занятие 2 неограйсианство

Введение в современную
лингвистическую прагматику

Занятие 2, 18.10, ОТиПЛ МГУ
Виталий Долгоруков
НИУ ВШЭ, фак-т философии, ИГИТИ
Наталья Зевахина,
НИУ ВШЭ, фак-т филологии (направление
лингвистики)

Часть I. Неограйсианство и
скалярные импликатуры

Нео-грайсианство
 Реинтерпретация максим Грайса:
 Максимы Хорна
 Максимы Левинсона
 Скалярные импликатуры
 Сердце нео-грайсианства
 Экспериментально тестируемые
 Нет единой теории

Максимы Хорна
Q Principle
Make your contribution sufficient; say as much as
you can (given R)
Quantity-1, Obscurity Avoidance, and Ambiguity
Avoidance

R Principle
Make your contribution necessary; say no more
than you must (given Q)
Quantity-2, Brevity, Maxims of Relation, and
Orderliness

Максимы Левинсона
 Q-heuristic: What isn’t said, isn’t.
 I-heuristic: What is expressed simply is stereotypically
exemplified.
 M-heuristic: What’s said in an abnormal way isn’t
normal.

Скалярные импликатуры
 Подмаксима-1 первой максимы количества/
информативности (Говори настолько информативно,
насколько это требуется)
 Порождение скалярных импликатур основывается на
априори существующих шкалах, состоящих из
множества языковых выражений, ранжированных от
менее информативных к более информативным.
 Например, <some, all>, <might, have to>, <warm, hot> и
др.

Стандартный рецепт для
порождения скалярных
импликатур
Bonnie took some of the pears.
i. Вместо того, чтобы произнести (1), Говорящий мог бы
сделать более сильное утверждение:
(1*) Bonnie stole all the pears.
Почему же он так не сделал?
ii. Наиболее правдоподобное объяснение состоит в том,
что Говорящий не верит, что (1*) истинно:
 BelS (1*).
iii. Говорящий может иметь мнение о том, истинно ли
(1*): BelS(1*)  BelS ((1*)).
iv. Из (ii) и (iii) следует BelS ((1*)): Говорящий верит, что
Бонни не взяла все груши.

Терминология
 Шаг ii называется слабой импликатурой (weak
implicature);
 Шаг iii – Competence Assumption
(предположение о компетентности
Говорящего);
 Шаг iv называется сильной импликатурой
(strong implicature).

 i. Weak implicature: BelS ()
 ii. Competence: BelS ()  BelS ( )
 iii. Strong implicature: BelS ( )

Стандартный рецепт для других
количественных импликатур
A: Вышла ли книга Сидорова?
B: Он вычитал ее. (2)
i. Вместо того, чтобы произнести (2), B мог бы сделать
более сильное утверждение:
(2*) Да, она вышла.
Почему же он так не сделал?
ii. Наиболее правдоподобное объяснение состоит в том,
что B не верит, что (2*) истинно:
BelB (2*).
iii. B имеет мнение о том, истинно ли (2*) : BelB (2*) 
BelB ((2*)).
iv. Из (ii) и (iii) следует BelB ((2*)): B верит, что книга
Сидорова еще не вышла.

Альтернативы
 Одна из проблем в теории скалярных импликатур
 Как они порождаются?
 Какой длины и сложности они должны быть?
 Верно ли, что существуют контекстуальные и
дефолтные шкалы?
 На уровне высказывания
 Релевантность
 Субституциональность

Релевантность
 Дискурсивные цели – общие цели
собеседников;
 Интересы Слушающего;
 Общие интересы.

Субституциональность?
 Horn
 Chierchia, Fox, Katzir и др. (MIT группа)

 Hirschberg, Geurts, Pouscoulous, Noveck и др.

Более общая проблема
 Дефолтизм или контекстуализм?

Вложенные импликатуры?
 Контекстуалисты: доказывают, что они не
существуют;
 Дефолтисты: утверждают и доказывают, что
они существуют.

Проблема симметричности
(3) Example
α: John read three books.
SI:  (John read four books)

Potential alternatives:
β: John read four books.
γ: John read exactly three books.

Symmetry problem
For any sentence S for which we would like to derive a SI
using an alternative S1, there is always another potential
alternative, S2 = S &  S1 which, if taken into account, would
prevent the desired inference from arising.

Решения
Horn (1972)
Alternatives are scale-mates. They are either monotonic, or non-
monotonic.
To derive the SI in (3), we must be able to negate β but not γ. On Horn’s
assumptions, this is accomplished by including the former but not the latter
in the set of scale-mates: three and four are scale-mates; three and exactly
three are not.

Gazdar (1979)
“Scales are, in some sense, ‘given to us’”.

