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Distributed Operations, Command, and Intelligence: A Brief Historical Perspective   Intelligence Support to Distributed Operations Workshop Col Eric M. Walters, USMC Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Marine Forces Command Commercial: (757) 836-1600  [email_address]
Purpose ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],?
This presentation is  UNCLASSIFIED Please do not discuss classified information
Non-Attribution Statement/Caveat ,[object Object],[object Object]
Agenda ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
What Drove DO in History? ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
DO Entails Decentralization & Infiltration ,[object Object],[object Object]
Past DO Historical Trends ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Reconnaissance Pull: What It is…What It Isn’t ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],William S. Lind,  Maneuver Warfare Handbook  (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985); Robert A. Doughty,  The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of  France, 1940  (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1990)
DO Historical Antecedents (I) ,[object Object],[object Object],Bruce I. Gudmundsson,  Stormtroop Tactics  (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers,  1989); Timothy T. Lupfer,  The Dynamics of Doctrine  (Fort Leavenworth,  KS, 1981). INFILTRATION
DO Historical Antecedents (II) ,[object Object],[object Object],Allen F Chew,  The White Death: The Epic of the Soviet-Finnish War   (Quantico, VA: FMFRP 12-78, 1989. INFILTRATION
DO Historical Antecedents (III) ,[object Object],[object Object],Shelford Bidwell,  The Chindit War: Stilwell, Wingate, and the Campaigns  In Burma, 1944  (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Ltd., 1979) INFILTRATION
DO Historical Antecedents (IV) ,[object Object],[object Object],Maj Bruce H Norton,  Stingray  (New York: Ballantine Books, 2000) INFILTRATION
DO Historical Antecedents (V) ,[object Object],[object Object],Michael E. Peterson,  The Combined Action Platoons  (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1989) Al Hemingway,  Our War Was Different  (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994) INFILTRATION
DO Historical Antecedents (VI) ,[object Object],[object Object],Christopher Bellamy,  The Future of Land Warfare  (New York: St.  Martin’s Press,   1987) INFILTRATION
Historical DO Theory (I):  Complementary Force Dilemma ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],John A. English & Bruce I. Gudmundsson,  On Infantry (Rev Ed)  (Westport,  CT:  Praeger, 1994); Stephen Biddle,  Military Power,  (Princeton, NJ: 2004)
Historical DO Practice (I):  Complementary Force Dilemma ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Stephen Biddle,  Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in  Modern Battle  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004)
Historical DO Theory (II):  Operational Leverage Relationship ,[object Object],[object Object],Richard Simpkin,  Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century  Warfare  (London: Brassey’s Defence Publishing Co., Ltd., 1985) Maneuver force The “Lever Arm” Maneuver force
Historical DO Practice (II):  Operational Leverage Relationship ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Historical DO Theory (III):  Troop to Task to Space Ratios ,[object Object],[object Object],Stephen Biddle,  Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern  Battle  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004)
Historical DO Practice (III):  Troop to Task to Space Ratios ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Historical DO Theory (IV):  Dispersion = Protection ,[object Object],[object Object],Trevor N. Dupuy,  Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War  (Falls Church, VA: NOVA Publications, 1995); Stephen Biddle,  Military Power  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); Robert Leonhard,  Principles of War of the Information Age  (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 2000)
Historical DO Practice (IV):  Dispersion = Protection ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Robert Leonhard,  Fighting By Minutes:Time and the Art of War  (Novato, CA: 1991) Richard Simpkin,  Race to the Swift  (London: Brassey’s Defence  Publishing, 1985) MOVE PROTECT STRIKE
Recent Trends Enhancing DO:  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Recent Trends Inhibiting DO:  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Historical DO Countermeasures (I) ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Brian Steed,  Armed Conflict: The Lessons of Modern Warfare  (New  York: Ballantine Books, 2002
Historical DO Countermeasures (II) ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Brian Steed,  Armed Conflict: The Lessons of Modern Warfare  (New York: Ballantine Books, 2002; Robert Leonhard,  The Art of Maneuver   (New York: Ballantine Books, 1991)
Historical DO Countermeasures (II) ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Brian Steed,  Armed Conflict: The Lessons of Modern Warfare  (New York: Ballantine Books, 2002
Conceptual Conflicts and Dangers ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Robert Bateman,  Digital War: A View From the Front Lines  (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1999).
DO Command and Control: Historical Patterns ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Historical DO Intelligence Patterns (I) ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Historical DO Intelligence Patterns (II) ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Implications ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Robert A. Doughty,  The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French  Army Doctrine, 1919-1939  (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1985)
Implications ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Robert A. Doughty,  The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of  France, 1940  (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1990)
Implications ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
QUESTIONS??
This presentation was  UNCLASSIFIED

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Distributed Operations

  • 1. Distributed Operations, Command, and Intelligence: A Brief Historical Perspective Intelligence Support to Distributed Operations Workshop Col Eric M. Walters, USMC Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Marine Forces Command Commercial: (757) 836-1600 [email_address]
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  • 37. This presentation was UNCLASSIFIED

Notes de l'éditeur

  1. Is Distributed Operations a new idea? Actually, the concept has historical roots well before the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab began experimenting with infestation/investation tactics in the late 1990s. What can we learn from those historical roots? What are the lessons learned? Good________, I am Colonel Eric Walters, the G2 of Marine Forces Command, and I’ll provide you with a brief overview of the historical perspective on Distributed Operations, or DO.