Abstract State-led restructuring of sub-national economic governance and regeneration has been rapidly evolving over the past year or so across England. With several waves of cross-boundary Local Enterprise Partnerships approved by the UK Government, it is opportune to take stock of some of the more notable shifts. Building on a preliminary analytical mapping of the rocky road from regionalism to sub-regional localism, the paper pays particular attention to the politicised process underpinning the alliances, and crafting, development and subsequent submission of LEP proposals, as well as the eventual assessment and state sanctioning of LEP bids. Examining the process from a variety of perspectives, the paper highlights unequal power relations and extracts a number of powerful policy considerations. The paper propounds the argument that the rhetoric of permissive policy masks centralist controlling tendencies and unwritten rules. Pugalis, L. (2011) 'Look before you LEP', Journal of Urban Regeneration and Renewal, 5 (1), 7-22.

1. Look before you LEP
Paper should be cited as:
Pugalis, L. (2011) 'Look before you LEP', Journal of Urban Regeneration and Renewal, 5
(1), 7-22.
Abstract
State-led restructuring of sub-national economic governance and regeneration has been
rapidly evolving over the past year or so across England. With several waves of cross-
boundary Local Enterprise Partnerships approved by the UK Government, it is opportune to
take stock of some of the more notable shifts. Building on a preliminary analytical mapping
of the rocky road from regionalism to sub-regional localism, the paper pays particular
attention to the politicised process underpinning the alliances, and crafting, development and
subsequent submission of LEP proposals, as well as the eventual assessment and state
sanctioning of LEP bids. Examining the process from a variety of perspectives, the paper
highlights unequal power relations and extracts a number of powerful policy considerations.
The paper propounds the argument that the rhetoric of permissive policy masks centralist
controlling tendencies and unwritten rules.
Keywords: Public-private partnerships, sub-national governance, regeneration, economic
policy, regional development, business engagement, leadership and local enterprise
partnerships
INTRODUCTION
Following the Conservative Party’s announcements to replace England’s Regional
Development Agencies (RDAs) outside of London with Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs)
in the run up to the May, 2010 General Election, which broadly correlated with Liberal
Democrat views, it was clear that, failing a Labour election victory, RDAs’ dominant
economic regeneration role would be living on borrowed time.1 Once David Cameron and
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2. Nick Clegg had shaken hands on a deal to form a UK Coalition Government, the axe quickly
fell on RDAs as their powers, funding and responsibilities were curtailed, well in advance of
legislation set to formally abolish them by April, 2012. Alongside this act of demolition was
the fledgling idea of sub-national economic reconstruction centred on business-led LEPs.
Recognising ‘the constitutional paradox of a permanent civil service that has no permanent
memory’ (p. 214),2 it is considered crucial to analyse the ideas, thoughts and motivations
directing policy change in order to capture lessons that would otherwise go unnoticed or
remain concealed. Building on a preliminary analytical mapping of the rocky road from
regionalism to sub-regional localism that theorised the transitional landscape,3 the present
paper pays particular attention to the politicised process underpinning the alliances, and
leading to the crafting, development and subsequent submission of LEP proposals, as well as
the eventual state assessment of LEP bids. Consequently there is merit in briefly recapping
and updating the core aspects of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat’s (Con-Lib’s) state-led
restructuring of sub-national economic governance and regeneration since Pugalis posed the
exploratory question: ‘where do we go from here?’.3
The spatial scales favoured for the attempted management and governance of
economic regeneration policy have ebbed and flowed since the identification of the so-called
‘regional problem’ in the 1930s.4 Theoretical developments, policy-driven research and
socio-economic shifts have all played a role, yet it is arguably political ideology that has
instigated some of the more radical scalar-contingent institutional shifts. Whilst ‘regions’
performed an important administrative role prior to the 1990s (e.g. as statistical units), the
Major-led Conservative Government standardised them by way of introducing Government
Offices for the English Regions (GOs) in 1994. Partly in response to the European Union’s
preference for the regional administration of funding, such as the European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF), GOs provided Whitehall departments with regional tentacles.
The promotion of regions as preferable units for the administration and integration of sub-
national policy continued under New Labour, including the launch of RDAs in 1999. 5
Possessing statutory powers for furthering the economic development of regions, their
responsibilities grew incrementally and they wielded significant influence over regeneration
schemes involving the public sector. Despite largely favourable ‘independent’ evaluations,
they came under political scrutiny from the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats prior to the
General Election. Whilst space does not permit a detailed analysis here, against a background
of economic recession RDAs were attacked and criticised on democratic grounds owing to
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3. their locally unaccountable private sector-led boards and bureaucratic grounds perceived to
produce an ‘additional layer’ at an inappropriate spatial scale, amongst other things.
