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Improving the Quality of
PFMEAs
David J. Benedict
Senior Manager
Advance Supplier Quality Planning
Chassis/Electrical/Electronics
DaimlerChrysler Corporation
Why am I here
today?
Today’s Agenda:
1. Introduction
2. Brief Background
3. Common Errors in
PFMEAs
4. Supplier PFMEA
Audit
5. Questions
Current Paradigm New Paradigm
“Ensures our products and“Ensures our products and
processes are robust”processes are robust”
Error/Mistake
Proofing
Process
Control Plans
– Taken seriously
… All critical and new products/processes
… Data driven
… Roll-up RPN values (Green Y philosophy)
– Early
… Completed while design is still fluid
… “Living” document
“Paper exercise done
when pushed”
– Taken lightly
… “Selective” products/processes chosen
… Based on opinion
… All “magically” below the RPN cut-off
– Too late
… Error/Mistake proofing window long
gone
… Rarely validated with field results
Maintenance
Plans
DrivesFMEAFMEA
What are some common
errors?
1. Not started because production equipment not
operational.
2. Looking only at RPNs when prioritizing Recommended
Actions.
3. Not following minimum guidelines for Severity
rankings.
4. RPN below “target level” and no further action
needed.
5. Filled out using ONLY references to other
documents.
What are some common
errors?
6. Effects of Failure not “Customer” effects.
7. Not distinguishing between types of controls.
8. Inconsistency in Severity or Detection rankings.
9. Detection ranking too low.
10.Insufficient Controls for Severity rankings of 8, 9 or
10.
PFMEA not started because
production equipment not
operational
• Minimum documents required to start a
PFMEA:
– Process Flow Chart
– Risk Assessment
– Work Instructions
• The PFMEA should be updated later with
findings from trial/pilot runs.
Looking only at the RPN’s when
prioritizing Recommended Actions
Gas Porosity too
great (greater than x
criteria
Potential
Effect(s) of Failure
Surface
contaminants
not completely
removed
Process
Function
Requirements
S
e
v
C
l
a
s
s
Potential Failure
Mode
Hydrogen
Supersaturation
due toexcessive
weight melt
temperature. 2
Automated
Temperature
Controls in melt
furnace Strip charting and SPC 6
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
D
e
t
e
c
t
R
P
N
Potential
Cause(s) /
Mechanism(s) of
Failure
O
c
c
u
r
Contamination in
Rinse Water 5
Periodic exchange of DI
water-once per shift
100% visual inspection
at Op. 180 8
Fracture of wheel-does
not meet FMVSS
requirements
Unacceptable
Appearance
noticed by most
customers
10
4
120
160
OP:20
OP:170
• For Severity, OP. 20 is much more critical than OP. 170.
• The RPN number suggests OP. 170 is a higher priority.
• What would be the results of a quality spill for OP. 20 vs.
OP. 170?
Not following minimum guidelines
for Severity rankings
• Misidentifying “Potential Effects of Failure” can
make establishing meaningful Severity rankings
difficult.
• “Legal” concerns sometimes drive lower rankings.
• Note: If the severity received a ranking of 9 or
10, it is important to include a Customer- or
Supplier-specific safety symbol to highlight its
significance.
RPN below “target level” and no further
action needed
• PFMEA is a continuous
improvement tool and
a living document.
• Reducing occurrence
should continue to be a
goal long after error-
or mistake-proofing
has been implemented.4 N/R
2
Action
Results
Action Results
S
e
v
O
c
c
D
e
t
R
P
N
N/R
Recommended
Action(s)
Responsibility
& Target
Completion Date
D
e
t
e
c
t
R
P
N
2 N/R
24
36
42
Filled out using ONLY references
to other documents
Advantage
• This is great for TS/QS
documentation purposes.
• Modification not required
when document changes.
Disadvantages
• Impossible to assess
appropriateness of Detection
rankings without referenced
documents.
• Encourages “check-the-box”
mentality.
Too Small Shot
Blast Media
Used 3 W.I. 483-11-04 Form F-19.78 2
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
D
e
t
e
c
t
Potential Cause(s) /
Mechanism(s) of
Failure
O
c
c
u
r
Tool Wear 3 W.I. 483-11-04Form F-19.78 2
Effects of Failure not “Customer”
effects
• Consider what would
happen if there were
NO CONTROLS!
