Abstract The investiture of a UK Coalition Government in 2010 heralded the (ongoing) production of new sub-national geographies of governance in England. Of primary concern is the disbanding of the English regions, outside of London, which were New Labour’s preferred scale for ‘managing’ economic regeneration during the 2000s. In a bid to rollback the role of the state as part of their deficit reduction plan, the Coalition embarked on a political rescaling strategy resulting in various institutional reconfigurations. This rescaling of state power has significant policy implications in the context of European funding, which is the focus of this paper. By analysing a field of policy activity during a period of significant motion, the intent is to highlight some notable dilemmas, aided by posing some practical questions; in order to prompt some much needed policy discussion and academic deliberation. Pugalis, L. & Fisher, B. (2011) 'English regions disbanded: European funding and economic regeneration implications', Local Economy, 26 (6/7), pp. 500-516.

1. English regions disbanded: European funding and economic regeneration
implications
Pugalis and Fisher
Cite as:
Pugalis, L. & Fisher, B. (2011) 'English regions disbanded: European funding and economic
regeneration implications', Local Economy, 26 (6/7), pp. 500-516.
Abstract
The investiture of a UK Coalition Government in 2010 heralded the (ongoing) production of
new sub-national geographies of governance in England. Of primary concern is the
disbanding of the English regions, outside of London, which were New Labour’s preferred
scale for ‘managing’ economic regeneration during the 2000s. In a bid to rollback the role of
the state as part of their deficit reduction plan, the Coalition embarked on a political rescaling
strategy resulting in various institutional reconfigurations. This rescaling of state power has
significant policy implications in the context of European funding, which is the focus of this
paper. By analysing a field of policy activity during a period of significant motion, the intent
is to highlight some notable dilemmas, aided by posing some practical questions; in order to
prompt some much needed policy discussion and academic deliberation.
Key words: European funding, economic regeneration, sub-national development, state
rescaling, governance, Regional Development Agencies, Local Enterprise Partnerships
Introduction
The present UK Government is a ‘Coalition’ formed between the Conservatives and Liberal
Democrats. After striking a deal in May 2010 following days of intense negotiations (HM
Government, 2010a), the Coalition made it clear that they wanted to institute a more radical,
new ‘localist’ approach to the governance and delivery of economic regeneration in
England.1 ‘Regions’, understood here as a spatial unit for managing sub-national
1
The other parts of the UK – Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland – are outside the remit of the analysis due to
their unique devolutionary arrangements (see Goodwin et al., 2005).
1

2. development activity, rebuked by government as part of a political rescaling strategy to
demonstrate that a new era had arrived. The Coalition has, in effect, erased the notion of
‘region’ from the contemporary English policy vocabulary. To illustrate the ‘death’ of the
region as an organising principle for policy activity (Bentley et al., 2010), civil servants have
quietly advised prospective funding bidders to ‘drop the word region’. It is within this climate
that practitioners sardonically joke about belonging to or representing places ‘formerly
known as regions’. Charting the perpetual stream of supposedly innovative remedies for
managing the ‘regional problem’, it is observed that sub-national development activity has
undergone intermittent periods of policy upheaval, including the 12 month window of
considerable change since the election of the Coalition that this paper peers through.
Across Europe, sub-national governance reforms over the past decade have enthusiastically
sought out a scalar management fix for the multi-scalar spatial dynamics of contemporary
society (Gualini, 2006; Haughton et al., 2009; Healey, 2004; Salet et al., 2002). Evans and
Harding (1997), for example, point towards the trends across European countries, including
Italy, France and Spain, to embark on projects of decentralisation to regional tiers of
government. Prior to the election of a New Labour Government in 1997, the UK was
curiously out of sync with a Europe of the Regions (Ibid.). Associated with theories of the
‘hollowing out’ of the state (Jessop, 2002) through rescaling upwards (e.g. supranational
organisations such as the EU), downwards (e.g. regional governance) and outwards (e.g. non-
state actors), it is well recognised that the role of the state has changed dramatically over
recent decades. Alongside the shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ (Davies and
Imbroscio, 2009), para-state actors and agencies now play a much more prominent role in the
policy-making arena; a ‘filling in’ of state space (Jones et al., 2005; Shaw and MacKinnon,
2011). For some ‘a territorial focus’ has merit in bringing this heterogeneous array of actors
together (Albrechts, 2006) – a ‘meeting ground’ for integration through a shared sense of
place (Counsell et al., 2007). What remains more disputed is whether the (ongoing)
reterritorialisation of state power has witnessed a reduced or enhanced role of the state, as
‘new state spaces’ are being produced (Brenner, 2004).
In a bid to rollback the role of the state as part of their deficit reduction plan, the Coalition
instigated a series of economic regeneration policy reforms as part of a rescaling of state
power. Of primary concern is the disbanding of the English regions, outside of London,
which were New Labour’s preferred scale for ‘managing’ economic regeneration during the
2

