1. Causes of separation of East Bangal
Introduction
Bangladesh is a state in an ancient land. It has been described by an American political scientist as “a
country challenged by contradictions”. It is neither a distinct geographical entity, nor a well-defined historical unit.
Nevertheless, it is the homeland of one of the largest nation in the world whose gropings for a political identity were
protracted, intense and agonizing. The key to these apparent contradictions lies in her history.
Historically, the word Bangladesh is derived from the cognate “Vanga” which was first mentioned in the Hindu
scripture Aitareya Aranyaka (composed between 500 B C and 500 A D). It is derived from:-
• The Tibetan word “Bans” which implies “wet and moist”. According to this interpretation, Bangladesh literally
refers to a wetland.
• Bodo (aborigines of Assam) words “Bang” and “la” which connote “wide plains.”
I have divided the history of Bengal in the three periods:-
• Ancient Bengal (326 B.C. to 1204 A.D.)
• Mediaeval Bengal (1204 to 1757)
• British Rule in Bengal (1757 to 1947).
Political Background (1947-1970)
 Transition to Nationhood (1947-58)
Pakistan was born in bloodshed and came into existence on August 15, 1947, confronted by seemingly
insurmountable problems.
• The rehabilitation of 12 million people involved in the mass transfer of population between the two countries.
• Pakistan’s boundaries were established hastily and
• The minimal requirements of a working central government were missing.
• Until 1947 the East Wing of Pakistan, had been heavily dependent on Hindu management. After partition people
from West Pakistan took their place.
• After partition, Muslim banking shifted from Bombay to Karachi.
• Much of the investment in East Pakistan came from West Pakistani banks. Because of this the Bengalis found
themselves excluded from the managerial level and from skilled labor and West Pakistanis tended to favor Urdu-
speaking Biharis.
• Pakistan had a severe shortage of trained administrative personnel. The Muslim Bengalis didn’t have any past
administrative experience because of which high-level posts in Dhaka, were usually filled by West Pakistanis or by
refugees from India who had adopted Pakistani citizenship.
• One of the most divisive issues was the question of what the official language of the new state was to be. Every
province was upset that their language will be a second-class language. In East Pakistan, the dissatisfaction quickly
turned to violence. The Bengalis constituted a majority (an estimated 54 percent) of Pakistan’s entire population. In
1954, the National Assembly designated “Urdu and Bengali and such other languages as may be declared” to be the
official languages of Pakistan.
The government machinery established at independence was similar to the viceregal system that had prevailed in the
pre-independence period. When Quaid-e-Azam died in September 1948, the seat of power shifted from the governor
general to the Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan. After the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan on October 16, 1951,
Pakistan faced an unstable period that would be resolved by military and civil service intervention in political
affairs. The Constituent Assembly was an ineffective body, which took almost nine years to draft a constitution,
which for all practical purposes was never put into effect.
A conservative Bengali, Governor General Khwaja Nazimuddin, succeeded Liaquat Ali Khan as Prime Minister.
Former finance minister Ghulam Mohammad, a Punjabi career civil servant, became governor general.
In 1953 Ghulam Mohammad dismissed Prime Minister Nazimuddin, established martial law in Punjab, and imposed
governor’s rule (direct rule by the central government) in East Pakistan.
In 1954 He appointed his own “cabinet of talents.” Mohammad Ali Bogra, another conservative Bengali and
previously Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States and the United Nations, was named prime minister. Also In
East Pakistan, the Muslim League was overwhelmingly defeated in the provincial assembly elections by the United
Front coalition of Bengali regional parties anchored by Fazlul Haq’s, Krishak Sramik, Samajbadi Dal (Peasants and
Workers Socialist Party) and the Awami League (People’s League) led by Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy. Rejection

2. of West Pakistan’s dominance and the desire for Bengali provincial autonomy were the main ingredients of the
coalition’s twenty-one-point platform.
In September-October 1954 Prime Minister Bogra tried to limit the powers of Governor General Ghulam
Mohammad. The governor general, however, enlisted the tacit support of the army and civil service, dissolved the
Constituent Assembly, and then formed a new cabinet. Bogra, a man without a personal following, remained Prime
Minister but without effective power. General Sikander Mirza, who had been a soldier and civil servant, became
minister of the interior; General Mohammad Ayub Khan, the army commander, became minister of defense; and
Choudhry Mohammad Ali, former head of the civil service, remained minister of finance.
