Francesco Rampa Head of Food Security Programme, ECDPM 28 September 2016, Pre-conference workshop at the Annual German Agricultural Economics Conference (GEWISOLA) 2016.

1. Francesco Rampa
Head of Food Security Programme, ECDPM
The political economy around
regional food market
integration and policies in Africa

2. • Why ECDPM (think&…doing it)
• Big picture: policy/political bottlenecks
to RI
• A PEA angle (from ECDPM)
• Political Economy of reg food markets in
ECOWAS: rice (livestock)…& corridors
• What can we do about it? Way Forward
…doing it: example of Reg PPP Platforms
in COMESA
ECDPM Page 2

3. • Africa’s food import bill is worth US$35 billion (excluding
fish) every year  both public & private sectors are
having good % of Rents (not only exporters)
• To meet its basic food demand, Africa relies on imports from outside
(87% of imports from the RoW vs. 13% from Africa)
• Africa’s basic food products EXP also directed towards external
partners despite its strong internal needs (78% of exports to the RoW
vs. 22% to Africa)
• …but always beware of “largely used data” e.g. according to SWAC
Secretariat, RoW-food-imp shouldn't be compared to TOT-imp but to
TOT-size of Food Economy e.g. in WA 178bn $ in 2010 = 36% of
regional GDP vs Food imp are only 7% of Food Ec total size. + Ag
exports are only 9% of total Ag GDP in the region.
 Infrastr & Governance/political & Policy Bottlenecks
 National interests: implementation of regional
cooperation and integration takes place only when in line
with key ‘national interests’ (as defined by ruling elites)
 RI/RECs heavily dependent on donors (ECOWAS partial
exception)
The BIG picture
ECDPM Page 3

4. Facts & Figures
African countries are losing out on billions of dollars in potential
trade every year because of the region’s fragmented market.
(World Bank. 2012. De-Fragmenting Africa: Deepening Regional Integration in Goods and Services.)
% Africa’s intra-regional goods trade in total goods exports is just
12 per cent, compared with 25 per cent in the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations and 65 per cent in the European Union.
(World Economic Forum. 2013)
A truck driver on the Koutiala–Dakar corridor between Mali and
Senegal has to pass through almost 100 checkpoints and border
posts and is required to pay about US$437 in bribes along the
route. (World Economic Forum. 2013. The Africa Competitiveness Report. Based on data from the West
Africa Trade Hub, USAID)

5. artificial borders & urban consumers VS rural producers
• Challenge is to get food
from rural areas to
consumers in growing
urban centers
• Nearest city is often across
a border
• Provides incentive to invest
in higher productivity
Source: Haggblade et al (2008).

6. History matters
Page 6ECDPM

8. Trade Policy Barriers for expanding trade
in Africa
huge potential for an ambitious trade
facilitation agenda:
– Free Circulation of goods still not
achieved within Custom Unions (intra-
trade still affected by MFN tariffs, double
taxation…)
– Numerous fees and bribes
– Administrative burden
– Inefficiency of checkpoints (delays)
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%
ECOWAS CEMAC COMESA SACU
Average Import Tariffs on
Agri-food imports
Applied to non SSA countries Applied to SSA countries
• Despite RI [tariffs within RECs
going down], intra-Africa trade
still affected by significant tariffs
[still significant between RECs],
espec in Agric…need to address
between blocks trade barriers
• External pressure to liberalize
markets with third countries (EPA
with the EU..)
• Still instability / uncertainty
regarding some trade policies

9. …. Political economy & lack of competition along
whole value chain
Trade barriers
limit access to
seeds and
fertilisers
Transport
cartels, road
blocks result
in high costs
Trade policies
are opaque
and
unpredictable
Quality standards
and SPS rules
can block trade
Distribution services
are not linking poor
producers to poor
consumers
Farmers on average receive less
than 20% of consumer price
Source: World Bank (2012).

10. Food trade as risky business, especially for women
Source: World Bank (2012).

11. ECDPM Page 11

12. PEA... 5 lenses
Foundational & structural factors
Institutions - formal & informal rules of the game
Actors and agency - power and interests
Sectoral characteristics
External factors - financial and other
12
to examine the interaction of political & economic processes & incentives...

13. 13
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA
What drives and constrains regional organisations?

14. e.g. Foundational & Structural factors... “continue to shape the
environment in which African regional organisations set and
implement their agendas.”
- ECOWAS - franco-anglo colonial and linguistic heritage
- IGAD - common physical challenges vs long-run conflicts
- COMESA - 8/19 landlocked; 4/19 islands, dispersed
- EAC - landlocked Ug, Rw, Burundi but ‘coalition of the willing’
 PEA of reg food markets in ECOWAS: rice, livestock…corridors:
15 countries (among poorest), fragmented, fragility(terrorism),
UEMOA/ECOWAS, variable geometry, PS mistrust, Nigeria…
P&Security: strong incentive for reg.cooperation  effective ;
Food Sec not enough (despite 2008)  very slow progress after 10y of
ECOWAP/RAIP
14

15. • ECOWAS Commission: adhoc path, looking for windows of
opportunities to play informal broker/foster compliance, alliance
with ‘willing’ & ‘soft mechanisms’ of persuasion… informal
coalitions/different. gears may be > appropriate
• EAC (smaller, more cohesive, less fragile, legislates, etc.) follows >
formal, transparent, institutionalised rules respected by “all” 
highest intra-reg exports EAC 19,5%, lowest ECOWAS 8,5%
 “main challenge for donors: align much closer to the real
political economy dynamics prevailing in a given sector or
policy area (linked to power relations, incentives and
interests) rather than towards formal players and processes”
ECDPM Page 15