3. 2000s (Mawson, 1998; Pugalis, 2009; 2011d; Webb and Collis, 2000). Based on careful
monitoring of the (ongoing) production of new sub-national geographies of governance that
have begun to emerge in England over the first 12 months of Coalition rule, this paper
focuses on some of the most significant policy implications in the context of European
structural funding. It draws on a range of sources of qualitatively rich material – from local
practitioners, regeneration media and institutional networks – which has recently been shown
to produce useful insights (Broughton et al., 2011), especially during periods of momentous
policy upheaval (Pugalis, 2011d). In addition, the paper is also informed by the authors’
reflections of performing a range of professional economic regeneration roles over the past
decade. Experience includes participating in the production of regional machinery as well as
scalar roles above and below the regional governance terrain.2 This unique position provides
reflections that perceive the regional scale to be neither ‘good/bad’ or ‘right/wrong’, but as an
appropriate spatial unit for coordinating some aspects of sub-national development.
It is necessary to point out that the Coalition’s approach remains fluid with many key
decisions yet to be taken. It is within this context that analytical observations presented are
necessarily exploratory and, thus, remain provisional. Writing in June 2010, Harding noted
that ‘The crystal ball … is still a little murky’, but not to such an extent that it should prevent
us from ‘start tracing in the broad contours of future change’ (Harding, 2010, p. 8). Whilst the
crystal ball remains shadowy, the implications of doing away with regional policy
architecture remain profound (Pugalis and Townsend, 2012). In light of Walburn’s caution,
that ‘[p]ublic policy is now preparing to abandon the experience of recent years, including the
groups practitioners involved, and embark on new initiatives without relying on any clear
evidence base’ (Walburn, 2011, p. 76), it is crucial to ask: is it all worth it? By analysing a
field of policy activity amidst the throes of significant flux, the intent is to highlight some
notable dilemmas, aided by posing some searching questions; in order to prompt some much
needed policy discussion and academic deliberation. The remainder of this paper is organised
into four sections. Firstly, a brief historical review outlines the contours of the trajectory of
English regional policy development. Secondly, the emergent post-regional geography of
governance is elaborated on in comparison to previous arrangements. Thirdly, some of the
key European funding and economic regeneration policy implications that have arisen from
2
The authors’ combined professional practice includes over a decade employed by a Regional Development
Agency, alongside time spent at a Government Office Region and national and local government.
3

4. this politically-induced upheaval are examined. Fourthly, concluding remarks are presented
alongside posing some unanswered questions.
Regional policy pre and post European Integration
‘Regional policy’ has an extensive lineage, with some important international strands
producing dissimilar trajectories, theoretical divergence and practical departures, alongside
some more characteristic strands of commonality and convergence. The recent demise of ‘the
region’ from policy discourse aside, most scholars would agree that English regional policy
came to prominence during the 1930s (see, for example, McCrone, 1969). A fuller historical
overview, of what has been described as a ‘topsy-turvy’ course (Walburn, 2011) that has
‘ebbed and flowed’ (Pugalis, 2011d), particularly over more recent decades, is beyond the
scope of this paper (see, for example, Albrechts et al., 1989; Pike et al., 2006, for a detailed
account). Nevertheless, it is important to point out that English regional development policy
was not a sole outcome of European integration. For example, the establishment of the nine
Government Office Regions (GORs) (Mawson et al., 2008; Mawson and Spencer, 1997), in
1994, under a Conservative Government, partly to satisfy some European environmental and
funding requirements, was not a radically new step. For several decades, England had been
organised into regional units for statistical purposes. Also, regional administrative outposts of
Whitehall had been a common feature since 1945. See Figure 1 for a map of England’s
‘standardised’ regions.
Figure 1. England’s standardised regions
4

