1. CITIES & ARMED VIOLENCE: THE RELEVANCE OF PREVENTION Dr. Paula Miraglia Director General, ICPC GD Review Conference 2011 Reduce armed violence, enable development 31 October – 1 November, 2011
7. 2 SUCCESSFUL STORIES City of Diadema, Sao Paulo, Brazil City of Medellin, Colombia Source: Tuca Viera Source: Bernardo P é rez Salazar
8. CASE 1 LOCAL CP STRATEGY Municipality of Diadema, Sao Paulo, Brazil
9. CASE 2 SOCIAL URBANISM AS A CP STRATEGY: Case of Medellin, Colombia* *Based on Bernardo P é rez Salazar’s presentation - 12 th UN Congress, April 2010 in Brazil
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11. THANK YOU! For more information on ICPC, please visit: www.crime-prevention-intl.org
Notes de l'éditeur
International network of national governments, local authorities, public agencies, specialized and international institutions, nongovernmental organizations and community-based organizations - in the Americas, Europe, Africa, and Oceania Created in 1994 by government of Canada, France, Quebec 11 member governments, over 50 members International observatory, knowledge base and centre of expertise on crime prevention and community safety, technical assistance - tools to reduce risk factors, enhance safety Monitors international trends in delinquency, crime and prevention, carries out comparative analysis of policies, programmes and actions, and identifies new and emerging issues. Advises cities, governments and international organizations in implementing policies, strategies and effective and sustainable programs
Launch in June 2011
Overview: 1) Medellin is a thriving city of 2.6 million inhabitants at the heart of a metropolitan area of 3.5 million in an area of 340 km 2) Medellin´s reputation as a high crime city is widely held since violence peaked in 1991 during the war against Pablo Escobar and the Medellin Cartel, with murder rates soaring to around 380 per 100,000. 3) Strict control of populations and territories became a pre-condition to dominate extortion rackets, drug and firearms trafficking, illegal recruitment of youths for surveillance, miscellaneous errands, sharp shooters, and hit men, as well as to economically control access to public service infrastructure. In Medellin, illegal groups controlled some urban areas in this fashion for more than five years. 4) At its height, urban conflict involved some 650 armed bands, 4 ELN and numerous FARC urban insurgent structures, 3 AUC paramilitary counterinsurgent units, and an independent militia known as CAP. INITIATIVES 1) In October 2002, the national government ordered a joint operation of police, justice, military and state security forces, known as Operación Orión , in the populous Comuna 13 in the slopes of western Medellin. Government regained control of an urban "no go" area held by insurgents after three days of combat, which left a body count of 10 insurgent militias and 4 members of the joint government forces, as well as 40 injured civilians (16 of them underage), 5 missing, and 308 arrested. After Operación Orión murder rates dropped by half in Medellin, from 184 per 100,000 in 2002, to 98 in 2003. 2) During 2003, the first of numerous disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes was begun by counterinsurgent paramilitary units in the Medellin area. 3) Early in 2004, the municipality established a Peace and Reconciliation Programme (PPR) in order to provide ex-paramilitaries with legal, social and psychological assistance as well as support for income generation. 4) By 2005, Medellin had around 100 armed bands, and about 4,000 ‘street gangs’. The local government regained territorial control of peripheral areas of the city, and reopened schools and health services which had been absent in some areas for as long as 5 or 6 years 5) In response, local authorities established a vigorous social inclusion policy as the centerpiece of the municipal development plan for 2004-2007, based on an approach known as "social urbanism“ OUTCOMES Yet social urbanism has laid the groundwork to build communities with greater capacity to resist renewed and uncontested subordination to illegal groups and criminal organizations. The investment already made in this successful strategy is now supporting local government’s resolve to continue investing in the policy of social inclusion. Initiating urban improvement interventions will, in turn, translate into better living, safety and security conditions for local populations.
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