16. ECDPM Page 16

17. ECDPM Page 17

18. Regional dependency on imports: Rice, political
staple food (ECOWAP/Offensive Riz)
ECDPM Page 18
0 2000000 4000000 6000000 8000000 10000000 12000000 14000000 16000000
1961
1970
1980
1990
2000
2005
2008
2012

19. ECDPM Page 19

20. • Rice [no RVC]: corridors facilitate imports from outside WA
Livestock [RVC !]: significant % of intra-regional livestock
trade makes use of existing transit corridors in the region
• Scattered informal trade info & location of rice
production basins and urban markets imply some
intra-regional rice trade passes through corridors
(e.g. potential Bamako-Abidjan; Bamako-
Ouagadougou), but also suggests most existing intra-
regional trade (in particular in Central Basin) is
informal trade along transb.production basins
(re-exports)
• Importers & vote-seekers won [10% CET] :
incentives to invest in local prod…Dreyfus etc agree
(GA) but no Quality/Contract-enf...so Policies  work
with crossborder trader associations/aggregators
…Inclusive Reg VC PPP Platform/MIS
ECDPM Page 20

21. PEA means being realistic…but difficult choices. Work with
Nigeria: 50% CONS-25% IMP/35%...(avg. prod. 2010-
2012) + C.d’Iv./Mali/Guinea…and all rest buyers?
ECDPM Page 21
Nigeria
37%
Mali
15%
Guinea
13%
Côte d'Ivoire
10%
Sierra Leone
8%
Senegal
4%
Ghana
4%
Others
9%

22. - Build “RI Vision” … especially on RVC and linking
ECOWAP-trade-corridors...Nigeria!
- Stable Trade Policy: CET impl.differently: tariffs on
imported rice not uniform in ECOWAS  opportunities
for transhipment and smuggling within the region
- Pre-requisite: CB for enforceability (Min of Finance…)
- Massive need for more info: impact on informal
economy (40% rural household: non-farm informal
post-harvest segments of food VC:
processing/distribution…) + PEA + informal trade data
- PS in the lead (which PS?): actors mapping!
- Corridors are important (e.g. cities need rice) but link
them via Feeder to Border MKTs
ECDPM Page 22

23. • “Plan for sailboats, not trains” (Kleinfeld, 2015)
• A Knowledge Agenda (data/PEA/informal) BUT goDEEP/VC
• Bottleneck based & multistakeh: from top-down to bottom-
up RI; instead of CFTA and wholesale RFTAs, pragmatic
(PPP) initiatives to remove trade barriers for a small set of
priority food commodities, where real political commitment
and commercial interests can effectively change policies
and practices ? [differentiated gears]
• HORIZ & VERTICAL coherence !
• Transparent rules / Trust building within VC/accountability
for all (monitor pro-poorness/inclusiveness of VCs)
• Champions&strategic Comms – help champion
countries/individuals, coalitions
- at the political and technical levels,
- in regional and national organisations, P-P sectors
Way Forward ?
ECDPM Page 23

24. • Mushrooming DP initiatives
• ECOWAP DP Coordination practices : vertical
and horizontal coherence?
• protectionism can work to attract investors in
Agric, if done at regional level ? EPA EAC
exclusion list include dairy products
• Trading commodities with EU vs Inclusive
investment in East Africa ? Nexus (Nairobi)?
• e.g. Flowers vs Milk or Potato
DP Coordination
ECDPM Page 24

25. • At the policy level most RECs have or are
developing CAADP Reg. Inv. Plans to address
specific cross-border trade issues
• COMESA Regional Investment Programme in
Agriculture – Priority Area 2 (RIPA-II)
• Platforms for public-private dialogue aimed at
participatory regional value chain development
• Competition U-K-R on dairy / quality / processing
• (see also Rice in EAC !)
DOING IT…RIPA-II
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26. 1. Working in the kitchen represents a significant
investment (getting to impact? Exit strategy?) – but
can yield returns (learning, partners, funding)
2. Partnership building is crucial (MoUs?), but choose
partners wisely, and get to know them well! (CAADP
Unit vs EAFF)
3. Promoting ‘business unusual’ is hard! (interests in
status quo, wariness about new structures)
4. Enhancing inclusivity is possible, but we face limits
(private sector buy in?)
12 lessons from the kitchen
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27. 5. Donors don’t always put their money where their
mouths are – need for PEA of donors?
6. Doing is great, but don’t forget to think (plan!!!,
reflect, share)!
7. Being there could be useful but probably only where
aims are concrete
8. Interest in funding is one of real motivators and we
can use this, but it can also create jealousies
12 lesson from the kitchen (cont.)
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28. 9. Political commitments (especially at high level -
COMESA Summit (PPPs) & Malabo Declaration
(Tripling)) can help move things along
10.Effective independent partnership brokers are hard to
find, including in Africa
11.Kitchen work only possible because of large network
12.Thinking and working politically is crucial (work with
established structures, vested interests, etc.)
12 lesson from the kitchen (cont.)
ECDPM Page 28

29. Your views !
PUBs: GREAT, WAx2,
Maize2feed,PEA&Caadp
www.ecdpm.org/foodse
curity
fr@ecdpm.org
@F_Rampa
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