1. BRINGING ORDER TO CHAOS:
HARNESSING AND DISTRIBUTING INFORMATION
AT ALL LEVELS OF LARGE-SCALE RESPONSES
Emerging Best Practices and Decision-Making in Crisis Emergencies
Gail Kulisch, CAPT, USCG (ret)
EricTelfer, CDR, USCG
Alliance of Hazardous Materials Professionals
13 September 2012

2. Bringing Order to Chaos
Three Key Elements
• Understand the Unique
Characteristics of Large-Scale
Response
• Design for Complex and
Layered Decision-Making
• Generate Meaningful
Information and Understand
Stakeholder Needs

3. Bringing Order to Chaos
Three Key Elements
• Understand the Unique
Characteristics of Large-Scale
Response
• Design for Complex and
Layered Decision-Making
• Generate Meaningful
Information and Understand
Stakeholder Needs

4. The Unique Characteristics
Two Types of Emergencies
Mode R : Routine Emergency
Mode C : Crisis Emergency
─ Key Elements Known
─ Situation has Familiar Aspects ─ Significant Novelty
─ Methods Exist to Adapt ─ Relatively Low Understanding
Response to Specific of the Situation
Circumstance ─ Requires Creativity to
─ Necessary Skills Have Been Improvise New Approaches
Trained to ─ Situation Goes Beyond
─ Authority Based C2 Structure Existing Plans
Suited to Directing Execution ─ Cognitively Driven Routines
─ Implement Well-Developed and ─ Collaborative adaptive C2
Practiced Routines Style
─ Familiar Script or Elements ─ Limited Expertise in Key Areas
Requiring Only Moderate of the Response
Adjustments or Scaling
─ No Comprehensive Script
─ Hierarchical Structure with Well-
─ Variably Flattened Structure
Defined General Routines
(Ref: Howitt, Arnold and Herman B. Leonard; Managing Crises: Responses to Large-Scale
Emergencies, CQ Press, Washington, D.C., 2009.)

5. The Majority of Responses
Routine Emergencies
 All emergencies start as „operations‟
 Most incidents resolved before ever
leaving the stem and entering planning
cycle
chaos  For complex or extended response –
Move to the Spiral: Get “Planning”
ahead of “Operations”.
 Responses can start as „routine‟ but
become „crisis‟ emergencies.

6. Bringing Order to Chaos
Three Key Elements
• Understand the Unique
Characteristics of Large-Scale
Response
• Design for Complex and
Layered Decision-Making
• Generate Meaningful
Information and Understand
Stakeholder Needs

7. Design for Layered, Complex Decision-Making
 Recognize Key Attributes of Large-Scale Response - Novelty, Complexity,
Distributed Consequences, Insufficient Quantities of Specialized Equipment.
 Get A System in Place (GASP) – Quickly.
 National Incident Management System (NIMS) – Necessary - But Not Sufficient…need:
 Need additional structural elements to coordinate political entities.
 Local engagement strategy.
 Adaptive leader skilled in collaboration while developing solutions, hierarchical in execution.
 Adjusted organizational structure: flattened for solution development, hierarchical for execution.
 Implementing National Incident Commander framework - leadership and experience matter to more rapidly orient.
 Flatten the Organization and Distribute Decision-Making.
 Harness the Information.
 Recognize corresponding complexity of information needs .
 Sustainably Staff and Equip.
 Shift and Communicate National, International, and Corporate Level Allocation and
Resources - Scale Up Rapidly, Plan for Long Duration.
 Establish Priorities and Decision-Making for Allocation of Limited Critical Resources.

8. The Game-Changers
Crisis Emergencies
 11 SEPTEMBER 2001: Commercial Aircraft as Weapon to Destroy Iconic Infrastructure.
─ A „war‟ on US soil.
─ Entire US federal agency structure revisited through the lens of US „defense‟ and domestic security - DHS
created.
 ANTHRAX ATTACKS: U.S. Mail System as a Delivery System for a Biological Weapon.
─ Distributed terror attack and unique vulnerability of every citizen to „new‟ weapons.
─ 15 Threats Vectors established with corresponding substantial investments in critical infrastructure
protection, early warning systems.
 HURRICANE KATRINA: The Known But Unthinkable - Levee Failures (5 locations).
─ Hurricane “Pam” Laid Out the Unlikely Scenario.
─ National Response Framework established.
─ FEMA paradigm and culture substantively changed.
 DEEPWATER HORIZON: Uncontrolled Release of Oil at Virtually Inaccessible Depths.
─ Started as a „routine‟ emergency (platform fire).
─ Exceptionally complex decision-making in unique political environment (5 States, x „county equivalents‟).
─ National Contingency Plan‟s adequacy tested; response mechanisms adjusted and added
─ Private sector owned the financial capacity and technical means.
─ Exposed significant limitations of the National Contingency Plan.

9. Emergency Response Starts With
NIMS ICS
 Forms the Backbone of Routine and Crisis Response.
─ ICS developed by Firefighting Resources of Southern California Organized
for Potential Emergencies (“Firescope”).
─ Chartered by Congress 1972; developed and Implemented in 1982.
─ Early adoption by some municipal fire departments and National Strike
Force.
─ Post-Katrina FEMA adopted it and integrated it into a whole of response
solution (tailored from FIRESCOPE ICS to NIMS ICS).
─ NIMS ICS and FEMA Joint Operations Center/Emergency Management
Functions harmonization evolving.
─ Regardless of complexity, NIMS allows you to orient.
 Formally adopted by DHS
─ Whole of government sanctioned and supported.
─ Element of the National Response Framework.