Supposedly aligned with their localism philosophy, the Coalition Government invited
English localities to put forward proposals – backed by democratic and business leaders – for
the creation of LEPs. This was initially restricted to those areas of England outside of
London, but the Government subsequently extended its invitation to London after discussions
with its Mayor. By way of these invitations, the gauntlet had been laid down by the Coalition
for a respatialisation of neoliberal economic regeneration entities. Providing localities – that
were originally expected to be composed of two or more upper-tier authorities – with less
than 70 days to put together propositions on the back of a few paragraphs of guidance in the
form of broad ‘parameters’ contained in a letter of 29th June, 2010 by the Business Secretary
and Communities Secretary,6 Government refrained from publishing any policy-guidance
until after the state-set 6th September, 2010 deadline. It was not until 28th October, 2010
when the Coalition issued their eagerly anticipated Local Growth ‘White Paper’7 that the
Government’s policy on LEPs was revealed.5
The White Paper is intended to provide the overarching framework for how the Con-
Libs seek to rebalance the country’s spatial economy as part of achieving an economic
recovery. It sets out three priorities:
1. Shifting power to local communities and businesses – by establishing local
partnerships of business and civic leaders (i.e. LEPs)
2. Increasing confidence to invest – by creating the right conditions for growth and a
new incentives regime
3. Focused investment – by tackling barriers to growth that the market will not address
itself and supporting investment that will have a long term impact on growth
As part of this broad brush agenda, a range of measures, designed to provide incentives for
local authorities (LAs) to promote business growth, is outlined in principle.5 The White Paper
also provided details of the first tranche of approved LEPs (see Figure 1), the process for
dismantling the RDAs and set out high-level criteria for the Regional Growth Fund. The
latter is set to be the prime (and only major) economic regeneration funding pot over the next
three years. The £1.4 billion England-wide fund, administered (but not financially supported)
by Vince Cable’s Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), will, among its
tasks, be instrumental in providing ‘match-funding’ for accessing the ERDF, administered by
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4. Eric Pickles’ Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG).8 The latter is an
example of the recentralisation of policy-funding functions; previously ERDF had been
managed by the RDAs and GOs before them.
Figure 1: A map of the first wave of state sanctioned LEPs
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5. Taking a critical look at the framing, process and politics underpinning the Coalition’s
‘open call’ for LEPs and the concomitant territorial alliances informing LEP submissions, the
paper extracts a number of powerful lessons that can be learnt from this policy story still
being written. Examining the process from several different perspectives, including business,
academic, political and practitioner views, the paper highlights unequal power relations.
Following the methodological approach via policy ‘chatter’ advocated by Pugalis,3 which
helps capture the political nuances and practitioner deliberations in a fast-paced policy and at
times chaotic environment, the paper propounds the argument that the rhetoric of permissive
policy masks centralist controlling tendencies and unwritten rules. The state-led orchestrated
politicised process is recounted in the next section, which is followed by an overarching
analysis of the LEP proposals submitted to Government. The assessment process is then
examined, before concluding with some lessons to date. As with all state-led restructuring
exercises, the motivations, implementation and outcomes are contextually embedded and thus
spatially distinct. Yet, in the realm of globally connected local places and practices, some
insights specific to England are likely to resemble processes evolving across other places,
countries and continents. In this respect, findings will be of interest and appeal to a wider
international audience of scholars and policy analysts. However, direct and unsympathetic
‘fast’ policy transfer of lessons learnt is not advisable.
THE POLITICISED PROCESS
The dismantling of regions, including the abolition of RDAs, was a political act. Con-Lib
critiques of RDAs – revolving around unsuitable administrative geographies, unaccountable
creatures of central government and inefficient bureaucratic machinery – can be viewed as a
smokescreen for eradicating vestiges of the Blair-Brown Labour era (1997-2010).9 Perhaps
owing to their primary desire of drawing to a swift end Labour’s regional policy-
infrastructure, the Coalition’s localist policy rebuilding plan was less developed.10 As
Damian Waters, the Confederation of British Industry’s (CBI’s) regional director in the North
West, put it: ‘There is a danger that [the Government] are throwing out the baby with the bath
water’. More extreme views attest that there is a danger of throwing the bath out as well!
Lesser and greater remarks of concern were reiterated from different perspectival lenses (e.g.
LA officers, entrepreneurs and regeneration practitioners), forming a strong impression that
whilst the ‘old’ regionalist policy approach was imperfect, wholesale demolition and
reconstitution was unnecessary, and potentially counterproductive.3, 9
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6. Prior to the General Election the most comprehensive account of LEPs was contained
in a letter by Caroline Spelman and Ken Clarke.11 Claiming that the RDAs were a legacy of a
failed regional government experiment, in reference to the North East of England’s ‘no’ vote
for an Elected Regional Assembly, the Spelman-Clarke letter suggested reforms to the
existing regional system, rather than ‘scrap it’ entirely. The assertion was that such reform
would strengthen local economic development and urban regeneration priorities. In terms of
leadership, Spelman and Clarke were insistent that ‘a leading local business person will chair
each new partnership’ (p. 2). Proceeding the General Election result, the Cable-Pickles letter
was a little more flexible, indicating that they were ‘willing to consider variants’ such as an
elected mayor (p. 2).6 The reference to elected mayors was a nod in the direction of their
intent to legislate for these in the 12 ‘largest’ cities (as set out in the Localism Bill).12 Yet, the
two page letter by Cable and Pickles has been widely rebuked across different sectors and
interests. Enraged by contradictory views pertaining from different ministers, Richard
Lambert, director-general of the CBI, described the manner in which the Government went
about creating LEPs as a ‘shambles’.
