1. Cooperation Over Water in the Eastern
Nile Basin: Obstacles & Opportunities
Farah Hegazi
April 14, 2011
Advisor: Dr. Erika Weinthal
1

2. Background
• Egypt depends on the Nile for 96% of its water
• Sudan relies less on the Nile because of precipitation
• Ethiopia relies mainly on rain-fed agriculture
• 1959: Nile Waters Treaty
• 2010: Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework
Agreement (CFA)
Background
• Wichelns et al.’s proposed framework
– Move away from focusing on water allocation
– Intra-regional trading system
• Ethiopia: hydropower and livestock
• Sudan: rice & wheat
• Egypt: fruits and vegetables
2

3. Purpose of Research
Assess the political factors in the Eastern Nile
Basin that would hinder Wichelns et al.’s
framework
Research Methods
• Feasibility Study
– Elements of SWOT analysis
• Data Sources
– Existing literature
– 11 semi-structured interviews
3

4. What Are the Obstacles?
1959 Agreement
• Bilateral Nature
– Little trust between upstream and downstream
countries
– Quantity-based allocation
• Egypt unwilling to give up its allocation
4

5. The 1959 agreement is an obstacle to
Wichelns et al.’s framework.
Cooperative Framework Agreement
• All riparians agree on the principals of the
CFA
• Article 14b is the primary source of contention
5

6. Article 14b
“…not to significantly affect the water security
of any other Nile Basin State”
vs.
“…not to adversely affect the water security and
current uses and rights of any other Nile Basin
State”
So, What Does This Mean?
• Two Options
– Continue with the status quo
• “…cannot possibly monopolize what is not in their
control ... they … understand that to keep the unequal
status quo will not work” (Interview, Yacob Arsano,
November 24, 2010.)
– Adopt the original text of Article 14b
6

7. The CFA is not an obstacle to
Wichelns et al.’s framework.
Alternatives to Military Action
• “Water wars” is attention-grabbing
• Several authors and politicians have predicted
a war over water in the Nile Basin.
7

8. Alternatives to Military Action
“I wouldn’t be categorical in saying that Egypt
wouldn’t use force, but I keep thinking that it’s
an impossibility.”
“If large social violence occurred for other
reasons, then it would be easier to see how
water could be used in the service of some
other reason, but water as the reason, no.”
“A load of baloney.”
Virtual Water
Egypt’s total crop virtual water import: 30.5 km3
Zeitoun et al., 2010
8

9. Military action cannot be considered
a barrier to Wichelns et al.’s solution.
Other Obstacles
“It would be very easy to tell a farmer [in
Egypt] to stop growing rice and start growing
oranges, however, it needs commitment from
the government … If you introduce a new crop
to a farmer with sustainable markets they will
change. The problem is that the Egyptian
Government changes their crops every few
years … without [a] stable and mature
agriculture policy, there is no way they can
change because people won’t trust them.”
9

10. Other Obstacles
“Comparative advantage is not something that
one declares and the other accepts. There must
be a process of negotiation” (Interview, Yacob
Arsano, November 24, 2010).
Conclusion
Wichelns et al.’s framework is not
feasible.
10

11. Recommendations
• Cooperation “can begin at home” (Waterbury,
1997, 286).
– Improve irrigation efficiency in Egypt
• Project-by-project approach
– Create a shift in thinking
• Egypt and Sudan should sign the CFA
– Article 14b relegated to annex
– Opportunity to participate and exert influence
– “… a logical cul-de-sac” (Mekonnen, 2010, 440)
Thank you to Dr. Erika Weinthal,
Dr. Marc Jeuland, and my
interviewees.
11

12. Reflections
• South Sudan
• Mubarak’s resignation
12