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The Afghan-Pakistan War:  “Clear, Hold, Build”   Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy May 11, 2009 1800 K Street, NW  Suite 400  Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 1.202.775.3270 Fax: 1.202.775.3199 Web:  www.csis.org/burke/reports
The Challenge: Six “Wars” in One ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Fighting Them as “Microwars” ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
The Strategy: “Clear, Hold, Build” ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
“ Declared” and Overt Threats ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
“ Undeclared” and Covert Threats ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
The American Threat ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Generic Lessons ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
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“ Clear:” Combat and Kinetics
Enemy Initiated Attacks in Iraq and  Afghanistan: May 2003 to March 2009 GAO: “Iraq and Afghanistan, March 2009, GAO-09-476T, p.4.
Enemy Initiated Attacks in Afghanistan  May 2003 to March 2009 GAO: “Iraq and Afghanistan, March 2009, GAO-09-476T, p.11.
Security Summary (February 2009) 40% of Afghans say country headed in right direction, 38% say headed in wrong direction* For Jan and Feb 09, 80% of kinetic events occurred in 11% of the districts Feb09 vs. Previous 3 Months’ Average (i.e. Nov08-Jan09) INS Initiated Attacks: +12% IED Events:  -15%  (57% of all casualties    since Jan 07) Attacks on GIRoA: -37% Suicide Attacks: +3% Kidnappings/Assassinations: +20% ISAF Deaths: +21% ANSF Deaths: -27%   Civilian Deaths: +9% Building Host Nation Capacity:** ANA: 77 total Kandak BNs formed 47 Kandaks capable of BN Ops  ANP: 52 districts undergoing FDD 13 of 20 Civil Order Police BNs  fielded Baluchistan NWFP FATA 2008 Kinetic Activity Except for the two items with asterisks, the source of information on this slide is the NATO JOIIS database. * Source: ABC News / BBC / ARD Poll conducted 30 Dec 08 – 12 Jan 09 and published on 9 Feb 09. ** Source: CSTC-A. Kinetic Event Density   Increasing
Security Summary: Jan-April 2008 vs. Jan-April 2009 Source: NATO-ISAF, April 9. 2009
Insurgent Attacks Source: NATO-ISAF, April 9. 2009
UN Estimate of Expanding No Go Zones:  2005 versus 2007 SenlisAfghanistan, Decision Point 2008, London, 2008, p. 27;
UN Accessibility Map 2008
UN Sec Gen’s Assessment: March 2009  Report by the Secretary General,  The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security , A/63/751–S/2009/135, March 10, 2009, pp. 4-5
Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan Source: NATO-ISAF, April 9. 2009
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan Experiences with US/NATO/ISAF Air Attacks in Past Year: 2009 Source:  Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,”  Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: US/NATO/ISAF Air Strikes: Acceptability & Blame Source:  Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,”  Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
Military Deaths Source: NATO-ISAF, April 9. 2009
Terrorist Incidents and Casualties in Afghanistan: 2005-2008 National Counterterrorism Center,  2008 Report on Terrorism , 30 April 2009, http://www.nctc.gov/ , p. 14.
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Most Likely Outcome of War Source:  Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,”  Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
Public Perception of  Security : 2005-2009
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll:  Afghan Ratings of Local Security: Feb 09 Source:  Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,”  Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan Positive Ratings of Local Security: Feb 09 Source:  Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,”  Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan Experiences with Violence in Past Year: 2007 vs. 2009 Source:  Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,”  Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009 Civilians hurt by (Net 38%)
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Biggest Danger to Afghanistan : 2-2009 Source:  Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,”  Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009 Among other violence, a quarter report car bombs or suicide attacks in their area in the past year; three in 10, kidnappings for ransom. Thirty-eight percent report civilian casualties in the past year, attributed about equally either to U.S./NATO/ISAF or to anti-   government forces, and somewhat less so to Afghan government forces.  Given these and their many other challenges, the number of Afghans who expect their lives to improve in the year ahead has dropped from a peak of 67 percent in 2005 to 51 percent today. And just under half, 47 percent, expect a better life for their children, hardly a ringing endorsement of the country’s prospects. The resurgence of the Taliban is a key element of the public alarm: Fifty-   eight percent of Afghans see the Taliban as the biggest danger to the country, measured against local warlords, drug traffickers or the U.S. or Afghan governments. And 43 percent say the Taliban have grown stronger in the past year, well more than the 24 percent who think the movement has weakened.
