1. Dynamic Planning for COIN in Afghanistan

2. Potential
Fractiousness
of Society
Support for Neutral Support for HN
Insurgency Populace Government
COIN operations must accomplish three tasks
simultaneously:
• Influence insurgent-minded individuals to adopt a neutral
disposition.
• Influence neutral-minded individuals to adopt a
supportive disposition.
• Retain supportive individuals.
These operations are conducted in an environment where
tensions and hostilities between groups may destabilize a
society and provide opportunities for insurgents
• This environment may suggest courses of action aimed
at reinforcing or widening seams

3. • An increase in Coalition funding will influence Coalition
economic investment and development. Funding
• A strengthened economy will influence movement
from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups Economic
toward the supportive group. Investment
Potential
Fractiousness Economic
of Society Development
Support for Neutral Support for HN
Insurgency Populace Government

4. Coalition
Satisfaction with Funding
Breakdown of Essential Services
Developing and Essential Services
Restoring Essential
Services Economic
Expectations for
Essential Essential Services Investment
Services
Time to Develop
Essential Services Potential
Fractiousness Economic
of Society Development
Support for Neutral Support for HN
Insurgency Populace Government
• An increase in Coalition funding will significantly
impact the restoration of essential services.
• Improvements in the provision of essential services
will influence movement from the insurgent- and
neutral-minded groups toward the supportive
group.

5. Coalition
Satisfaction with Funding
Breakdown of Essential Services Time to Develop
Developing and Essential Services Governance
Restoring Essential
Services Economic
Expectations for
Essential Essential Services Investment
Services Governance
Time to Develop
Essential Services Potential
Psychological
Operations Fractiousness Economic
Effectiveness of Society Development
Support for Neutral Support for HN
Insurgency Populace Government
Available
Perceived Workforce
Security
External Material
A government that is established, Support
recognized, and that maintains a secure Insurgent Acts
environment is in a position to of Violence
• Send a positive, credible message of
success to the populace.
• Provide an environment that enhances
stable employment of the workforce.
• Persuade insurgents and neutrals to
consider becoming supporters.

6. Coalition
An appropriate force mix, and correct operational
Satisfaction with Funding
Breakdown of Essential Services Time to Develop
tempo, timing, and synchronization will have very
Governance
Developing and Essential Services
Restoring Essential significant impacts on
Services
Expectations for restoration of essential services. Economic
• The
Essential Essential Services Investment
Services Governance
• The populace’s perception of security.
Time to Develop
Essential Services
Psychological Potential Government’s and COIN forces’ credibility in
• The
their communications efforts with the populace.
Fractiousness Economic
Operations
Effectiveness of Society Development
Impact of Support for Neutral Support for HN
Illegitimate Actions Insurgency Populace Government
Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force Available
Perceived Workforce
Security Information
Individual Competence, External Material
Judgment, and Ability Support
to Execute Time to Develop HN
Insurgent Acts Security Forces
Appropriate
Strategic Emphasis of Violence
Total Force Host Nation
Insurgent to Force Density Security Forces
Density Ratio Understanding and
Knowledge of Social
Structures
Coalition Force Host Nation
Density Force Density

7. Coalition
Satisfaction with Funding
Breakdown of Essential Services Time to Develop
Developing and Essential Services Governance
Restoring Essential
Services Economic
Expectations for
Essential Essential Services Investment
Services Governance
Time to Develop
Essential Services Potential
Psychological
Operations Fractiousness Economic
of Society
Effectiveness Development
Impact of Support for Neutral Support for HN
Illegitimate Actions Insurgency Populace Government
Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force Available
Perceived Workforce
Security Information
Individual Competence, External Material
Judgment, and Ability Support
to Execute Time to Develop HN
Insurgent Acts Security Forces
Appropriate
Strategic Emphasis of Violence
Total Force Host Nation
Insurgent to Force Density Security Forces
Density Ratio Understanding and
Knowledge of Social
Structures
Coalition Force Host Nation
Density Force Density
The Logical Lines of Operations from FM 3-24