10. Novelty: Anthrax Capitol Hill 2001
 Distributed Attack
─ Entire US mail system potential
source of increased
contamination
 Unique Weapon
─ Weaponized biological agent
 Created Adjusted Structures
─ US Congress Oversees
Response – Maintains Continuity
of Government.
─ Executive Branch Supports.
─ Supreme Court Facilities
Impacted.

11. Novelty: No Prior Anthrax Playbook
 When There Is No Playbook - Create One:
─ Build on What You Do Have/Know.
 Tannery Field Decontamination Protocols.
 Medical Community/USAMRID Microbiological
Sampling Experience.
 „Repurposed‟ Existing Methods for Decon (Chlorine
Dioxide and Ethylene Oxide for Medical
applications).
─ Apply Fundamentals of Hazmat Response.
 Slow it down.
 Isolate and Control Entry.
 Deliberate Assessment.
 Organizational Discipline (Rigor of the ICS Planning
Cycle).
 Life Safety Priorities.
─ Actively Manage The Differences
 Legislative Branch Culture.
 Continuity of Government Requirements.
 Large Area Assessments of Commercial and
Government Buildings.
Standardization Provides a Baseline – Adaptation Makes It Work

12. Distributed Consequences: National Mail System
As An Attack Vector
 Extent and Location of Contamination Unknown - Emerged Over Time.
─ Established a system of reporting from Public Health System and First Responders.
 Postal Service Established a Unified Command.
─ Collaboration with Public Health agencies.
─ Tracked and engaged on every report.
─ Aggressively traced each report back to finite number of letters.
─ Localized decontamination efforts were situation dependent.
─ Ultimately „pieces of the puzzle‟ became known.
─ Applied and shared guidance and protocols evolved as incident evolved.
 EPA Retained National Federal On Scene Coordinator Role.
─ Legal authorities and fund access.
─ Created a body of adapted knowledge and techniques.
─ Developed and applied tailored techniques learned from one site to another.
─ Created technical and response protocol continuity.
 Every Hazmat Unit in the US a Potential Responder.
─ Required extensive distributed decision-making and professional collaboration.
─ Adapted existing and evolving response protocols while preserving a common framework; applied
the basic principles of hazmat response.
─ Commercial sector adapted equipment to expedite detection.

13. Unprecedented Consequences:
World Trade Center Ground Zero
No Script.
Requires Critical Leadership Adaptations.
POTUS Channeled the Emotions:
 Struck the right chord at the right moment
 In two sentences framed a common purpose.
 Harnessed the emotion and gave it a direction.
 Visual display of solidarity across fed, state, and local elements.
Mayor Guillianni harnessed the culture of New Yorkers.
 Engaged leadership.
 Resilient and independent.
 Invincible culture despite the obstacles.
Addressed emotional overlay of an entire nation.

14. Katrina: Insufficient Resources, Inadequate
Response System Design
 The Known But Too Hard to Address
Scenario – Levee Failures.
 Disproportionate Impact to the Poor and
Infirmed.
 Extraordinary Property Damage.
 Complexity Exceeded Designed Roles and
Capabilities of the Federal Disaster
Response System.
─ FEMA Redesigned.
─ Creation of the NIC and Whole of
Government Mechanisms.
─ Federal Role in Disasters Reevaluated.
 Decision-Makers Operated in an
Information Vacuum.

15. Hurricane Pam: Too Hard to Even Plan
 2004 SE Louisiana/Gulf Coast Catastrophic Hurricane
Exercise.
─ 12 parishes represented, State Agencies and 15 federal agencies
for an 8 day workshop.
─ Slow moving Cat 3 Hurricane (120 mph) with 20 inches of rain
 Resulted in the SE Louisiana catastrophic hurricane
functional plan – with some highly detailed, some sketchy,
and some TBD sections.
 Last "Hurricane Pam" training exercise was completed
August 24, 2005, less than a week before Hurricane Katrina
struck the Gulf Coast.

16. Katrina: What Went Right
 6,000 Coast Guard personnel rescued 33,000 people along
the Gulf Coast – largest helicopter rescue op in history.
 Private citizens heroic personal contributions.
 Military contributions to support and logistics.
 Private sector role including Wal-Mart‟s now reknown „empty
the shelves‟ philosophy.
 States and individual federal agencies created unique
solutions to tackle extraordinary issues.

17. Post-Katrina: Government and Organizational
Insufficiencies Exposed and Addressed.
 Chapter Six Transforming Preparedness.
 Define and Implement A Comprehensive National
Preparedness System.
 Foster a New, Robust Culture of Preparedness.
• Align Federal Response Structures to NIMS with ICS
as field command structure.
• Create New Principal Federal Official Authorities.
• Substantial Revisions to the National Response Plan.
• Significant Review of All Federal Agency Support
Rules in Response.

18. DWH: Novelty, Complexity, and Unprecedented
Technical Challenges
 Largest National Contingency Plan Governed
Response In History.
 Whole of Government Engagement – The NIC Role.
 Novelty Elements Delayed Critical Flattening of
Organization.
 Critically Dependent on Common Operating Picture.
Unique Legal, Fiduciary Obligations of Responsible
Party (BP) Challenged Decision-Making.
 Capping at Depth; Limited National Boom Inventory.