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Who Afghans Mainly Blame for Violence: 2007 vs. 2009-2 Source:  Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,”  Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
Afghan Perceptions of Freedom of movement: 2007-2009 Source: NATO-ISAF, May 11, 2009 “ How safe do you feel driving outside your Mantaqa during the day?”
Afghan Perceptions of Freedom of movement: 2007-2009 Source: NATO-ISAF, May 11, 2009
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Trend in Experience with Taliban Violence :2006-2009/2 Source:  Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,”  Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Experience with Taliban Violence by Province: 2009/2 Source:  Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,”  Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: At Least Some Support for the Taliban : 2007 versus 2009/2 Source:  Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,”  Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Taliban  More Moderate?: 2009/2 Source:  Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,”  Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Should The Government Negotiate with the Taliban? 2009-2 Source:  Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,”  Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
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Pakistan’s Strategic Position Source: HM Government,  UK policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan: the way forward , April 2009, p. 29.
Ethnic & Linguistic Diversity  Percent of Population and Language Speakers Source: CIA World Factbook 2007
The  “Af-Pak” Border  Area Source: HM Government,  UK policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan: the way forward , April 2009, p. 30.
Helmand: The Key Area of Cross Border Operations Source: HM Government, UK policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan: the way forward. April 2009, p. 31.
Khyber: The Challenge to US and NATO/ISAF Supply Routes
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“ Hold:” Provide Security, Give Combat Meaning
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghans Who Feel Attacks on Coalition Forces are Justified : 2-2009 Source:  Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,”  Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
Public Perception:  Who Provides Security
Public Perception of the ISAF
Public Perception of the ISAF
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Confidence in Security Forces and Local Support for Them: 2009-2 Source:  Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,”  Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
ANA Land and Air Forces: April 2009  Source:NATO/ISAF: http://www.NATO.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.html In September 2008, the Joint Commission and Monitoring Board, co-chaired by the Afghan government and the United Nations, agreed to increase the total strength of the ANA to 122,000 personnel with a 12,000 man training margin. As of April 2009, the ANA has an actual strength of approximately 82,780 personnel. This represents 62% of the 134,000 approved strength which is scheduled to be reached by the end of 2011. Operationally, the ANA is currently fielding 5 Corps Headquarters, a Capital Division responsible for the security of the Kabul area, and an ANA Air Corps providing the essential air support to the ANA brigades deployed throughout Afghanistan. Now, over 90% of ISAF operations are conducted in conjunction with the ANA.
Projected Growth of the ANSF: 2005-2014 (Authorized Personnel) Source: Department of Defense,  Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan January 2009 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181),  January 2009, pp.33.
Growth of the Afghan National Army: 2007-2008 (Trained and Assigned Personnel) Source: Department of Defense,  Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan January 2009 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181),  January 2009, pp. 35. Trained and assigned ANSF stand at 145,000 and will reach the current objective of 216,000 by the beginning of 2014.  In November 2008, the ANA stood at 79,068 (including 5,420 absent without leave- AWOL), composed of 78 kandaks (battalions) and five Commando (CDO) kandaks.  In summer 2008, the GIRoA sought agreement to further increase the ANA from 80,000 to 122,000 soldiers with an additional 12,000 trainee, transient, hospitalized, and student (TTHS) account (for a total authorized end strength of 134,000). On September 10th 2008, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approved.  The GIRoA will reach its objective of 134,000 ANA personnel by the beginning of 2014.  The 134,000 force structure calls for 20 brigades, a new division headquarters in the capital, Corps-level artillery, engineer and Quick Reaction Force assets, as well as an increase in institutional support.