In September, 1955 Bogra fell in August and was replaced by Choudhry; Ghulam Mohammad, plagued by poor
health, was succeeded as governor general in by Mirza.
In 1956 the four provinces of West Pakistan were amalgamated into one administrative unit. Provisions were made
for an Islamic state as embodied in its Directive of Principles of State Policy, which defined methods of promoting
Islamic morality. The national parliament was to comprise one house of 300 members with equal representation
from both the west and east wings.
In September, 1956 Awami League’s Suhrawardy succeeded Choudhry as Prime Minister in and formed a coalition
cabinet. He failed to secure significant support from West Pakistani power brokers. Suhrawardy’s thirteen months in
office came to an end after he took a strong position against abrogation of the existing “One Unit” government for
all of West Pakistan.
In 1957 the president used his considerable influence to out Suhrawardy from the office of Prime Minister. The drift
toward economic decline and political chaos continued.
From 1954 to Ayub’s assumption of power in 1958, the Krishak Sramik and the Awami League waged a ceaseless
battle for control of East Pakistan’s provincial government.
The Revolution of Ayub Khan (1958-66)
Because of the ongoing condition on October 7, 1958, Mirza issued a proclamation that abolished political
parties, abrogated the two-year -old constitution, and placed the country under martial law. On October 27, he swore
in a twelve-member cabinet that included four generals in ministerial positions and the eight civilians. Until 1962,
martial law continued and Ayub purged a number of politicians and civil servants from the government and replaced
them with army officers.
The new constitution promulgated by Ayub in March 1962 has following features:-
• All executive authority of the republic lies with the president.
• As chief executive, the president could appoint ministers without approval by the legislature.
• There was no provision for a Prime Minister.
• There was a provision for a National Assembly and two provincial assemblies, whose members were to be chosen
by the “Basic Democrats.
• Pakistan was declared a republic (without being specifically an Islamic republic) but, in deference to the religious
scholars.
• The president was required to be a Muslim, and no law could be passed that was contrary to the tenets of Islam.
The 1962 constitution made few concessions to Bengalis. Throughout the Ayub years, East Pakistan and West
Pakistan grew farther apart. The death of the Awami League’s Suhrawardy in 1963 gave the mercurial Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman the leadership of East Pakistan’s dominant party. Mujib, who as early as 1956 had advocated the
“liberation” of East Pakistan and had been jailed in 1958 during the military coup, quickly and successfully brought
the issue of East Pakistan’s movement for autonomy to the forefront of the nation’s politics. During the years
between 1960 and 1965:-
• The annual rate of growth of the gross domestic product per capita was 4.4 percent in West Pakistan versus a poor
2.6 percent in East Pakistan.
• Bengali politicians complained that much of Pakistan’s export earnings were generated in East Pakistan by the
export of Bengali jute and tea.
• As late as 1960, approximately 70 percent of Pakistan’s export earnings originated in the East Wing.
• By the mid-1960s, the East Wing was accounting for less than 60 percent of the nation’s export earnings, and by the
time of Bangladesh’s independence in 1971, this percentage had dipped below 50 percent. Mujib demanded in 1966
that separate foreign exchange accounts be kept and that separate trade offices be opened overseas. Also West
Pakistan was benefiting from Ayub’s “Decade of Progress,” with its successful “green revolution” in wheat, and
from the expansion of markets for West Pakistani textiles, while the East Pakistani standard of living remained at an
abysmally low level. Bengalis were also upset that West Pakistan, because it was the seat of government, was the
major beneficiary of foreign aid.

3. Emerging Discontent (1966-70)
In 1966 Mujib announced his controversial six-point political and economic program for East Pakistani provincial
autonomy. He demanded:-
• The government be federal and parliamentary in nature, its members to be elected with legislative representation on
the basis of population.
• The federal government have principal responsibility for foreign affairs and defense only
• Each wing have its own currency and separate fiscal accounts
• Taxation would occur at the provincial level, with a federal government funded by constitutionally guaranteed
grants
• Each federal unit could control its own earning of foreign exchange; and
• Each unit could raise its own militia or paramilitary forces.
