1. Phi club IPFW
Ioan Muntean
1

2. Overview
 About a divorce: metaphysics and current science
 About a possible convergence
 Example: the role of spacetime in metaphysics
 Does all hell break loose?
 Metaphysical digressions on dimensionality
 Optimistic promissory note and three projects on
convergence
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3. Science and metaphysics?
 Analytic metaphysics is in resurgence.
 What is the relationship between the new analytic
metaphysics and current science?
 Option 1: things are far more complicated than in
Carnap’s years on both sides. Their relationship is in
shambles
 Option 2 (and my argument): a new type of
relationship is possible, more reconciliatory, call it
“convergence”
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4. Bad news: A marriage in hell
 20th century science has started with a distrust in
metaphysics
 Philosophy of science was born right from the divorce
between metaphysics and scientific method
 How can they become reconciliatory?
 Convergence? No way!
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5. Bad News (2): No commonalities
 The incommensurability position
 Science does not share the same language with
metaphysics, so there is no real disagreement
 They talk past each other
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6. Post-modern ennui: “so what?”
 In the 20th century science have talked less about
existence or about fundamental entities
 Science is more pragmatic, based on intervention
 The thrill is gone
 Therefore:
 1 science cannot contribute to metaphysics
 2 metaphysics cannot inform science
 “so much the worse for metaphysics” (P. Maddy, T.
Maudlin, J. Ladyman)
 “so much the worse for science”
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7. A “so much the worse” quote
“Fiber bundles have their own, interesting structure, a
structure that does not correspond to the traditional
philosophical vocabulary. Instead of a rearguard
operation in defense of the old philosophical tradition,
philosophers would do best to try to understand the
structure in their own terms. If they do not translate
well into the categories in which philosophical debates
have taken place, so much the worse for the
philosophical debates.” (Maudlin 2007)
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8. Do metaphysicians retort?
 Foundationalism:
 No special science can arrogate to itself the task of rendering mutually
consistent the various partial portraits: that task can alone belong to an
overarching science of being, that is ontology (Lowe 2006).
 “Our practical grasp of this logic is not to be called into question on account of
recondite physics. A physicists who casts doubt upon it is sawing off the branch
he sits upon” (Geach, 1972, 304, my emphasis)
 Conceptual analysis. Concepts such as identity, necessity, causation, essence,
counterfactuals, space and time are all metaphysical. We need conceptual
analysis (F. Jackson, N. Markosian, J. Kim)
 Argument from modality. Modal properties should supervene on the
nonmodal properties. (L.A. Paul 2004, 172)
 Argument for commonsense. Metaphysics is an internal affair of philosophy
and it is orthogonal to science. The metaphysician is able to marshal strong
and plausible commonsense intuitions to support her view.
 Argument from pessimistic metainduction: all sciences, even the most
advanced, have been proven to be false. Why should we trust our current
science?
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9. “The division of labor”
 Metaphysics is about something else
“[...] about the most explanatorily basic necessities and
possibilities. Metaphysics is about what could be and
what must be. Except incidentally, metaphysics is not
about explanatorily ultimate aspects of reality that are
actual.” (Conee and Sider, 2005)
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10. More bad news to come (3):
clashes, Sturm und Drang
 The reformation move: science should inform are
reform (radically, if necessary) metaphysics
 Science scorns metaphysics: metaphysics is the
handmaid of science
 Metaphysics scorns sciences: “why should we believe
science”? Similar to the pessimistic meta-induction.
 Forget about science: metaphysics is forever
 Any attempt to find a common ground would totally
damage them
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11. The destructive debates (textbook
examples)
 The impact of special relativity on the debate between
endurantism/perdurantism or tense /tenseless theories of time
 The impact of general relativity on the debate between
substantivalism/relationalism theories of space(time)
 Quantum mechanics and its impact on identity and individuation of
particles
 Quantum mechanics and its impact on
 the part-whole relation
 principle of recombination (a la Lewis)
 Interpretations of quantum mechanics and principles of modality
(mainly Many Worlds Interpretation of QM)
 Holism in physics (interpretation of gauge theories) and its impact on
metaphysics