ANA Unit CM Readiness Levels, June 2006 -December 2008 with Progress Goals for 2009-2014 Source: Department of Defense,  Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan January 2009 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181),  January 2009, pp. 42 & 43. As of November 2008, the ANA had seven battalions and one brigade and one corps  headquarters rated at Capability Milestone (CM)1: capable of operating independently.  Twenty-   nine battalions/squadrons, six brigade headquarters, and three corps headquarters were reported at the CM2 level: capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations at the battalion level with international support.  Twenty-five battalions/squadrons, four brigade  headquarters, one corps headquarters, and the ANAAC headquarters were reported at the CM3:  partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations at the company level with support  from international forces.  Six battalions/squadrons and one brigade headquarters are reported at  CM4: formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions.  Finally, there are  eighteen battalions/squadrons and two brigade headquarters that are still not formed or  reporting.  Currently, two of the five corps can field nearly all of their subordinate units and join  their international partners in some of the most contentious areas of RC East and South
ANSF Deliberate Operations Source: NATO-ISAF, May 11, 2009
ANA Size and Capability 2009 ANA Increasingly Conducting and Leading Operations (53% in last 120 days) •  109 of 160 units fielded; 87,300 assigned (will grow to 134,000 by Dec 2011) •  ANA Air Corps have over tripled monthly troop and cargo capacity since Feb 08 •  Air Corps flying 90% of all Afghan missions Source: NATO-ISAF, May 11, 2009
 
Shortages in US and NATO Afghan Army Trainers: 2007-2013 Source: Department of Defense,  Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan January 2009 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181),  January 2009, pp.38 & 39.
Readiness of Afghan Police Units: Current and Projected by Readiness Category: 2008-2013 (District AUP and Specialized Unit CM levels, February-December 2008, with Projections for 2009-2013 Source: Department of Defense,  Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan January 2009 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181),  January 2009, p. 48.
Impact of Afghan Police Reform:  Casualties and Pay Source: Department of Defense,  Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan January 2009 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181),  January 2009, pp. 46 & 47.
NATO/ISAF: Afghan Public Protection Program Source: NATO/ISAF, April 9, 2009 •  Class 2: - Phase 1 training began 25 Apr - 81 students from Jalreyz and Maydan Shahr) •  Continuing to conduct shaping operations in Nerkh and clear/hold operations in Jalreyz •  Forming plans for Chak-e Vardak - Conditions-based progression
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“ Build:” Create the Opportunity for Lasting Victory
Source: ABC/BBC/ARD poll – Afghanistan: Where things stand, poll of  a random sample 1,534 Afghans in all 34 of the country’s provinces;, February 9, 2009 ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Afghan Conditions of Life
Source: ABC/BBC/ARD poll – Afghanistan: Where things stand, poll of  a random sample 1,534 Afghans in all 34 of the country’s provinces;, February 9, 2009
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Conditions in Your Area -Good?  2009-2 Source:  Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,”  Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
National Solidarity Program
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Perceived Reconstruction: Rebuilt or Reopened in Past Five Years Source:  Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,”  Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
Funding of the Afghan National  Development Strategy by Budget Year (US Millions) GAO: “Iraq and Afghanistan, March 2009, GAO-09-476T, p.8.
NATO/ISAF PRTs and RCs (April 2009) NATO/ISAF:  http://www.NATO.int/isaf/docu/epub/maps/index.html
Source: ABC/BBC/ARD poll – Afghanistan: Where things stand, poll of  a random sample 1,534 Afghans in all 34 of the country’s provinces;, February 9, 2009 ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Afghan Economic Realities
Source: ABC/BBC/ARD poll – Afghanistan: Where things stand, poll of  a random sample 1,534 Afghans in all 34 of the country’s provinces;, February 9, 2009 ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
The Economics of  Opium: 2004-2009 United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, “Afghanistan Opium Wjnter Assessment, January 2009, p. 10, 11, 15
The Rising Opium Threat in  the South: 2006-2008 United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008,” Executive Summary, August 2008, p.  24.,
Opium Trade: Financing the Taliban United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008,” Executive Summary, August 2008, p.  40.