Mujib’s six points ran directly counter to President Ayub’s plan for greater national integration.
In January 1968 the government arrested Mujib.
On 1968 Ayub suffered a number of setbacks in. His health was poor, and he was almost assassinated at a ceremony
marking ten years of his rule.
On February 21, 1969, Ayub announced that he would not run in the next presidential election in 1970. A state of
near anarchy reigned with protests and strikes throughout the country.
On March 25,1969, Ayub resigned and handed over the administration to the commander in chief, General Agha
Mohammad Yahya Khan. Yahya announced that he considered himself to be a transitional leader whose task would
be to restore order and to conduct free elections for a new constituent assembly, which would then draft a new
constitution.
On August 1969 Appointment of a largely civilian cabinet.
On November 12, 1970, a cyclone devastated an area of almost 8,000 square kilometers of East Pakistan’s mid-
coastal lowlands and its outlying islands in the Bay of Bengal.
On December 7, 1970 Yahya announced plans for a national election. The elections were the first in the history of
Pakistan in which voters were able to elect members of the National Assembly directly. In the election that
followed, the Awami League won a triumphant victory. The misfortune however was that the Awami League did
not won a single seat in West Pakistan. Similarly, the Pakistan People’s Party did not have a single seat in eastern
wing. At the Bengal Assembly elections, the results were as follows:
At the National Assembly elections, the Awami emerged as the majority party, as the table shows:
The Awami League’s electoral victory promised it control of the government, with Mujib as the country’s prime
minister, but the inaugural assembly never met.
Political Events of 1971
The military, bureaucracy, and business, all West Pakistani-dominated, were shocked at the results because they
faced the prospect that the central government’s power would be passed away to the Bengalis, if the Awami League
were allowed to shape the constitution and form a government. The results of the election gave the Awami League
the possibility of framing the constitution according to its 6-point program. The election put the Pakistani ruling elite

4. in such a position that, if it allowed the democratic process to continue, then it would be unable to stop the Awami
League from framing a constitution that would protect the Bengali interests.
The month of December passed and yet there was no sign of the calling of the assembly.
On the 3rd of January 1971, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman called a mammoth public meeting in which he administered an
oath to the persons who had been elected to the national and provincial assemblies by which they swore allegiance
to the party’s programme for provincial autonomy. Between the election results and this meeting apparently no
effort was made by General Yahya khan to bring the leaders together for consultations, though later when he made
such efforts the Sheikh adopted hard attitude.
By and large most of the parties in the west did openly oppose the six points programme. It has been alleged that
Pakistan people’s party alone did not. On the 7th of January 1971 with this background General Yahya went to East
Pakistan. The evidence suggest that at this stage the presidential team did not have a copy of the six points
programme and no serious efforts were done to convince Sheikh on his six points. Accordingly the meeting was
held. Mujib presented his six pints and asked General Yahya: -
“Sir you know what the six points programme is, please tell me what objections you have to this programme.”
General Yahya said that he himself had nothing against the programme but the west Pakistanis does have some
problems. However, the meeting ended with the reference from General Yahya to the Sheikh as his future prime
minister.
From Dacca the president came to Karachi and on 17th January 1971 went o Larkana to pay a visit to Mr. Bhutto.
After this visit Mr. Bhutto went with some other members of his party to Dacca where he met the Sheikh on the 27th
of January 1971. Mr. Bhutto returned from Dacca really having failed in his mission.
Mr. Bhutto met General Yahya at Rawalpindi on the 11th February 1971, and reported to him the result of the
discussions After this meeting, General Yahya announced that the assembly will met on the 3rd of march 1971.
On the 15th of February, Mr. Bhutto called a press conference in Peshawar and said that the date has come as total
surprise to him. On the 21st February, a convention of the party took an oath to abide by the party decision not to
attend the assembly on the 3rd of March 1971.
On the 22nd of February 1971, the president convened a meeting of the governors and martial law administrators at,
which were present also, some high ranking military and civilian officers. He gave a review of current situation and
the stand of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. It is also a fact that the president took the decision to postpone the national
assembly as early as the 22nd February.