• “Scrap/downtime” are
true, but are not what
the “Customer” would
notice or experience.
• Think of what the
customer would
notice/experience if the
“Bolt” was “loose.”
Process
Function
Potential Failure
Mode
Potential
Effect(s) of Failure
S
e
v
Requirements
OP. 210 Valve
Hole Deburr/
Burr Free
Burrs Excessive scrap/
downtime
7
OP. 220 Punch
Hole/Hole
Diameter 10.0
mm +/-0.2
Hole Diameter
>10.2 mm.
Bolt loose
5
Not distinguishing between types of
controls
• Prevention affects ONLY Occurrence rankings.
• Detection affects ONLY Detection rankings.
• Not knowing the difference often leads to incorrect
Detection rankings.
• When using 2nd edition FMEA Manual form, Controls must
be labeled (P) for Prevention and (D) for Detection.
• 3rd edition form has two separate columns for Prevention
and Detection Controls.
Inconsistency in Severity or
Detection rankings
• Final Functional
Testing is called out
as both a 3 and 2.
Why?
• Clarify/be more
specific if Control is
truly different.
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
D
e
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
Standardized
work
instructions
Final Functional
Testing Machine 3
Standardized
work
instructions
Final Functional
Testing Machine 2
Detection ranking too low
100%Visual
Inspection
at Op. 220.
3
Operator did not
remove all
burrs-
insufficient
lighting.
4
Standardized
Work Instructions
OP. 210 Valve
Hole deburr/all
burrs removed
Not all burrs
removed.
Flat tire-Value
Stem cut during
tire mounting. 7
Requirements
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
D
e
t
e
c
t
Process
Function
Potential Failure
Mode
Potential
Effect(s) of Failure
S
e
v
C
l
a
s
s
Potential Cause(s) /
Mechanism(s) of
Failure
O
c
c
u
r
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
• In this example, the Detection Controls are
100% visual inspection.
• The Detection ranking should be an 8, not 3.
Insufficient Controls for
Severity rankings of 8, 9 or 10
OP:20 Aluminum
Melt/Gas Porosity not
to exceed x criteria
Gas Porosity too
great (greater than x
criteria
10
Potential
Effect(s) of Failure
Process
Function
Requirements
S
e
v
C
l
a
s
s
Potential Failure
Mode
Hydrogen
Supersaturation
due toexcessive
weight melt
temperature. 2
Automated
Temperature
Controls in melt
furnace
Strip charting
and SPC
Current
Process
Controls
Prevention
Current
Process
Controls
Detection
Potential Cause(s) /
Mechanism(s) of
Failure
O
c
c
u
r
Fracture of wheel-does
not meet FMVSS
requirements
6
120
D
e
t
e
c
t
R
P
N
• A non-conformance for OP. 20 can result in a Field Campaign/Recall.
• While SPC is good at detecting trends, it cannot detect with much certainty a
single, random non-conformance.
• Error/Mistake-proofing must be implemented (Detection ranking of 3 or less)
for Severity rankings of 9 or 10.
• Limit Detection ranking to no greater than 4 for Severity ranking of 8.
Supplier PFMEA Audit
What is the Audit?
• An objective tool to evaluate the quality of
the PFMEA
Why was the Audit Form Created?
• Previous process involved individuals
applying their own criteria for
determining what made a “good” vs.
“bad” PFMEA (often inconsistent and
confusing).
• PFMEA best practices were not being
shared.
• Needed to find a way to accelerate
PFMEA improvement.
Who will use the Audit?
• Suppliers (self-assessment)
• Customers (evaluate Supplier PFMEA
submissions)
What can the audit do?
• The form is really 2-in-1 and has the
flexibility to be used:
– by those creating or developing the
PFMEA (supplier manufacturing engineer,
design engineer, quality engineer, etc.), or
– by those conducting a “3rd party” audit of
the PFMEA (supplier or customer corporate
quality function, etc.)
What are some of the things the
audit form can help detect?
• It can help detect whether:
– a cross-functional team provided input
during the creation of the PFMEA
– the probability of occurrence was created
using real world data
– previous internal or external rejects were
included
– the DFMEA was referenced/used in the
creation of the PFMEA
How do you use the Audit form?
• The use of the form is straight
forward:
– If you are creating or developing (or wish
to do a "deep dive" into the data behind the
PFMEA), answer ALL questions on the
form.