The quiet conflict between Eric Pickles (Conservative) and Vince Cable (Liberal
Democrat), icons of the notable policy differences that have traditionally existed between
their respective departments, CLG and BIS, goes much of the way in explaining why the
policy on LEPs lacks strategic cohesion, has developed unevenly and been riddled with
inconsistencies. It is feasible that the internal wrangling between BIS and CLG officials,
reminiscent of ‘negotiations’ that stretched out the implementation of the Treasury’s13
‘Review of sub-national economic development and regeneration’ in 2007 under a Labour
Government, may have expended valuable time and space for more creative, strategic
thinking. Though, it should be noted that this trait is not limited to national policy
deliberation. It is a pervasive peculiarity that transcends political affiliations and spatial
scales. Considering the vagueness of the policy of compromise contained in the ‘Local
Growth White Paper’,5 the role and scope of LEPs is yet to be adequately clarified, despite 12
months passing since the circulation of the Cable-Pickles letter. Consequently, LEPs in
practice are subject to be drastically transformed over time and across space.
In a letter addressed to Vince Cable, dated 14th September, 2010, which was leaked
to the press, Mark Prisk, Business and Enterprise Minister, alerted the Business Secretary to
the ‘strong concerns of the business community’ regarding LEPs. Prisk cautioned that LEPs
could be a ‘failure in large parts of England’ should business become ‘detached’ from the
initiative. Prisk’s letter of concern was in direct response to the public criticisms from
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7. powerful business lobby groups, such as the CBI. Sir Digby Jones, the former boss of the
CBI, claimed that LEPs are ‘politically driven and managed’, confused in their objectives, too
small to operate strategically and already had a ‘local authority mentality’. Jones’
condemnation epitomised the mood of the business community who began to refer to LEPs as
‘toothless tigers’ destined to be ‘talking shops’ and ‘empty vessels’.
The process, to date, has been a maelstrom of conflicting ministerial pronouncements
lacking the substance of a considered policy-framework, let alone any evidence supporting
the advocacy for yet another round of reterritorialised institutional manoeuvring, that shows
no signs of abating. Even Cable acknowledged that the process had been ‘a little Maoist and
chaotic’. In parallel to the ministerial induced confusion, LAs and businesses were presented
with the unenviable task, and potentially poisoned chalice, of garnering ambitious LEP
proposals in a relatively short period of time (i.e. 10 weeks).
SUBMISSIONS
In July 2010 the consultancy CommunitySense launched a research project to investigate how
LAs intended to progress the development of LEPs.14 More than 50 senior regeneration
professionals participated, with survey findings, unsurprisingly, indicating that LAs want
LEPs to adopt a strong enterprise focus including supporting employment, skills and business
development. Responses revealed a pragmatic acceptance that most LEPs would be formed
from existing partnership arrangements and there was a widely held expectation that
brokering business involvement would be particularly challenging. The Government received
a total of 62 LEP proposals, including a few propositions for strategic (regional) forums
intended to operate alongside and in cooperation with LEPs, such as, the Yorkshire
Enterprise Partnership. Content analysis of the majority of these submissions, alongside
interviews and media reports validates the public sector practitioners’ initial views captured
in CommunitySense’s LA survey.
Focus and priorities
Whilst there was no government blueprint for LEPs, at least no blueprint that Cable and
Pickles could agree and issue publicly prior to the September deadline, their letter provided a
broad steer and hinted at some of the Coalition Government’s emergent thinking.3 As cross-
boundary entities, the letter stated that LEPs should produce a ‘clear vision’ for their area
setting out ‘local economic priorities’. Providing the ‘strategic leadership’ for their functional
Page 7 of 20

8. economic space, the letter stated that they will play a key role in delivering the Coalition’s
commitment to ‘rebalance the economy towards the private sector’. The Cable-Pickles letter
intends LEPs to tackle issues like planning and housing, local transport and infrastructure,
employment and enterprise, and tourism in some areas, as analysed in more detail
elsewhere,3, 10, 15 thereby, supporting the Government’s aspiration to create the ‘right
environment for business and growth’. Although ministers claim that the model for LEPs is
that there is no model, by effectively – at first – ruling out the role of LEPs in some activities
including inward investment, sector leadership, responsibility for business support,
innovation, and access to finance, the broad parameters had been set. As a result, the salient
feature of LEP bids have several key characteristics in common (see Figure 2). However,
beyond the commonalities – reflective of the Government’s broad parameters and existing
economic regeneration priorities – proposals ranged significantly. It was clear that some, for
example, had been prepared late in the process; lacking broad partner input, analytical rigour
and thoughtful priorities. Some bids amounted to less than a handful of pages of text, whereas
others exceed 200 pages, including maps, diagrams and detailed economic analysis. Several
propositions mentioned an intent to adopt ‘innovative’ financial instruments, although
elaboration was absent in most cases.