On the 1st of March General Yahya announced the postponement of the national assembly meeting. The East
Pakistanis reacted violently to the postponement and the immediate results were the violent demonstrations and
disturbances in Dacca. The army was called to cope with this situation. Also, on that day Yahya named General
Tikka Khan, as East Pakistan’s military governor.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on the 7th of March 1971 announced a weeklong programme to continue non-cooperation
movement starting on March 2nd.
General Yahya reached Dacca on 15th march and met Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on the same date. The proposals of
Sheikh were:-
• Martial Law is lifted.
• National Assembly will start functioning both as a Constituent assembly and the legislature.
• Power transferred both at national and provincial levels.
The second and third rounds were held on the 17th and 21st of March 1971 respectively. Mr. Bhutto on an invitation
from Dacca on the 19th reached Dacca on the afternoon of the 21st and met the president. The next three days were
occupied with discussions of president aides with the Pakistan People’s Party and the Awami League separately.
On the 23rd March 1971, General Yahya summoned a conference of the leaders at Dacca for the 10th. Again, Mujib
refused to attend and there after General Yahya fixed the 25th for the meeting of the assembly. Bengalis following
Mujib’s lead defiantly celebrated “Resistance Day” in East Pakistan instead of the traditional all-Pakistan “Republic
Day.” The new flag of Bangladesh was hoisted on all government and private buildings.
On the 24th and 25th march, Mr. Bhutto met the president to discuss the proposals of Awami League. On the
evening of the 25th the Pakistan’s People’s Party was informed about the final proposals of Awami League. At
about midnight between the 25th and 26th Dacca was awakened to the nose of gunfire; military crackdown has
started. General Yahya had already left Dacca.
On the 28th June 1971, General Yahya made a broad cast to the nation again in which he spoke with sorrow of the
recent happenings and emphasized once again that his aim had been to restore democracy in the country.
Unfortunately due to the preplanned rebellious act of the Awami League situation as existed immediately after the
military action was as follows:-
• Major portion of the territory of East Pakistan was in rebels hands.

5. • Civil servants were also actively associated with Awami League. A large fled to India or had left their work place.
• Communications had been badly disrupted due to sabotage by the rebels.
• Educational Institutions were the main centers of agitation and resistance.
• It was difficult to apply normal laws of the country.
Military Aspect
The military aspect of the Indo-Pakistan war is naturally the most important part of my report.
THE Military Concept of National Defence
In the war Directive No 4 issued by Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan on 9th August 1967 the National Aim
is:-
“To preserve national security, integrity and the sovereignty of Pakistan, while promoting prosperity and well being
of its people so as to enable the country to find an honorable place on the comity of nations. Within the context of
this main aim and without prejudice to it, continue efforts to secure the rights of self determination for the people of
Kashmir.”
The directive lays down that the mission of the armed forces would be:-
“On commencement of hostilities or as soon as favorable conditions are created or offered, offensive operations will
be undertaken to capture and hold as much enemy territory as possible whilst containing and neutralizing the enemy
forces elsewhere by all means at our disposal in the west. In the East contain and neutralize as many enemy troops
as possible, inflicting maximum casualties without running the risk of annihilation.”
Since the commencement of the political crises and the military action in East Pakistan in March 1971, certain
significant changes had taken place:-
• India had entered into a military alliance with the Soviet Union, thus ensuring substantial supplies of sophisticated
weapons in all fields, and decisively tilting the military balance against Pakistan.
• The prolonged military action in East Pakistan had completely alienated the local population, with the result that the
Pakistan army was faced not only with external aggression, but also with the constant threat of internal subversion.
• India has openly started training forty to fifty thousand guerillas for infiltration into East Pakistan.
• By the month of October and November 1971, India had concentrated on the border of East Pakistan a force
equivalent to nearly twelve divisions.
• The declare objective of India at this juncture was the establishment of Bangladesh by overrunning the capturing
part, if not the whole of East Pakistan.
• The Pakistan Army was stretched in penny-pockets all along the East Pakistan border wit India.
In view of these facts and circumstances, the concept that “the defence of East Pakistan lies in West Pakistan”
needed a serious fresh look by those responsible for the formulation of our defence policy. The first important task
was to hold out in East Pakistan as long as possible so as to enable International community to intervene effectively.
