2. 1. Productivity: now more than ever
2. Mind the Gap: the Breakdown of the
Diffusion Machine
3. Stimulating Diffusion
– Engaging in Trade / Integrating into GVCs
– Reallocating (misallocated) resources
– Boosting Innovation (absorptive capacity)
Structure of the presentation
2
4. 4
4
Productivity (MFP) drives standards
of living…
4
Decomposition of cross-country differences in GDP per capita into their determinants, 2005
(United States = 100)
GDP PPP per capita TFP Human capital Physical capital Employment
United States 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Canada 83.5 72.0 103.3 105.8 106.0
Japan 72.6 52.6 100.4 130.7 105.1
China 9.8 13.6 57.3 105.2 119.5
India 5.2 12.7 47.7 98.3 87.1
Brazil 20.5 29.3 70.1 103.1 96.8
Russian Federation 28.6 31.5 84.9 97.4 99.3
EU27 + EFTA 64.7 67.8 91.2 114.1 91.3
Total World 22.8 27.9 64.2 104.2 95.8
Source: OECD.
5. 5
…and productivity growth has slowed across
the OECD, even before the crisis.
Labour productivity growth since 1990
GDP per hour worked (China and India refer to GDP per worker)
6. Business investment has been slack…
Business investment in different cycles
Cyclical peak in OECD real business fixed investment=100
(date of peak indicated)
6
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
t 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28
t=1973Q4 t=1981Q4
t=2000Q3 t=2008Q1
Quarters since the peak
8. …leading to diverging views on the Future
of Productivity.
8
http://blog.ted.com/the-future-of-work-and-innovation-robert-gordon-and-erik-brynjolfsson-debate-at-ted2013/
10. 80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Most advanced firms
(3.5% per annum)
All firms
(1.7%)
Other firms
(0.5% per annum)
Manufacturing Sector Services Sector
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Most advanced firms
(5.0% per annum)
All firms
(0.3% per annum)
Other firms
(-0.1% per annum)
Productivity of Frontier Firms and the Rest
“Frontier firms” corresponds to the average labour productivity of the 100 globally most productive firms in each 2-digit sector. On a rolling basis. “Non-frontier
firms” is the average of all other firms. “All firms” is the sector total. AAGR shown in parentheses. Source: Andrews, Criscuolo and Gal (2015), “Frontier firms,
technology diffusion and public policy: micro evidence from OECD countries ” mimeo
11. The Global Frontier versus the Others
Note: “Frontier firms” corresponds to the average labour productivity of the 50 globally most productive firms in each 2
digit sector in ORBIS. “Non-frontier firms” is the average of all other firms.
14. Diffusion is dictated by global connections,
reallocation and KBC (absorptive capacity).
Estimated frontier spillover (% pa) associated with a 2% point increase in
MFP growth at the global productivity frontier
Global connections Reallocation Knowledge-Based
Capital
14
16. Participating in global value chains…..
Estimated gains to MFP growth associated with raising GVC
participation
Source: Saia, A., D. Andrews and S. Albrizio (2015).
17. 0
5
10
15
20
25
30
%
Gross exports of ICT goods and services Domestic value added of ICT goods and services in foreign final demand
0
1
2
3
4
Magnified
Source: OECD (2015), Digital Economy Outlook 2015, forthcoming.
Trade in ICT goods and services – gross exports and value added, 2011
Percentage shares of the world total
... as distinct from trade per se is important
because…
18. …collaboration with suppliers and clients
spurs innovation…
18
80
60
40
20
0
20
40
60
80
Suppliers Clients
Large firms
SMEs
As a percentage of product and/or process innovative firms
(2008-2010)
SOURCE: OECD, based on Eurostat (CIS-2010) and national data sources, June 2013.
19. …and exposes services to competition.
Services content of gross exports for G20 countries, percent,
2011
Source: OECD-WTO Trade In Value Added Database, June 2015.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
SAU
IDN
MEX
KOR
ARG
CHN
RUS
ZAF
CAN
AUS
BRA
JPN
TUR
DEU
ITA
USA
IND
FRA
GBR
Domestic VA content Foreign VA content Gross service export share
21. Looking beyond the “mean” – to get resources
where they do the most good…
21
Source: Adapted from Bartelsman et al., (2008).
