Pacific Conference on the future of the ACP Group, Samoa, 17-19 October 2013 Geert Laporte, Deputy Director, European Centre for Development Policy Management

1. The future of PacificEU relations: with or
without the ACP?
Pacific Conference on the future of the
ACP Group, Samoa, 17-19 October 2013
Geert Laporte, Deputy Director, European Centre for
Development Policy Management

2. ECDPM
Independent foundation working on ACP-EU
for more than 25 years:
1. Non-partisan facilitation of dialogue among
ACP and EU
2. Practical and policy relevant analysis
3. Systematic linking with key players in the EU
and the ACP/ Pacific through networks and
partnerships
4. Capacity building in the ACP to bring more
balance in the partnership
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3. Structure of presentation
1. Milestones in the ACP and EU reflection
process
2. Emerging general views in the ACP and in
the EU on the future of ACP and ACP-EU
relations beyond 2020
3. Emerging views in the Pacific and the EU
on the future of ACP and Pacific-EU relations
beyond 2020
4. Possible scenarios for the future of PacificEU relations beyond 2020
5. Future steps in the reflection process
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4. The debate has started…
• ACP Ambassadorial WG on future
perspectives in Brussels, Sipopo HoS
declaration, Eminent Persons Group
• DEVCO-EEAS WG and EU-Inter-service
Group
• Initial reflections in individual EU and ACP
countries
• Civil society initiatives
• Joint Parliamentary Assembly & European
Parliament
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5. ACP: between critical
perceptions….
•“Post-colonial configuration with lack of
internal coherence”
•“Overly dependent on EU aid”
•“No political weight at global level”
• ACP-EU “relationship fatigue” (PM)
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6. …and positive perceptions
•Strong growth in many ACP countries
•ACP (sub) regions and countries with
growing influence
•Numbers count in global world
•Willingness to tackle longstanding issues
affecting credibility (e.g financing of the
Group)
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7. What do ACP and EU have in
common?
•Almost 40 years of unique contractual
partnership: common values, joint
institutions and dialogue,…
•Shared concern over need for
“humanisation’’ of globalisation
•Common concern for “blue economy”
and Cotonou can be “cornerstone” (Pres
Marshall islands)
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8. Emerging views in the ACP
1.Status quo is NOT an option to ensure
continued relevance of ACP Group
2.Stronger political partnership beyond aid
3.Broaden Partnership beyond Europe (BRICS,
South-South)
4.More prominent role ACP in global fora
5.Financial sustainability = credibility and
relevance
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9. Emerging views in the EU
1. Recognition of economic progress in many
individual ACP countries
2. Growing focus on regional and subregional
relations (EPAs, joint strategies,…)
3. ACP Group only marginally contributes to EU
aspirations for stronger global role
4. ACP Group has no formal place in EU treaties
and institutions
5. ACP Group needs to determine its own future
with EU and beyond
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10. Pacific: increasingly
attractive for global players
• Australia & New Zealand: key donors
• Growing presence China (natural resources,
fisheries, immigration,…)
• India, Indonesia, South Korea (more diplomatic
representations, military cooperation, aid in kind,..)
• Increasing interest Russia (visits MFA Lavrov, aid,
investments, recognition Abkhazia, South Ossetia)
• USA: increasing presence since 2011 (aid,
economic, military and security support, energy,
natural resources, education, health,..)
• Japan: regaining interest and alliance building with
USA and EU
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11. Where does the European Union
(EU) fit in this picture?
• 2012: EU Strategy for the Pacific “Pacific is
emerging foreign policy priority for EU”)
• EU: second aid partner in the region: Total 10th EDF
750 million EURO
• EU key priorities: development cooperation,
trade, climate change, fisheries, regional
integration, governance,…)
• Perceived “contradictions” in EU messages:
differentiation in the allocation of aid, no increase
of aid in EDF 11, closing down EU representation,..)
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12. Some Pacific perceptions on
benefits of ACP Group
membership
•Bargaining power: ACP has helped to get
increased recognition of Pacific in EU and at
international level
•Enhanced South-South and intra-ACP
cooperation = more global awareness of
challenges Pacific (climate change, “vulnerability”
small islands states alliances in UN and WTO,
g7+ grouping of post conflict countries
•Substantial aid through ACP
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13. Some Pacific perceptions on the EU
and the Cotonou Partnership (value
added)
•EU: major donor of development aid
•Sector and budget support = strengthening
government systems + incentive for other
donors
•Model for regional cooperation and
integration
•Climate change (key for Pacific)
•Renewable energy, (eco)-tourism, etc
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14. Pacific perceptions on the EU and the
Cotonou Partnership (critical
perspectives)
•Unequal partnership in spite of declared principles
of “reciprocity” and “equal partnership” :
•Strongly aid driven partnership = dependency
•marginalisation Pacific vis-à-vis Africa
•“Splitting up” the region in EPA negotiations (IEPA
with PNG)
•EU has put burden on capacities of the region
(negotiation of EPA, rigid procedures, heavy
conditions, absorption capacities, NAO system is
heavy burden on small administrations of small
islands,…)
•
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15. What are the perceived EU’s interests
in the Pacific?
•Fisheries (tuna = 50% of total European
consumption)
•Natural resources: large unexplored potential
of resources (including unknown seabed
resources)
•Alliances on climate change
•Political and diplomatic capital (Pacific = 15
sovereign votes= numbers count)
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16. POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR POST
2020
1. Status quo? “Group must adapt and
reshape itself” (Samoa PM)
2. EU Agreement with an Asia-Pacific
Group of countries?
3. Separate EU-Pacific Agreement?
4. EU regional agreements under one ACP
umbrella with specific role and value
added? “ACP Group should not do
everything” (Samoa PM)
5. Other scenarios?
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17. How to promote an effective
reflection process?
1.ACP and Pacific region/ countries should be in the
driving seat
2.Realistic political economy assessments are
needed: address difficult key strategic questions
upfront and interest articulation
3.From intentions to implementation: show results
4.Move debate out of Brussels to ACP countries
and regions
5.Drop taboos: assess what has (not) worked and
why + critical introspection on both sides beyond
vested interests and political correctness
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18. Thank you!
www.ecdpm.org
gl@ecdpm.org
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