19. DWH: Novelty, Complexity, and Unprecedented
Technical Challenges
 The „Responsible Party‟ and the National Contingency
Plan.
 NIC Communication Skills Essential.
 Extraordinary Legal Claims.
 New legislation required to allow funding for
government costs in advance of reimbursements from
BP.
 Limited Technical Solutions and Specialized Equipment.

20. DWH: NIC Role Proved Critical
 Identified Air Space Safety As Critical Need – Facilitated
National Command Authority Action to Control the Air
Space.
 Mobilized Senior Interagency Partners, Cabinet Level
Officials - Mechanism for Higher Level Engagement and
Decision-Making.
 Filled Critical Cross-Government Facilitation Role.
 Effective Communicator: Ability to Simplify Complex
Information.
 Supported Flattened Organization and Broadened
Engagement of the Locals in Decision-Making.
 Drove Development of a Common Operating Picture.

21. DEEPWATER HORIZON
 Single greatest challenge was lack of a common operating
picture (adm allen)
 DWH Example:
 Authorities:
 Incident Command authority to prescribe the Persistent
Demand for accurate, real time info
 RRI underfunded and unsupported for years- incomplete and
inaccurate inventory of response equipment.
 Information requirements and authorities
 Air Tasking Order essential to manage all flights operating
above and around the spill site
 Before ADM Allen implemented it, there were 8 near air-to-air

22. Flatten the Organization: Engaging the
Locals
 Establish pre-existing relationships with community based
organizations who can take leadership roles.
 Establish strong engagement with business community
(large-scale capabilities, logistics mechanisms)
 Collaborative decision-making –
 Capture and incorporate info requirements of all
stakeholders.
 Staff and sustain – surge versus dribble.
 Common Operating Picture – can they see what you see.
 The articulate communicator.
 Elevate quickly to NRF/NIC structure - can always back off.

23. Engaging the Locals: A Checkered History
 Ground Zero – Solidarity of Purpose (citizenry
supported responders)
 Cosco Busan –Responders became „the enemy‟.
 Deepwater Horizon – Scale and complexity across 5
states exceeded routine collaborative methods.
─ Ultimately created additional and incident command elements
with distributed authority and power, collaborative decision-
making within discrete geographic areas.
─ Incident leadership distributed to personally engage locals.

24. Flatten the Organization: Engage the
Private Sector
„The Restorative Function of Business‟
Director Craig Fugate
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Role of Business in Disaster Response
US Chamber of Commerce Report
 Pre-Crisis Alignment and Partnerships
─ Business Leaders Emergency Operations Center
─ Coca Cola partnership with the Red Cross
─ Target partnership with FEMA
─ Citi partnership with World Food Programme
 Bring Unique Expertise, Logistics, Innovation and
Speed

25. Bringing Order to Chaos
Three Key Elements
• Understand the Unique
Characteristics of Large-Scale
Response
• Design for Complex and
Layered Decision-Making
• Generate Meaningful
Information and Understand
Stakeholder Needs

26. Harness The Information
Mature the
Feedback Loops
Proactively Adjust the
Engage at All Response
Levels
Collect and
Distribute
Information
Define
Information
Requirements
Establish
Incident
Management
Structure

27. Harnessing Information:
Facilitated By Technical Tools
 Common Orientation.
 Consistency.
 Effective/Efficient Resource Allocation.
 Accelerate Assessment and Decision-Making.
 Safety.
─ People do not need to physically „be‟ in the danger zone to have
information.
─ Operate moving resources in concentrated areas
(air, marine, ground) without physical danger.

28. Harnessing Information:
Managed As A System
Requires:
 Authorities.
- Air Space Management.
- Collection Means Authorized.
- Decision-Makers Engaged.
 Processes.
─ Requirements Identified and Validated.
─ Standard Requirements Developed in Plans.
 Tools.
─ Common Operating Picture.
─ Real-Time Video.
─ Accessible Network.

29. Harnessing Information:
Structured By Defined Requirements.
 Learn From Other Disciplines:
─ The Intelligence Community.
 Requirements Developed, Validated, Sourced.
 Collected Information Distributed.
 Intelligence Cycle Repeatable.
 Plan, Collect, Analyze, Produce, Disseminate.
─ The Coast Guard‟s SDCIP Operational Planning Model.
 Surveil.
 Detect.
 Classify.
 Identify.
 Prosecute.

30. SDCIP Tactics and Fusion Model

31. Harnessing Information: Collect and
Distribute.
 Defined By:
─ Pre-scripted Priority Incident Requirements.
─ Event Specific Requirements.
 Collected by:
─ Real-Time Systems In A Repeatable Cycle.
 Displayed In:
─ A Common Operating Picture.
 Augmented By:
─ Push Tools Such as
 Emergency Incident Alerts
 Notifications
 Updates

32. Harnessing Information:
Strengthened By The Power of Social Media.
Emergency Situation Awareness - Twitter for Crisis Management
(Cameron et al) “Emergency Situation Awareness–Automated Web
Text Mining” (ESA-AWTM) system. .
 Detect unexpected or unusual incidents.
 Condense and summarize messages maintaining awareness of aggregated
content.
 Classify and review high-value messages during an incident - understand the
impact of an incident on people and infrastructure.
 Identify, track, manage issues within an incident.
 Pro-actively identify and manage issues that may last for hours, days or weeks.
 Perform forensic analysis of incidents by analyzing social media content from
before, during, and after an incident.