– If you are conducting a “3rd party” audit
of a PFMEA, answer only those questions
not shaded/italicized.
Where can I find the Audit form?
• Go to Covisint and log in.
• Go to DaimlerChrysler page.
• Go to bulletin 76738.
Questions?

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2006 pfmea presentation

  • 1. Improving the Quality of PFMEAs David J. Benedict Senior Manager Advance Supplier Quality Planning Chassis/Electrical/Electronics DaimlerChrysler Corporation
  • 2. Why am I here today?
  • 3. Today’s Agenda: 1. Introduction 2. Brief Background 3. Common Errors in PFMEAs 4. Supplier PFMEA Audit 5. Questions
  • 4. Current Paradigm New Paradigm “Ensures our products and“Ensures our products and processes are robust”processes are robust” Error/Mistake Proofing Process Control Plans – Taken seriously … All critical and new products/processes … Data driven … Roll-up RPN values (Green Y philosophy) – Early … Completed while design is still fluid … “Living” document “Paper exercise done when pushed” – Taken lightly … “Selective” products/processes chosen … Based on opinion … All “magically” below the RPN cut-off – Too late … Error/Mistake proofing window long gone … Rarely validated with field results Maintenance Plans DrivesFMEAFMEA
  • 5. What are some common errors? 1. Not started because production equipment not operational. 2. Looking only at RPNs when prioritizing Recommended Actions. 3. Not following minimum guidelines for Severity rankings. 4. RPN below “target level” and no further action needed. 5. Filled out using ONLY references to other documents.
  • 6. What are some common errors? 6. Effects of Failure not “Customer” effects. 7. Not distinguishing between types of controls. 8. Inconsistency in Severity or Detection rankings. 9. Detection ranking too low. 10.Insufficient Controls for Severity rankings of 8, 9 or 10.
  • 7. PFMEA not started because production equipment not operational • Minimum documents required to start a PFMEA: – Process Flow Chart – Risk Assessment – Work Instructions • The PFMEA should be updated later with findings from trial/pilot runs.
  • 8. Looking only at the RPN’s when prioritizing Recommended Actions Gas Porosity too great (greater than x criteria Potential Effect(s) of Failure Surface contaminants not completely removed Process Function Requirements S e v C l a s s Potential Failure Mode Hydrogen Supersaturation due toexcessive weight melt temperature. 2 Automated Temperature Controls in melt furnace Strip charting and SPC 6 Current Process Controls Prevention Current Process Controls Detection D e t e c t R P N Potential Cause(s) / Mechanism(s) of Failure O c c u r Contamination in Rinse Water 5 Periodic exchange of DI water-once per shift 100% visual inspection at Op. 180 8 Fracture of wheel-does not meet FMVSS requirements Unacceptable Appearance noticed by most customers 10 4 120 160 OP:20 OP:170 • For Severity, OP. 20 is much more critical than OP. 170. • The RPN number suggests OP. 170 is a higher priority. • What would be the results of a quality spill for OP. 20 vs. OP. 170?
  • 9. Not following minimum guidelines for Severity rankings • Misidentifying “Potential Effects of Failure” can make establishing meaningful Severity rankings difficult. • “Legal” concerns sometimes drive lower rankings. • Note: If the severity received a ranking of 9 or 10, it is important to include a Customer- or Supplier-specific safety symbol to highlight its significance.
  • 10. RPN below “target level” and no further action needed • PFMEA is a continuous improvement tool and a living document. • Reducing occurrence should continue to be a goal long after error- or mistake-proofing has been implemented.4 N/R 2 Action Results Action Results S e v O c c D e t R P N N/R Recommended Action(s) Responsibility & Target Completion Date D e t e c t R P N 2 N/R 24 36 42
  • 11. Filled out using ONLY references to other documents Advantage • This is great for TS/QS documentation purposes. • Modification not required when document changes. Disadvantages • Impossible to assess appropriateness of Detection rankings without referenced documents. • Encourages “check-the-box” mentality. Too Small Shot Blast Media Used 3 W.I. 483-11-04 Form F-19.78 2 Current Process Controls Prevention Current Process Controls Detection D e t e c t Potential Cause(s) / Mechanism(s) of Failure O c c u r Tool Wear 3 W.I. 483-11-04Form F-19.78 2
  • 12. Effects of Failure not “Customer” effects • Consider what would happen if there were NO CONTROLS! • “Scrap/downtime” are true, but are not what the “Customer” would notice or experience. • Think of what the customer would notice/experience if the “Bolt” was “loose.” Process Function Potential Failure Mode Potential Effect(s) of Failure S e v Requirements OP. 210 Valve Hole Deburr/ Burr Free Burrs Excessive scrap/ downtime 7 OP. 220 Punch Hole/Hole Diameter 10.0 mm +/-0.2 Hole Diameter >10.2 mm. Bolt loose 5
  • 13. Not distinguishing between types of controls • Prevention affects ONLY Occurrence rankings. • Detection affects ONLY Detection rankings. • Not knowing the difference often leads to incorrect Detection rankings. • When using 2nd edition FMEA Manual form, Controls must be labeled (P) for Prevention and (D) for Detection. • 3rd edition form has two separate columns for Prevention and Detection Controls.