8. Coalition
Satisfaction with Funding
Breakdown of Essential Services Time to Develop
Developing and Essential Services Governance
Restoring Essential
Services Economic
Expectations for
Essential Essential Services Investment
Services Governance
Time to Develop
Essential Services Potential
Psychological
Operations Fractiousness Economic
Effectiveness of Society Development
Impact of Support for Neutral Support for HN
Illegitimate Actions Insurgency Populace Government
Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force Available
Perceived Workforce
Security Information
Individual Competence, External Material
Judgment, and Ability Support
to Execute Time to Develop HN
Insurgent Acts Security Forces
Appropriate
Strategic Emphasis of Violence
Total Force Host Nation
Insurgent to Force Density Security Forces
Density Ratio Understanding and
Knowledge of Social
Structures
Coalition Force Host Nation
Density Force Density
The Basic Information Ops Loop

9. Popular Support – Sympathizers and Active Supporters
Relative
Popular
Support/
/Tolerance
Govt vs
Insurgents
Population Population Neutral/On Population Population
Actively Sympathizing the Fence Sympathizing Actively
Supporting w/ Gov’t w/ Insurgents Supporting
Gov’t & SF Insurgency
POPULAR Potential
Attractiveness
of Govt vs.
SUPPORT Insurgent Path
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 9

10. Population Conditions, Beliefs, & Structures
Perceived Damages/Use
of Force by Insurgents
Perceived Damages/Use Perception of Insurgent
of Force by Gov’t and CF Strength and Intent
Fear of Ins.
Attack,
Relative WOM Message
Repercussions
Amplification Gov’t vs Ins
Perception of Coalition
Intent & Commitment
Perception of Gov’t
Strength of Strength and Intent
Religious Ability to
Ideology & Tribal Reconcile Satisfaction w/ Gains
Structures Religious in Security, Services &
Ideology, Employment
Cultural Erosion/ Tribal
Displacement Structures w/ Visible Gains
Expectations
Gov’t Path In Security,
for Security,
Services & Services &
Employment Employment
Perceived
Ethnic/Tribal Average
Security
Rivalry Connectedness
of Population
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 10

11. Population Conditions, Beliefs, & Structures
Perceived
Damages &
Use of Force
by Ins.
Perceived Relative
Damages/Use Popular
of Force by Support/
Gov t & Coalition Perception of /Tolerance
Insurgent Govt vs
Insurgents
Strength &
Intent
POPULATION
Population
CONDITIONS Actively
Supporting
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Gov’t
Neutral/On
the Fence
Population
Sympathizing
w/ Insurgents
Population
Actively
Supporting
Gov’ t & SF
& BELIEFS
Relative WOM
Message
Fear of Ins.
Attack/
Insurgency
Amplification Repercussions
Gov’t vs Ins
POPULAR
POPULAR Potential
Attractiveness
of Gov t vs.
Perception of
Coalition Intent
SUPPORT Insurgent Path
& Commitment Perception
Of Govt
Strength
Strength of & Intent
Religious
Ideology &
Tribal Satisfaction
Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to w/ Gains in
Displacement Reconcile Security, Services
Religious & Employment Visible Gains
Ideology, In Security,
Ethnic/Tribal Tribal Services &
Rivalry Structures Employment
w/ Gov’t Expectations
Path for Security,
Average Services, &
Connectedness Employment
Perceived
of Population Security
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 11

12. Insurgent Capacity, Outside Support/ Enablement of Insurgents, Narcotics
Outside
Fear of Gov’t / Support /
ANSF / Coalition Enablement Insurgent
Insurgent Repercussions Havens / of Ins. Terrain
Damages & Ability to
1 Advantage
Casualties Operate
Insurgent Coordination Insurgent
Offensives & Among Ins Leadership Insurgent
Territory Not Presence Factions Training, Skill Recruiting,
Under Gov’t (Clear & Hold) & Exper Retention, Criminal/
Control 2 Manpower, Trafficking
Ins Strategic
Ins Provision Insurgent & ISR Capability &
Comm/IO & Ties to
of Gov’t & Capacity, Coercion
Affiliation w/ Narcotics
Services Priorities &
Population & Other Funding &
Effectiveness Material
Ins Targeted Criminal
Attacks on Funding Support to Likelihood
Insurgents Narcotics &
Progress/ of Crime/
Criminal
Support for Gov’t Violence/
Activity Levels
Ins Support
for Payment
Illegit Agric
Production
Trade &
Feedback Loop Examples: Employment
1. Insurgent expansion: Insurgent factions with havens as base can expand their
presence and influence, further increasing their operating base territory.
(Permissive population contribution to Havens / Ability to Operate input from
separate sector).
2. Alignment of criminal and insurgent interests: Weakly governed / policed Terrain
territory may support insurgents, terrorists and criminals alike. Often interests Harshness
align and lines blur with criminal activity and funding contributing to insurgent & Breadth
operations and expansion, further increasing the weakly governed terrority and
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 12