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghanistan’s Direction: 2005 to 2009-2 Source:  Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,”  Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Government Going in Right Direction? 2008-12 to 2009-2 Source:  Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,”  Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
Source: ABC/BBC/ARD poll – Afghanistan: Where things stand, poll of  a random sample 1,534 Afghans in all 34 of the country’s provinces
NATO/ISAF: Public Perceptions of Provincial Councils 12/08-3/09 Source: ANQAR Survey; last version completed Mar 09
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Perceptions of Corruption: 2007-2009-2 Source:  Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,”  Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
Economy & Essential Services
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Perceived Ability to Afford Food: 2007 vs. 2009-2 Source:  Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,”  Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
Afghan Agriculture: Output By Crop and Value of Exports Source: Department of Defense,  Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan January 2009 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181),  January 2009, pp. 67 & 68.
Healthcare in 2009 Day Kundi not sampled due to extremely poor security & high risk *rating good or very good Source: MRA, ANQAR 2.0, Dec 08 How would you rate the quality of the healthcare available in your area? " * Community Health Workers Total requirement 2006 2008 Nationwide Results Results by Province  Source: WSSCC WASH   Source: WSSCC WASH   60 - 100% 40 - 60% 20 - 40% 0 - 20% Under five Mortality rate Children % not growing normally Afghanistan 19.1 48 Algeria 4.9 6 Ghana 10 25 Kenya 12.2 23 Malaysia 0.8 18 Morocco 4.4 9 Peru 3.9 8 Sudan 10.7 17 Uzbekistan 6.9 19
Education 2009
NATO/ISAF Ring Road Map  in 2008
Impact of Road Programs as of March 2009 Source: NATO/ISAF, April 9, 2009

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Af pakclearholdbuild11 5_09

  • 1. The Afghan-Pakistan War: “Clear, Hold, Build” Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy May 11, 2009 1800 K Street, NW Suite 400 Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 1.202.775.3270 Fax: 1.202.775.3199 Web: www.csis.org/burke/reports
  • 2.
  • 3.
  • 4.
  • 5.
  • 6.
  • 7.
  • 8.
  • 9.
  • 10. “ Clear:” Combat and Kinetics
  • 11. Enemy Initiated Attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan: May 2003 to March 2009 GAO: “Iraq and Afghanistan, March 2009, GAO-09-476T, p.4.
  • 12. Enemy Initiated Attacks in Afghanistan May 2003 to March 2009 GAO: “Iraq and Afghanistan, March 2009, GAO-09-476T, p.11.
  • 13. Security Summary (February 2009) 40% of Afghans say country headed in right direction, 38% say headed in wrong direction* For Jan and Feb 09, 80% of kinetic events occurred in 11% of the districts Feb09 vs. Previous 3 Months’ Average (i.e. Nov08-Jan09) INS Initiated Attacks: +12% IED Events: -15% (57% of all casualties since Jan 07) Attacks on GIRoA: -37% Suicide Attacks: +3% Kidnappings/Assassinations: +20% ISAF Deaths: +21% ANSF Deaths: -27% Civilian Deaths: +9% Building Host Nation Capacity:** ANA: 77 total Kandak BNs formed 47 Kandaks capable of BN Ops ANP: 52 districts undergoing FDD 13 of 20 Civil Order Police BNs fielded Baluchistan NWFP FATA 2008 Kinetic Activity Except for the two items with asterisks, the source of information on this slide is the NATO JOIIS database. * Source: ABC News / BBC / ARD Poll conducted 30 Dec 08 – 12 Jan 09 and published on 9 Feb 09. ** Source: CSTC-A. Kinetic Event Density Increasing
  • 14. Security Summary: Jan-April 2008 vs. Jan-April 2009 Source: NATO-ISAF, April 9. 2009
  • 15. Insurgent Attacks Source: NATO-ISAF, April 9. 2009
  • 16. UN Estimate of Expanding No Go Zones: 2005 versus 2007 SenlisAfghanistan, Decision Point 2008, London, 2008, p. 27;
  • 18. UN Sec Gen’s Assessment: March 2009 Report by the Secretary General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security , A/63/751–S/2009/135, March 10, 2009, pp. 4-5
  • 19. Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan Source: NATO-ISAF, April 9. 2009
  • 20. ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan Experiences with US/NATO/ISAF Air Attacks in Past Year: 2009 Source: Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,” Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
  • 21. ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: US/NATO/ISAF Air Strikes: Acceptability & Blame Source: Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,” Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
  • 22. Military Deaths Source: NATO-ISAF, April 9. 2009
  • 23. Terrorist Incidents and Casualties in Afghanistan: 2005-2008 National Counterterrorism Center, 2008 Report on Terrorism , 30 April 2009, http://www.nctc.gov/ , p. 14.