  • 14. Inconsistency in Severity or Detection rankings • Final Functional Testing is called out as both a 3 and 2. Why? • Clarify/be more specific if Control is truly different. Current Process Controls Prevention Current Process Controls Detection D e t e c t i o n Standardized work instructions Final Functional Testing Machine 3 Standardized work instructions Final Functional Testing Machine 2
  • 15. Detection ranking too low 100%Visual Inspection at Op. 220. 3 Operator did not remove all burrs- insufficient lighting. 4 Standardized Work Instructions OP. 210 Valve Hole deburr/all burrs removed Not all burrs removed. Flat tire-Value Stem cut during tire mounting. 7 Requirements Current Process Controls Detection D e t e c t Process Function Potential Failure Mode Potential Effect(s) of Failure S e v C l a s s Potential Cause(s) / Mechanism(s) of Failure O c c u r Current Process Controls Prevention • In this example, the Detection Controls are 100% visual inspection. • The Detection ranking should be an 8, not 3.
  • 16. Insufficient Controls for Severity rankings of 8, 9 or 10 OP:20 Aluminum Melt/Gas Porosity not to exceed x criteria Gas Porosity too great (greater than x criteria 10 Potential Effect(s) of Failure Process Function Requirements S e v C l a s s Potential Failure Mode Hydrogen Supersaturation due toexcessive weight melt temperature. 2 Automated Temperature Controls in melt furnace Strip charting and SPC Current Process Controls Prevention Current Process Controls Detection Potential Cause(s) / Mechanism(s) of Failure O c c u r Fracture of wheel-does not meet FMVSS requirements 6 120 D e t e c t R P N • A non-conformance for OP. 20 can result in a Field Campaign/Recall. • While SPC is good at detecting trends, it cannot detect with much certainty a single, random non-conformance. • Error/Mistake-proofing must be implemented (Detection ranking of 3 or less) for Severity rankings of 9 or 10. • Limit Detection ranking to no greater than 4 for Severity ranking of 8.
  • 18. What is the Audit? • An objective tool to evaluate the quality of the PFMEA
  • 19. Why was the Audit Form Created? • Previous process involved individuals applying their own criteria for determining what made a “good” vs. “bad” PFMEA (often inconsistent and confusing). • PFMEA best practices were not being shared. • Needed to find a way to accelerate PFMEA improvement.
  • 20. Who will use the Audit? • Suppliers (self-assessment) • Customers (evaluate Supplier PFMEA submissions)
  • 21. What can the audit do? • The form is really 2-in-1 and has the flexibility to be used: – by those creating or developing the PFMEA (supplier manufacturing engineer, design engineer, quality engineer, etc.), or – by those conducting a “3rd party” audit of the PFMEA (supplier or customer corporate quality function, etc.)
  • 22. What are some of the things the audit form can help detect? • It can help detect whether: – a cross-functional team provided input during the creation of the PFMEA – the probability of occurrence was created using real world data – previous internal or external rejects were included – the DFMEA was referenced/used in the creation of the PFMEA
  • 23. How do you use the Audit form? • The use of the form is straight forward: – If you are creating or developing (or wish to do a "deep dive" into the data behind the PFMEA), answer ALL questions on the form. – If you are conducting a “3rd party” audit of a PFMEA, answer only those questions not shaded/italicized.
  • 24. Where can I find the Audit form? • Go to Covisint and log in. • Go to DaimlerChrysler page. • Go to bulletin 76738.
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