5. Following the election of a Labour Government in 1997, Regional Development Agencies
(RDAs) were established in the form of QUANGO’s (Deas and Ward, 1999; Fuller et al.,
2002; Liddle, 2001; Pearce and Ayres, 2009; Pugalis, 2010). They were tasked with
providing strategic direction and delivery capabilities to support the development of regional
economies. The responsibility for the management and administration of EU structural
funding at the regional level was subsequently transferred from GORs to RDAs. Regional
oversight of European programmes remained with the RDAs for more than a decade;
delivered within a regional governance framework with agreed priorities, such as those set
out in Regional Economic Strategies (RES). The Coalition’s rejection of regions as a scalar
platform for governance and spatial unit for ‘managing’ economic regeneration interventions
resulted in some crucial upward and downward state rescaling strategies. Notably, this
included the centralisation of regional grant apparatus and the creation of a centrally-
administered funding pot, curiously named the ‘Regional Growth Fund’ (RGF). Other
elements, including planning, are expected to be localised (subject to legislation).
Since the policy recognition of the so-called ‘regional problem’ in the 1930s to date,3 new
policy remedies have been sought and administered to cure ‘the problem’. A regular feature
of the highly centralised system of government operating in England, almost unparalleled
across much of Europe, has been the institutional reworking and rescaling strategies of an
incoming government. Typically, the pots of public funding shrank under a Conservative
Government, therefore reducing the size and scale of ‘assisted areas’ supported by the
regional policy of the previous Labour Government. Based on this understanding, the
Coalition’s commitment to disband England’s regional machinery – which had been
incrementally strengthened, though not without some significant setbacks (Rallings and
Thrasher, 2006; Shaw and Robinson, 2007; Valler and Carpenter, 2010), and developed
under 13 years of Labour Government between 1997 and 2010 – is not uncharacteristic.
Although perhaps less characteristic, particularly in an international context, is the speed and
manner of change. Whilst critiques of an almost amnesic state of policy development have
lambasted ‘change for change’s sake’, the implications of this state reterritorialisation project
warrants closer consideration. Nonetheless, it is necessary to briefly sketch out what new
policy remedy has been designed to combat what the Coalition considered to be ineffective
3
Regional differences in terms of GDP per capita are more pronounced in the UK than in any other EU country
(European Commission, 2007).
5

6. and laborious regional programmes reliant on dense policy and top-down managerialism (see
Pugalis, 2011a for a more detailed discussion).
A post-regional geography of governance
In the lead up to the last general election in May 2010, it was clear that failing a Labour
victory, the status afforded to regions as a scalar platform for governance and spatial unit for
‘managing’ economic regeneration interventions would retract. Indeed, the pledges and
manifestoes of both the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats proposed (in outline) to replace
England’s nine statutory RDAs with more ‘locally’ accountable governance ensembles (see
Figure 2). Yet, these initial proposals indicated that at least some of the new scalar remedies –
under the guise of a Local Enterprise Partnership (LEP) – would reflect standardised regions
in terms of units for spatial organisation.
Figure 2. Election pledges
Adapted from Pugalis (2011a).
What subsequently transpired was, what was popularly termed a ‘bonfire of the QUANGOs’,
as the Coalition systematically set about stripping away, almost entirely without consultation,
6