22. …because the share of start-ups is
declining in many OECD countries….
Share of start-ups among all firms
Note: As a percent of all firms in the total private business sector. Startups are firms aged from
0 to 2. Data for Japan refers to establishment in the manufacturing sector.
Source: Criscuolo, Gal and Menon (2015).
23. …and post-entry growth is a problem.
Source: Andrews, Criscuolo and Gal (2015).
How much higher would overall manufacturing sector labour productivity
be if NF firms were as productive and large as GF firms?
NF firms in Italy have productivity levels
close to the GF but they are relatively small
24. The importance of removing barriers to growth
so that firms can…
Post-entry growth - average size of young and old firms
24Source: Criscuolo, Gal and Menon (2015).
25. …scale, and afford to adapt technology that
enables integration into GVCs.
Use of enterprise resource planning (ERP) software
Percentage of enterprises in each employment size class: 2010 & 2014
26. Effective framework policies encourage the
growth of innovative firms…
Source: Andrews, Criscuolo and Menon (2014).
Additional capital attracted by an innovative firm
(patent stock increase by 10%, 2002-10)
27. …and make sure the workers find the
businesses that need their skills….
27Source: Adalet McGowan, M. and D. Andrews (2015b),
28. …which is affected by a variety of policies.
The probability of skill mismatch and public policies
28
Entry and Exit Labour mobility Education
Source: Adalet McGowan, M. and D. Andrews (2015b),
29. • Policies that promote efficient firm exit:
– Bankruptcy legislation that does not excessively penalise business
failure and regulations which don’t favour incumbents
• Policies that make labour mobility easier:
– Housing market policies that facilitate residential mobility.
– Employment protection legislation that does not impose too heavy or
unpredictable costs on hiring and firing.
• But also policies to help workers adapt to technological
change and cushion the costs of reallocation:
– Promotion of adult and lifelong learning.
– Well-designed social safety nets.
– Portable health and pension benefits.
29
Policies to reallocate scarce resources to
the most productive firms
31. Investment in public research matters…
Public R&D expenditure by type of research system
HERD and GOVERD, as a percentage of GDP, 2012, and total HERD and GOVERD in 2007
Source: OECD, Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 2014, based on OECD, MSTI Database, June
2014, www.oecd.org/sti/msti. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933151601
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
%
HERD GOVERD Total HERD and GOVERD, 2007
32. …as does the mix of policies to induce
private investment...
Direct funding of business R&D and R&D tax incentives,
as a percentage of GDP, 2012
Source: OECD R&D Tax Incentive Indicators, www.oecd.org/sti/rd-tax-stats.htm
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
% Direct funding (grants, loans, procurement)… Indirect funding (R&D tax incentives) Indirect funding (no cost estimate) Total financial support, 2007…
33. Business investment in KBC and tangible assets
(as % of business sector value added, 2010)
Source: OECD calculations based on INTAN-Invest, Eurostat and multiple national sources. 33
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
%
Brand equity, firm-specific human capital, organisational capital R&D and other intellectual property products
Software and databases Non-residential physical assets
…but innovation is more than R&D.
34. Policies to keep the innovation engine
running
34
Est. frontier spillover (%per
annum) associated with 2% point
increase in MFP growth at the
frontier
Higher and more efficient public
investment in basic research.
• Role for international co-operation?
Enhanced U/I collaboration:
• funding, personnel, open science
Public investment to support private
investment in infrastructure
• Broadband, data
Innovation Investment bundles
• Beyond R&D to KBC
Review Innovation Policy Portfolios
• Too generous R&D tax credits?
• 21st Century IPR
35. • OECD (2015), “The Future of Productivity”. OECD, Paris
• Adalet McGowan, M. and D. Andrews (2015a), “Labour Market Mismatch and
Labour Productivity: Evidence from PIAAC Data”, OECD Economics
Department Working Papers, No. 1209.