General Yahya and most of his commanders are of the view that allocation of more forces to East Pakistan could not
have produced any different results, as East Pakistan could not be held in any case.
 Area Distribution
The area was divided into three sectors namely-
• Eastern sector consisting of Narsinghdi- Ghorosal- Demra- Narayanganj.
• Northern Sector comprised of area Kaliakair- Rajendrapur- Joydevpur- Tunji
• Western Sector consisted of Damrai- Savar- Mirpur
The southern sector lying between Padma and Buri Ganga was left unprotected because natural obstacles covered
that area.

6. Indian Involvement Before 20th November
The Indian involvement was there right from the beginning, it appears that after the Indians succeeded in
utilizing the refugee problem, to turn international opinion against Pakistan, they got down to the task of planning
more effective involvement. They started the reorganization of defected East Pakistan units and the training of
guerilla force, called Mukti Bahini.
Evidence suggests that Indian activities were intensified from 9th October 1971, when they started intervening
directly. They started accordingly, with shelling and then on 27th October even experimented with chemical
warfare. By 3rd November 1971, the Indian intention of escalating the war became clearly evident from the attacks
o the border outposts by regular troops and rebels. From the above the Indians intentions have been clearly
established but the eastern command was still persisted o the view that the Indians would not have started the war in
east Pakistan if the second front had not been opened in west Pakistan on the 3rd December, 1971.
Events in East Pakistan from 20th November to 3rd December 1971
General Niazi has persistly maintained that till 3rd December they were fighting an undeclared war. They
were coming in deep. Following are the events of this period:-
On the 14th of November 1971 Indian troops had begun to advance into the Chittagong area.
On the 19th November 1971 the eastern command made an alteration in their existing plans by creating an adhoc
division under Maj.-Gen. M. Rahim khan called the 30-A. The area from comilla, downwards to Chittagong,
including the Chittagong Hill tracts was made the area of responsibility of this new division. The Indian regular
troops advanced on Mohammadpur and Saldanadi BOPs and overran them.
On the night 19/20 November 1971 the Indians launched their attack, through Boyra Salient, first in the area of
responsibility of Brig Hayat and captured the border outposts of shahzadpur, Maslia and Charabari.
On 21 November the enemy invaded Atgram border outposts and Zakiganj in the sylhet sector at about 3 am and
both these positions were lost. On 21-22 November 1971 Pachagarh was attacked and out-flanked and the Indians
advanced towards Thakurgaon, which was contacted on 24th November 1971.
From the 23rd to 27th November 1971 the enemy tried to push forward wherever a gap was noticed or positions
appeared to be lightly held. Amar Khana and BaraKhata had to be vacated by 23rd November 1971. Jibanagar was
attacked on 25th with the support of artillery and tank fire. The company placed there, abandoned its position
without offering any resistance. The attack on the Dangpragur came on the 25th of November. New battalions
arrived in Dacca between 25th and 27th November 1971.
In the area Feni, Laksham, Comilla however, the enemy after taking the Belonia salient moved only cautiously and
on 24th November, one Sikh and BSF battalion was reported to be concentrated against Chaudagram. On 25th
November, however the Indian shelled Feni town causing considerable civil casualties.
On 29th November, the enemy heli landed approximately a battalion of troops north of Rangamati in the Chittagong
hill tracts. On the 30th November 1971 Uthali was taken and Darsana was completely encircled. Large columns of
enemy moved about three miles into Pakistan territory and then a regiment launched an attack. By 2nd December
1971 Kot Chandpur was threatened. The main attack on Chaudagram was launched on the night of 3/4th December
1971.
It is interesting that the eastern commander said the planning was to stop the enemy at the approaches of Dacca but
for that also he made no arrangements. No positions were prepared, no troops allocated, no instructions given to
anyone to man any particular position. It was only when our enemy was well in and our own troops were falling
back that desperate efforts began to be made to get troops for this purpose. But then it was too late.