  • 24. ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Most Likely Outcome of War Source: Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,” Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
  • 25. Public Perception of Security : 2005-2009
  • 26. ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan Ratings of Local Security: Feb 09 Source: Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,” Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
  • 27. ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan Positive Ratings of Local Security: Feb 09 Source: Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,” Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
  • 28. ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan Experiences with Violence in Past Year: 2007 vs. 2009 Source: Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,” Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009 Civilians hurt by (Net 38%)
  • 29. ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Biggest Danger to Afghanistan : 2-2009 Source: Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,” Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009 Among other violence, a quarter report car bombs or suicide attacks in their area in the past year; three in 10, kidnappings for ransom. Thirty-eight percent report civilian casualties in the past year, attributed about equally either to U.S./NATO/ISAF or to anti- government forces, and somewhat less so to Afghan government forces. Given these and their many other challenges, the number of Afghans who expect their lives to improve in the year ahead has dropped from a peak of 67 percent in 2005 to 51 percent today. And just under half, 47 percent, expect a better life for their children, hardly a ringing endorsement of the country’s prospects. The resurgence of the Taliban is a key element of the public alarm: Fifty- eight percent of Afghans see the Taliban as the biggest danger to the country, measured against local warlords, drug traffickers or the U.S. or Afghan governments. And 43 percent say the Taliban have grown stronger in the past year, well more than the 24 percent who think the movement has weakened.
  • 30. ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Who Afghans Mainly Blame for Violence: 2007 vs. 2009-2 Source: Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,” Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
  • 31. Afghan Perceptions of Freedom of movement: 2007-2009 Source: NATO-ISAF, May 11, 2009 “ How safe do you feel driving outside your Mantaqa during the day?”
  • 32. Afghan Perceptions of Freedom of movement: 2007-2009 Source: NATO-ISAF, May 11, 2009
  • 33. ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Trend in Experience with Taliban Violence :2006-2009/2 Source: Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,” Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
  • 34. ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Experience with Taliban Violence by Province: 2009/2 Source: Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,” Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
  • 35. ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: At Least Some Support for the Taliban : 2007 versus 2009/2 Source: Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,” Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
  • 36. ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Taliban More Moderate?: 2009/2 Source: Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,” Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
  • 37. ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Should The Government Negotiate with the Taliban? 2009-2 Source: Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,” Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
  • 38.
  • 39. Pakistan’s Strategic Position Source: HM Government, UK policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan: the way forward , April 2009, p. 29.
  • 40. Ethnic & Linguistic Diversity Percent of Population and Language Speakers Source: CIA World Factbook 2007
  • 41. The “Af-Pak” Border Area Source: HM Government, UK policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan: the way forward , April 2009, p. 30.
  • 42. Helmand: The Key Area of Cross Border Operations Source: HM Government, UK policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan: the way forward. April 2009, p. 31.
  • 43. Khyber: The Challenge to US and NATO/ISAF Supply Routes
  • 44.
