Social Clouds provide the capability to share resources among participants within a social network - leveraging on the trust relationships already existing between such participants. In such a system, users are able to trade resources between each other, rather than make use of capability offered at a (centralized) data centre. Incentives for sharing remain an important hurdle to make more effective use of such an environment, which has a significant potential for improving resource utilization and making available additional capacity that remains dormant. We utilize the socio-economic model proposed by Silvio Gesell to demonstrate how a "virtual currency" could be used to incentivise sharing of resources within a "community". We subsequently demonstrate the benefit provided to participants within such a community using a variety of economic (such as overall credits gained) and technical (number of successfully completed transactions) metrics, through simulation.
NO1 WorldWide online istikhara for love marriage vashikaran specialist love p...
Incentivising Resource Sharing in Social Clouds
1. Incentivising Resource Sharing in
Social Clouds
Magdalena Punceva
Joint work with: Ivan Rodero (Rutgers University), Manish Parashar
(Rutgers University), Omer Rana (Cardiff University) and Ioan Petri
(Cardiff University)
2. Social Clouds
• What is a social cloud?
– Resource sharing system built on top of an existing social network.
• Purpose: sharing resources among participants in social
networks
– Resource: storage, computational power, applications
– Social networks: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter…
• Why social clouds?
– Utilize trust relationships already existing between such participants
(in contrast to p2p sharing).
3. Social Clouds
3-hops
sharing
2-hops
sharing
1-hop
sharing
4. Trust in social networks
• Trust
– Inherent in social networks: friends trust each other
– People will be more willing to share resources with friends or socially
close users then with total strangers.
– Trust levels are variable
– By trust we mean trusting that a friend will not misbehave (e.g. a
friend will not interrupt a resource exchange or transaction).
5. Incentives and Trading
• Incentives
– Although trust exists between friends, incentives are needed to
motivate the users to share their spare resources.
– Incentives remain an important hurdle to make effective use of social
clouds environment.
The central problem in this work is defining the right incentives
for sharing in social clouds.
• Trading as an incentive
- Users will trade resources between each other and get
payed for the resources they share.
6. Problem statement
• Key challenges: propose economic incentives for sharing
resources that satisfy the following goals:
1. Node-providers who offer good quality services and resources
should get an advantage
2. Node-consumers should be able to report and share their
experiences and the feedback should affect the payoff providers
receive.
3. Distributed solution
• Existing related approaches
– Barter: simple however limiting [BitTorrent}
– Credit-networks: p2p sharing [Z. Liu et al., P. Dandekar et al.]
– Global currency: complex rules [C. Aperjis et al.,V. Vishnamurthy et al. ,
B. Yang et al.]
7. Related approach: credit networks
u v w
c1 c2
• Node u trusts node v for up to c1 units of v’s
currency (v can use a service from u for up to c1
units of v’s currency)
• All nodes use the same currency
• Nodes participate in an underlying social network.
• Credit limits c1 and c2 reflect the level of trust
between u and v and v and w respectively.
8. Related approach: credit networks
• Transaction: w purchases a product/service from u
worth p units.
p p
u v w
• Transaction goes through a chain of friends (1-hop
neighbors).
9. Related approach: credit networks
• After transaction: credit limits are being decreased
on each link p units.
p p
u v w
c1-p c2-p
In order for a transaction to be successful: c1>p and
c2>p
There must be at least p credits on every link
10. Our approach: distributed currency
• Each node generates its own currency.
• Currency values may be different.
• Trading is done using such virtual currencies.
• When a node pays to another node, currency exchange rates
must be known to both.
• Partially inspired by Silvio Gesell’s work: The Natural Economic
Order, 1958.
Idea: The value of a node’s currency depends on the quality of
the resources/services it offers.
11. How to define currency exchange
rates?
• Currency exchange rates should satisfy the following conditions:
1) Common knowledge: nodes should know the exchange rates
2) Conservation: currency exchange rates should be conserved along any cycle of
payment.
A
1 B-dollar=2 A-dollars
1 C-dollar=3 B-dollars
1/2 ? Exchange rate between A
and C must be 1/6 in
order to conserve the
currencies.
B C
1/3
12. Clusters of trust
• The requirements (common knowledge and conservation) imply globally
defined exchange rates. Is distributed model possible?
• Our solution: clusters of trusted (socially close) nodes.
• Currency exchange rates are defined within each cluster.
13. How to define the exchange rates
within a cluster?
• Value of a node’s currency depends on the quality of its
resources.
• Consumers give feedback as a score about the providers ->
reputation model
• The reputation of a node is an average of all received scores .
14. Two types of payments
Transaction 2
Transaction 1
• Two types of payments: within a cluster (Transaction 1) and between
clusters (Transaction 2).
15. Payments within a cluster
(Transaction 1)
• Reputation lists are maintained within each cluster: e.g. a
list (r1,r2,..,rn) corresponds to nodes 1…n that belong to
cluster 1
• Reputation scores are given upon successful transaction.
• Reputation of a node is an average of all scores received.
• Currency conversion rates:
1u’s dollar=(ru/rv) v’s dollars
u v
ru rv
16. Payments between clusters
(Transaction 2)
• As in credit networks: nodes exchange IOU (I owe you) credits.
• Such credits have limited use: if node u has p IOUs from node
v, then can use them to purchase service/product only from v.
• Convertible currencies can be used for purchasing
services/products from any node in the corresponding cluster.
• Simple to implement, supports asynchronous demands,
simpler than price forming mechanisms.
17. Our solution: summary
Nodes who offer good Their currencies will have
services should get an higher values since they
advantage depend on reputations
Consumers should be able Reputation model:
to give feedback and share aggregates feedback
their experiences scores
Clusters provide
Distributed solution decentralized and self-
organized solution
18. Experimental setup
• Java based simulator
• Synthetic social graph based on measurements study about
Microsoft IM communication graph
– p(k)≈k-ae-bk
– av. clustering coefficient: 0.37
• Main metric: number of successful transactions, account
statements
• Experiment: set of predefined transactions
• Transaction path: shortest path (Dijkstra algorithm).
19. Our simulations should answer
these questions
• How does the number and sizes of clusters affect the number
of transactions completed? How much do we gain in terms of
completed transactions compared to pure credit networks?
• Is the approach scalable?
• How much does the non-uniform (power-law) distribution of
reputations and social graph degrees affect the successfully
completed transactions?
20. Our results: impact of cluster sizes
Success rate increases non-linearly with cluster sizes.
21. Our results: impact of reputation
distribution
Equal and uniform reputation distributions lead to higher
success rate than the power-law distribution.
22. Our results: scalability and impact of
the social graph
n 256 512 1024 2048 4096
success 76.00 72.86 81.70 78.70 70.65
rate(%)
23. Our results: impact of account limits
Number of successful transaction almost linearly
increases with credit limits.
24. Conclusions
• We extended the credit-network approach by enabling
within clusters currency conversions.
• By simulations we have shown how much it improved
long-term liquidity (achieved higher number of
completed transactions).
• Different currency values give advantage to high-
quality providers (incentive for improving the quality of
resources)
• Distributed reputation model
• Scalable with social graphs’ sizes and structures.
25. Research directions
• Integrating with CometCloud: parallelization and
application.
• Solutions for non-cooperative nodes: nodes may
downrate good providers, make coalitions to increase
reputation mutually.
• Free money property: money loses value over time.
• Exchange rate should include the impact of demand
and predefined quality of service.
• Network dynamics: nodes join/leave the network.
• Cluster dynamics: nodes join/leave a cluster.