33. The Common Operating Picture
 DWH - Initial lack of a GIS-based Common Operating Picture.
─ Hampered sharing and decision-making.
─ No tool to effectively manage airspace safety.
 Single biggest impediment to response decision making and
communications: lack of common operating picture (ADM Thad
Allen)
 The emergence of ERMA - Emergency Response Management
Application.
─ GIS base/on-line mapping tool.
─ Integrates both static and real-time data
 Maps
 Environmental Sensitivity Index (ESI) maps
 Ship Locations
 Weather/Ocean Currents
 Impacted Areas
 Industrial Data

34. Deepwater Horizon ERMA

35. Arctic ERMA

36. Caribbean ERMA

37. ERMA Architecture

38. Real-Time Situational Awareness
 From the Civil War:
─ President Lincoln and “T-Mail”
(Wheeler, Tom; Mr. Lincoln‟s T-Mails: How Abraham
Lincoln Used the Telegraph to Win the Civil War;
Harper Collins Publishers, NY, NY, 2006)
─ Personally Coordinated with
Generals in the Field
 To the War on Terror:
─ The Raid on Bin Laden
─ Real-Time Camera feed
from an Isolated Location
in Pakistan.

39. Tactics and Tools At The Speed of Light
 New environment demands new tools to meet those needs.
 Data and information must be contextualized.
─ Rapid evolution of COP tools, incident notification tools, mapping
tools; e.g.
 HSIN:
− Common Operational Picture (COP) provides situational awareness and
analysis;
− Integrated Common Analytical Viewer (iCAV) gives geographical
visualization,;
− 24/7 availability, document Libraries, instant-messaging tool, Web
conferencing, incident reporting, Common Operational Picture (COP)
provides situational awareness and analysis, announcements, discussion
boards, task lists, requests for Information/or Your Information (RFIs/FYIs),
calendars
− Really Simple Syndication (RSS) Feeds
− Online training materials
− ERMA

40. Virtual On-line Sharing Tools (VOST)
Reference: Bledsoe, Cheryl; VOST The Basics, Clark Regional
Emergency Services, Twitter@CRESA@cherylble

41. Reference: Bledsoe, Cheryl; VOST The Basics, Clark Regional
Emergency Services, Twitter@CRESA@cherylble

42. Value of a Video
─ 911 - the repeated image of the towers falling created an
enormous emotional impact.
─ Katrina - primary info in first 3 days was provided by CG
Helicopter clips of rescues.

43. Katrina Clips

44. Repeated Video Impact
 Al Qaeda techniques:
─ IED explosion from multiple angles over mass comms medium –
viewer perceives a single attack as multiple attacks.
─ Repeated viewing of same attack – exponential emotional
impact.
─ Increases emotional impact of the terror.

45. Power of the Private Sector
Resilient communities have:
 A greater percentage of small businesses with disaster
plans;
 85% of business is small business (confrim)
Yet:
 71% of small businesses have no disaster plans
 43% with no plan never reopen
 If they do reopen, only 29% are still open two years laterThe
Role of Business in Disaster Response, US Chamber of
Commerce
(Ref: The Role of Business in Disaster Response, US Chamber
of Commerce, Business Civic Leadership Center, 2012

46. The Human Element
In times of crisis, and on a daily basis, Allen said members of the public are
going to base their perceptions of government on personal transactions, as
they did after oil spill. Alluding to the dissatisfaction among Gulf Coast
residents with contractors staffed in the region, the retired commandant said,
"You cannot outsource core values -- empathy and compassion -- to a third
party."
Admiral Thad Allen, National Incident Commander
Hurricane Katrina and Deepwater Horizon

48.  The power of a picture…and the value of a video –
 Airsta Rescue – Katrina piece from

49. Commercial Tools
 Rapidly expanding
 Pre-incident warning

50. Backup Slides

51.  Deep Dive into Information Management:
DEEPWATER HORIZON Case Study - CDR
Erich Telfer, USCG
 Information Management – Broader Context

53. Social Media Explosion
 Data, data everywhere…Monitoring Social Media
During a Crisis

54. Evolving Capabilities of the Private Sector
 People Finder (Google)
 Satellite Based emergency networks for responders
─ Private Sector capabilities rapidly expanding

55.  Its not the size that matters – complexity as a differentiator
 When there is no script – the unthinkable aand the new
normal
 US Government Structural Transition and the Rise of the
super-NIC
 NIMS is necessary – but not sufficient
 Situational Awareness on Steroids
 Tools and schools
 Brokering limited resources –
 Whole of Effort – global private sector players as experts in
Scalewho understand large problems…and can opportunity to
Scale

56.  In large-scale, a number of issues rise to this
level….how best to maximize that „opportunity‟
─ Invest in a solid NIMS process to bring as many issues into the
NIMS/IC – Area Command process as possible; the better the
workings and processes inside NIMS, the better the chance
issues not „addressable‟ at AC level or IC level must
─ Courageous, knowledgable, articulate NIC
 Meta-Leader
 Knows what moves into the brokered sphere
 Knows how to minimize the disconnects creating unnecessary
engagement of senior leaders
 Communications mastery – complex concepts made simple
 Visible
 No personal agenda/affiliation – „agnostic‟ – direct report to CIC…