• Adalet McGowan, M. and D. Andrews (2015b), “Skill Mismatch and Public Policy
in OECD Countries”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1210.
• Andrews, D., C. Criscuolo and P. Gal (2015), “Frontier Firms, Technology
Diffusion and Public Policy: Micro Evidence from OECD Countries”, OECD
Mimeo, forthcoming.
• Calvino, F., C. Criscuolo and C. Menon (2015), “Cross-country Evidence of
Start-Up Dynamics”, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Paper.
• Criscuolo, C., P. Gal and C. Menon (2014), “The Dynamics of Employment
Growth: New Evidence from 18 Countries”, OECD Science, Technology and
Industry Policy Papers, No. 14.
• Saia, A., D. Andrews and S. Albrizio (2015), “Public Policy and Spillovers From
the Global Productivity Frontier: Industry Level Evidence”, OECD Economics
Department Working Papers, No. 1238.
The following reports provide detail on the
results
35
36. Thank you
36
Follow us 0n Twitter:
@OECDinnovation
Website: www.oecd.org/sti
Newsletter: www.oecd.org/sti/news.htm
Contact: Andrew.Wyckoff [at] oecd.org
Read more about our work
The Future of Productivity
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/global-dialogue-on-the-future-of-productivity.htm
Notes de l'éditeur
Methodology:
-- this analysis marshals a wide-range of statistics and varying methodological approaches, most importantly firm-level data, to analyse this problem
-- It is important to recognise that currently available firm-level data sources are not ideal, particularly for analysis of the productivity dynamics of laggard firms.
-- to compensate, the report relies on a mix of critical review of existing evidence, descriptive analysis and when possible, firm level econometric analysis to try to provide insights.
-- Nevertheless, it is reassuring that the results from policy analysis using incomplete firm level data are often confirmed by analysis using official industry level data.
background and a reminder as to why we care so much about productivity growth
Productivity growth slowed in many OECD countries even before the crisis
Concerns of a structural slowing in productivity growth.
Looking back over the last 4 cycles since 1973 (green), 1981 (red), 2000 (orange):
the current cycle, dated to 2008 (grey) has been distinguished by lacklustre investment
Notes: Gross investment, PPP weights, data are for OECD countries for which the breakdown of investment is available.
Knowledge-based capital (KBC) which has been more resilient during the downturn has declined since 2007 as well.
Notes: Sourced from Corrado et al. (2012) … KBC includes R&D, firm specific skills, organizational know-how, databases, design, and various type of intellectual property.
Which is where the new OECD work that I will present fits in:
Analysis led by Chiara Criscuolo (OECD STI) and Dan Andrews (OECD ECO) find evidence to support both views
While Gordon is right about the average which for manufacturing is rather lacklustre, at 1.7% since 2000;
Brynolffson is right about the “most advanced firms” whose productivity is robust at 3.5%;
It is simply that the average is dragged down by the “other firms” at 0.5%
This bifurcation is even more pronounced in services where the average is a low 0.3% while the global frontier is 5.0% and the “other” category is actually negative.
Note that this divergence between the global frontier and the rest has grown over time.
11
12
The paper examines 3 mechanisms for stimulating diffusion
Let’s assume that MFP growth at the frontier is 2% -- roughly the same as the US in the 2nd half of the 1990s
This Figure presents estimates of how the benefits of this productivity growth at the global frontier diffuse to countries, depending on differences in the policy setting for an array of policies.
For example, countries that trade very intensively with the frontier economy (e.g. Canada with the US) would realize 0.35 percentage points higher productivity growth per annum from more rapid diffusion, compared to a country with fewer such trade linkages (e.g. Austria).
Similarly -- higher efficiency of skill allocation, R&D investment and managerial quality have similar effects and these gains are economically significant
I will use this framing...trade, reallocation and KBC…to draw out some policy implications and directions for future work
Notes:
The chart shows how the sensitivity of MFP growth to changes in the frontier leader growth varies with different levels of structural variables. The diamond refers to the estimated frontier spillover effect associated with a 2% MFP growth at the frontier around the average level of the policy. The label “Minimum” (Maximum) indicates the country with the lowest (highest) value for the given structural indicator in a given reference year.