  • 45. “ Hold:” Provide Security, Give Combat Meaning
  • 46. ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghans Who Feel Attacks on Coalition Forces are Justified : 2-2009 Source: Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,” Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
  • 47. Public Perception: Who Provides Security
  • 50. ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Confidence in Security Forces and Local Support for Them: 2009-2 Source: Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,” Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
  • 51. ANA Land and Air Forces: April 2009 Source:NATO/ISAF: http://www.NATO.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.html In September 2008, the Joint Commission and Monitoring Board, co-chaired by the Afghan government and the United Nations, agreed to increase the total strength of the ANA to 122,000 personnel with a 12,000 man training margin. As of April 2009, the ANA has an actual strength of approximately 82,780 personnel. This represents 62% of the 134,000 approved strength which is scheduled to be reached by the end of 2011. Operationally, the ANA is currently fielding 5 Corps Headquarters, a Capital Division responsible for the security of the Kabul area, and an ANA Air Corps providing the essential air support to the ANA brigades deployed throughout Afghanistan. Now, over 90% of ISAF operations are conducted in conjunction with the ANA.
  • 52. Projected Growth of the ANSF: 2005-2014 (Authorized Personnel) Source: Department of Defense, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan January 2009 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), January 2009, pp.33.
  • 53. Growth of the Afghan National Army: 2007-2008 (Trained and Assigned Personnel) Source: Department of Defense, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan January 2009 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), January 2009, pp. 35. Trained and assigned ANSF stand at 145,000 and will reach the current objective of 216,000 by the beginning of 2014. In November 2008, the ANA stood at 79,068 (including 5,420 absent without leave- AWOL), composed of 78 kandaks (battalions) and five Commando (CDO) kandaks. In summer 2008, the GIRoA sought agreement to further increase the ANA from 80,000 to 122,000 soldiers with an additional 12,000 trainee, transient, hospitalized, and student (TTHS) account (for a total authorized end strength of 134,000). On September 10th 2008, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approved. The GIRoA will reach its objective of 134,000 ANA personnel by the beginning of 2014. The 134,000 force structure calls for 20 brigades, a new division headquarters in the capital, Corps-level artillery, engineer and Quick Reaction Force assets, as well as an increase in institutional support.
  • 54. ANA Unit CM Readiness Levels, June 2006 -December 2008 with Progress Goals for 2009-2014 Source: Department of Defense, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan January 2009 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), January 2009, pp. 42 & 43. As of November 2008, the ANA had seven battalions and one brigade and one corps headquarters rated at Capability Milestone (CM)1: capable of operating independently. Twenty- nine battalions/squadrons, six brigade headquarters, and three corps headquarters were reported at the CM2 level: capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations at the battalion level with international support. Twenty-five battalions/squadrons, four brigade headquarters, one corps headquarters, and the ANAAC headquarters were reported at the CM3: partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations at the company level with support from international forces. Six battalions/squadrons and one brigade headquarters are reported at CM4: formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions. Finally, there are eighteen battalions/squadrons and two brigade headquarters that are still not formed or reporting. Currently, two of the five corps can field nearly all of their subordinate units and join their international partners in some of the most contentious areas of RC East and South
  • 55. ANSF Deliberate Operations Source: NATO-ISAF, May 11, 2009
  • 56. ANA Size and Capability 2009 ANA Increasingly Conducting and Leading Operations (53% in last 120 days) • 109 of 160 units fielded; 87,300 assigned (will grow to 134,000 by Dec 2011) • ANA Air Corps have over tripled monthly troop and cargo capacity since Feb 08 • Air Corps flying 90% of all Afghan missions Source: NATO-ISAF, May 11, 2009
  • 57.  
  • 58. Shortages in US and NATO Afghan Army Trainers: 2007-2013 Source: Department of Defense, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan January 2009 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), January 2009, pp.38 & 39.
  • 59. Readiness of Afghan Police Units: Current and Projected by Readiness Category: 2008-2013 (District AUP and Specialized Unit CM levels, February-December 2008, with Projections for 2009-2013 Source: Department of Defense, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan January 2009 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), January 2009, p. 48.