 Add your preferred debate between metaphysics and science here
_____________________
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12. Real debates: modalities and QM
 Do physicists (especially Everettians) build different
type of modalities than metaphysicians?
 Physical modalities are different than metaphysical
modalities so back to the “division of labor” attitude.
 The superposition rule of composition does not generate
new possible worlds
 There is a new sense of modality in Everettian QM
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13. Underdetermination of
metaphysics by science(s)
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14. Science involved in metaphysics?
 Metaphysical statements can be tested by science
(Hawley, 2005)
 Witness that mature/full-fledged and empirically
confirmed sciences are needed
 (Some) empirically confirmed theories may have some
bearings on metaphysics
 In respect of other, more suspicious scientific theories,
adopt the :
 wait-and-see attitude (or the “Greek chorus” attitude)
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15. Better news: possible convergence
 Some scientific theories are partially interpreted
 Especially those parts of science with are not yet mature,
full-fledged theories
 Metaphysics can help in interpreting science
 Possible convergence? Is Quine’s prophecy that science
and metaphysics will end up “on a par” fulfilled?
 I would say no, we’re far from it, if ever, if any
convergence is possible
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16. The bad “why” questions in science
 See Kepler’s explanation of the planetary system
 Why are there n=9(8?) planets in the solar system?
 He looked for necessity in the wrong place and took
contingency for necessity
 There is no “deep metaphysics” of the solar/planetary system
 The same in the case of the “deep metaphysics” of light
(Goethe etc)
 Is the question about the shape of spacetime that wrong-
headed?
 I argue that some questions about spacetime are not Kepler-
like
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17. The superficiality issue
 For some, some debates in metaphysics are purely
verbal:
 Endurantism-perdurantism
 A-theorist-B-theorists
 Nihilist-non-nihilists
 Possibilists-actualists
 Some debates in science are merely verbal, too.
 Some questions seem settled forever and in fact they
are not
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18. What do I want to add to existing
debates?
 My discussion is centred on questions about the shape of
spacetime in metaphysics
 What is the role of spacetime in metaphysics?
 None?
 Not important?
 Other existing discussions:
 Modality (for example, give an scientific interpretation of the
Lewisian “disconnected spacetime” concept used in the
possible world metaphysics)
 Branching spacetimes
 The general covariance of spacetime and the similarity
relation a la Lewis (T. Maudlin)
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19. Good old fashioned metaphysics of
space
 Descartes
 matter=extension
 individuation of matter = spatial separation.
 Newton (De Gravitatione)
 “space has its own manner of existence which fits neither substances.,
nor accidents”
 (Newtonians): space is the only principle of individuation. Spatial
separation makes two identical bodies different (contra Leibniz)
 Kant
 space has its own reality (Inaugural Dissertation)
 the post-Kantians: Space and time (not spacetime) were the principium
individuationis
 In Einstein’s relativity: a non-null spatio-temporal separation is a
sufficient condition for individuation (separability)
 In quantum mechanics, this does not happen at all (e.g. photons)
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20. Science and metaphysics, again
 The relation between the “new analytic metaphysics”
and contemporary science
 Several approaches:
 Historical approach
 “Division of labor” approach
 The new scientism (Maudlin, Ladyman, Van Fraassen)
 Similarities (LA Paul, P. Godfrey-Smith)
 Differences (Ladyman, Maudlin, present paper)
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21. Aims of this project
 Focus on differences, not on similarities
 Metaphysical modality is essentially different than
scientific modality
 At the core, there is a difference in representation and
“theory” choice, albeit the language is similar
 Differences are as useful as analogies and help the
advancement of metaphysics.
 It is an argument in metaphysics methodology and its
resemblance to scientific methodology
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22. What is the “new metaphysics”?
 Chronologically, comes after Naming and Necessity
 Conceptually, originates in Lewis, Armstrong
 The new systematic metaphysics orients itself towards
modality and existence
 The new analytic metaphysics is not centered on ordinary
language, but on the practice of philosophy itself
 A “newer new analytic metaphysics” is at the horizon:
 Grounding (Schaffer)
 Fundamentalism
 Back to language? Sider
 Meta-metaphysic-sy projects
22

