4 – Hardware toggle USB on Countermeasure C5 – Network isolation Countermeasure C6 – Software security assessment Example threat scenario 18 Attackers ePHI Weak or well- known passwords Software defects OS vulnerabilities
  • 19. Methods • SetThreatProbability – estimated annual rate of occurrence of the threat • SetThreatDamageToAsset – estimated damage to asset value as a percentage • SetCountermeasureEffectiveness – estimated effectiveness as a percentage • SetAssetValue , GetValueAtRisk – in Dollars/Euro/Rupee 19
  • 20. Step 2 - Learn to speak fluently 20
  • 21. Learn on the job Vis-à-vis the regulator • Understand what audit requirements count Vis-à-vis your business • Understand what threats count • Prioritize • Increase profits 21
  • 24. Step 3 Go green • Measure risk reduction in money • Attention to root causes • Recycle controls & policies 24
  • 25. Why the Tao of GRC works • Threat models are transparent and recyclable. • Transparency means more eyeballs can look at issues. • Recycling & more eyeballs reduces cost. • More eyeballs means safer products. • Safer products means more revenue. 25
  • 26. Acknowledgements 26 1. Michel Godet, for sharing his work reducing silos and creating reusable risk building blocks 2. Wlodek Grudzinski, for sharing his insights as a bank CEO and introducing me to Imperfect Knowledge Economics 3. My clients ,for giving me the opportunity to teach them the language of threats. 4. My colleagues at PTA Technologies for doing a great job.