7. what they considered to be little more than bureaucratic machinery. Consequently, alongside
the abolition of RDAs (subject to legislation), GORs were rapidly axed (by March 2011) and
statutory regional plans such as the Regional Spatial Strategy (RSS) revoked (again subject to
legislation) (Bentley et al., 2010; Pugalis, 2011c). In turn, state funding for Regional
Observatories, Regional Leaders’ Boards and Regional Select Committees was withdrawn as
their functions were considered largely defunct (CLG, 2010). Importantly, the act of
deconstructing Labour’s top-down regional policy architecture, see Table 1, created space,
sub-nationally, which prepared the foundations for a new political project; that of Local
Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) (Cable and Pickles, 2010; HM Government, 2010b; Pickles
and Cable, 2010; Spelman and Clarke, 2010).
Table 1. Defunct regional policy functions
Policy function Overriding remit Coalition rationale for
abolition/withdrawing funding
Regional To create sustainable Rejection of regions and specifically RDAs on
Development economic growth in each of grounds of being unelected, expensive and
Agencies the nine English regions unaccountable which fail to represent functional
economic geographies
Government Office Implementation and Lack democratic accountability, create burdens and
Regions monitoring of national policy bureaucracy for local councils and impose arbitrary
and the regulatory administrative boundaries over ‘real’ communities
management (budget and
contractual) of spending
programmes of sponsoring
government departments
Regional Spatial Provide regional level Such regional plans and processes were considered
Strategy/Regional planning, economic and to be cumbersome, unresponsive, top-down and
Economic spatial frameworks in expensive
Strategic/Regional collaboration with regional Purported to go against the grain of ‘localism’
Strategy stakeholders
Regional Formed by regional No longer a mandate for Regional Observatories to
Observatories organisations to provide provide a function at the regional level
independent, impartial Some functions considered to be overlay onerous
analysis of data to support and duplicitous
decision-making and policy ‘Valuable’ activities to be carried forward and
development at a sub-national undertaken by other bodies, such as local
level authorities or LEPs
Regional Leaders’ Responsibility for Unelected to perform a regional role
Boards representing local authorities The Coalition pointed towards an annual public
in the production of Regional saving of £16m as further rationale for their
Strategies. Other functions termination
included: regional funding
allocations and local authority
cross-boundary issues
Regional Select Established to scrutinise and Closure of RDAs and with no manifesto
Committees monitor RDAs and the authorisation Regional Select Committees had no
delivery of services in the further mandate
regions to ensure
complementarity and
7

8. accountability with National
Select Committees and
Government departments
At the heart of the Coalition’s ‘new model’ for sub-national development was the incremental
state sanctioning of more than 30 (larger than local or sub-regional) LEPs (see Figure 3).
Acting at the institutional interface between national government and individual localities,
LEPs were formed to replace RDAs. Considering that many LEPs, whilst still formative,
have a small fraction of the RDAs’ financial draw, is one of several key features which
illustrate that LEPs are not necessarily a suitable replacement for RDAs.
Locally constituted cross-sectoral economic regeneration configurations, LEPs vary in terms
of their geographical scope, governance, organisational form and priorities (see Table 2).
Whilst national policy rhetoric suggests that LEPs have the autonomy to intervene in matters
to enable local growth, the ‘freedom’ of LEPs is significantly curtailed by the lack of state
funding. Confirming suspicions that the Coalition’s discourse of localism is a thinly veiled
disguise for the (re)centralisation of powers (Bentley et al., 2010; Pugalis, 2010; 2011d), the
Local Growth White Paper set out permissive guidance on what policy areas LEPs may
choose to engage with (i.e. additional responsibilities without additional powers/resources)
and also ‘regional’ policy activities transferred to Whitehall (HM Government, 2010b). Also,
it has been observed that fiscal restraint measures are resulting in more centralised
commissioning powers wherein ‘decisions are moving up the local chain of command’
(Broughton et al., 2011, p. 88). The research goes on to note that ‘[w]hile more powers may
be devolved to local authorities, the real power to decide resource allocation is being
centralized within them – a sort of ‘centralized localism’’ (Ibid.).
8

9. Figure 3. England’s emergent landscape of LEPs, July 2011
Functions, such as, business support, innovation, international investment and business
finance provide an indication of some significant policy areas previously delivered at a
regional scale that are undergoing recentralisation to Whitehall. For instance, in the case of
9