13. Insurgent Capacity, Outside Support/ Enablement of Insurgents, Narcotics
OUTSIDE SUPPORT
TO INSURGENT
Ins. Damages
& Casualties
Fear of FACTIONS
Gov’ t/ANSF/
Coalition
Repercussions
Outside
Havens / Ability to Support/
Operate Enablement
of Ins.
Ins. Coordination
Offensives & Among Ins. Insurgent
Territory Not Presence Factions Ins. Terrain
Under Gov’t (Clear & Hold) Insurgent Advantage
Control (Afghan Leadership, Recruiting,
& Pakistan) Training, Skill Retention,
& Experience Manpower Criminal/
Ins. Provision & ISR Trafficking
Of Gov’t &
Services
Insurgent
Capacity,
INSURGENTS
Ties to
Capability &
Coercion
Perceived Priorities &
Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness Narcotics &
Commun /IO Use of Force Other Criminal
Ins. Targeted
& Affiliation w/
Population
by Ins. Attacks on
Progress/
Funding Funding &
Material
Support to
NARCOTICS
Perceived Support Relative Insurgents Likelihood of
Damages/Use for Gov’t Popular Crime/Violence
of Force by Support/ /Ins. Support
Gov t & Coalition Perception of /Tolerance for Payment
Insurgent Govt vs Narcotics
Insurgents & Criminal
Strength &
Intent Activity
POPULATION
POPULATION Population Population
Levels
Population Neutral/On Population
CONDITIONS
CONDITIONS
Actively
Supporting
Gov’ t & SF
Sympathizing
w/ Gov’t
the Fence Sympathizing
w/ Insurgents
Actively
Supporting
Insurgency IllegitAgric
Relative WOM Fear of Ins. Production,
& BELIEFS
& BELIEFS
Message
Amplification
Attack/
Repercussions
Trade &
Employment
Gov’t vs Ins
POPULAR
POPULAR Potential
Attractiveness
of Gov t vs.
Terrain
Harshness
Perception of
Coalition Intent
SUPPORT
SUPPORT
Insurgent Path & Breadth
& Commitment Perception
Of Gov t
Strength
Strength of & Intent
Religious
Ideology &
Tribal Satisfaction
Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to w/ Gains in
Displacement Reconcile Security, Services
Religious & Employment Visible Gains
Ideology, In Security,
Ethnic/Tribal Tribal Services &
Rivalry Structures Employment
w/ Gov’t Expectations
Path for Security,
Average Services, &
Connectedness Employment
of Population Perceived
Security
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 13

14. Infrastructure, Services, & Economy
Feedback Loop Examples:
1. Agricultural production and markets: Investment and spending
enables agricultural production. Production can boost economic
activity and trade which feeds back into private sector re-investment.
(Public policy and investment in infrastructure, workforce, financial
markets, etc helps start / maintain private sector momentum.)
2. Making legit agriculture more attractive: Improved legit agricultural
opportunities may make illegit agricultural options less attractive which
further increases legit agricultural production, trade, and markets.
(Other inputs to decisions related to legit vs illegit from other sectors.)
Legit Agric
Production Fraction of
Workforce
and Agric.
2 Legit vs Illegit
Private Sector
Workforce Population
Skill & Avail Basic Needs
Service Levels
& Employment
Infrastructure Civilian
Legit vs Illegit
Dev. Adequacy Legit Other Services
Relative
& Sustainment Production (SWET,
Economic
& Services Healthcare,
Opportunity
Non-Agric Education)
1
Ability to Move Private Sector
Infr. Services, Econ, Legit Economic
People & Capital Mgmt,
Policy & Execution/ Activity, Trade &
Goods Rapidly Investment &
Perceived Fairness Employment
Spending
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 14

