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OPSEC for hackers

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A gentle introduction to keeping your mouth shut. Video of the talk: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9XaYdCdwiWU

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OPSEC for hackers: because jail is for wuftpd the.grugq@gmail.com
OPSEC forFREEDOM FIGHTERS hackers: because jail is for wuftpd the.grugq@gmail.com
Overview • Intro to OPSEC • Methodology • lulzsec: lessons learned • Techniques • Technology • Conclusion
Avon:You only got to fuck up once… Be a little slow, be a little late, just once. How you ain’t gonna never be slow? Never be late? You can’t plan for that. Thats life.
Intro to OPSEC
WTF is it?
OPSEC in a nutshell • Keep your mouth shut • Guard secrets • Need to know • Never let anyone get into position to blackmail you
STFU
Methodology
• put the plumbing in first • create a cover (new persona) • work on the legend (history, background, supporting evidence for the persona) • Create sub-aliases • NEVER CONTAMINATE
The 10 Hack Commandments
FREEDOM The 10 Hack FIGHTING Commandments
• Rule 1: Never reveal your operational details
• Rule 1: Never reveal your operational details • Rule 2: Never reveal your plans
• Rule 1: Never reveal your operational details • Rule 2: Never reveal your plans • Rule 3: Never trust anyone
• Rule 1: Never reveal your operational details • Rule 2: Never reveal your plans • Rule 3: Never trust anyone • Rule 4: Never confuse recreation and hacking FREEDOM FIGHTING
• Rule 1: Never reveal your operational details • Rule 2: Never reveal your plans • Rule 3: Never trust anyone • Rule 4: Never confuse recreation and hacking FREEDOM FIGHTING • Rule 5: Never operate from your own house
• Rule 6: Be proactively paranoid, it doesn’t work retroactively
• Rule 6: Be proactively paranoid, it doesn’t work retroactively FREEDOM • Rule 7: Keep personal life and hacking FIGHTING separated
• Rule 6: Be proactively paranoid, it doesn’t work retroactively FREEDOM • Rule 7: Keep personal life and hacking FIGHTING separated • Rule 8: Keep your personal environment contraband free
• Rule 6: Be proactively paranoid, it doesn’t work retroactively FREEDOM • Rule 7: Keep personal life and hacking FIGHTING separated • Rule 8: Keep your personal environment contraband free • Rule 9: Don’t talk to the police
• Rule 6: Be proactively paranoid, it doesn’t work retroactively FREEDOM • Rule 7: Keep personal life and hacking FIGHTING separated • Rule 8: Keep your personal environment contraband free • Rule 9: Don’t talk to the police • Rule 10: Don't give anyone power over you
Why do you need OPSEC?
It hurts to get fucked
No one is going to go to jail for you.
Your friends will betray you.
#lulzsec: lessons learned
never ever ever do this
Violation Never trust anyone
ProTip: Don’t use your personal Facebook account to send defacement code toFREEDOM FIGHTERS your friends
Violation Don’t contaminate
Violation Keep personal life and hacking separate
Violation Keep personal life and FREEDOM hacking separate FIGHTING
Violation Never operate from your home
Violation Don’t reveal operational details
Violation Don’t reveal operational details
Violation Be paranoid
Virus (10:30:18 PM): don't start accusing me of [being an informant] - especially after you disappeared and came back offering to pay me for shit - that's fed tactics
Virus (10:30:18 PM): don't start accusing me of [being an informant] - especially after you disappeared and came back offering to pay me for shit - that's fed tactics Virus (10:30:31 PM): and then your buddy, topiary, who lives in the most random place
Virus (10:30:18 PM): don't start accusing me of [being an informant] - especially after you disappeared and came back offering to pay me for shit - that's fed tactics Virus (10:30:31 PM): and then your buddy, topiary, who lives in the most random place Virus (10:30:36 PM): who's docs weren't even public
Virus (10:30:18 PM): don't start accusing me of [being an informant] - especially after you disappeared and came back offering to pay me for shit - that's fed tactics Virus (10:30:31 PM): and then your buddy, topiary, who lives in the most random place Virus (10:30:36 PM): who's docs weren't even public Virus (10:30:38 PM): gets owned
Virus (10:30:18 PM): don't start accusing me of [being an informant] - especially after you disappeared and came back offering to pay me for shit - that's fed tactics Virus (10:30:31 PM): and then your buddy, topiary, who lives in the most random place Virus (10:30:36 PM): who's docs weren't even public Virus (10:30:38 PM): gets owned Sabu (10:32:29 PM): offering to pay you for shit?