23. Strong antinaturalism
 Metaphysics Science
The necessary
The actual
The possible
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24. Weak antinaturalism: overlapping
The possible
The actual
The
necessary
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25. Division of Labor
 Division of Labor: metaphysics charts the domain of objective
possibility through reason; science explores actual reality through
empirical methods.
 “Metaphysics deals in possibilities’’(E. J. Lowe)
 C. Callender (about the division of labor): “… whereas scientists
excavate dusty field sites and mix potions in laboratories to tell
us which states of affairs are actual, metaphysicians are
concerned with what is and isn’t metaphysically possible.”
 “Metaphysics is after something bigger and more abstract, the
structure of metaphysical modality. What it investigates can tell
us about the actual world, but only ‘incidentally’ because the
actual world is one possible world of many”
 Modal truth is different than truth based on evidence
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26. Old fashioned scientism
 Russell: make philosophy look more “exact”
 Make it look like mathematics or science.
 Modality and certainty:
 “Philosophy diminishes our feeling of certainty as to
what things are, but greatly increases our knowledge as
to what they may be”. Russell
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27. The new scientism
 New scientism: In the light of contemporary theories
in physics, metaphysicians need to reform their
fundamental ontology.
 Van Fraassen, Ladyman&Ross&Spurrett, Maudlin
 Science is not only a supply of counterexamples to
metaphysics
 But the source of change and progress in metaphysics
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28. Some reconciliatory projects
A. Do not aim to reform metaphysics, but inform it scientifically:
French, Callender: “metaphysics is best when informed by
good science, and science is best when informed by good
metaphysics”;
B. (Re)situate metaphysics in meta-science
C. Find similarities between science and metaphysics
D. Find differences and show they are central to both science and
metaphysics
E. (Re)situate science in meta-metaphysics
I argue here that D and E are more attractive than C
B. is well-explored in the philosophy of science (Friedman)
A. is vague
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29. A. Informing metaphysics
 Metaphysical statements can be tested by science
(Hawley, 2005)
 Metaphysics is underdetermined by sciences (French,
2009)
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30. B. Metaphysics and meta-science
 Metaphysics is meta-science
 Friedman: “the philosophical articulation of what we
might call metaparadigms or meta-frameworks for
revolutionary science capable of motivating and
sustaining the transition to a new scientific paradigm.’’
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31. C. Similarity
Some similarities. They may share:
I. their subject-matter: the mind-independent reality
II. (some) ideals: simplicity, unification, expressibility, symmetry,
etc.
III. (some) methods: IBE, modeling (LA Paul, P. Godfrey-Smith)
IV. (some) concepts: causation, laws, necessity, possibility,
structure, realism
The “strong resemblance” view: keep I (perhaps, partially, II-IV)
“Weak resemblance view”: reject I, but accept II, III or IV and other
combinations
I focus here on a weak resemblance view that keeps III and IV
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32. I. The science-metaphysics
continuum
 For Humeans, metaphysics and science are part of the
“best systematization of the world” (Callender)
 “we can treat metaphysical claims as parts of the Best
Theory that are more abstract and distantly related to
experiment than the bulk of the theory, that is,
science.” (Callender 2011 47)
 Callender: modalities are not independent of scientific
modalities
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33. II. Scientific theories and
metaphysical doctrines
 They try to explain and unify
 They aim to simplicity
 They explain (Sider 2009); metaphysicians even use
the inference to the best explanation for genuine
modal realism (Shalkowski 2010)
 They both use underdetermination (but this is
controversial in metaphysics, Ladyman 2012)
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34. III. Modeling in science and
metaphysics
 metaphysics and science share the same method, (but
not the same subject matter)
 They both build models: LA Paul, P. Godfrey-Smith
 They use confirmation: ordinary experience plays the
role of experimental data in metaphysics
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35. Models in science
 The simplified view: (P. Godfrey Smith, St French&Costa)
 a model is a set of objects and relations among them
 They act as interpreting structures for a mathematical theory
 A theory is true when there is an partial or total
isomorphism between the model and the world
 Models uses abstracts and idealization:
 In building models, scientists ignore aspects of the world
and structures of the theory.
 Scientists do incorporate false statements in their models
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36. Modeling in metaphysics
 “metaphysical methods used to make claims about the
world can be similar to scientific methods used to
make claims about the world, but that the subjects of
metaphysics are not the subjects of science” Paul 2012
 metaphysical doctrines = models or classes of models
 “a class of models, where the models are composed of
logical, modal and other relations relating variables
that represent n-adic properties, objects, and other
entities” LA Paul 2012
 idealization and abstraction are important .
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37. Idealization and abstraction
 abstraction and idealization are used in theory-
building in metaphysics.
 Exemple: Idealization in the metaphysics of causation
(when ignoring non-relevant causes).
37

