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Collusion-Resistant
Mechanisms with Verification
Yielding Optimal Solutions
    Carmine Ventre (University of Liverpool)

    Joint work with:
    Paolo Penna (University of Salerno)
Routing in Networks
                            s
                                    Change over time    No Input
                                    (link load)         Knowledge
                   3
                       10
       1                        1
               2
                                      Selfishness      Private Cost
                                2
           1
                            3
               7

                       7
       4
                            1




Internet
Mechanisms: Dealing w/ Selfishness
                        s
                                    Augment an algorithm
                                
               3
                                    with a payment function
                   10
   1                        1
                                    The payment function
                                
           2
                                    should incentive in
                            2
                                    telling the truth
       1
                        3
           7
                                    Design a truthful
                                
                                    mechanism
                   7
   4
                        1
Truthful Mechanisms
                 s




                                                M = (A, P)



                                                – cost =          – true
                            Utility = Payment

M truthful if:
                     , .... ,   ) ≥ Utility (bid,
Utility (true,                                         , .... ,     )
for all true, bid,      and       , ...,
Optimization & Truthful Mechanisms
    Objectives in contrast

        Many lower bounds (even for two players and
    
        exponential running time mechanisms)
            Variants of the SPT [Gualà&Proietti, 06]
        

            Minimizing weighted sum scheduling [Archer&Tardos,
        
            01]
            Scheduling Unrelated Machines [Nisan&Ronen, 99],
        
            [Christodoulou & Koutsoupias & Vidali 07], …
            Workload minimization in interdomain routing [Mu’alem
        
            & Schapira, 07], [Gamzu, 07]
        & a brand new computational lower bound
    

            CPPP [Papadimitriou &Schapira & Singer, 08]
        

    Study of optimal truthful mechanisms

Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms
                                                       CRMs are
                                                   
                                                       “impossible” to
                                                       achieve
       Coalition C
                                                           Posted price
                                                       

                                                           [Goldberg &
                                                           Hartline, 05]
                                                           Fixed output
                                                       

                                                           [Schummer, 02]
                                                               Unbounded apx
                                                           
                                                               ratios
∑ Utility (true, true,     , .... ,     ) ≥ ∑ Utility (bid, bid,       , .... ,   )
 +
in C                                        in C


for all true, bid, C and       , ...,
 –
Describing Real World: Collusions




    “Accused of bribery”

        1,030,000 results on Google
    

        1,635 results on Google news
    

    Can we design CRMs using real-world information?

Describing Real World: Verification
                                             TCP datagram starts at time
                                         
                                             t
                                                 Expected delivery is time t +
                                             

                                                 1…
                                                 … but true delivery time is t
                                             
     TCP
                     1
                     3                           +3
                                             It is possible to partially
                                         
                                             verify declarations by
                                             observing delivery time
                                             Other examples:
                                         

                                                 Distance
                                             

                                                 Amount of traffic
                                             

                                                 Routes availability
                                             


IDEA ([Nisan & Ronen, 99]): No payment for agents caught by verification
Verification Setting

     Give the payment if the results are given “in

     time”
         Agent      is selected when reporting bid
    

         true bid       just wait and get the payment
    1.

         true > bid     no payment (punish agent )
    2.
CRMs w/verification for single-
parameter bounded domains
    Agents aka as “binary” (in/out outcomes)

        e.g.,       controls edges
    

    Sufficient Properties

        Pay all agents(!!!)
    
                      s
        Algorithm 32-resistant
                    true
Truthfulness          Pe’ = 0
                      10
                                                   true
                                           e
                1         1
• e’ has no way to enter the                   11+Pe
                                                 2
                    2
solution by unilaterally lying
                          2
                                                   true
                  1
• In coalition they 7can make the              10+Pe
                                                10
                        3

                                                          e’
cut really expensive  7
                4
                     true 1
                    Pe – 2
UtilityC(true)=
UtilityC(bid)=Pbid – 10 ≥ 10 + Pe – 10 > UtilityC(true)
                                true
               e’
Truthful Mechanisms w/ Verification:
the threshold
                             (A,P) truthful with verification
 A(bid,        )

                                 bid <                  in
                             
                                           ths

          in                     bid >                  out
                             
                                           ths




          out
                                     bid
                      ths

[Auletta&De Prisco&Penna&Persiano,04]
2-resistant Algorithms
b=(bid, bid, , .... , )
t=(true, true, , .... , )
bid ≥ true(Verification doesn’t work)
                            b’ = b- =(bid ,          , .... ,    )
                            t’ = t- =(true ,          , .... ,       )


     b’        t’
           ≥
     ths       ths       in



                         out
                                     t’        b’
                                     ths       ths
Exploiting Verification: CRMs
 w/verification
                                b’
                        h-            if     out
                                ths
   Payment (b) =
                        h             if     in