Virus (10:30:18 PM): don't start accusing me of [being an informant] - especially after you disappeared and came back offering to pay me for shit - that's fed tactics Virus (10:30:31 PM): and then your buddy, topiary, who lives in the most random place Virus (10:30:36 PM): who's docs weren't even public Virus (10:30:38 PM): gets owned Sabu (10:32:29 PM): offering to pay you for shit? Virus (10:32:55 PM): yeah, you offered me money for "dox"
Virus (10:30:18 PM): don't start accusing me of [being an informant] - especially after you disappeared and came back offering to pay me for shit - that's fed tactics Virus (10:30:31 PM): and then your buddy, topiary, who lives in the most random place Virus (10:30:36 PM): who's docs weren't even public Virus (10:30:38 PM): gets owned Sabu (10:32:29 PM): offering to pay you for shit? Virus (10:32:55 PM): yeah, you offered me money for "dox" Virus (10:33:39 PM): only informants offer up cash for shit -- you gave yourself up with that one
HAPPY ENDING Virus is still free
Violation Never contaminate
Bonus: w0rmer
Techniques
Plumbing
It is boring.
You’ll know it worked if nothing happens.
Put it in place first.
Paranoia doesn’t work retroactively
Personas
Spiros: He knows my name, but my name is not my name. And you... to them you're only "The Greek." The Greek: And, of course, I'm not even Greek.
Problem: You are you.
Solution: Be someone else.
Personas • Danger to personas is contamination • Contact between personas (covers) contaminates both • Keep cover identities isolated from each other
Layered defense
• Fail safe technological solution • TOR all the things! • Back stop persona • Primary cover alias as first identity • Secondary cover aliases (eg. handles)
Profiling data
Pitfalls • Location revealing information • Weather • Time • Political events • Profiling data
Practice • Amateurs practice until they get it right, professionals practice until they can’t get it wrong • Practice makes perfect
Stringer: What you doing? Shamrock: Robert's Rules says we got to have minutes of the meeting. These the minutes. Stringer: Nigga, is you taking notes on a criminal fucking conspiracy?
No logs. No crime.
Staying Anonymous
Personal info is profiling info
Guidelines against profiling • Do not include personal informations in your nick and screen name. • Do not discuss personal informations in the chat, where you are from... • Do not mention your gender, tattoos, piercings or physical capacities.
Guidelines, cont. • Do not mention your profession, hobbies or involvement in activist groups • Do not use special characters on your keyboard unique to your language • Do not post informations to the regular internet while you are anonymous in IRC. • Do not use Twitter and Facebook
Guidelines, cont. • Do not post links to Facebook images. The image name contains a personal ID. • Do not keep regular hours / habits (this can reveal your timezone, geographic locale) • Do not discuss your environment, e.g. weather, political activities,
Hackers are no longer the apex predator
Hackers are no longer FREEDOM FIGHTERS the apex predator
That position has been ceded to LEO
That position has been ceded to LEO * *Law Enforcement Officials
Technology
VPNs vs. TOR • VPNs provide privacy • TOR provides anonymity • Confuse the two at your peril
• TOR connection to a VPN => OK • VPN connection to TOR => GOTO JAIL
On VPNs • Only safe currency is Bitcoins • because they come from nothing • Purchase only over TOR • http://torrentfreak.com/which-vpn- providers-really-take-anonymity- seriously-111007/
Fail closed
PORTAL
PORTAL Personal Onion Router To Avoid LEO
PORTAL • Router ensuring all traffic is transparently sent over TOR • Reduce the ability to make mistakes • Use mobile uplink • Mobility (go to a coffee shop) • Reduce risk of wifi monitoring
PORTAL • Uses tricks to get additional storage space on /
Hardware • TP-LINK AR71xx personal routers • MR-11U • MR-3040 • MR-3020 • WR-703N
MR-3040 & MR-11U • Battery powered • Approx. 4-5 hrs per charge • USB for 3G modem
http://torporfavor.org/ download/portal/
Conclusion
STFU
Questions?