Allout War from 3rd December 1971
On 3rd December, 1971 at 5 Pm our air force made, what has been described as its pre-emptive strike on
the forward airbases of India located at Srinager, Pathankot, Adampur, Amritsar, Halwara, Sirsa and Ambala and
what unfortunate effects it produced in the western theatre, but now how far it is true that if the second front was not
opened, the war in West Pakistan would not have been escalated.

7. The Indians started an all-out war on 20th November 1971 using their own air force where necessary. The
consequences of opening second front were:-
• Indian stepped up their Air activity and bombed and rocketed the Dacca Airfield to make our own air force
ineffective.
• The Indian eastern fleet, which was already positioned in the Bay of Bengal, blockaded the port of Chittagong as
also provided facility to the Indians to bomb Chittagong by their carrier based planed from the sea side.
Therefore I think that eastern command has a misconception that if he second front had not been opened it can
control the enemy on the borders in spite of its own deficiencies. The threat to Dacca materialized from 3rd and 4th
December 1971 when the Mukti Bahini activities were suddenly stepped up and the Indian air force commenced
bombardment. Some of the events after 3rd December 1971 were:-
• The Indian Army launched an attack on 4th December 1971 from the flank on Darsana through which the railway
line also passes and it was situated on a vital line of communication. The defensive position prepared at Bakshiganj
also fell on the evening of 4th December 1971. On the 3rd/4th December the main offensive of the army was
launched in comilla-Noakhali area against chaudagram. On the 4th/5th December the enemy launched a heavy
attack on the southern side of Akhaura and partially overran it. The Indians attacked Munshi Ganj and captured it.
• On the 6th December the enemy reached Mudafarganj and finding it vacant occupied the defensive positions
prepared by our own troops. On the 5th and 6th December the eastern command thought that nothing can stop the
enemy to enter Jessore so they decided to abandon Jessore and go towards Khulna. Also the enemy started moving
towards Comilla from the northeast and on the 7th December encircled the garrison of comilla and also captured the
southern tip of Lalmai. The Afridi task force also fell back on Jhenida between 6th and 7th December 1971 and
started withdrawing under the heavy pressure from the enemy.
• On the 7th of December the enemy entered in Jessore and found it empty and also occupied Jhenida and sent the
brigade towards Maghura and Kushtia. But it suffered a lot. The enemy attacked Haluaghat and our troops fell back
to Phulpur Ferry on 7th December 1971. Similarly our troops because of immense pressure fell back to Jamalpur on
7/8th December 1971. The Sylhet fortress was itself attacked on the 7th December but our forces pushed back the
attack.
• By the 8th or 9th the Brigade succeeded in organizing the troops and those who had exfilterated from the defensive
line. On the 8th the enemy after cutting the Bogra Rangpur road moved towards Ghora Ghat. The enemy captured
Palasbari and increased its pressures towards Bogra by 9th December 1971. The troops were concentrated at
Mymensingh, which was also developed as a fortress but on 10th December the whole brigade was ordered to
withdraw and take up defensive positions on the Gorai Hillocks in the north west of Dacca. The position was so
desperate that on 15th December they were again moved to Tungi.
• The divisional headquarters was shifted from Bogra back to Natore on 11th December 1971. The enemy forces that
had captured Daudkandi, by 10th December 1971 landed a battalion in area east of Sitalakhya opposite Demra. On
the 11th December 1971 another battalion was Para-landed near Tangail and also our troops fell back to Hemu and
pull back to Sylhet. Also the second surrender of the war took place on the 11th December 1971 in the Comilla-
Laksham-Chittagong Area.
• On the 15th of December the enemy outflanked the 107 brigade’s Khulan defences. Also the enemy launched its
troops to cross Madhumati but cease-fire was ordered. The orders for surrendering came on 16th December 1971
and On the 17th December 1971 General Niazi himself surrendered at a disgraceful ceremony held at the Dacca
Race Course the same day.
• All these events show that there was not an organized and planned defence plans. The misconception of the
commander eastern command that India will not launch an all-out war in East Pakistan proved a wrong judgment.
Although there was shortage of resources but those available were not utilized properly. It was a surprise that the
major fortresses were abandoned without a fight. There was no clear plan for the defence of Dacca.
Also I think that although the surrender in East Pakistan was due to the ill planning of eastern command but it was
the duty of the army general headquarters that if the commander eastern wing was not working properly then they
take steps to correct him.