Atlas & Levinson (1981)
Alternatives should be from the same semantic field, of the same brevity,
and lexicalized to the same degree.

Hirshberg (1985)
Alternatives are salient in a particular context.

Conversational Condition
(Matsumoto 1995)

The choice of W instead of S must not be attributed
to the observance of any information-selecting
Maxim of Conversation other than the Quality
Maxims and the Quantity-1 Maxim (i.e., the Maxims
of Quantity-2, Relation, and Obscurity Avoidance,
etc.)

Matsumoto 1995
Informativeness requirement
S must entail W
Functional alternative requirement
S and W must belong to the same semantic field
(Atlas and Levinson 1981)
S and W must form a salient scale in a given
discourse (Hirshberg 1985)

Matsumoto 1995
Possible Horn scales
They satisfy the informativeness requirement
Or equally, the notion of Horn scale might refer to the
set of all scales that can license a Quantity-1
implicature at least in some context
Functional Horn scales
They satisfy both the informativeness requirement and
the functional alternative requirement in a given context
C
Logical entailment is neither a necessary condition
(<spaniel, dog>), nor a sufficient condition ({Sephardic,
Ladino, Spanish}) on Horn scales

Katzir 2007
CONVERSATIONAL PRINCIPLE (alternative-sensitive):
do not assert  if there is another sentence ’  A
() such that both
a.   , and
b.  is weakly assertable

WEAK ASSERTABILITY
A structure  will be said to be weakly assertable by
a speaker S if S believes that  is true, relevant,
and supported by evidence. (i.e., following Maxims
of Quality 1 and 2, and Relation).

Katzir 2007
Complexity is based on the idea that we can transform 
into a structure that is no more complex if we restrict
ourselves to (a) deleting elements in , and (b)
substituting elements in  with other elements from an
appropriately defined source.

SUBSTITUTION SOURCE (Katzir (2007))
Let  be a parse tree. The substitution source for ,
written as L() is the union of the lexicon of the
language with the set of all subtrees of .
Substitution source is a collection of objects that are
available for further syntactic operations.

Matsumoto’s example
Matsumoto’s example is captured by Substitution
Source:
: It was warm yesterday, and it was a little bit more
than warm today.
Implicature: It was not a little bit more than warm
yesterday.
Matsumoto’s conclusion: Brevity is not an
information-selecting maxim. It does not choose
between statements with different meanings.

Fox and Katzir 2009
Let S, S1, S2 be three sentences. We will say that S1 and S2 are
symmetric alternatives of S if both S1, S2  S, and
S1  S   S2

F(S) = {S’: S’ is the result of replacing scalar items in S with
their scale mates}
A = C  F(S)
C is a set of contextually determined sentences.
F(S) restricts alternatives and is needed to avoid a symmetry
problem.

Fox and Katzir 2009
Relation of at-most-as-complex-as
S C S’ if S can be derived from S’ by successive
substitutions of sub-constituents of S’ with elements
of the substitution source for S’ in C, SS (S’, C).
SS (X, C), the substitution source for X in context
C, is the union of the following sets:
a. The lexicon
b. The sub-constituents of X
c. The set of salient constituents in C

Focus and scalar inferences
 Alternatives for both SI and AF are determined in
the same way.
 The set of alternatives in both cases is a
contextual restriction of the focus value of the
sentence (that is, computing SI involves AF).
 Contextual restriction is subject to a constraint
that prevents it from breaking symmetry.
 Focus values are determined based on structural
rather than semantic (type-theoretic)
considerations.

(4) John did some of the homework.
Implicature:  (John did all of the homework)

SIA (S) =  { Si: Si  NSI (A,S)}
F(S) = {S’: S’ is the result of replacing scalar items in S with
their scale mates}

(5) John only introduced Mary to Sue.
Inference:  (John introduced Jane to Sue)

EXCA (S) =  { Si: Si  NAF (A,S)}
OnlyA (S) = S  EXCA (S)
F(S) = {S’: S’ is the result of replacing focused items in S
with their focus alternatives}
Claim: FSI (S) = FAF (S)

Differences between Focus and SIs
 Intonation: focus is always intonationally marked (in
spoken language).
 Contextual dependency: focus alternatives are always
context-dependent.
 Scalar implicatures can be either weak or strong.
When they are weak, they have nothing in common
with focus.
 Monotonicity does not hold for focus.
 Psycholinguistic plausibility: focus assertion excludes
other alternatives in 100% cases, it does not vary
from speaker to speaker.
 Focus is a semantic phenomenon whereas scalar
implicature belongs to pragmatics.

