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Hack In The Box 2012
Killing a bounty program, Twice.
By : Itzhak (Zuk) Avraham; Nir Goldshlager;

05/2012
# whoami | presentation

Itzhak Avraham (Zuk)
Founder & CEO

Ihackbanme
http://imthezuk.blogspot.com

zuk@zimperum.com
# whoami | presentation


Nir Goldshlager
Senior Web Applications Researcher

Twitter: @nirgoldshlager
Blog : http://nirgoldshlager.com
Reasons for bug bounty

ü  Money
ü  Credit
Reasons for bug bounty

ü  Money
ü  Credit
ü  Okay, mostly credit, they don’t pay much :P
Bug bounty programs
1995 – Netscape
2004 – Firefox
2005 – ZDI
2007 – Pwn2own
2010 – Google
2011 – Facebook
Know your enemy
Know your enemy
Nope. Your enemies might be :
 •  Masato Kinugawa
 •  Neal Poole
 •  Nils Juenemann
 •  Szymon Gruszecki
 •  Wladimir Palant
Know your enemy
Nope. Your enemies might be :
 •  Masato Kinugawa
 •  Neal Poole
 •  Nils Juenemann
 •  Szymon Gruszecki
 •  Wladimir Palant
Learn your target Overview
Spy on their blogs
  •  New bugs – new ideas to detect different vulnerabilities.

Learn the company
  •  Unchecked services
     •  Successful acquisitions
     •  Untested/Less secured web applications
  •  Multi vector
     •  Unknown vectors / logical techniques
  •  Repetitive of weak spots
Google Overview
Learn the company
 •  Successful acquisitions
   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_acquisitions_by_Google
    •  New services – Knol(???), Friends Connect
    •  Subdomains
    •  Learn all the functions of the application you are going to test
 •  Multi vector
    •  Unknown vectors / logical techniques
 •  Repetitive of weak spots
Google Overview
 •  Successful acquisitions
   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_acquisitions_by_Google
 •  More than 1 acquisition per week since 2010!
Google Overview
Approach
 •  Logical / mixed issues
XSS for fun and … profit?
•  XSS is not just for account hijacking
•  Trusted website, runs malicious javascript…
  •  Client Side Exploit anyone?
Google Overview
Convention
  •  Calender
    Google.com/calender
  •  Friends Connect
    google.com/friendconnect
  •  Knol
    Google.com/knol
  •  Analytics
    Google.com/analytics
  •  Blogger
    Google.com/blogger
Google Support Overview
Convention
  •  Knol
        Google.com/knol
        No
  •  Friends Connect
     Support.google.com/friendconnect
  •  Calendar
     Support.google.com/calendar
  •  Analytics
     Support.google.com/analytics
  •  Blogger
     Support.google.com/blogger
  •  Admob
     Support.google.com/admob
Google Calendar Stored XSS
Google Calendar Error based

•  General Attacks against
  Google Calendar.
•  Going Deep Into the
  Application.
•  What we found.
•  We need to find a way to
  trigger it for REMOTE users.
Stored XSS (Error based)
“Self” Xss Payload
Google Calendar Error based
•  Changing the attack vector
•  Resolving the Self XSS Issue By using the Sharing
  Option
Google Calendar Error based

The Sharing process:
Google Calendar Error based

Wait,
HOUSTON WE HAVE A
PROBLEM!!!
user must delete his calendar
1-5 times.
How can we force our
Target to delete our
malicious calendars?
Google Calendar Error based
•  Resolving the problem: No sharing limit.
•  Users gets email for each share & our Calendar Is
  added Automatically to the victim account.
Google Calendar Error based

•  Calendar SPAM !!!
•  After the user deletes 1-5 ,
   Error occurred
•  Error Message Details:
•  Calendar (calendar name)
   not load, After that a Stored
   XSS will be triggerJ
Google Calendar Error based
Game over! Achievement unlocked.
Google Analytics – Stored XSS
Google Analytics
In-page analytics doesn’t escape incoming requests:
  •  Meaning, an attacker can send XSS to the administrator by
    sending a URL
Google Analytics
In-page analytics doesn’t escape incoming requests:
  •  Meaning, an attacker can send XSS to the administrator by
    sending a URL
Google Analytics
Google Analytics
Let’s exploit this vulnerability in 2 creative ways:
  •  In-Page Analytics – When the administrator logins. Ouch.
  •  Sharing – Infect ourselves and share our Analytics with the
     victim (direct link to in-page analytics)
Google Analytics
1st method:
Google Analytics
Let’s wait for our administrator to login
Google Analytics
Let’s wait for our administrator to login
  •  Achievement unlocked, we can run JS on any web administrator
     using Analytics
Google Analytics
Google Analytics
•  Second method : Sharing with the victim our analytics
•  We will add the victim with read-only permission and
  will submit the link for google.com/analytics account
  with our ID
Google Analytics
Google Analytics
§  Game over. Achievement unlocked
Google FeedBurner Stored XSS



FeedBurner	
  	
  provides	
  custom	
  RSS	
  feeds	
  and	
  management	
  
tools	
  to	
  bloggers,podcasters,	
  and	
  other	
  web-­‐based	
  	
  
content	
  publishers
Google Feedburner Stored XSS
Feed title is “vulnerable” to an XSS
Google Feedburner Stored XSS

Wait, Nothing Happened here!!!, There is “NO” XSS
Google Feedburner Stored XSS
Lets look closer on the features of FeedBurner App
Google Feedburner Unsubscribe XSS
§  We already know that there is a Subscription feature in
    Feed burner, Right???
§  What about Unsubscribe option, Maybe this can help us?
Google Feedburner Unsubscribe XSS
When the victim will decide to unsubscribe from the
malicious feed burner a stored xss will be run on his
client.
Google Feedburner Unsubscribe XSS

Lets Exploit it with two methods:
1. Victim subscribe to the service & Later unsubscribe from
     the malicious FeedBurner.