For example, countries that trade intensively with the frontier (Canada) would realise 0.35 percentage points higher productivity growth per annum than a country with fewer linkages (Austria).
16
But if you focus on traditional gross trade you are not getting the right picture.
OECD TIVA
For example: China appears to be the world beater in terms of gross exports of ICT & Electronics (dark blue) = traditional measure, but in terms of value-added (light blue) it falls behind the US.
Also GVCs and the connections that they propagate are an important vector for innovative collaboration:
Those firms that are “innovative” report that collaboration with up-stream suppliers or down-stream clients are the most important source…
19
Pushing the frontier also requires enabling experimentation with radical new technologies and business models.
Since innovation is about trial and error, failure needs to be recognised as an opportunity to learn and rebound, rather than being seen as the end of the game.
Thus, the policy environment should enable successful firms to grow, but also let weak firms exit the market, so that scarce resources can be released to underpin the growth of the successful ones.
The average productivity gap that some countries face can be due to two different factors:
Country A is the Global Frontier to which all aspire;
Country B and C have the same average Productivity, but the distribution across firms is very different – leading to different policy prescriptions
Country B – has a problem of a large gap between the National Frontier and the Global Frontier
reallocation is not the central problem but lack of innovation in general;
Country C – which has the same average productivity as B, has a problem of weak market selection
bad firms are surviving and locking in resources which should be re-allocated to more productive firms
22
23
This likely reflects the inability of firms to grow to scale and the fact that low potential firms can survive when market selection is weak,
with significant cross-country differences emerging in the relative sizes of old and new businesses.
Notice, while French firms enter at almost twice the size of US firms (the blue bar), after 10 years (the square), the size of the firms in the US are basically twice as big; this may be because many French regulations become binding at 50, and incentives are withdrawn
Why does it matter? Because many attributes of being a productive firm come with the additional resources that are commensurate with “scale”
One example – the adoption of Enterprise Resource Planning software (ERPs) like SAP which are the glue that allows SMEs to interconnect with GVCs which have been shown to be a productivity enhancing characteristic.
But the adoption of ERPs are not easy – they can be complex and require specific skills that many SMEs cannot afford.
Not surprisingly SME uptake lags – red line – only about 25% of 10 to 49 employee sized firms have ERP these firms lack the resources
While closer to 80% of large firms (250+); blue line
But what is interesting is that the 50-249 (medium – green line) are at 60% – scale matters.
More generally, those firms that are innovative (patents increase) are more successful at attracting capital (resource re-allocation) when good “framework policies” are in place:
Both under and over skilling
Underskill = shortage; Overskill = allocation problem, underutlised HC;
High rates of skill mismatch often coincide with the presence of many small and old firms.
For example, skill mismatch is estimated to account for up to one-fifth of Italy’s labour productivity gap with the United States.
Yet, the research in this book suggests that around one-quarter of workers report a mismatch between their skills and those required to do their job. A better use of talent could translate into significant labour productivity gains in many OECD economies.
Around one-quarter of workers report a mismatch between their skills and those required to do their job. A better use of talent could translate in up to 10% higher labour productivity in some economies.
However, the most advanced firms often have productivity levels close to the global frontier, but their aggregate impact can be muted if they are small.
High rates of skill mismatch emerge as a key constraint on the growth of innovative firms. On average across countries, roughly one-quarter of workers report a mismatch between their existing skills and those required for their job – i.e. they are either over or under-skilled – but this figure is closer to one-third in Italy, Spain and the Czech Republic (Figure 4). Over-skilling is generally more common than under-skilling, with the average likelihood of being over-skilled roughly two and a half times greater than that of being under-skilled.
When firms draw from a scarce and fixed pool of skilled labour, trapping highly-skilled labour in relatively low productivity firms can make it more difficult for more productive firms to attract the workers necessary for their expansion.
This could close about one-fifth of the gap in labour productivity between Italy and the United States (or Sweden).
31
32
33
Firms at the global frontier are more likely to be part of a MNE group than other firms. This suggests that global co-ordination policy measures might be relevant