Similarities between Focus and SIs
 Substitution
 In order to compute a scalar implicature, a hearer
has to ‘focus‘ on a constituent in question.
Zondervan (2010) experimentally showed that
focused items increase triggering scalar
implicatures compared to non-focused ones
though not drastically.

Литература
Chierchia, G. (2004). Scalar implicatures, polarity phenomena and the
syntax/ pragmatics interface. In A. Belletti (Ed.), Structures and beyond, pp.
39–103. Oxford University Press.
Chierchia, G. (2006). Broaden your views: implicatures of domain widening
and the “logicality” of language. Linguistic inquiry 37: 535–590.
Chierchia, G., D. Fox, and B. Spector (to appear). The grammatical view of
scalar implicatures and the relationship between semantics and pragmatics.
In C. Maienborn, K. von Heusinger, and P. Portner (Eds.), Handbook of
semantics. Mouton de Gruyter.
Fox, D. and R. Katzir (2010). On the characterization of alternatives //
Natural Language Semantics 19: 87–107.
Gazdar, G. (1979). Pragmatics: implicature, presupposition, and logical
form. New York: Academic Press.
Geurts, B. (2010). Quantity implicatures. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2010.
Harnish, R. (1976), Logical Form and Implicature. In T. Bever, J. Katz and T.
Langendoen (Eds.)(1976), An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Abilities, New
York: Crowell, pp. 464-479.

Hirschberg, J. (1985). A theory of scalar implicature. Ph.D. thesis,
University of Pennsylvania.
Horn, L. R. (1972). On the semantic properties of the logical operators in
English. Ph.D. thesis, University of California at Los Angeles.
Horn, L. R. (1984). Towards a new taxonomy for pragmatic inference: Q-
based and R-based implicature. In D. Schiffrin (Ed.), Meaning, form, and
use in context: linguistic applications, pp. 11–42. Washington: Georgetown
University Press.
Horn, L. R. (2006). The border wars: a neo-Gricean perspective. In K. von
Heusinger and K. Turner (Eds.), Where semantics meets pragmatics, pp.
21–48. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Katzir, R. (2007). Structurally-defined alternatives // Linguist and Philos
(2007) 30: 669–690.
Levinson, S. C. (2000). Presumptive meanings. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Matsumoto, Y. (1995). The conversational condition on Horn scales.
Linguistics and philosophy 18: 21–60.

Часть II. Неограйсианство и
Релевантность

Introduction: 1. Pragmatics; Part I.
Relevance and Meaning: 2. The mapping
between the mental and the public lexicon;
3. Truthfulness and relevance; 4. Rhetoric
and relevance; 5. A deflationary account of
metaphors; 6. Explaining irony; Part II.
Explicit and Implicit Communication: 7.
Linguistic form and relevance; 8. Pragmatics
and time; 9. Recent approaches to bridging:
truth, coherence, relevance; 10. Mood and
the analysis of non-declarative sentences;
11. Metarepresentation in linguistic
communication; Part III. Cross-disciplinary
Themes: 12. Pragmatics, modularity and
mindreading; 13. Testing the cognitive and
communicative principles of relevance; 14.
The why and how of experimental
pragmatics; 15. A pragmatic perspective on
the evolution of language.

Истоки теории релевантности
 Теория импликатур П.Грайса
 «Модулярная теория сознания» Дж.Фодора

Grice -> Relevance theory

«Relevance theory may be seen as an attempt to
work out in detail one of Grice’s central claims:
that an essential feature of most human
communication is the expression and recognition
of intentions (Grice 1989: Essays 1–7, 14, 18;
Retrospective Epilogue)» [Sperber D., Wilson D.
Relevance Theory // G. Ward, L. Horn (eds)
Handbook of Pragmatics. Oxford: Blackwell, 2004,
p.607]

Недостатки грайсианства с точки
зрения теории релевантности

 Слишком много принципов
 Никак не объясняются систематические
нарушения максим
 Анализ иронии и метафор как нарушения
максимы качества

 «Relevance, and the maximisation of relevance,
is the key to human cognition.»

Кодовая и инференциональная
модели коммуникации

 «The goal of inferential pragmatics is to explain
how the hearer infers the speaker’s meaning on
the basis of the evidence provided»

 Effecteffort
 Explicatureimplicature
 Echoic utterances and irony

«Мы считаем, что решающее значение в
обработке новой информации (в особенности
передаваемой с помощью языковых средств)
имеет объединение ее с контекстом —адекватно
избранным множеством фоновых допущений,
извлеченных из памяти дедуктивного
устройства». [НЗЛ,224]

 Презумпция оптимальной релевантности
 (а) Набор допущений {I}, который коммуникант
намеревается довести до сознания адресата,
является достаточно релевантным для того,
чтобы потребовать от адресата приложения
необходимых усилий для обработки
остенсивных стимулов.
 (б) Остенсивные стимулы, используемые
коммуникантом, являются наиболее
релевантными из тех, которые могли быть
использованы для передачи {I}.