Attitude and Conduct of The Indians in East Pakistan
Indian officers and men on their first contact with the Pakistan armed personnel showed regard and respect
but their attitude hardened within two days of the surrender after the Pakistanis had parted with their personal
weapons and Indians became abrupt and insulting. This attitude was a result of specific instructions from Indian
high command to humiliate Pakistani army in the eyes of East Pakistanis and the Pakistani officers in the eyes of
their own men. The loot was partly planned and organized for the benefit of Indian industrialists who wanted to
acquire jute machinery installed in East Pakistan since 1947.

8. Removal of Personnel from East Pakiatan
The operations for removing the prisoners of war from East Pakistan to Indian camps started almost
immediately after surrender. Most of the POWs believed at the time that their stay in India would be short but the
Indian government had no such intention to permit early repatriation. The senior commanders and staff officers were
immediately separated from the troops and flown out of East Pakistan. The senior officers were interrogated by the
Indian intelligence staff several times to gain knowledge about our organization, equipment and tactics as well as
our future war potential. Most of the officers seem to have talked openly. Our intelligence staff was specially
subjected to grueling examination and even tortured as a result of which the intelligence system of the Pakistan army
may be assumed to have been seriously compromised.
Treatment in India
The treatment meted out to our prisoners of war was typical of a bitterly hostile enemy whose enmity with
Pakistan did not terminate with the fall of East Pakistan and the cessation of hostilities on the western front. The
following measures were adopted by the Indians to damage the future of what remained of Pakistan:-
• Creating parochial feelings particularly between the Pathans and Punjabis who form the main components of the
armed forces.
• Encouraging the inter-district feelings wherever existing.
• Humiliating the officers as a class in the eyes of JCOs and men and encouraging the idea that our armed forces were
poorly led particularly at the higher command.
• Inculcating doubt in the future viability of Pakistan.
• Casting aspersions on the present political leadership of Pakistan and encouraging the idea that NAP provided the
best solution to the problems of the subcontinent.
• Undermining the martial spirit of the Pakistani people and projecting the idea that the victorious Hindu has proved
that he is as good, if not better soldier than the Muslim.
• Projecting India as a new super military power with which Pakistan cannot hope to compete suggesting that it would
be best for the latter to submit.
The Indians did their best in these designs but being not so well versed in the techniques of subversion and due to
the lack of proper organization and trained staff I feel they failed to achieve their aim.
Repatriation
Most of the POWs were repatriated to Pakistan during the period of January to March 1974 after spending
more than two years in the Indian Camps. The Pakistan government, the armed forces, television and press gave
them a good reception and the honor, as they are a victorious force. Such actions can have serious repercussions on
the future of the nation in general and armed forced in particular.
Conclusion
In the end of the report this is the summary of conclusions on the causes of surrender of East Pakistan. I
think that the defeat suffered by the armed forces of Pakistan was not merely the result of military factors alone but
had been brought about as the cumulative result of political, international, moral and military factors.
• The direct and devastating effects of political situation during the military regime itself were the prolonged
involvement of army in counter insurgency measures throughout the province and forces deployment along the
borders. Due to these factors the army was fighting a losing battle from the very start.
• The major role in the 1971 disaster had been that of the ground forces and the strategic concept required revision in
the light of the situation but the army high command did not carried out the in-depth analysis.
• The planning was hopelessly defective and there was no plan for some important areas like Dacca.
• There was no order to surrender but that in view of the desperate picture painted by the commander eastern
command the higher authorities only gave him permission to surrender.
• The responsibility of these failures lies with the commander eastern command the GHQ cannot escape its
responsibility as the plan had been approved by it. It was also the responsibility of the GHQ to correct the mistakes
of the eastern command.
• There was a lack of moral character and courage in the senior army commanders.
The surrender in East Pakistan has indeed been a tragic blow to the nation. By the act of surrender the image of
Pakistan army as an efficient and excellent fighting force stood shattered. The situation that resulted in the
movement for independence was also responsible i-e the economic exploitation of East Pakistan in the hands of
West. I can only hope that the nation has learnt the necessary lessons from these tragic events.

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