57.  Information versus data
 How do you educate at the same time you inform?
 What parameters guide or determine how porous and
rapid the data flow is versus information assessment by
„experts‟ – does free flow of data (accurate or inaccurate)
spur

58. Efforts to flow data and information…
 Can not themselves create more chaos - still need a
system, still need some degree of site
control, accounting for victims and responders, hazard
assessment….
 Pentagon 911 response, the DC fire dept and units from
MD that they mobilized showed up and operated on the
pentagon site without informing or integrating into the
professionally well-known ICS structure - acted
independently

59. A Number of Solutions on the Market

60.  Words matter – careful and deliberate selection of terms
can ease tension, minimize misunderstanding…poorly
selected terms can fuel rhetoric and misinform
perception
 Cat spirit:
 Safe anchorage vs „harbor of refuge‟ (what is it hiding
from)
 Returned to international svc (conveys acceptance of
standards by a legitimate independent body) versus
„allowed to enter port‟ (implies a personal decision of an
individual cotp without context)
 Others?

61. KATRINA
Photo clip/Video

62.  The predicted crisis
 Hurricane Pam – 2004 full deliberate effort to plan and
exercise reponse to a catastrophic hurricane in NOLA –
all 12 parishes represented, state agenceis and 15
federal agencies for an 8 day workshop – slow moving
cat 3 hurricane w20 inchses of rain……SE Loisiana
catastrophic hurricane functional plan resulted – with
some highly detailed, some sketchy and some TBD
sections – assumed there were no levee breaches (yet
believed it to be the worst case)…communicating the
unthinkable…

63.  http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?
webmap=ecfd899b55e944a1977f00c06a111013&e
xtent=-95.4268,29.5805,-94.747,29.8685
 Wetlands map baseline

64.  Effective comms and info mgmt and decision making
structures will depend on whether there is a culture of
„self-relience‟ and „resilience‟ or a culture of „dependence
„ and „vulnerability‟….in either case, the need for
extraordinary external engagement and support is
necessary, how that becomes
interfaced, coordinated, and implemented depends on
which circumstance the community is grounded in.
Individuals can be either, this is a characterization of the
collective behavior not individual behavior.

65.  Precrisis alignement and pre-existing relationships
(w/business, govenrment entities, private sector
groups, the broader response community) – increase
resilience
 Precrisis macro culture (reliance or independence)

66. Resilient communities have
 Greater percentage of small businesses with disaster
plans;
 - 85% of business is small business (confrim)
 71% of small businesses have no disaster plans
 43% with no plan never reopen
 If they do reopen, only 29% are still open two years later

67. RISK COMMUNICATION

69.  Incredible restorative function of business (Director
Fugate)
 ROB rules in disaster resonse….

70. The Power of a Picture: Photos and
Videos.

71. Study topics
 When is too much info „bad‟
 How to optimize the theory “transparency breeds self-
correcting behavior”

72. References
 The Role of Business in Disaster Response, US
Chamber of Commerce/Business Civic Leadership
Center, 2012

73. Nyc - resilience 911
 Greatest example of resilience – canal street south
completely shut down to vehicles – cement dust and
debris coated every inch of buildings and streets –
 16 acre „pile‟ – gutted center of the financial district

74. Wrap
 Large-scale have phases that go on for decades – still
working Katrina issues , still individuals in „temp‟
housing; still an active series of recovery issues that are
actively managed -

75. Info needs
 Need to add the context against the array of distributed
info that spews from an incident
 Who adds the context, how, how to then distribute
it, refresh it, stay relevant
 How to embrace the disparate nodes and corral them to
a more powerful effect.
 Aggregation tools? – visual displays
 Data and info must be proactively contextualized – by
credible source?, by an aggregate in a freely dispersed
environment…

76. The Cycle

77.  Social media and extensive communications
channels, including historically novel and significant
expectations on

78. Expectations
 The president was expecdted (via press q‟s) to everyday
know how much ice and water were distributed to new orleans
 Or in dwh, how much oil had leaked that day – info mgmt
means accurante info on details has to move from
reliable/validated source
 Info: how much/how many.
 Will always be many answers unless all agree on „as of time
and date‟ and from „what geographic area‟ – a „simple‟
question but unless there is a common understandingof the
parameters, answers will sound „uninformed‟….get through
this by establishing a set time for reporting/freeze the
counts, communicate the agreement of parameters

79.  The standup 8 hr (really every 6) change of shiftsL - LB
FD reponse to 5000 gal baker tank 30% hydrogen
peroxide self-venting….the 36 hour perspective watching
6 shift changes.
 Whiteboard on a pier – each brief, key pieces were
dropped – perished. Not uncommon – continuity of
people balanced against fatigue question

80. Info expectations
 All responses have phases
 Need to be clear about movement from one „phase‟ to
another‟ and the info expectatIons between different
phases
 Create distinct phases that cause shift in tactics, and
communicates the progress
─ cap hill: emergency phase to recovery phase
─ dwh: katrina: rescue phase to recovery