                                       (A,Payment) is a CRM
Thm. Algorithm A 2-resistant
                                       w/ verification

Proof Idea.
  At least one agent is caught by verification
            Usage of the constant h for bounded domains
                        any number between bidmin & bidmax
b’

Proof (continued)                                         h-          if   out
                                                                ths
                                         Payment (b) =
                                                          h           if   in

                                                Each      is not worse
No agent is caught by verification
                                                by truthtelling
      t           b
      in          in
     out          in
                                          in
     out          out
      in          out
                                          out
                                                         t’                 b’
                                                true           true
                                                         ths                ths


  Utility (t) = h - true = Utility (b)

  Utility (t) = h - true ≥ h --trueb’ = Utility (b)
                       t’
                       t’         b’
                           ≥h     thsths
                       ths
                       ths
Simplifying Resistance Condition
b=(bid, bid, , .... , )          b=(bid ,   , .... , )
t=(true, true, , .... , )
                                 t=(true ,  , .... , )
bid ≥ true(Verification doesn’t work)≥ true
                                 bid
b’ = b-                   b’ = b- =(bid , , .... , )
t’ = t-                   t’ = t- =(true ,   , .... , )
                    in

                                          Optimal
     b’        t’
                                          CRMs
           ≥   thsout
     ths                 in
                          t’      b’
                            ths   ths



Thm. Optimal threshold-monotone algorithms with
                          out
fixed tie breaking are n-resistant t’  b’
                                   ths ths
Applications

    Optimal CRMs for:

        MST
    

        k-items auctions
    

        Cheaper payments wrt [Penna&V,08]
    

    Optimal truthful mechanisms for

    multidimensional agents bidding from
    bounded domains and non-decreasing cost
    functions of the form
                 Cost(bid , ..., bid )
Multidimensional Agents
Outcomes = {X1, ..., Xm}
                                       View bid as a virtual coalition C
bid =(bid(X1), .... ,bid(Xm))
                                       of m single-parameter agents
b=(bid , ..., bid )

  B(b) optimal algorithm with              A(bid ) m single-player
  fixed tie breaking rule                  functions

                       P (b) = ∑ payment (bid )
                                in C


   Lemma. If every A is m-resistant then (B,P) is truthful

   Thm. For non-decreasing cost
                                            Every A is           (B,P) is
   function of the form
                                            m-resistant          truthful
          Cost(bid , ..., bid )
   every A is threshold-monotone
Conclusions

    Optimal CRMs with verification for single-

    parameter bounded domains
    Optimal truthful mechanisms for

    multidimensional bounded domains
        Construction tight (removing any of the hypothesis we
    
        get an impossibility result)
    Overcome many impossibility results by using a

    real-world hypothesis (verification)
    For finite domains: Mechanisms polytime if

    algorithm is
    Can we deal with unbounded domains?


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Crm Esa08 1234869680124198 3