If you think, don’t speak If you speak, don’t write If you write, don’t sign If you sign, don’t be surprised

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OPSEC for hackers

  • 1. OPSEC for hackers: because jail is for wuftpd the.grugq@gmail.com
  • 2. OPSEC forFREEDOM FIGHTERS hackers: because jail is for wuftpd the.grugq@gmail.com
  • 3. Overview • Intro to OPSEC • Methodology • lulzsec: lessons learned • Techniques • Technology • Conclusion
  • 4. Avon:You only got to fuck up once… Be a little slow, be a little late, just once. How you ain’t gonna never be slow? Never be late? You can’t plan for that. Thats life.
  • 7. OPSEC in a nutshell • Keep your mouth shut • Guard secrets • Need to know • Never let anyone get into position to blackmail you
  • 9.
  • 10.
  • 11.
  • 12.
  • 13.
  • 14.
  • 15.
  • 16.
  • 17.
  • 18.
  • 20. • put the plumbing in first • create a cover (new persona) • work on the legend (history, background, supporting evidence for the persona) • Create sub-aliases • NEVER CONTAMINATE
  • 22. FREEDOM The 10 Hack FIGHTING Commandments
  • 23.
  • 24. • Rule 1: Never reveal your operational details
  • 25. • Rule 1: Never reveal your operational details • Rule 2: Never reveal your plans
  • 26. • Rule 1: Never reveal your operational details • Rule 2: Never reveal your plans • Rule 3: Never trust anyone
  • 27. • Rule 1: Never reveal your operational details • Rule 2: Never reveal your plans • Rule 3: Never trust anyone • Rule 4: Never confuse recreation and hacking FREEDOM FIGHTING
  • 28. • Rule 1: Never reveal your operational details • Rule 2: Never reveal your plans • Rule 3: Never trust anyone • Rule 4: Never confuse recreation and hacking FREEDOM FIGHTING • Rule 5: Never operate from your own house
  • 29.
  • 30. • Rule 6: Be proactively paranoid, it doesn’t work retroactively
  • 31. • Rule 6: Be proactively paranoid, it doesn’t work retroactively FREEDOM • Rule 7: Keep personal life and hacking FIGHTING separated
  • 32. • Rule 6: Be proactively paranoid, it doesn’t work retroactively FREEDOM • Rule 7: Keep personal life and hacking FIGHTING separated • Rule 8: Keep your personal environment contraband free
  • 33. • Rule 6: Be proactively paranoid, it doesn’t work retroactively FREEDOM • Rule 7: Keep personal life and hacking FIGHTING separated • Rule 8: Keep your personal environment contraband free • Rule 9: Don’t talk to the police
  • 34. • Rule 6: Be proactively paranoid, it doesn’t work retroactively FREEDOM • Rule 7: Keep personal life and hacking FIGHTING separated • Rule 8: Keep your personal environment contraband free • Rule 9: Don’t talk to the police • Rule 10: Don't give anyone power over you
  • 35. Why do you need OPSEC?
  • 36. It hurts to get fucked
  • 37. No one is going to go to jail for you.
  • 38.
  • 39.
  • 40.
  • 41. Your friends will betray you.
  • 43.
  • 44.
  • 45.
  • 46. never ever ever do this
  • 48.
  • 49.
  • 50.