81. References
 Howitt, Arnold and Herman Leonard, Managing Crises: Responses to Large-Scale Emergencies; CQ
Press, Washington DC, 2009.
 Renaud, Cynthia
 Leonard, Herman and Arnold M. Howitt, Katrina as Prelude: Preparing for and Respnding to Future Katrina-Class
Distrurbances in the United States; Testimony before the U.S. Senate Homealnd Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee; 8 march 2006
 Townsend, Francis, et al; The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina – Lessons Learned; February 2006.
 Kulisch, Gail P. et al; LNGC CATALUNYA SPIRIT Adrift Incident After Action Report; une 2008.
 Telfer, Erich; Unlimited Impossibilities: Intelligence Support to the Deepwater Horizon Response; Center for Strategic
Intelligence Research, National Defense Intelligence University, DIA (Unpublished) Dec 2011.
 Rupert, Richard; Federal on-scene Coordinator‟s Report for the Capitol Hill Site, Washington, D.C.; USEPA Region 3;
undated.
 US Coast Guard, On-Scene Coordinator Report Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, Submitted to National Response
Team, Sept 2011.
 Floriida Division of Emergency Management, Deepwater Horizon Response 30Apr2010 – 27AUg2010, After Action
Report/Improvement Plan, 2March2011
 Papp, Rober t, COMDT USCG, BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR), Final
Report, Jan 2011

82. National Level Exercises
The „Next Best Thing‟ to Actual Events
 NLE11 – New Madrid Fault
Earthquake (May 2011)
 NLE12 – Cyber Focus (October 2012)
─ New Paradigm: Distributed Effects
─ Specifically Test:
 Impacts to Infrastructure/Physical Effects
 Information Exchange/Communications
 National Cyber Incident Response Plan
 Federal Government Continuity

84. ─ Deep Dive into Information Management:
DEEPWATER HORIZON Case Study - CDR Erich
Telfer, USCG
─ Information Management – Broader Context
─ Decision-Making in Large-Scale Crises

85. Bring Order to the Chaos
 Get A System in Place (GASP) – quickly
 National Incident Management System (NIMS)
− Necessary, But Not Necessarily Sufficient
 National Response Framework
− Whole of government effort
 Recognize the Key Attributes of a Large-Scale Response –
Novelty, Complexity, Distributed Consequences, Insufficient
Quantities of Specialized Equipment
 Sustainably Staff and Equip – National and Corporate Level
Allocation and Designations

86. Tool Time
 Volunteer Tracking
 COP
 ICS Forms Management/Tracking
 Notifications and Alerts
 Interactive Mediums
 Hybrid Emergency Management Software

87. Volunteer2.com
VolSoft
www.iamresponding.com

88. Katrina (2005)
 Worst case scenario – levees protecting major city
breached
 Required full national engagement – „Beyond FEMA‟
 Led to comprehensive review of National structure and
established whole of government mechanisms
 NRF published 2008

89. Deep Water Horizon
 Complexity exceeded previous incidents.
─ Role of designated private commercial entity („responsible
party‟) in a national level response
─ Uncontrolled release at unprecedented depth
 Sufficiency of the National Contingency Plan
challenged.

90. Erich

91. Define Information
Requirements, Systems, and
Dissemination

92. Incident Communications and Structures:
Before, During, and After
 Before – Minimize the Impact: Information „pushed‟ to potential victims – e.g.
warning phase
- Good Robo Calls : one of the first times „robo calls‟ used to scale was LA fires in 200x -
warned individuals in remote area and communicated instructions e.g. „evacuate and go to
the Staples Center‟
- Downside: Non-receipt and tracking of same – this past summer‟s Waldo Canyon fire in
Colorado - more then 20,000 evacuation calls never delivered to residents in the path –
two-thirds of the 32,000 impacted residents
 New tools to account, distribute, and engage all levels:
─ - People Finder (Haiti)
─ - Real-Time Logistics Tracking/Inventory and Distribution Technology (post-Katrina
emphasis)
─ - Codified NIC structure and instituted multiple Incident Commanders concept creating
mechanisms for direct engagement with impacted populations (Cosco Busan concerned
citizen volunteers), impacted industries (fishermen in GOM), Congressional Members and
staff (Cap Hill Anthrax), and accountable elected leaders (DWH).
Command and control – distributed decision-making and engagement of the local elected leaders
(DWH)

93. Information Management
 Proliferation of tools
─ Emergent and initial incident (warning phase)
─ Incident management (response phase)
─ Post-crisis (recovery phase)
Define Information Requirements, Systems, and Dissemination

94.  Its not the size that matters – complexity as a differentiator
 When there is no script – the unthinkable and the new
normal
 US Government Structural Transition and the Rise of the
super-NIC
 NIMS is necessary – but not sufficient
 Situational Awareness on Steroids
 Tools and schools
 Brokering limited resources –
 Whole of Effort – global private sector players as experts in
Scale who understand large problems…and can opportunity
to Scale

95.  Harnessing the Private Sector
 - People Finder
 - Satellite Based emergency networks for responders

96. Tactics and tools at the speed of light
 New environment demands new tools to meet those needs
data and information must be contextualized
─ - rapid evolution of COP tools, incident notification tools, mapping
tools; e.g.
 HSIN:
− Common Operational Picture (COP) provides situational awareness and
analysis;
− Integrated Common Analytical Viewer (iCAV) gives geographical
visualization,;
− 24/7 availability, document Libraries, instant-messaging tool, Web
conferencing, incident reporting, Common Operational Picture (COP)
provides situational awareness and analysis, announcements, discussion
boards, task lists, requests for Information/or Your Information (RFIs/FYIs),
calendars
− Really Simple Syndication (RSS) Feeds
− Online training materials
− ERMA