10. business finance, the RDAs Grant for Business Investment (GBI) and Research &
Development (R&D) grant have been subsumed into the Department for Business, Innovation
& Skills’ (BIS) national Technology Strategy Board (TSB) and substantially reduced funding
amalgamated into the £1.4bn RGF. The RGF was initiated as the Coalition Government’s key
financial policy tool designed help ‘rebalance’ the economy by leveraging private sector
investment (HM Government, 2010b; HM Treasury, 2011). Recognising that the
‘rebalancing’ trope is multidimensional and permits different interpretations, one key aspect
is the geographical facet (i.e. the need to support the regeneration and development of
particular places such as those located within the assisted areas of Europe).
Table 2. Common characteristics of LEPs
Key themes Common characteristics Examples
Role Most LEPs consider the principal role to be Majority of LEPs, such as North
that of strategic leadership Eastern, have continued a
Terminology such as ‘influencing’, commitment to provide a strategic
‘advocacy’, ‘support’ and ‘enabling’ has been advisory role rather than a
frequently mentioned dedicated delivery capability
Scope and Most LEP proposals tended to reflect the New Anglia LEP has prioritised six
priorities enterprise brief set out in the Cable–Pickles policy themes and activities:
letter, although addressing locally specific business start-up and growth;
priorities featured prominently in many bids growth sectors and business
Some proposals used the government’s clusters; infrastructure
language of ‘rebalancing the economy’ to improvements; lobbying and
frame their priorities negotiation; business and
community engagement; and skills
and workforce development
Form The proposed form of LEPs tend to be either The Black Country LEP formed as
an informal partnership arrangement, often an informal partnership. Several
supported by a LA acting as accountable body, LEPs are also considering the
or an entity with a legal personality, such as a option of a community interest
company limited by guarantee company
Functions Beyond those functions identified by Cable Cumbria’s LEP intends to: drive
and Pickles, such as housing, planning and enterprise, innovation and growth in
transport, other functions including access to the Cumbrian economy; stimulate
finance, supporting business start-ups and job growth within the private,
developing a low carbon economy were community and third sectors;
frequently identified in bids provide economic and business
Functions identified by government to be intelligence; strengthen Cumbria’s
delivered nationally, particularly inward social fabric through pursuing the
investment, were considered crucial to the ‘big society’ agenda; and
workings of LEPs in many cases influencing the key activities of
housing and planning, transport and
infrastructure, employment and
skills, business and enterprise
development, transition to the low
carbon economy and support for
tourism and other key sectors
10

11. Governance The majority of LEP bids largely mirrored the Cornwall and Isles of Scilly LEP
Cable–Pickles guidance by proposing a have recruited six private sector
private-sector chair and equitable board members and five public sector
representation across the public and private members
sectors. In numerical terms, private sector
interests tend to dominate, particularly in
comparison to voluntary and sector interests
represented at board level
Geography Almost all LEP submissions were composed A single upper-tier bid was
of at least two upper-tier authorities, with successful in Cumbria
frequent claims of territories matching ‘natural
economic areas’
Funding and Consistent calls for accessing the Regional Greater Birmingham and Solihull
other sources Growth Fund. Several bids suggested that they LEP have indicated that they intend
would consider pooling public-sector to borrow money through Tax
of finance resources and there was significant interest in Increment Financing aligned with a
place-based budgeting proposed Enterprise Zone in
Birmingham city centre.
Adapted from Pugalis (2011d).
Politically-induced upheaval: policy implications
In view of regions performing a key role in the administration of European funding, owing to
the fact that they form the basis for the EU’s territorial cohesion policy, a (provisional)
analysis of the dilemmas introduced and anticipated policy implications arising from the
politically-induced disbanding of regions is all the more intriguing. The ‘European question’
of the UK Government’s reterritorialisation project has not bypassed the attention of
practitioners and scholars alike. Soundings from workshops held in Leeds, Birmingham and
London throughout March 2011 gauged particular concern surrounding the future
management of European funding (Mott MacDonald, 2011). Indeed, concerns emanating
from sub-national policy circles led Pugalis (2011b) to question ‘How will ERDF be
managed and by whom?’.
Firstly, in the short-term, what are the anticipated arrangements for the management of
European funding? The abolition of England’s RDA network as a preferred delivery vehicle
for European funding witnessed a transfer of management arrangements to alternative
organisations with different scalar remits. For example, ERDF is now managed at the
regional scale by self-contained Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG)
units, which is akin to ‘centralised regionalism’. European venture and loan capital
programmes (i.e. JEREMIE and JESSICA) are to be transferred to Whitehall, whilst the
11