  • 51. ProTip: Don’t use your personal Facebook account to send defacement code toFREEDOM FIGHTERS your friends
  • 52.
  • 53.
  • 54.
  • 55.
  • 56.
  • 57.
  • 58.
  • 60.
  • 61.
  • 62.
  • 63. Violation Keep personal life and hacking separate
  • 64. Violation Keep personal life and FREEDOM hacking separate FIGHTING
  • 65.
  • 66.
  • 67.
  • 69.
  • 70.
  • 71.
  • 72.
  • 73. Violation Don’t reveal operational details
  • 74.
  • 75.
  • 76.
  • 77.
  • 78.
  • 79.
  • 80.
  • 81.
  • 82. Violation Don’t reveal operational details
  • 83.
  • 84.
  • 85.
  • 86.
  • 88.
  • 89. Virus (10:30:18 PM): don't start accusing me of [being an informant] - especially after you disappeared and came back offering to pay me for shit - that's fed tactics
  • 90. Virus (10:30:18 PM): don't start accusing me of [being an informant] - especially after you disappeared and came back offering to pay me for shit - that's fed tactics Virus (10:30:31 PM): and then your buddy, topiary, who lives in the most random place
  • 91. Virus (10:30:18 PM): don't start accusing me of [being an informant] - especially after you disappeared and came back offering to pay me for shit - that's fed tactics Virus (10:30:31 PM): and then your buddy, topiary, who lives in the most random place Virus (10:30:36 PM): who's docs weren't even public
  • 92. Virus (10:30:18 PM): don't start accusing me of [being an informant] - especially after you disappeared and came back offering to pay me for shit - that's fed tactics Virus (10:30:31 PM): and then your buddy, topiary, who lives in the most random place Virus (10:30:36 PM): who's docs weren't even public Virus (10:30:38 PM): gets owned
  • 93. Virus (10:30:18 PM): don't start accusing me of [being an informant] - especially after you disappeared and came back offering to pay me for shit - that's fed tactics Virus (10:30:31 PM): and then your buddy, topiary, who lives in the most random place Virus (10:30:36 PM): who's docs weren't even public Virus (10:30:38 PM): gets owned Sabu (10:32:29 PM): offering to pay you for shit?
  • 94. Virus (10:30:18 PM): don't start accusing me of [being an informant] - especially after you disappeared and came back offering to pay me for shit - that's fed tactics Virus (10:30:31 PM): and then your buddy, topiary, who lives in the most random place Virus (10:30:36 PM): who's docs weren't even public Virus (10:30:38 PM): gets owned Sabu (10:32:29 PM): offering to pay you for shit? Virus (10:32:55 PM): yeah, you offered me money for "dox"
  • 95. Virus (10:30:18 PM): don't start accusing me of [being an informant] - especially after you disappeared and came back offering to pay me for shit - that's fed tactics Virus (10:30:31 PM): and then your buddy, topiary, who lives in the most random place Virus (10:30:36 PM): who's docs weren't even public Virus (10:30:38 PM): gets owned Sabu (10:32:29 PM): offering to pay you for shit? Virus (10:32:55 PM): yeah, you offered me money for "dox" Virus (10:33:39 PM): only informants offer up cash for shit -- you gave yourself up with that one
  • 96. HAPPY ENDING Virus is still free
  • 97.
  • 98.
  • 100.
  • 101.
  • 103.
  • 104.
  • 105.
  • 109. You’ll know it worked if nothing happens.
  • 110. Put it in place first.
  • 111. Paranoia doesn’t work retroactively
  • 113. Spiros: He knows my name, but my name is not my name. And you... to them you're only "The Greek." The Greek: And, of course, I'm not even Greek.
  • 115.
  • 117.