Figure 2: Common characteristics of LEP bids
Key themes Common characteristics Bid examples
Role Many bids consider the principal role to be that of The East Sussex Prosperity through
strategic leadership Growth proposal did not outline
Terminology, such as ‘influencing’, ‘advocacy’, decision-making powers, instead
‘support’ and ‘enabling’, was frequently preferring a more strategic advisory
mentioned role
Scope and Most proposals tended to reflect the enterprise The Newcastle and Gateshead bid
priorities brief set out in the Cable-Pickles letter, although suggested the use of a spatial
addressing locally specific priorities featured development plan to guide and
prominently in many bids prioritise the work of the LEP
Some proposals used the Government’s language
of ‘rebalancing the economy’ to frame their
priorities
Form The proposed form of LEPs tended to be either an The East Anglia bid was silent on the
informal partnership arrangement, often supported form of its proposed LEP
by a LA acting as accountable body, or an entity
with a legal personality, such as a company limited
by guarantee
Functions Beyond those functions identified by Cable and Oxfordshire’s submission proposed
Pickles, such as housing, planning and transport, joint-working with the Homes and
other functions including access to finance, Communities Agency in allocating
supporting business start-ups and developing a low housing and regeneration funds
carbon economy were frequently identified in bids Gloucestershire, Swindon and
Functions identified by Government to be Wiltshire sought devolved
delivered nationally, particularly inward responsibility for inward investment
investment, were considered crucial to the through their bid
Page 8 of 20

9. workings of LEPs in many cases
Private sector Most propositions claimed to have private sector The Atlantic Gateway bid was a rare
support backing with some utilising signatories as example of being genuinely private
‘evidence’ sector-led
Governance The majority of bids mirrored the Cable-Pickles The Solent proposition set out to make
guidance by proposing a private sector chair and use of an Employment and Skills
equitable board representation across the public Board
and private sector
Many propositions were explicit about their
intention to secure further/higher education
representation at board level
Most bids were silent on the matter of voluntary,
community and third sector representation at board
level
A number of bids intend to employ Employment
and Skills Boards
Business Some bids had clearly thought of different Hampshire’s submission cited
representation mechanisms and processes to engender broader engagement through online
business engagement beyond those nominated to mechanisms and a business forum
comprise the board
Geography Almost all submissions were composed of at least Greater Manchester made a strong case
two upper-tier authorities, with frequent claims of on the grounds of functional economic
territories matching ‘natural economic areas’ space
A single upper-tier bid was submitted
in Cumbria
Boundary There were competing bids covering similar and/or Competing bids were received by
disputes overlapping geographies Government across Lancashire,
Numerous LAs were included in two or more LEP Pennine Lancashire and Flyde Coast
submissions
Cross-boundary Many propositions recognised the need for Adopting consistent language, each of
working working across LEP boundaries, primarily with the LEP submissions from across the
immediate neighbours but also with LEPs across North East proposed to work with a
other parts of the country with similar sectoral regional forum – the North East
strengths Economic Partnership
Some LEP bids proposed confederated working
arrangements and others set out to work within a
regional framework
Existing It was common for LEP submissions to recognise Many of the City Regions and Multi-
partnerships the need to build on existing partnerships, though Area Agreements, such as Leeds City
not necessarily mirror existing geographies, Region, put forward LEP bids
although some LEP bids are remarkably similar to
sub-regional governance entities established under
the previous Labour Government
Governmental Several propositions were explicit about the need The Birmingham and Solihull
relations to work closely with specific government proposition specifically mentioned its
departments and agencies intent to work closely with UK Trade
and Industry
Staffing Due to budget constraints and uncertainty of The Tees Valley submission identified
arrangements funding most submissions outlined an expectation a core team of staff that would provide
that secretariat support would be kept to a policy and delivery support, and seek
minimum to access additional funding
Funding and Consistent calls for accessing the Regional Growth Liverpool City Region’s submission
other sources of Fund called for financial benefits where their
finance Several bids suggested that they would consider role in achieving welfare benefit
pooling public sector resources and there was savings could be demonstrated
significant interest in place-based budgeting
Assets Consistent calls were made through LEP bids for The Marches proposition sets out to
taking on the ownership of RDA physical assets, deliver ambition on the back of RDA
such as land and property assets
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10. The majority of submissions identified workforce skills and inward investment as key
local priorities and therefore expected the LEP to play a decisive role.16 Yet, the Coalition
intends to recentralise these functions. Overall, an analysis of the LEP proposals shows a
clear trend towards LEPs performing a strategic enabling and influencing role – ‘steering and
cheering’. Locally distinct, specific details of the role to be performed by LEPs tended to be
sketchy in the propositions, which is understandable when considering the adventurous
timescales, lack of clarity from Government and no sign of state financial backing. It is clear
that some localities decided to design-in flexibility, with interview responses suggesting that
many LEPs intend to adapt once the landscape of LEPs becomes clearer. More than one
respondent made reference to waiting to see ‘which way the wind is blowing’ before
specifying functions and activities. Another practitioner involved in the crafting of a LEP
submission maintained that it was for ‘the board itself to determine priorities and activities ...