97. Is too much information Bad?
Is the info „accurate‟?
Is it „current‟ with respect to the receive-act timeframe? If it was
accurate 1 minute ago and you now receive it at time +3min
does it cause more harm? Who determines „accurate‟?
Is it this data or information? – experience accelerates the
determination of „harm vs benefit‟ for info pieces and cycles –
other ways to rapidly assess „harm vs benefit‟? Who decides –
one persons harm is another‟s benefit….and, on top of that,
what is the power and value of „transparency‟…do we
underestimate the power of
“Transparency breeds self-correcting behavior” – ADM Thad
Allen, USCG (ret)

98. Frameworks and Structures
 Evolve over the course of the incident
 Nims is necessary but „not sufficient‟ in large-scale
disasters – in addition to accepted and trained-to
structures, LSDs must have systems for addressing
contentious decisions that require „not insignificant‟
trade-offs
─ Role for elected and appointed leaders responsible to the
citizenry.
─ Facilitated by an agreed upon, „codified‟ acknowledged process.
─ Realistic acknowledgement of individual tactics , using
information means and media, to influence others and position
ones priorities above others - goal here is to gain as much
common consensus with agreed upon best possible
data/information, visible to each other.

99.  In large-scale, a number of issues rise to this
level….how best to maximize that „opportunity‟
─ Invest in a solid NIMS process to bring as many issues into the
NIMS/IC – Area Command process as possible; the better the
workings and processes inside NIMS, the better the chance
issues not „addressable‟ at AC level or IC level must
─ Courageous, knowledgable, articulate NIC
 Meta-Leader
 Knows what moves into the brokered sphere
 Knows how to minimize the disconnects creating unnecessary
engagement of senior leaders
 Communications mastery – complex concepts made simple
 Visible
 No personal agenda/affiliation – „agnostic‟ – direct report to CIC…

100.  Information versus data
- How do you educate at the same time you inform?
New language, no framework….
- what parameters guide or determine how porous and
rapid the data flow is versus information assessment by
„experts‟ – does free flow of data (accurate or inaccurate)
spur

101. Efforts to flow data and information…
 Can not themselves create more chaos - still need a
system, still need some degree of site control, accounting for
victims and responders, hazard assessment….
 How to share imperfect and evolving information – will you
always be „wrong‟?
─ Create deliberate structures of reporting e.g. “as of” information
─ Match to normal cycles of information requirements
─ Simultaneous „picture‟
─ The CG helicopter rescues during Katrina
 Pentagon 911 response, the DC fire dept and units from MD
that they mobilized showed up and operated on the
pentagon site without informing or integrating into the
professionally well-known ICS structure - acted
independently

102. The Meta Leader as Communicator
 Must earn the confidence of highly diverse set of both
the engaged and enraged.
 Must see strategic picture.
 Be able to speak to detail of most elements.
 Communicate at multi-levels.
 Make people feel „safe‟ when they are „unsafe‟ and
„unsure‟.
 Contextualizes data and information for common
understanding.
 Lays out the areas for hard-choices
─ DWH not enough boom for everyone.

103. Info needs
 Need to add the context against the array of distributed
info that spews from an incident
 Who adds the context, how, how to then distribute it,
refresh it, stay relevant
 How to embrace the disparate nodes and corral them to
a more powerful effect.
 Aggregation tools? – visual displays
 Data and info must be proactively contextualized – by
credible source?, by an aggregate in a freely dispersed
environment…

104.  Do the same principles apply if
 - event is predicted
- Resources are prestaged
- Vulnerabilities and impact area are known

105. The Averted Crisis – LNGC CATALYUNA
SPIRIT Disabled Adrift – April 2008
 Words matter – Be Careful With Terms of Art
─ Careful and deliberate selection of terms can ease
tension, minimize misunderstanding…poorly selected terms
with specialized meaning can fuel rhetoric and misinform
perception.
 Safe Anchorage versus Harbor of Refuge (what is it hiding from)
 Returned to International Service (conveys acceptance of
standards by a legitimate independent body) versus „Allowed to
Enter Port‟ which others might interpret as a personal decision of an
individual without context.

110. Info mgmt within the zone
 - disaster and crisis phase – rely on preexisting natural
nodes within the community – unique to each
community – a church, civic group, or school system
(joplin high school) – serve as comms and coordination
nodes
 Citizens want to engage – economic
incentives, environmental sensitivity incentives, desire
to contribute, feeling of having control (COSCO Busan)
 The Role of Business

111.  - effective comms and info mgmt and decision making
structures will depend on whether there is a culture of
„self-relience‟ and „resilience‟ or a culture of
„dependence „ and „vulnerability‟….in either case, the
need for extraordinary external engagement and
support is necessary, how that becomes
interfaced, coordinated, and implemented depends on
which circumstance the community is grounded in.
Individuals can be either, this is a characterization of the
collective behavior not individual behavior.

112. Influencers
 - precrisis alignement and pre-existing relationships
(w/business, govenrment entities, private sector
groups, the broader response community) – increase
resilience
 precrisis macro culture (reliance or independence)

113. RISK COMMUNICATION

116. References
 The Role of Business in Disaster Response, US
Chamber of Commerce/Business Civic Leadership
Center, 2012

117. The meta leader as communicator
 Must see strategic picture
 Know every detail of every element
 Communicate at multi-levels
 Make people feel „safe‟ when they feel „unsafe‟ and
„unsure‟
 Contextualizes data and information for common
understanding
 Lays out the areas for hard-choices
─ - DWH not enough boom for everyone

119.  The standup 8 hr (really every 6) change of shiftsL - LB
FD reponse to 5000 gal baker tank 30% hydrogen
peroxide self-venting….the 36 hou r perspective
watching 6 shift changes.
 Whiteboard on a pier – each brief, key pieces were
dropped – perished. Not uncommon – continuity of
people balanced against fatigue question
 Risk was „local‟ if they dropped a key piece of info – so
didn‟t illustrate critical need; but you operate for the big
one the way you practice for the little ones.