12. management of the Rural Development Programme for England (RDPE) is now delivered
nationally by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and
administered locally by Local Action Groups. During this transitional period, there was a loss
of human resources and tacit knowledge accumulated during years of practice. Combined
with a lack of policy clarity, the viability of delivering European-funded projects pre and post
2013 has been called into question. One former RDA European manager interviewed,
believed that the inability of European teams to allocate financial resources in line with
targeted ‘regional’ policy interventions ‘may have a longer-term negative impact upon local
and regional economies in the future’. The inference was that the pipeline of projects
focussed on longer-term, ‘strategic’ interventions could be significantly disrupted or even
broken beyond repair.
Secondly, what impact will the delivery of European funding from a fractured array of
institutional organisations have on ‘regional’ priorities? The transition from a regionally
integrated and embedded (strategic) delivery structure to a more fractured array of disparate
management bodies is likely to create a disconnect between strategic priorities and projects
that receive European funding (Marks, 1997; Pearce, 2001). Indeed previously, European
funding was commonly aligned with regional economic priorities and RDA funding.
Assuming ‘regional’ policy and strategy continues to take precedence in the immediate future
how will current and future European projects correlate with the priorities of LEPs and other
local and sub-regional stakeholders? Moreover, what will constitute ‘regional’ priorities post
2013? It would be reasonable to envisage that in lieu of a regional policy-framework, LEPs
and other sub-national entities will be directly competing for what limited economic
regeneration funding remains.
Thirdly, in the absence of RDA support services where and from whom will European
funding teams garner support from? The ‘wrap-around’ support provided by RDAs,
particularly in the provision of policy, economic and spatial strategy, legal advice, business
finance, and marketing assistance is no longer available. Without the in-house support and
central ‘hub’ provided by the RDAs, European projects ‘will be difficult to coordinate
independently and time-consuming to develop, monitor and deliver ERDF funded projects’,
argued another interviewee. Retreating from the co-alignment of policy practices, could give
rise to further fragmentation, overlaps, duplications and inefficiencies (Healey, 2006). Devoid
of assistance from the RDA, project bidders and European funding teams will have to procure
12

13. support services from elsewhere, which is anticipated to have ramifications on the ability to
deliver projects and may result in inefficiencies.
Figure 4. European structural funding for England, 2007-2013
13

14. Fourthly, to what extent were European funded projects contingent on RDA Single
Programme finance to deliver projects? Indeed, who will fill the funding void left by the
demise of RDAs? In addition to the coordination and delivery of regional economic
development programmes, RDAs were responsible for providing ‘match funding’ to
European programmes. For instance, in the past four years, the RDA for the North East of
England, ‘contributed approximately £320m or 80 percent of Single Programme matched
funding to ERDF projects’, according to one officer. Closure of the RDA network is of
particular concern for the West Midlands, North West, North East, and Yorkshire and the
Humber which received over €4bn in EU funding allocation for 2007-2013 (see Figure 4).
Without the security and match-funding of the RDA Single Programme the ability of those
regions to identify co-funding partners and expedite approximately €1.4bn in ERDF projects
is severely diminished.
Fifthly, in recognition that LEPs are to receive limited state funding, who will plug this
financial void needed to deliver sub-national development objectives? The abolishment of
RDAs has also created a significant financial void. For example, during the 2007-2008
funding period, the nine RDAs collectively had a Single Programme budget of £2.3 bn
(Pugalis, 2010). Further, the Coalition’s deficit reduction plan has witnessed the retrenchment
of economic regeneration budgets. The public sector was unquestionably the most prominent
co-partners in the majority of European-funded projects in England. Contributions from the
private sector have historically been hampered by state aid regulations and projects bidding
for the first round of RGF assistance were unable to match fund with ERDF. The latter is a
prime example of the disjointed practice evidenced during the space of transition. This would
imply that the dismantling of regional machinery was reactionary rather than proactively
transformative. Indeed, the government’s economic transition plan lacks strategic awareness
and coherence (Pugalis and Townsend, 2012). The vacuum left by the RDAs could
potentially derail existing EU projects reliant on Single Programme funding and cause
significant repercussions for longer-term regeneration projects post 2013. As a consequence,
England languishes in a position of ‘service delivery organizations fighting for fewer pots of
money, each with less money in them’ (Broughton et al., 2011, p. 89). Yet, a glimmer of
optimism is provided by Broughton and colleagues, who suggest that intensified competition
for resources could open up opportunities for collaboration. As with any policy shift,
adapting to change can render new and innovative working practices. From the wreckage of
demolished regional institutions, new ‘softer spaces’ of governance (Allmendinger and
14