  • 118. Personas • Danger to personas is contamination • Contact between personas (covers) contaminates both • Keep cover identities isolated from each other
  • 120. • Fail safe technological solution • TOR all the things! • Back stop persona • Primary cover alias as first identity • Secondary cover aliases (eg. handles)
  • 122. Pitfalls • Location revealing information • Weather • Time • Political events • Profiling data
  • 123. Practice • Amateurs practice until they get it right, professionals practice until they can’t get it wrong • Practice makes perfect
  • 124. Stringer: What you doing? Shamrock: Robert's Rules says we got to have minutes of the meeting. These the minutes. Stringer: Nigga, is you taking notes on a criminal fucking conspiracy?
  • 125. No logs. No crime.
  • 127. Personal info is profiling info
  • 128. Guidelines against profiling • Do not include personal informations in your nick and screen name. • Do not discuss personal informations in the chat, where you are from... • Do not mention your gender, tattoos, piercings or physical capacities.
  • 129. Guidelines, cont. • Do not mention your profession, hobbies or involvement in activist groups • Do not use special characters on your keyboard unique to your language • Do not post informations to the regular internet while you are anonymous in IRC. • Do not use Twitter and Facebook
  • 130. Guidelines, cont. • Do not post links to Facebook images. The image name contains a personal ID. • Do not keep regular hours / habits (this can reveal your timezone, geographic locale) • Do not discuss your environment, e.g. weather, political activities,
  • 131.
  • 132. Hackers are no longer the apex predator
  • 133. Hackers are no longer FREEDOM FIGHTERS the apex predator
  • 134. That position has been ceded to LEO
  • 135. That position has been ceded to LEO * *Law Enforcement Officials
  • 137. VPNs vs. TOR • VPNs provide privacy • TOR provides anonymity • Confuse the two at your peril
  • 138. • TOR connection to a VPN => OK • VPN connection to TOR => GOTO JAIL
  • 139. On VPNs • Only safe currency is Bitcoins • because they come from nothing • Purchase only over TOR • http://torrentfreak.com/which-vpn- providers-really-take-anonymity- seriously-111007/
  • 140.
  • 142.
  • 143. PORTAL
  • 145. PORTAL • Router ensuring all traffic is transparently sent over TOR • Reduce the ability to make mistakes • Use mobile uplink • Mobility (go to a coffee shop) • Reduce risk of wifi monitoring
  • 146. PORTAL • Uses tricks to get additional storage space on /
  • 147. Hardware • TP-LINK AR71xx personal routers • MR-11U • MR-3040 • MR-3020 • WR-703N
  • 148. MR-3040 & MR-11U • Battery powered • Approx. 4-5 hrs per charge • USB for 3G modem
  • 151. STFU
  • 153.
  • 154. If you think, don’t speak If you speak, don’t write If you write, don’t sign If you sign, don’t be surprised

Notes de l'éditeur

  1. \n
  2. \n
  3. STFU\nNeed to Know\nPlumbing\n
  4. The Wire, season 1, episode 5. This show is the most quotable show for OPSEC, evar!\n
  5. \n
  6. \n
  7. “Thwarting enemies at home and abroad” book. Blackmail is basically, don’t allow anyone to have power over you where they can dictate your actions. You ceed control of your actions to someone else, and it will end poorly for you.\n
  8. \n
  9. I love this guide. It provides general guidelines to committing criminal activities and staying out of jail. These are good OPSEC techniques for one activity (smoking weed), but many can be generalized to all criminal^W freedom fighting activities.\n
  10. \n
  11. \n
  12. \n
  13. NOTE: not using code doesn’t mean don’t use cryptonyms (code names). These are very good.\n
  14. NOTE: not using code doesn’t mean don’t use cryptonyms (code names). These are very good.\n
  15. NOTE: not using code doesn’t mean don’t use cryptonyms (code names). These are very good.\n
  16. NOTE: not using code doesn’t mean don’t use cryptonyms (code names). These are very good.\n
  17. \n
  18. \n
  19. \n
  20. \n
  21. #4 - don’t socialize with your criminal co-conspirators\n
  22. #4 - don’t socialize with your criminal co-conspirators\n
  23. #4 - don’t socialize with your criminal co-conspirators\n
  24. #4 - don’t socialize with your criminal co-conspirators\n
  25. #4 - don’t socialize with your criminal co-conspirators\n
  26. #4 - don’t socialize with your criminal co-conspirators\n