we [officers and representatives] can provide them with something to work with, but [the
board] need to have an input and make the final decision’. This type of stance indicates that
some proposals, perhaps even a significant majority, should be viewed as provisional works-
in-progress. Hence, it is likely to transpire that the actual focus and prioritisation of actions
over coming months and years may bear little resemblance to original bids. Indeed, the
announcement to revive Enterprise Zones (EZs), a favoured Conservative policy of the 1980s
and 1990s, with the 2011 Budget Report identifying the first 11 of 21 EZs across England,17
but only available to those places with a LEP, has prompted some commentators to claim that
‘New life has [been] breathed into LEPs’.18
Developing existing partnerships – LEPs are nothing new
In part owing to the compressed timescale for developing LEP submissions, but also
reflective of the array of neoliberal spatial governance arrangements developed over the
preceding decade – including but not limited to Multi-Area Agreements, City Regions and
Sub-Regional Partnerships – there was a strong propensity for LEP submissions to recast
existing arrangements. Indeed, the CommunitySense survey reported that ‘Over 87% of
Local Authorities sampled were preparing to utilise and merge existing partnership structures
to support LEP development’ (p. 7).14 Some of the most notable examples of LEP
submissions taking forward prior partnership configurations are the two pilot statutory City
Regions, announced in the 2009 Budget, covering Greater Manchester and the urban
conurbation centred on Leeds. Adopting such tactics prevents ‘reinventing the wheel’, which
is to be commended. These recast or simply rebadged partnerships will have accumulated a
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11. unique history of cooperation that any new partnership clearly has to negotiate. In this sense
established cross-boundary entities, such as Tees Valley Unlimited, may be at a distinct
advantage, as notwithstanding their own politico-institutional problems, they are
commencing life as a LEP with a track-record of economic governance at the larger than
local level. However, there is an apparent risk that some (predominantly public sector) actors
see LEPs as ‘business as usual’. In contrast, Dickinson asserts that the private sector ‘wants a
radical change’ in modes of working.16 Partly in response, terms such as, ‘fleet of foot’ have
entered the practitioners’ vocabulary to describe a new way of working that is more agile and
responsive than recent practice. Yet, so far, there has been little sign of a substantive cultural
shift to indicate that this will be the case other than in the most exceptional of circumstances.
It would be invidious if this latest round of state-led restructuring does not rouse more
innovative partnership arrangements and more creative ways of solving longstanding
economic issues.
Business involvement
Since the Coalition came to power, and especially in the period up to the September, 2010
LEP submission deadline, there has been a spate of policy announcements. Consequently, an
overwhelming weight of material was being fired in all directions and it was difficult for the
private sector to engage within such a small window of opportunity. A survey of almost 300
businesses by Shropshire Chamber of Commerce conducted prior to government deadline
revealed that approximately two-thirds of respondents were aware of the abolition of RDAs,
but there was less clarity on the role and governance of LEPs.19 For example, 37 percent of
respondents had no knowledge that LEPs are intended to be business-led with strong board
representation. Notwithstanding some promising exceptions and creative ways of engaging
businesses, such as through online networks, it is little wonder that the role of business in the
crafting, formulation and endorsement of submissions has been variously described as ‘thin’20
and ‘patchy’.21 As a result – implicitly and explicitly – the process can be characterised as
being LA-led, despite the Cable-Pickles letter calling for business leadership. The following
quote from a researcher at the Centre for Cities think-tank demonstrates the assumption that
LAs are the driving force behind the development of LEP submissions:
‘Partnerships will need to consider carefully who to involve from the business community,
and how to work with them to ensure a laser focus on growing local economies. The
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12. Partnership for Urban South Hampshire, for example, only engages with business on key
strategic issues, to make best use of their time’.21
There is an implicit inference that ‘partnerships’ are run by public sector stakeholders who
have more time to devote, with businesses only consulted ‘on key strategic issues’. If such a
view informs the workings of LEPs then the business as usual model will surely prevail. The
‘involvement’ of business interests in sub-national economic governance is an area that is
worthy of additional theoretical and empirical enquiry. It is far too simplistic to view private
sector or even more holistic multi-sector leadership as a magic bullet for the many complex
and entrenched issues that LEPs will inevitably face in the future.
In a context of economic austerity, some commentators are concerned that LEPs will struggle
to compensate for the ‘regional lacuna’ that has emerged following the demise of the RDAs.9
Drawing on the case of the North-West RDA, Kevin Meagher argued that the BBC would
never have moved to Salford Quays without a strategic regional body in place ‘to bang heads
together and get a rational approach agreed’ between Manchester and Salford councils.22
Calling for LEPs to have genuine powers that can help generate business interest, Meagher
opined that ‘the last thing anyone needs are a fleet of empty vessels manned by squabbling
local authorities as the big picture on regional economic development gets missed’. Yet,
prospective LEPs submitted their proposals lacking clarity on what they were permitted to do,
how they will do it, and how and by whom they will be judged.
RED, AMBER, GREEN: PERMISSIVE POLICY OR UNWRITTEN RULES?
As a consequence of the Government’s embryonic policy for LEPs, there was broad concern
from business groups and think-tanks that there could be ‘far too many little ones - which
would undermine their effectiveness’.23 Yet, a high number of bids was always likely to be a
by-product of localism, particularly if one agreed with the Coalition’s view that the eight
RDAs (excluding London) were too remote from local economic ‘realities’. A permissive
approach, what CLG’s deputy director of economic partnerships defines as ‘no prescription,
no guidance, no duties, with accountability [instead resting with] local people, and an end to
mindless reporting/strategies and plans produced to satisfy Government’s appetitive for more
and more data and information’,24 would therefore place an onus on the multiple stakeholders
within localities negotiating translocal economic forces. Here, local actors decide what the
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13. issues are, how to tackle them, who to work with and how to work – the What, Who and How
formula. Such a ‘bottom-up’ approach may not necessarily correlate with the views of
Whitehall, but it would demonstrate a first step of localism in action.