15. Haughton, 2009; Haughton and Allmendinger, 2007; Haughton and Allmendinger, 2008;
Haughton et al., 2009) and ‘soft policy’ instruments (Hutton, 2007) are anticipated to emerge.
Operating in the interstices of formal politico-bureaucratic-legal policies, processes and
organisational confines, the strategies of softer spaces occupy and help connect multi-scalar
decision-making arenas, ‘whereby strategies try to integrate European, national and sub-
national policies and priorities. Actions within the strategies have overlapping geographies
and actor constellations. And there are few regulatory requirements involved: the emphasis is
on utilising existing funds and instruments and coordinating them. The strategies act as a
‘bridge’ between vision and implementation’ (Stead, 2011, p. 165). Not necessarily replacing
more formalised ‘harder’ spaces and processes, ‘softer’ ways of operating are
complementary. They ‘have a pragmatic approach’ (Ibid.).
Sixthly, with the production of new geographies of governance, particularly concerning the
formation of LEPs, what is the anticipated impact on the medium to long term administration
of future rounds of EU Structural Funding? Transitional arrangements are intended to apply
up until the remainder of the 2007-2013 programme. However, post-2013, how will
England’s sub-national territories align with European policy? Without regional institutions,
how will negotiations, relations and representations with the EU unfold? For instance, will
the Coalition Government ‘renationalise’ EU regional policy and financial support? (Bentley
et al., 2010). Such a move would not only further contradict the Coalition’s localism rhetoric,
but would present challenges for European territorial policy.
Seventhly, what will be the role of LEPs in respect of European funding and what voice will
they have in Europe? The role of LEPs within the management and delivery of European
funding programmes is still to be clearly defined. The Coalition Government’s intention is
that ‘spending decisions provided to England from the EU budget 2014-20 should be taken at
the local level’ (HM Government 2010b). However, there has been no indication from
government that they intend to devolve the management of European funding to LEPs (Mott
MacDonald, 2011). Whilst ministers have suggested that LEPs will play an ‘important’ role
in this respect, soundings from civil servants suggest that this will be little more than
supporting and/or endorsing funding bids. Thus, it would appear LEPs are expected to play a
role, albeit marginal, in shaping the next round of European funding rather than providing the
form of management oversight and integration of funding streams previously undertaken by
the RDAs. Moreover, the impracticality of 30-plus entities providing management and
15