  • 60. Impact of Afghan Police Reform: Casualties and Pay Source: Department of Defense, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan January 2009 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), January 2009, pp. 46 & 47.
  • 61. NATO/ISAF: Afghan Public Protection Program Source: NATO/ISAF, April 9, 2009 • Class 2: - Phase 1 training began 25 Apr - 81 students from Jalreyz and Maydan Shahr) • Continuing to conduct shaping operations in Nerkh and clear/hold operations in Jalreyz • Forming plans for Chak-e Vardak - Conditions-based progression
  • 62.
  • 63. “ Build:” Create the Opportunity for Lasting Victory
  • 64.
  • 65. Source: ABC/BBC/ARD poll – Afghanistan: Where things stand, poll of a random sample 1,534 Afghans in all 34 of the country’s provinces;, February 9, 2009
  • 66. ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Conditions in Your Area -Good? 2009-2 Source: Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,” Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
  • 68. ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Perceived Reconstruction: Rebuilt or Reopened in Past Five Years Source: Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,” Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
  • 69. Funding of the Afghan National Development Strategy by Budget Year (US Millions) GAO: “Iraq and Afghanistan, March 2009, GAO-09-476T, p.8.
  • 70. NATO/ISAF PRTs and RCs (April 2009) NATO/ISAF: http://www.NATO.int/isaf/docu/epub/maps/index.html
  • 71.
  • 72.
  • 73. The Economics of Opium: 2004-2009 United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, “Afghanistan Opium Wjnter Assessment, January 2009, p. 10, 11, 15
  • 74. The Rising Opium Threat in the South: 2006-2008 United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008,” Executive Summary, August 2008, p. 24.,
  • 75. Opium Trade: Financing the Taliban United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008,” Executive Summary, August 2008, p. 40.
  • 76. ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghanistan’s Direction: 2005 to 2009-2 Source: Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,” Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
  • 77. ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Government Going in Right Direction? 2008-12 to 2009-2 Source: Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,” Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
  • 78. Source: ABC/BBC/ARD poll – Afghanistan: Where things stand, poll of a random sample 1,534 Afghans in all 34 of the country’s provinces
  • 79. NATO/ISAF: Public Perceptions of Provincial Councils 12/08-3/09 Source: ANQAR Survey; last version completed Mar 09
  • 80. ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Perceptions of Corruption: 2007-2009-2 Source: Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,” Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
  • 82. ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Perceived Ability to Afford Food: 2007 vs. 2009-2 Source: Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,” Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009
  • 83. Afghan Agriculture: Output By Crop and Value of Exports Source: Department of Defense, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan January 2009 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), January 2009, pp. 67 & 68.
  • 84. Healthcare in 2009 Day Kundi not sampled due to extremely poor security & high risk *rating good or very good Source: MRA, ANQAR 2.0, Dec 08 How would you rate the quality of the healthcare available in your area? " * Community Health Workers Total requirement 2006 2008 Nationwide Results Results by Province Source: WSSCC WASH Source: WSSCC WASH 60 - 100% 40 - 60% 20 - 40% 0 - 20% Under five Mortality rate Children % not growing normally Afghanistan 19.1 48 Algeria 4.9 6 Ghana 10 25 Kenya 12.2 23 Malaysia 0.8 18 Morocco 4.4 9 Peru 3.9 8 Sudan 10.7 17 Uzbekistan 6.9 19
  • 86. NATO/ISAF Ring Road Map in 2008
  • 87. Impact of Road Programs as of March 2009 Source: NATO/ISAF, April 9, 2009

Editor's Notes

  1. 80% of kinetic events in 2008 occurred in 20% of the districts For Feb 09, 80% of kinetic events occurred in 11% of the districts
  2. 80% of kinetic events in 2008 occurred in 20% of the districts For Feb 09, 80% of kinetic events occurred in 11% of the districts
  3. 80% of kinetic events in 2008 occurred in 20% of the districts For Feb 09, 80% of kinetic events occurred in 11% of the districts