 Принцип релевантности
«Любой акт остенсивной коммуникации
содержит презумпцию своей собственной
оптимальной релевантности».

 a.Peter: How far is Nottingham from London?
 b.Mary: 120 miles.
 c.Mary: 118 miles.

 Mary, of Peter, who has just tripped over his own
feet:
 Peter’s just like Rudolf Nureyev

 Peter is very clumsy.
 Peter is not at all like Rudolf Nureyev.

 a. Peter bought a paper before leaving.
 b. Peter purchased a newspaper prior to
departure.

 More generally, relevance theory sheds light on
the cognitive effects of style. Some stylistic
effects are not deliberately achieved: for example,
the speaker’s choice of vocabulary may betray
her social or political attitudes. Such attitudes
may also be deliberately communicated. To take
just one illustration, modern English speakers
who prefer the form of words ‘he or she to the
more economical form ‘he’ communicate that, for
them, choice of the more economical form would
carry unwanted implications

 a. I have no brothers or sisters.
 b. I have no siblings.

The differences between (a) and (b) are straight-forwardly
explained on the assumption that the relative brevity of the
word ‘sibling’ is not enough to offset the increase in
processing cost resulting from its infrequency, so that (a) is
more economical overall.
An anomaly in Grice’s framework is thus removed.

Шпербер, Д., Уилсон, Д. Релевантность //Новое в зарубежной лингвистике. Вып.
23: Когнитивныеаспекты языка. М., 1988. С. 212—257
Blakemore D. Semantic Constraints on Relevance. Blackwell, Oxford, 1987.
Blakemore D. Linguistic Meaning and Relevance: The Semantics and Pragmatics of
Discourse Markers. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002.
Carston, Robyn and Seiji Uchida (eds.) (1998). Relevance Theory: Applications and
Implications. Amsterdam: Benjamins
Gabbay D.M. (ed.) Agenda Relevance. A Study in Formal Pragmatics, Elsevier, 2003.
Robyn Carston & Seiji Uchida (eds.) Relevance Theory: Applications and Implications.
John Benjamins, Amsterdam: 283-93.
Happe F. Communicative competence and theory of mind in autism: A test of
relevance theory // Cognition, 48.2, 1993 pp. 101–
19,http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~lds/readinggroup/Happe%201993.pdf
Leech G. N. Principles of Pragmatics. London, 1983.
van Rooij R., Franke M., de Jager T. Relevance in Cooperation and Conflict,
(2009) Journal of Logic and Computation (to
appear),http://staff.science.uva.nl/~vanrooij/JointRelevance.pdf

Saul J. What is said and psychological reality: Grice’s project and relevance
theorists’ criticisms // Linguistics and Philosophy 25, 2002, pp. 347–
72,http://stuff.mit.edu/afs/sipb/project/wine/dosdevices/z:/mit/lugia/MacData/afs.cours
e/24/24.954/OldFiles/www/files/saul.gricecritics.pdf
Sperber D., Wilson D. Relevance: Communication and Cognition, Harvard University
Press, 1986. (Second edition 1995. Blackwell, Oxford.)
Sperber D., Wilson D. Precis of Relevance: Communication and Cognition
//Behavioral and Brain Sciences. Vol.10, 1987, pp. 697-75.
Sperber D., Wilson D. Linguistic form and relevance // Lingua. Vol. 90, 1993, pp. 1-
25, http://www.dan.sperber.fr/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/Linguistic-form-and-
relevance.pdf
Sperber, Dan and Deirdre Wilson.(2002). Pragmatics, modularity and mind-reading //
Mind & Language 17: 3–23,http://www.dan.sperber.fr/wp-
content/uploads/2009/09/PragmaticsModularityMindReading.pdf
Sperber D., Wilson D. Relevance Theory // G. Ward, L. Horn (eds) Handbook of
Pragmatics. Oxford: Blackwell, 2004, pp. 607-632
Stainton, Robert J.(1994). Using non-sentences: An application of relevance theory //
Pragmatics and Cognition 2: 269–84,http://works.bepress.com/robertstainton/114/
Wilson D., Sperber D.Truthfulness and relevance // Mind 111, 2002, pp. 583–
63,http://www.dan.sperber.fr/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/wilson_sperber.pdf
Wilson D. Relevance and lexical pragmatics // Italian Journal of Linguistics Rivista di
Linguistica Vol. 15, 2003, pp. 273-
291,http://www.phon.ucl.ac.uk/publications/WPL/04papers/wilson.pdf

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