"Controlling the tools of violence" Regional Review Conference on the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development Geneva, Switzerland | 8-9 July 2014

1. Ammunition surplus: once the threat to enemies, today
the threat to possessor
Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites (UEMS) - case
studies
Prepared by Blaz Mihelic
7-9 July 2014, Geneva, Swiss

2. Agenda
• UEMS risk index (statistical data)
• UEMS the cost and consequences
• Ammunition depot as a source of
illegal ammunition
• UEMS case studies
– Turkey – Afyonkarahisar
– Cyprus – Naval base
– Congo – Brazzaville
• UEMS basic risk assessment
• Recommendations

3. UEMS - statistical data in the period 1979 to 2013,
Ref: Handbook Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites (UEMS) Excess Stockpiles as
Liabilities rather than Assets; Edited by Eric G. Berman and Pilar Reina; Small Arms
Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva 2014,
First published in June 2014

4. Statistical data of UEMS
Table Number of UEMS by year and casualties, 2002 - 2011
Years Total Fatalities Injured
2002 20 1182 5787
2003 29 181 322
2004 20 1195 1683
2005 21 108 417
2006 21 54 174
2007 25 169 716
2008 25 55 340
2009 30 67 366
2010 31 148 277
2011 40 383 1944
Grand Total 262 3542 12026
Source: Small Arms Survey
Prepared by: Pilar REINA, 10 November 2012.
UEMS probability estimated by historical model
PEvent = (26.2/(1930 x 0.4) = 0.0339 = 3.39 x 10-2 (3.39%)

5. Number of Exploded Sites is larger than number of UEMS
(examples are Novobohdanivka in Ukraine and Pugachevo in Russia

6. UEMS Risk Index Probability & Severity

7. UEMS the cost and consequences
• Lost in humans and injured
• Damage to civilian infrastructure
• Humanitarian crises, humans displaces
• Clean-up operation cost: surface, subsurface, water coved area
• The overall cost of the incident
• Lost in ammunition and military infrastructure
• UEMS contaminated sites are:
– Potential source of explosives and ammunition – attractive for
terrorist and illegal trading
– UXOs attractive for locals as a source for income by collecting metal
scrap (brass, copper., steel etc.) many locals including kids were killed
or injured years after event
– Handling & disposal of UXOs found in UEMS affected areas is more
hazard and costly in comparison with disposal of stockpiled
ammunition
– UEMS affected areas are rarely secured (fenced and guarded)

8. Ammunition depot as a source of
illegal ammunition
Explosion rocks Libyan airbase
• Another Libyan ammunition depot blew-up
Monday (December 9th 2013).
• Some 50 criminals were behind the explosion at
the tank ammunition storage site at the Brak al-
Shatie airbase, 650 kilometers south of Tripoli, a
Sebha security source said.
• Thieves hoping to steal copper from destroyed
ammunition reportedly poured gasoline on the
arms depot in the morning. Overheating in the
afternoon caused rockets and shells to ignite
• Four base guards were injured, two of them
seriously. They were transferred to Tripoli for
treatment.
• The attack is the second of its type targeting the
same bunker in less than two weeks.
• Thirty people died in a blast at the airbase on
November 28th. The explosion occurred when a
group attempted to steal copper from the site.
Victims of the explosion included African
migrants.

9. Turkey: explosion at military depot in
Afyonkarahisar
• The explosion occurred at 21:15 local time on 5 September 2012 in
Afyonkarahisar, Turkey. According to the Turkey Armed Forces 25
servicemen died, four other soldiers and three civilians were injured by
the accident
• Accident happened in uncertain circumstances. One of the potential
reasons for the accident is poor ammunition management system.
• Comments of Turkey gen: The stock check should not have been
conducted at night and that the number of soldiers involved in the
procedure at Afyonkarahisar seemed to be too high.

10. Turkey: ammunition storage
bunkers are orientated towards and close to public road
and civilian infrastructure

11. Afyonkarahisar Ammunition stock in the nearby
bunker after explosion

12. Ammunition Mismanagement at military depot in
Afyonkarahisar : reference previous slides
• Ammunition stock is too high,
• Unstable stock / stock is under angle,
• Stock is placed wall to wall (no isle),
• Ammunition boxes are laying on the floor,
• Boxes are touching ceiling,
• Ammunition boxes are not palletized,
• Stock is close to the entry door,
• Ammunition boxes are not connected,
• Ammunition stock list is missing,
• UN marking system on boxes is missing,
• Doors are probably not blast resistant - certified.
• QD distances between PES and ES at storage site are questionable,
• Doors on bunkers are oriented to exposed sites: civilian buildings,
roads or bunkers

13. Cypriot authorities confiscated containers in February 2009 from a
ship sailing off and stored near the Vasilikos power plant the largest
electricity and drinking water production facility

14. AE filled 98 containers sitting next to the Power Station
No QD requirements meet or risk assessment done
Superiors were ignored warnings by local commander

15. Cyprus: UEMS the price
13 killed
62 Injured
Blackout in half of the
country
Cost: EUR 2 billion
Defence and Foreign
Ministers Resigned

16. Congo-Brazzaville
• On 4 March 2012, a series of blasts occurred at an army
arms dump in Brazzaville, the capital of the Republic of
the Congo. At least 250 people were killed by the
explosions. Additional bodies were said to be
"unfindable.“ Among the dead were six Chinese
workers from a Beijing Construction Engineering Group
work site close to the armory. Interior Minister
Raymond Mboulou said that nearby hospitals were
overflowing with injuries, with many wounded lying in
hallways due to lack of space. Total injures exceeded
2,300. More than 13,800 people were left homeless.
One survivor described the event as feeling like "the
apocalypse; others described it as "like a tsunami or
earthquake.

17. Congo-Brazzaville
before explosion

18. Congo-Brazzaville before explosion;
ammunition depot located in the city

19. Congo-Brazzaville ammunition
depot after explosion

20. Congo-Brazzaville after explosion

21. Congo-Brazzaville national disaster
because of absent of PSSM

22. Congo-Brazzaville example of basic risk assessment
process takes just to open site, move with cursor to the location and enter amount of explosives,
result is for illustrative purpose only
http://www.un.org/disarmament/un-saferguard/map/
• Explosives &
ammunition 10.000
kg class 1.1 (as
example)
• VBD Vulnerable
Building Distance
(Purple line)
• IBD Inhibited
Building Distance
(Yellow line)
• PTRD Public Traffic
Route Distance

23. AA&E Management
Source of technical informations
• United Nations Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous
Goods and on the Globally Harmonized System of Classification and
Labelling of Chemicals
• United Nations Safer Guard Program & International Ammunition
Technical Guidelines (IATG)
• OSCE Handbook of Best Practices on Conventional Ammunition
• Regional Ammunition Stockpile Reduction (RASR)
• European Network of National Safety Authorities on Ammunition
(ENNSA)
• CNAD AMMUNITION SAFETY GROUP (AC/326) / NATO Munitions Safety
Information Analysis Center (MSIAC)

24. The most active organizations in PSSM

25. AA&E Management levels
• National level:
– Stakeholders and policies
– National Safety Authorities on Ammunition (to approve
risk assessment for each PES)
– Laboratories and testing centers
• MOD:
– Organization structure
– Developed directives and regulations
– Qualified personnel (trained & certified)
– Personnel-command responsibility
– Risk assessment and personnel responsibility (all levels)
– QA/QC (all levels)
• AA&E duties (Logistic and EOD):
– ESO, ATO, AT, Ammunition Handler, etc

26. Thank you for your attention