16. administrative responsibility of European funds brings into doubt the ability of LEPs to
reflect and support the ‘functional economic areas’ they purport to serve (HM Government,
2010b). As one of the few constants amongst significant change, local authorities are
appropriate bodies to help address many of the dilemmas presented by the Coalition’s sub-
national policy review (Walburn, 2011), in terms of performing a substantial role in the
prioritisation, coordination and management of European funds. Yet, despite numerous
international precedents, the Coalition appears to be following a steady flow of UK
Governments that have variously proclaimed to decentralise powers, although each has failed
to relinquish central control.
Concluding remarks, dilemmas and unanswered questions
The geographies of the state are once again in sudden motion in England. Unique to this
latest round of destabilised institutional settings and socio-political contestation, is the
profound European quandary. How will the EU view these changes? Will England be further
out of step with a Europe of Regions? Across many parts of England, particularly the assisted
areas, localities have struggled economically for decades following the first round of
industrial restructuring in the 1930s. Consequently, economic regeneration funding, whether
direct grants to businesses, to help upskill and/or retrain the prospective labour force, or
infrastructural improvements, is an essential public policy. European funding performs a
decisive role at the sharp end of delivery. ‘Matched’ against other means of funding, it can
often be the deciding factor in a project progressing or not. It is within this context that the
disbanding of the English regions presents some significant policy consequences for those
places in the greatest need of European support. The new direction for English sub-national
policy also poses some important challenges for compatibility with European policy-
legislation. The paper concludes with some remarks on identified dilemmas and those
questions which remain unanswered.
Carrying a profoundly anti-regionalist ideology, upon appointment to government the
Coalition quickly embarked on the dismantling of RDAs, GORs, Regional Leaders’ Boards,
Regional Select Committees and Regional Observatories. Subsequently, the territorial
landscape of England has been radically altered in little over a year into the Coalition
Government’s tenure. With public consultation noticeably absent in the quest to make
changes under the banner of ‘localism’, some of the potentially more powerful aspects of
16

17. economic regeneration have been centralised with the remaining responsibilities localised as
a new round of, almost compulsive (Jones, 2010), reorganisation was ushered in. More
alarmingly, England’s scalar politics, organisational reorganisations and endless policy
adaptations has repercussions beyond its own shores. Centralising tendencies over the past
few decades have put England somewhat ‘out of step’ with the rest of Europe (Crouch and
Marquand, 1989). With the rejection of regions in 2010, this disconnect shows no signs of
waning.
The transitional governance arrangement for the management and administration of structural
funds in England is an emerging and not altogether clear landscape. In the short-term, the
disbanding of RDAs resulted in the transfer of ERDF, ESF and RDPE programmes to central
government control with management administered across a confusing array of scales.
However, this state rescaling strategy presents significant policy implications for European
funding and raises some serious questions. Firstly, the rejection of regions places the
Coalition Government out of step with the rest of Europe. Secondly, it is anticipated that the
voice of sub-national territories of England will diminish in the European arena. Thirdly, if
the EU does recognise England’s new territorial structure, how will the Coalition
Government ‘select’ an appropriate geographical scale for the administration of the 2014-
2020 Structural Funds? Fourthly, which institutional delivery bodies, and at what territorial
scale, will the Coalition propose to take forward the longer-term management of European
structural funding? Fifthly, and linked to the previous open question, how will such a
proposition be viewed by the EU? At this juncture it is unclear whether the management of
European funding will be undertaken by Whitehall, LEPs, groupings of local authorities, or
perhaps a new institutional configuration.
In light of the EU’s goal of territorial cohesion, through the application of integrated and
multi-level governance arrangements, it remains to be seen what impact England’s disparate
governance arrangements for the management of European funding will have upon ‘regional’
economies they set out to serve. Accordingly, a fundamental question arises: is it all worth it?
The emergent policy, which remains in motion, will require time to implement and a much
longer period to bed in. Schizophrenic policy shifts have quashed far too many promising
policy innovations. Vince Cable, the Business Secretary, appears to recognise the pitfalls of
such an approach, claiming that ‘[t]he perils of short-termism have been all too apparent over
the past few years ... great damage has been done by speculating on a short-term bubble in
17

18. property values rather than investing in economic production’ (Cable, 2010). But will he be
in office long enough to heed his own advice? Expressing more hope than conviction,
Walburn has pleaded that ‘out of the wreckage of organizational mayhem which has affected
local economic development in recent years, something more permanent and effective might
emerge at last’ (Walburn, 2011, p. 80). Only time will tell, but the changes being
implemented by the Coalition appear to be more reactive than transformative, which is out of
step with incremental policy evolution practised elsewhere across Europe.
18

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