Geert Laporte, ECDPM Seminar on Security policies in West Africa National Defence Academy, Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management, Vienna, 18-19 April 2013

1. Security Policies of
France in West Africa
Seminar on Security policies in West Africa
National Defence Academy, Institute for Peace
Support and Conflict Management, Vienna, 18-
19 April 2013
Geert Laporte, Deputy Director, European Centre for
Development Policy Management

2. 1. Short history of French security
interests in Africa
2. Changes in new rules of the game
3. Motives for French intervention in Mali
4. Short-term gains
5. Possible long-term implications
6. Quid the EU?
7. Quid AU and ECOWAS?
8. Lessons learnt
Structure of presentation
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3. • Strong post-colonial ties with francophone Africa
(“Francafrique”- “protection of African dictators in
return for minerals”)
• Various interventions to save or remove regimes
since 1960s
• Major french bases in CI, Burkina Faso, Chad,
Gabon
• Since more than 2 decades: “ time to move away
from Francafrique” - “immoral and outdated”.
• Sarkozy: scaling down French troops
• Hollande: “France should stop playing gendarme in
Africa”
Short history of French
security interests in Africa
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4. • December 2012: French refusal to intervene in
Central African Republic…
• …January 2013: French intervention in Mali as
epicentre of post- Libya instability
• Fear of spill-over effects in the region if Malian
state implodes
• Need to move fast + unilateral action but with
approval of international community (UN
resolution- unanimous support Security
Council)
New rules of the game
can quickly change
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5. • Security motives: stopping jihadist
movements “at EU doorstep”,
preventing destabilisation of the region
• Economic motives: secure energy
resources (uranium Niger, potential oil
in Mali,..) and deter rival powers
(China-BRICS)
• Illegal trafficking (drugs)
• Hostage crisis
Motives for French
intervention in Mali
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6. • Stop Jihadists and prevent take-over
Bamako and collapse Mali
• Re-affirmation of French military power
in Africa
• Praise and backing public opinion in
France, Mali and elsewhere in
Africa/world
• Test for foreign policy approach of
Hollande
Short-term gains
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7. •Neighbouring states could be drawn in conflict
(Algeria, Niger, Libya, …)?
•Reprisal attacks against French targets in West
Africa (30,000 French) and domestic retaliation
in France?
•Sahel: new battleground of global jihadism
•Long term insurgery war with terrorists (tactical
withdrawal jihadists and regrouping)?
•No clear French exit and long term strategy
Long-term implications (1)?
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8. •Is France willing to also invest in taking away
the underlying causes and breeding ground for
extremism (= poverty, injustice, poor
governance, violence, state fragility, corruption)
and to invest in post conflict peace building?
•Military action alone will not end the crisis in Mali
•Short-term quick fix should be complemented
with structural actions
Long-term implications (2)?
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9. • Comprehensive Sahel strategy with ambitious
security dimension
• Ashton “absent” after intervention of France
• Focus on development and long term state
reconstruction + training Malian armed forces
• EU should move beyond image of soft power
• BUT, EU institutions Post Lisbon not equipped
to make EU a stronger and faster player
Quid the EU?
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10. • ECOWAS-AU Plan for promoting inclusive
democratic process, reforming defence and security
sector, restoring territorial integrity, addressing
challenges facing wider Sahel with support of UN,
EU
• November 2012: agreement on coordinated
military intervention but deployment only foreseen
in …September 2013
• Exterme dependency for peace operations on donor
funding
Quid the African side?
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11. •Mali crisis is a regional issue requiring regional
approach with regional institutions in the lead
•Military intervention should be followed by non-
military action (structural development)
•Great need for more coherent EU post crisis
engagement
•Foreign intervention can only succeed if
objectives fit in with local dynamics= Mali stands
or falls with a credible government which does
not exist
Lessons learnt
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12. Thank you!
www.ecdpm.org
gl@ecdpm.org
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