Emanating from the loose guidance provided by Government was the added
confusion derived from stakeholder interpretations. Creating ‘space’ for LEPs to respond to
local needs and priorities, which is welcome, Johnson and Schmuecker warned that this ‘also
creates uncertainty as to what will meet the criteria and what will not’ (p. 1).25 Whilst there
were generalities across the submissions, as identified above, there were also spatially
specific priorities and tailored ‘solutions’. The process, therefore, increased the likelihood of
competing bids and overlapping geographies. The Government subsequently received more
than 60 individual LEP proposals, which was decidedly more than BIS had hoped for, but
probably more closely attuned with the localism policy of CLG and its ministerial head Eric
Pickles. Pugalis3 demonstrates this patchwork quilt of prospective LEP geographies visually
and SQW20 quantified that at least 70 district authorities were included in two or more
submissions. Figure 3 identifies many of the geographically overlapping bids.
Figure 3: Competing LEP bids
Region Areas with competing bids
North East None
Yorkshire and York and North Yorkshire and Leeds City Region
Humber York and North Yorkshire and Hull, East Riding and Scarborough
Hull, East Riding and Scarborough and Humber
Leeds City Region and Sheffield City Region
North West Liverpool City Region, Greater Manchester, Cheshire and Warrington and the
Atlantic Gateway
Lancashire, Pennine Lancashire and Flyde Coast
East Midlands South East Midlands and Northamptonshire
West Midlands Birmingham and Solihull with East Staffordshire, Lichfield and Tamworth and
Stoke on Trent in Staffordshire
East of England East Anglia and Norfolk
East Anglia and Greater Cambridge and Greater Peterborough
East Anglia and Kent-Essex
South East Kent-Essex and Kent and Medway
The M3 corridor and Surrey
The Solent and Hampshire and the M3 Corridor
Surrey and the Coast to Capital and the Gatwick Diamond
Gatwick Diamond and Coast to Capital
South West Cornwall and Isles of Scilly and Devon and Somerset/Heart of the South West
Devon and Somerset/Heart of the South West and South Somerset and East Devon
Page 13 of 20

14. With Government lacking substantive criteria with which to base their decisions, a
straightforward, objective and transparent assessment process of LEP submissions appeared
improbable. The Coalition had inadvertently set themselves an impossible challenge: how to
demonstrate commitment to their permissive approach and localist philosophy at the same
time as encouraging localities to overcome territorial disputes and rise above parochialism.
How the Coalition responded proved to be a significant early test in respect of their ‘appetite
for the reality as well as the rhetoric of devolution’.21 At this crucial stage, ministers were
forced to reveal their hand which confirmed that the ‘Whitehall knows best’ view had not
vanished, but had been masquerading through the concept of localism. The Government
opted to endorse an initial wave of 24 LEPs using ex-post rationalisation as a way out of the
trap they had inadvertently created (see Figure 1). Finding themselves in an unexpected
situation that tested their localist credentials, the Coalition, so as not to appear irrational,
modified their approach (philosophy) so as to ‘justify’ their course of action. Ex-post
rationalisation permits actors, in this case government ministers, to reformulate past actions
and processes to appear in a more positive light. The specific course utilised by the Coalition
Government involved the adoption of four key criteria to assess the LEP proposals: i) support
from business ii) natural economic geography iii) LA support iv) and added value and
ambition.7 Without explaining the use of such criteria or indeed acknowledging the existence
of such criteria prior to and/or during the open invitation for LEP submissions, it is doubtful
the extent to which this criteria informed the ministerial decision-making process. Whilst the
Coalition have been staunch advocates of transparency, with Pickles contending that Freedom
of Information requests would be rendered redundant if the public sector made more
information readily available, they have been far from transparent in the murky LEP approval
process. Indeed, politicised motives masquerading as rational policy decisions may also be
directing the location of EZs. In April, 2011 David Cameron reportedly stated that the Stoke-
on-Trent and Staffordshire LEP area would be granted one of the remaining ten EZs, pre-
empting what has been officially scripted as a competitive bidding process.
Decision letters to proposers support the view that ministers arbitrarily adopted a
traffic light system of assessing bids. ‘Red’ – limited chance of approval and a major rethink
required. ‘Amber’ – additional work need, largely in terms of geography or partner buy-in.
‘Green’ – approval granted. Around 90 percent of the content of decision letters to proposers
consisted of generic text, which provided the impression that individual bids had not been
systematically considered. The intention to provide ‘detailed and individual feedback to
partnerships’24 may have been laudable but was never realistic considering that the London-
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15. based civil servants in BIS and CLG were only ever resourced to liaise with nine RDAs, and
were themselves facing staff reductions as a result of the spending cuts announced in the
October, 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review.26
Figure 4: A map of 33 LEPs – April, 2011
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16. The first tranche of LEPs left approximately 40 per cent of the population of England
LEP-less, with significant left-over spaces occupying large swathes of the North East, North
Yorkshire, Lancashire, Humberside, East Anglia and the West Country. Since the initial
wave, three more were approved in December, 2010 and by the end of April, 2011 six more
had been approved on an incremental basis, which brought the number of state sanctioned
bids to 33 (covering approximately 93 per cent of England’s population and 1.9 million
businesses) (see Figure 4).
LESSONS TO DATE
In a rapidly evolving policy environment, change is the only constant at the moment.