15. Infrastructure, Services, & Economy
OUTSIDE SUPPORT
TO INSURGENT
TO INSURGENT
Ins. Damages
& Casualties
Fear of
Gov’ t/ANSF/
FACTIONS
FACTIONS
Coalition
Repercussions
Outside
Havens / Ability to Support/
Operate Enablement
of Ins.
Ins. Coordination
Offensives & Among Ins. Insurgent
Territory Not Presence Factions Ins. Terrain
Under Gov’t (Clear & Hold) Insurgent Advantage
Control (Afghan Leadership, Recruiting,
& Pakistan) Training, Skill Retention,
& Experience Manpower Criminal/
Ins. Provision & ISR Trafficking
Of Gov’t &
Services
Insurgent
Capacity,
INSURGENTS
Ties to
Capability &
Coercion
Perceived Priorities &
Ins. Strategic Damages & Effectiveness Narcotics &
Commun/IO Use of Force Other Criminal
Ins. Targeted
& Affiliation w/
Population
by Ins. Attacks on
Progress/
Funding Funding &
Material
Support to
NARCOTICS
Perceived Support Relative Insurgents Likelihood of
Damages/Use for Gov’t Popular Crime/Violence
of Force by Support/ /Ins. Support
Gov t & Coalition Perception of /Tolerance for Payment
Insurgent Govt vs Narcotics
Insurgents & Criminal
Strength &
Intent Activity
POPULATION
POPULATION Population Population
Levels
Population Neutral/On Population
CONDITIONS
CONDITIONS
Actively
Supporting
Gov’ t & SF
Sympathizing
w/ Gov’t
the Fence Sympathizing
w/ Insurgents
Actively
Supporting
Insurgency Illegit Agric
Relative WOM Fear of Ins. Production,
& BELIEFS
& BELIEFS Message
Amplification
Attack/
Repercussions
Trade &
Employment
Gov’t vs Ins
POPULAR
POPULAR Potential
Attractiveness
of Gov t vs.
Terrain
Harshness
Perception of
Coalition Intent
SUPPORT
SUPPORT
Insurgent Path & Breadth
& Commitment Perception Fraction of
Of Gov t Workforce
Strength And Agric.
Strength of & Intent Legit vs
Religious Legit Agric Illegit
Ideology &
Tribal Private Sector Production
Satisfaction Workforce
Structures Cultural Erosion/ Ability to w/ Gains in Infrastructure
Displacement Reconcile Skill & Avail
Security, Services Dev. Adequacy Population
Religious & Employment Visible Gains & Sustainment
Ideology, Basic Needs
In Security, Service Levels
Ethnic/Tribal Tribal Services &
Rivalry Structures & Employment
Employment
w/ Gov’t Expectations Legit vs.Illegit
Path Legit Other Civilian
for Security, Production Services Relative
Average Services, & & Services (SWET, Economic
Connectedness Employment Non- Agric Healthcare, Opportunity
of Population Perceived
Security Education)
INFRASTRUCTURE,
Ability to
Move
People
Private Sector Legit Economic
Infr, Services, Econ.
Policy & Execution
SERVICES & Rapidly
Capital Mgmt.,
& Goods Investment &
Spending
Activity,
Trade &
Employment
/Perceived Fairness
ECONOMY
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 15

16. Governance – Central Government Development & Capacity; Engagement /
Empowerment of Tribal Governance; Overall Governance Capacity & Impacts
Gov’t Security
Policy Quality Relative
& Investment Message
Central Gov’t
Institutional Quality
& Execution Gov’t vs Ins
Capacity
Gov’t Gov’t / ANSF
Funding Gov’t Training, Gov’t
Integration of StratCom/IO
Adequacy Mentoring, Gov’t Relative
Vetting, and Workforce Local Tribal Message ’
Hiring Skill & Avail Structures Impact
Gov’t vs Ins
Transparency of Gov’t
Professionalism, ’
Gov’t Processes
& Investments Policy Quality &
Fairness
Overall Gov’t
Reach,
Execution,
Gov’t/Contractor Recognition/
Capacity &
Corruption & Engagement to
Investment
Tribal Favoritism Integrate Tribal
Structures &
Tax Beliefs
Revenues
Feedback Loop Example:
Informal learning and mentoring: Formal training and vetting (enabled by institutional capacity) can
improve and maintain Government workforce skill and professionalism. However, as you build a
skilled, professional workforce base and culture, informal learning and expectations for behavior is
also very powerful (and can contribute to institutional development as well…another key loop)
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 16