120. Information Disrupters
 Phase Change
 Significant New Variable

121. References
 Howitt, Arnold and Herman Leonard, Managing Crises: Responses to Large-Scale Emergencies; CQ Press, Washington DC, 2009.
 Leonard, Herman and Arnold M. Howitt, Katrina as Prelude: Preparing for and Respnding to Future Katrina-Class Distrurbances in the
United States; Testimony before the U.S. Senate Homealnd Security and Governmental Affairs Committee; 8 march 2006
 Townsend, Francis, et al; The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina – Lessons Learned; February 2006.
 Kulisch, Gail P. et al; LNGC CATALUNYA SPIRIT Adrift Incident After Action Report; une 2008.
 Telfer, Erich; Unlimited Impossibilities: Intelligence Support to the Deepwater Horizon Response; Center for Strategic Intelligence
Research, National Defense Intelligence University, DIA (Unpublished) Dec 2011.
 Rupert, Richard;; Federal on-scene Coordinator‟s Report for the Capitol Hill Site, Washington, D.C.; USEPA Region 3; undated.
 US Coast Guard, On-Scene Coordinator Report Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, Submitted to National Response Team, Sept 2011.
 Floriida Division of Emergency Management, Deepwater Horizon Response 30Apr2010 – 27AUg2010, After Action Report/Improvement
Plan, 2March2011
 Papp, Rober t, COMDT USCG, BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR), Final Report, Jan 2011

122. Spare Slides

124.  http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?
webmap=84af65e379fb42dfbbb94e8bf0d78f5d&ex
tent=-80.8474,36.1439,-69.9709,40.3104
 Migratory bird map - baseline

125.  http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?
webmap=84af65e379fb42dfbbb94e8bf0d78f5d&ex
tent=-80.8474,36.1439,-69.9709,40.3104
 Migratory bird map - baseline

126. Wrap
 Large-scale have phases that go on for decades – still
working Katrina issues , still individuals in „temp‟
housing; still an active series of recovery issues that are
actively managed -

127.  Uncomfortable to responders
 National Security Concerns
 Decision-Making Ahead of Decision-Makers

128.  http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?
webmap=ecfd899b55e944a1977f00c06a111013&e
xtent=-95.4268,29.5805,-94.747,29.8685
 Wetlands map baseline

129. Frameworks and Structures
 Evolve over the course of the incident

130. HARNESSING THE INFORMATION
 Chaos phase
 Initial response
 NIMS ICS →→ NRF Build-out Mature
Feedback Loops
Proactively and Adjust
Engage/Deliberat Response
Define Information ely Distribute
Requirements
Collect and Distribute
Information
Establish
Mode R: Refine Structure
Incident
and Processes
Management
Mode C: Escalate - Shift
Structure
Leadership and Structure

131. Incident Communications and Structures:
Highly Engaged Communities and Opportunities
 Before – Minimize the Impact: Information „pushed‟ to potential victims
– e.g. warning phase
─ Good Robo Calls : one of the first times „robo calls‟ used to scale was LA fires
in 200x - warned individuals in remote area and communicated instructions e.g.
„evacuate and go to the Staples Center‟
─ Downside: Non-receipt and tracking of same – this past summer‟s Waldo
Canyon fire in Colorado - more then 20,000 evacuation calls never delivered to
residents in the path – two-thirds of the 32,000 impacted residents
 Now - New tools to account, distribute, and engage all levels:
─ People Finder (Haiti)
─ Real-Time Logistics Tracking/Inventory and Distribution Technology (post-
Katrina emphasis)
Command and control – distributed decision-making and engagement of the local
elected leaders (DWH)

132. Information Management
 Proliferation of tools.
─ Emergent and initial incident (warning phase)
─ Incident management (response phase)
─ Post-crisis (recovery phase)

133. New Methods and Innovation
 Novelty Requires Technical and Organizational Improv
and Adaptation.
─ Anthrax
 Decontamination techniques.
─ DWH
 Capping Technologies
 Manually Controlling a Well at Unprecedented Depth
 The Power of the Private Sector.

134. Is too much information Bad?
Is the info „accurate‟?
Is it „current‟ with respect to the receive-act timeframe? If it was
accurate 1 minute ago and you now receive it at time +3min
does it cause more harm? Who determines „accurate‟?
Is it this data or information? – experience accelerates the
determination of „harm vs benefit‟ for info pieces and cycles –
other ways to rapidly assess „harm vs benefit‟? Who decides –
one persons harm is another‟s benefit….and, on top of
that, what is the power and value of „transparency‟…do we
underestimate the power of
“Transparency breeds self-correcting behavior” – ADM Thad
Allen, USCG (ret)

135. Info mgmt within the zone
 - disaster and crisis phase – rely on preexisting natural
nodes within the community – unique to each community
– a church, civic group, or school system (joplin high
school) – serve as comms and coordination nodes