Although it is too early to judge the efficacy of LEPs, marked differences in the LEP
submissions and, just as importantly, their process of production, can be identified in order to
extract some key points of learning from the process to date. Whilst it would appear obvious
that LEPs should have clarity of purpose, including strategies, funding and powers,27 the
compressed timescale and lack of guidance mean that in many cases this remains a crucial
aspect to resolve. Without this basic understanding of their raison d’être and the tools at their
disposal, LEPs face an uphill struggle to influence the regeneration and growth of local
economies (especially over the short-term). Therefore, the first lesson to be drawn from
England’s state-led restructuring of sub-national economic governance and regeneration is
that clarity of goals and objectives, in this case to enable local growth, should be thoughtful
and achievable. Whilst locally tailored priorities and approaches are advocated, visions
lacking the substance to deliver will be futile. Lesson two is for the rules of the game to be
explicit and agreed upfront. It is for this reason that new policy concepts, such as LEPs, are
normally consulted upon prior to policy formulation and implementation. Linked to this,
lesson three is to learn from what has gone before: salvaging what has worked, revising what
could work better and learning from what has not worked so well. It is perhaps this lesson
which the Coalition Government should heed most in the future. Lesson four is to be realistic
about what can be achieved within compressed timescales. For example, seeking views and
proposals for new ways of working between public, private and voluntary sector interests
within a 10 week period was overambitious. The fifth lesson is that old rivalries, territorial
disputes, local politics and histories of stakeholder relations die hard. A perceived peril of
some of the submissions and state sanctioned LEPs is that the cavernous cracks created by
longstanding tensions may have only been papered over rather than fundamentally addressed.
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17. As the results of May, 2011 local government elections have transformed the political
dynamics of some areas, it will be interesting to monitor whether this unsettles or stabilises
emergent LEP relations. Those LEP-less areas, such as north and south of the Humber, may
use changes in local political leadership as an opportunity to put in place some cross-
boundary arrangements. The sixth lesson is to acknowledge that the form and focus of LEPs
will be spatially and historically contingent and, therefore, each LEP will require variable
degrees of national support and autonomy. The seventh lesson is to recognise the unequal
power relations of partnerships and to negotiate these in an open and transparent manner. The
Coalition exercise considerable power across the landscape of LEPs, yet arguably, these
powers have been concealed by representations of localism.
The ground rules for LEPs and sub-national economic regeneration has shifted rapidly
over the past 12 months. In part, this can be attributed to the frenetic politicised process that
framed the alliances, crafting, development and subsequent submission of LEP proposals, as
well as the eventual assessment and state sanctioning of LEP bids. Commencing with only a
nebulous notion of what form a LEP may take and what they could achieve, some
commentators perceived this to be evidence of ‘localism in action’ – a truly permissive
approach from Whitehall. Other analysts point to the tension between the localism of Pickles
and the regionalism-centralism of Cable, and indeed their respective officials, as the primary
reason underscoring a lack of guidance. As a result, the proposed LEP geographies were
unlikely to tessellate. Given the permissive rhetoric of the Con-Libs, their criteria for
assessing bids would prove challenging and contentious.
The paper has identified a lack of transparency, shifts in politico-policy direction and
ex-post rationalised criteria, leaving a dark cloud over the deliberations informing the crude
traffic light system of endorsing some (Green), leaving the door open for others (Amber) and
the bold rejection of the rest (Red). Despite expressions of localism wrapped-up in a
demagogical strategy, after 12 months of Con-Lib rule the shift from RDAs to LEPs appears
to mask insidious centralism. If this is so, then the Coalition’s sub-national policy is
remarkably similar to Labour’s. Further, LEPs could be considered more of a reaction against
Labour’s RDAs rather than a direct replacement. Though the Labour Government
propounded the virtues of subsidiarity,13 they were reluctant to grant localities genuine
economic powers, financial levers or incentives beyond a duty to assess the condition of their
economy. At a time when many areas have an improved understanding of economic
opportunities and regeneration priorities, in part supported by the production of Local
Economic Assessments, it is hoped that the tendency for Whitehall to centralise power and
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18. resources, which concomitantly undermines the representative role of local government, will
be reversed by way of LEPs. Such a shift would go some way in addressing the state-local
power imbalances and truly differentiate the Coalition’s espoused ‘radicalism’ from what
went before.
Speaking at the London Development Agency’s annual public meeting on 9th
November, 2010, London Mayor, Boris Johnson, believed it would be a ‘mistake’ to create a
network of LEPs within the capital
‘My motto is look before you LEP. What we need to do is be very careful that we don’t
reinvent the wheel. I think it would be a mistake for London to create a confusing and
complicated Venn diagram of sub-regions … I don’t think that’s the way to go’.
It has subsequently transpired that the Mayor’s advice has been heeded, with a single LEP
created for the capital (which in many respects is a direct replacement of the London
Development Agency but with much less financial muscle). Yet, even in London the LEP
picture is not totally clear.28 As the boundaries of England’s sub-national economic
governance and regeneration landscape continue to be redrawn geographically, politically,
institutionally, and across sectoral interests and stakeholders, many questions originally posed
by Pugalis3 remain pertinent but are yet to be answered at this stage. The importance of
collaboration, governance, powers, responsibilities and resources will be crucial to the
efficacy of LEPs and worthy of more detailed investigation in the future.