  • 1. Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions Carmine Ventre (University of Liverpool) Joint work with: Paolo Penna (University of Salerno)
  • 2. Routing in Networks s Change over time No Input (link load) Knowledge 3 10 1 1 2 Selfishness Private Cost 2 1 3 7 7 4 1 Internet
  • 3. Mechanisms: Dealing w/ Selfishness s Augment an algorithm  3 with a payment function 10 1 1 The payment function  2 should incentive in 2 telling the truth 1 3 7 Design a truthful  mechanism 7 4 1
  • 4. Truthful Mechanisms s M = (A, P) – cost = – true Utility = Payment M truthful if: , .... , ) ≥ Utility (bid, Utility (true, , .... , ) for all true, bid, and , ...,
  • 5. Optimization & Truthful Mechanisms Objectives in contrast  Many lower bounds (even for two players and  exponential running time mechanisms) Variants of the SPT [Gualà&Proietti, 06]  Minimizing weighted sum scheduling [Archer&Tardos,  01] Scheduling Unrelated Machines [Nisan&Ronen, 99],  [Christodoulou & Koutsoupias & Vidali 07], … Workload minimization in interdomain routing [Mu’alem  & Schapira, 07], [Gamzu, 07] & a brand new computational lower bound  CPPP [Papadimitriou &Schapira & Singer, 08]  Study of optimal truthful mechanisms 
  • 6. Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms CRMs are  “impossible” to achieve Coalition C Posted price  [Goldberg & Hartline, 05] Fixed output  [Schummer, 02] Unbounded apx  ratios ∑ Utility (true, true, , .... , ) ≥ ∑ Utility (bid, bid, , .... , ) + in C in C for all true, bid, C and , ..., –
  • 7. Describing Real World: Collusions “Accused of bribery”  1,030,000 results on Google  1,635 results on Google news  Can we design CRMs using real-world information? 
  • 8. Describing Real World: Verification TCP datagram starts at time  t Expected delivery is time t +  1… … but true delivery time is t  TCP 1 3 +3 It is possible to partially  verify declarations by observing delivery time Other examples:  Distance  Amount of traffic  Routes availability  IDEA ([Nisan & Ronen, 99]): No payment for agents caught by verification
  • 9. Verification Setting Give the payment if the results are given “in  time” Agent is selected when reporting bid  true bid just wait and get the payment 1. true > bid no payment (punish agent ) 2.
  • 10. CRMs w/verification for single- parameter bounded domains Agents aka as “binary” (in/out outcomes)  e.g., controls edges  Sufficient Properties  Pay all agents(!!!)  s Algorithm 32-resistant  true Truthfulness Pe’ = 0 10 true e 1 1 • e’ has no way to enter the 11+Pe 2 2 solution by unilaterally lying 2 true 1 • In coalition they 7can make the 10+Pe 10 3 e’ cut really expensive 7 4 true 1 Pe – 2 UtilityC(true)= UtilityC(bid)=Pbid – 10 ≥ 10 + Pe – 10 > UtilityC(true) true e’
  • 11. Truthful Mechanisms w/ Verification: the threshold (A,P) truthful with verification A(bid, ) bid < in  ths in bid > out  ths out bid ths [Auletta&De Prisco&Penna&Persiano,04]
  • 12. 2-resistant Algorithms b=(bid, bid, , .... , ) t=(true, true, , .... , ) bid ≥ true(Verification doesn’t work) b’ = b- =(bid , , .... , ) t’ = t- =(true , , .... , ) b’ t’ ≥ ths ths in out t’ b’ ths ths
  • 13. Exploiting Verification: CRMs w/verification b’ h- if out ths Payment (b) = h if in (A,Payment) is a CRM Thm. Algorithm A 2-resistant w/ verification Proof Idea. At least one agent is caught by verification Usage of the constant h for bounded domains any number between bidmin & bidmax
  • 14. b’ Proof (continued) h- if out ths Payment (b) = h if in Each is not worse No agent is caught by verification by truthtelling t b in in out in in out out in out out t’ b’ true true ths ths Utility (t) = h - true = Utility (b) Utility (t) = h - true ≥ h --trueb’ = Utility (b) t’ t’ b’ ≥h thsths ths ths
  • 15. Simplifying Resistance Condition b=(bid, bid, , .... , ) b=(bid , , .... , ) t=(true, true, , .... , ) t=(true , , .... , ) bid ≥ true(Verification doesn’t work)≥ true bid b’ = b- b’ = b- =(bid , , .... , ) t’ = t- t’ = t- =(true , , .... , ) in Optimal b’ t’ CRMs ≥ thsout ths in t’ b’ ths ths Thm. Optimal threshold-monotone algorithms with out fixed tie breaking are n-resistant t’ b’ ths ths
  • 16. Applications Optimal CRMs for:  MST  k-items auctions  Cheaper payments wrt [Penna&V,08]  Optimal truthful mechanisms for  multidimensional agents bidding from bounded domains and non-decreasing cost functions of the form Cost(bid , ..., bid )
  • 17. Multidimensional Agents Outcomes = {X1, ..., Xm} View bid as a virtual coalition C bid =(bid(X1), .... ,bid(Xm)) of m single-parameter agents b=(bid , ..., bid ) B(b) optimal algorithm with A(bid ) m single-player fixed tie breaking rule functions P (b) = ∑ payment (bid ) in C Lemma. If every A is m-resistant then (B,P) is truthful Thm. For non-decreasing cost Every A is (B,P) is function of the form m-resistant truthful Cost(bid , ..., bid ) every A is threshold-monotone
  • 18. Conclusions Optimal CRMs with verification for single-  parameter bounded domains Optimal truthful mechanisms for  multidimensional bounded domains Construction tight (removing any of the hypothesis we  get an impossibility result) Overcome many impossibility results by using a  real-world hypothesis (verification) For finite domains: Mechanisms polytime if  algorithm is Can we deal with unbounded domains? 