38. Modality and “testing” in
metaphysics
 1. Test a theory by considering the actual world or close
possible worlds with fictional, physically possible
situations.
 2 Look for possible worlds that contradict the theory.
Are there such possible worlds?
38

39. Ideal in metaphysics (Godfrey
Smith 2012)
 Project 1: describe the language and our thinking
 Project 2: describe a part of the world
 Project 3: relate project 1 and 2.
 Project 4: correct project 1 based on alternatives.
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40. Features of metaphysical modality
 Robustness: are there results robust across various
possible models? P. G-Smith: happens in metaphysical
modeling. I disagree
 Tractability. In metaphysical model? I do not see it
that way
P. Godfrey-Smith
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41. IV Concept-similarity in science and
metaphysics
 Causation is similar in science and metaphysics (but it is in itself
problematic)
 Structures are used in metaphysics, science, mathematics is a
pretty uniform way
 Laws of nature are less similar, but still you can see them on a
continuum
 Mereological concepts are even more different: parthood,
recombination, com-possibility, composition, constitution
 What about “possibility” as used in science and metaphysics?
 I show they are not similar at all, despite what is in general
suggested
 Many scientists embrace uncritically the concept of possibility from
metaphysics
 Metaphysicians dismiss any modal attempt coming from science
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42. D. Differences in modeling
 How much the theory involves the unobservable, the
indirectly confirmable, and the abstract;
 “and in how many different, competing models may
maximize the theoretical virtues while doing an
adequate job of saving the phenomena.” Paul 2012
 More theories to choose in metaphysics than in
science. Scientific models are constrained empirically.
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43. IV. modalities
 I argue that a different concept of modality is at work
in metaphysical modeling than in scientific modeling
 Despite appearances, different modal concepts are at
work in scientific modeling and modeling in
metaphyscs
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44. Modality in physics
 Does quantum mechanics (Everettians) presuposes a
different modalities than the standard metaphysics?
 Physical modalities are different than metaphysical
modalities, so we’re back to the “division of labor”.
 There is a new sense of modality in Everettian QM
 Symmetries do act as limitations of modality.
 Path integral as well as principle of least action are
related to modality (Butterfield)
 The multiverse modality is altogether another story.
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45. Modality in metaphysical modeling
 Causation: causal talk depends on contrasts between
what actually occurs and the ‘‘normal’’ course of events
(Hitchcock and Knobe 2009)
 Philosophy uses fiction and the imagination, thought-
experiments and imaginary cases
 If a metaphysical model uses fictional entities and
imaginative situations, thought experiments and
suchlike, it uses modality
 But is this similar enough to modality used in scientific
models?
45

46. Structure and world in scientific
modality
 Structure limits possibility
 The world also is a limit of the scientific possibility
46

47. Fictions
 Fictional entities in science are constrained by (a) a
theoretical structure, and (b) the structure of the
world
 Fictional entities in metaphysics are constrained by
conceivability.
 This is a major difference.
47

48. Abstractions and idealizations
 I argue they are fundamentally different in science and
metaphysics.
 The mathematical structure needed in a theory does
not exist
48

49. Caveats
 Perhaps models in science are more autonomous than
stated here
 Perhaps a theoretical structure is not needed (be it
mathematical or not).
 Why models? Perhaps a more syntactic-view friendly
approach would find more similarities between the
two modalities.
 Perhaps mathematical models are missing from the
picture. Put back mathematics where it belongs.
 Perhaps logical models?
49

50. Unintended consequences
 I may need to decouple possibility from necessity.
 Metaphysical possibility is dual to metaphysical
necessity.
 Scientific possibility (as used in modeling) is not
couple to scientific necessity (be it laws of nature,
regularities, generalizations.
50

51. Conclusion
 Different modality concepts are fruitful in metaphysics
 Can instigate new research directions within
metaphysics
51

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