The spatial injustices of a fractured society of the privileged and dispossessed could
potentially be exacerbated by LEPs, assuming that some will be more powerful and effective
than others or if some localities remain LEP-less in the post-regional landscape. Policies
focussing on enabling the market and responding to opportunities tend to have an unpleasant
track record of silencing marginal communities and actors, whilst benefiting more powerful
interests who tend to shout loudest.2 Considering that geographically rebalancing the
economy is purported to be a major strand of the Coalition’s growth strategy, such a situation
warrants serious political and analytical attention. Perhaps the Con-Libs and others should
have followed the advice of Boris Johnson and ‘looked before they LEPed’.
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19. REFERENCES AND NOTES
1. Due to its unique constitutional arrangements a separate process operated in London,
where the Mayor and London boroughs were invited to come forward with LEP proposals by
5 November, 2010, which was subsequently extended.
2. Houghton, J.H., and Blume, T. (2011), 'Poverty, power and policy dilemmas: Lessons
from the community empowerment programme in England'. Journal of Urban Regeneration
and Renewal Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 207-217.
3. Pugalis, L. (2011), 'Sub-national economic development: where do we go from here?'.
Journal of Urban Regeneration and Renewal Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 255-268.
4. Gudgin, G. (1995), 'Regional problems and policy in the UK'. Oxford Review of
Economic Policy Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 18-63.
5. Pugalis, L., and Townsend, A.R. (2011), 'Rebalancing England: Sub-National
Development (Once Again) at the Crossroads'. Urban Research & Practice Vol. In Press.
6. Cable, V., and Pickles, E. (2010), 'Local enterprise partnerships'. Open letter to Local
Authority Leaders and Business Leaders, HM Government, London.
7. HM Government (2010), 'Local growth: realising every place’s potential'. The
Stationery Office, London.
8. The Regional Growth Fund is expected to provide £580 million capital and £840
million resource funding over the ensuing three years. Open to all parts of England, financial
support is made up of contributions from CLG, the Department for Transport and the
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. CLG is the largest contributor,
providing £890 million. The budget allocation for for 2011-12 is £495 million.
9. Pugalis, L. (2011), 'The regional lacuna: a preliminary map of the transition from
Regional Development Agencies to Local Economic Partnerships'. Regions Vol. 281, No.,
pp. 6-9.
10. Pugalis, L. (2010), 'Looking Back in Order to Move Forward: The Politics of
Evolving Sub-National Economic Policy Architecture'. Local Economy Vol. 25, No. 5-6, pp.
397-405.
11. Spelman, C., and Clarke, K. (2010), 'Strengthening local economies'. Open letter to
Conservative MPs, House of Commons, London, pp. 1-4.
12. Communities and Local Government (CLG) (2010), 'Decentralisation and the
Localism Bill: an essential guide'. The Stationery Office, London.
13. HM Treasury (2007), 'Review of sub-national economic development and
regeneration'. HMSO, London.
14. CommunitySense (2010), 'LEPs: the story so far, A survey of 51 Local Authorities by
CommunitySense (Part 1)'. CommunitySense, London.
15. Bentley, G., et al. (2010), 'From RDAs to LEPs: A New Localism? Case Examples of
West Midlands and Yorkshire'. Local Economy Vol. 25, No. 7, pp. 535-557.
16. Dickinson, S. (2011), 'LEPs: puzzle or journey?'. In Local Enterprise Partnerships:
Good Neighbours - Good Outcomes, Evolution Business Centre, Northallerton.
17. HM Treasury (2011), 'Budget 2011'. Stationery Office, London.
18. Jones, A. (2011), 'Zones give teeth to partnerships'. Planning, 21 April, pp. 16-17.
19. Shropshire Chamber of Commerce (2010), 'LEP Survey'. Shropshire Chamber of
Commerce, Shropshire and Telford & Wrekin.
20. SQW (2010), 'Local Enterprise Partnerships: A new era begins?'. SQW, London.
21. Maugham, C. (2010), 'What will life be like after RDAs?'. Public Servant, 11
October.
22. Meagher, K. (2010), 'Opinion: Talk of RDA 'abolition' is premature'. Regeneration &
Renewal, 6 July.
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20. 23. Finch, D. (2010), 'Most LEP proposals not good enough - Cable'. Vol. Available at:
http://fishburn-hedges.typepad.com/dermot_finch/2010/09/cable-wrigglesworth-lukewarm-
on-leps.html [Accessed on 22 October 2010].
24. Francis, C. (2010), 'Local Enterprise Partnerships: The story so far and relationship
with planning', National Planning Forum, 8 October.
25. Johnson, M., and Schmuecker, K. (2010), 'Four Tests for Local Enterprise
Partnerships'. IPPR North, Newcastle.
26. HM Treasury (2010), 'Spending Review 2010'. The Stationery Office, London.
27. Lee, N., et al. (2010), 'No City Left Behind? The geography of the recovery - and the
implications for the coalition'. The Work Foundation, London.
28. Alongside a London Enterprise Partnership, covering the whole of the capital, the
North London Strategic Alliance (NLSA), representing business interests, public sector
bodies and eight councils, as of March, 2011, was intending to press ahead with their
London-Anglia LEP approach, which was rejected by Government. Despite no formal LEP
recognition, the NLSA contend that London’s economy is so diverse that a single LEP will
not adequately tackle its barriers to growth.
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