  27. #4 - don’t socialize with your criminal co-conspirators\n
  28. #10: control over your actions.\n
  29. #10: control over your actions.\n
  30. #10: control over your actions.\n
  31. #10: control over your actions.\n
  32. #10: control over your actions.\n
  33. #10: control over your actions.\n
  34. #10: control over your actions.\n
  35. \n
  36. \n
  37. \n
  38. \n
  39. \n
  40. \n
  41. \n
  42. \n
  43. \n
  44. \n
  45. \n
  46. \n
  47. \n
  48. \n
  49. \n
  50. This is a violation of the principle of “need to know”. Your lawyer needs to know that you are on probation (for a specific charge). Your criminal co-conspirators do not need to know this!\n
  51. note: example of good opsec, the feds dont’ name the other guy, ‘co-conspirator not named ... herein’. Only people who know who this is are: donncha, the hacker^Wfreedom fighter, and the feds pursuing the case\n
  52. note: example of good opsec, the feds dont’ name the other guy, ‘co-conspirator not named ... herein’. Only people who know who this is are: donncha, the hacker^Wfreedom fighter, and the feds pursuing the case\n
  53. note: example of good opsec, the feds dont’ name the other guy, ‘co-conspirator not named ... herein’. Only people who know who this is are: donncha, the hacker^Wfreedom fighter, and the feds pursuing the case\n
  54. note: example of good opsec, the feds dont’ name the other guy, ‘co-conspirator not named ... herein’. Only people who know who this is are: donncha, the hacker^Wfreedom fighter, and the feds pursuing the case\n
  55. note: example of good opsec, the feds dont’ name the other guy, ‘co-conspirator not named ... herein’. Only people who know who this is are: donncha, the hacker^Wfreedom fighter, and the feds pursuing the case\n
  56. note: example of good opsec, the feds dont’ name the other guy, ‘co-conspirator not named ... herein’. Only people who know who this is are: donncha, the hacker^Wfreedom fighter, and the feds pursuing the case\n
  57. note: example of good opsec, the feds dont’ name the other guy, ‘co-conspirator not named ... herein’. Only people who know who this is are: donncha, the hacker^Wfreedom fighter, and the feds pursuing the case\n
  58. note: example of good opsec, the feds dont’ name the other guy, ‘co-conspirator not named ... herein’. Only people who know who this is are: donncha, the hacker^Wfreedom fighter, and the feds pursuing the case\n
  59. note: example of good opsec, the feds dont’ name the other guy, ‘co-conspirator not named ... herein’. Only people who know who this is are: donncha, the hacker^Wfreedom fighter, and the feds pursuing the case\n
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  79. Keep your hacking^W freedom fighting, and family, completely separated\n
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  87. directly connecting to the target from your home IP? Are you out of your fucking mind!\n
  88. directly connecting to the target from your home IP? Are you out of your fucking mind!\n
  89. directly connecting to the target from your home IP? Are you out of your fucking mind!\n
  90. directly connecting to the target from your home IP? Are you out of your fucking mind!\n
  91. directly connecting to the target from your home IP? Are you out of your fucking mind!\n
  92. directly connecting to the target from your home IP? Are you out of your fucking mind!\n
  93. colloquially, don’t shit where you eat.\n
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  141. They call them warning signs for a reason...\n
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  162. They call them warning signs for a reason...\n
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  172. self incriminating confession == bad\n
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  174. Interrogation tactic: appeal to pride, ridicule the hacker’s abilities, encouraging him to “correct” your misperception of him... and in the process, confess. DO NOT TALK TO POLICE!\n
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  184. credit: ben nagy found this pic, i stole it from him cause my conference talk is first, :D\n
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  186. NOTE: he’s wearing a mask. \ncredit: ben nagy also found this photo. \n
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  221. use tor\n
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