2.  Attacker Send a malicious unsubscribe link to the victim
(Victim dont need to be subscribe to the malicious feed).
Google FriendConnect Error based
Meet your new best friend :
Google FriendConnect Error based
The target approved our request.
Google FriendConnect Error based
The target approved our request.
Now, let’s force him to delete us, not before we’re going
to change our name to :
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAA …. “><XSS Payload>
Google FriendConnect Error based
Google FriendConnect Error based
After User delete :
  •  Achievement Unlocked.
Permission bypass – Google Knol




     Knol	
  is	
  an	
  online	
  knowledge	
  Portal
Permission bypass
•  Privacy in Google Knol
•  Function :Publish, Unpublished Docs
Permission bypass
Example of Unpublished document:
Permission bypass
This document isn’t accessible via direct URL
    The image cannot be displayed. Your computer may not have enough memory to open the image, or the image may have been corrupted. Restart your computer, and then open the file again. If the red x still appears, you may have to delete the image and then insert it again.
Permission bypass
Google Validate Permission,
Block us from viewing the
unpublished
Document


What can we do ????
Permission bypass
Lets meet our new friend J
Google Knol Translator Toolkit
Permission bypass
Attacker Provide the url of the Unpublished Doc
Permission bypass
 And magic happens
Google Affiliate Network –
Stored XSS + Administrator Priv!
Google Affiliate Network
What Is Google Affiliate Network??
Google Affiliate Network
Google Affiliate Network is a free program that makes it
easy for website publishers to connect with quality
advertisers and get rewarded for driving conversions.
§  Discover high-performing advertisers
§  Save time with a speedy and intuitive interface
§  Track conversions and access real-time reporting
§  Enjoy local payments via your AdSense account
§  VIP and Rising Star status for top publishers
Google Affiliate Network
The goals:
1.  XSS an account.
2.  Gaining Administrator Privilege
Google Affiliate Network
First Attack:
ConnectCommerce->Performics->DoubleClick->Google;
Google Affiliate Network
First Attack:
Manipulating Parameters on connectcommerce.com domain in order
to Inject XSS Payload on google.com Domain
Google Affiliate Network
PoC : Stored XSS from Google.com Domain
Google Affiliate Network
Second attack??
Manipulate, Gaining administrator privilege on any Google Affiliate
  account.
Google Affiliate Network
Manipulate UserID, Email fields
Game Over 3133.7$!!!!!
Google Picnik – Local File Inclusion
Google Picnik
Picnik.com seems to be Secure
So what is the way to crack the lock?
Google Picnik

1.  Execute a BruteForce to
   Files, Dir Attack
2. Execute a Sub domain
   Brute Force Attack
3. Port Scanning
Google Picnik


 Treasure Found!!!!!!
 Result:
 Sub domain: vpn.picnik.com
Picnik WhoIs vpn
  Which	
  Server	
  vpn.picnik.com	
  
  Hosted	
  
Google Picnik

•  So what was the story of vpn
   picnik?,
•  Someone installed by mistake a
   older version of phpList in
   Picnik vpn sub domain
Google Picnik

•  So what was the story of vpn
   picnik?,
•  Someone installed by mistake a
   older version of phpList in Picnik
   vpn sub domain
•  No way!!! With Default Password
   J ?
What Is phpList???


  phplist is open source email application & suffers from well
  known Vulnerabilities
Google Picnik
File Inclusion vulnerability that allow me to get a Shell
with a leet bounty $3133,7
Google Picnik
Game Over
Summary


§  Out-Of-The-Box (Hack-In-The-Box) Thinking
§  Think different
§  Information gathering
§  Mixed services
§  Permissions
Reference

●    http://www.nirgoldshlager.com/2011/03/blogger-get-administrator-privilege-
     on.html - Blogger admin privileges bypass
●    http://www.google.com/about/company/rewardprogram.html - Google Reward
     program
●    http://www.google.com/about/company/halloffame.html - Google Hall of Fame
●    http://www.slideshare.net/michael_coates/bug-bounty-programs-for-the-web -
     Michael Coates - Bug Bounty Program – OWASP 2011
One more
Maybe it’s not a good idea to follow our blogs
One more
Maybe it’s not a good idea to follow our blogs
Okay okay, one more
Blogger video…

HPP Attack
Join us tonight at
Hack-In-The-Empire event
For invites : RSVP@zimperium.com
Subject : HITE Invite
Thank you!
Itzhak “Zuk” Avraham - @IHackBanMe
Nir Goldshlager - @NirGoldshlager

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Nir goldshlager Killing a bug bounty program - twice Hack In The Box 2012