U.S. Navy in WWII: Allied Offensive in North Africa

The U.S. Navy in World War II
session vi-The Allied Offensive against North Africa

a Catalina (PBY) captain at 19, the youngest
trained at Dorval (Canada) Ferry Command
my next-door neighbor

John Narburgh

“…delivering aircraft across the South Atlantic
was becoming a major part of the war effort…
“as American troops advanced from Morocco
towards British and Commonwealth troops
advancing from Egypt….

“…delivering aircraft across the South Atlantic
was becoming a major part of the war effort…
“as American troops advanced from Morocco
towards British and Commonwealth troops
advancing from Egypt….
“All US-manufactured a/c used in those
theaters were ﬂown to Africa via a number of
US bases that had been rapidly built down
through the Caribbean along the coast of
South America as far as Recife, Brazil,…
“then across to Ascension Island in the middle
of the South Atlantic, then ﬁnally to Accra or
Takoradi [in the Br. colony of Gold Coast/
Ghana] on the West Coast of Africa.”
op. cit., p. 88

the a/c which he ferried
PBY 5-A, equipped with wheels which could be extended for airport landings

DC-3 (military designation C-47, nickname Dakota)

later, B-25, Mitchell

B-26, Marauder or Widowmaker

B-26, Marauder or Widowmaker
A-20 Boston, like the British Mosquito

major topics in this session
strategic and political plans and preparations
tactical plans and preparations
Morocco
Algeria
Tunisia

Text
I. Strategic and Political Plans and Preparations
the big picture

–Captain B. H. Liddell Hart
“In strategy the longest way round is often the shortest way there; a direct approach
to the object exhausts the attacker and hardens the resistance by compression,
whereas an indirect approach loosens the defender's hold by upsetting his balance.”!

“…the Clausewitz of the 20th century”
1914-(age 18)-volunteered at war’s outbreak,
became an officer in the King’s Own Yorkshire Light
Infantry. Served two years on the Western Front
July 1916-(20) saw his battalion annihilated in the
Somme offensive, was invalided out with gas
injuries
wrote prolifically in the interwar period on military
history, military theory and the philosophy of war
most famous for his influential concept of the
indirect approach
Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart!
1895 – 1970

“…the Clausewitz of the 20th century”
1914-(age 18)-volunteered at war’s outbreak,
became an officer in the King’s Own Yorkshire Light
Infantry. Served two years on the Western Front
July 1916-(20) saw his battalion annihilated in the
Somme offensive, was invalided out with gas
injuries
wrote prolifically in the interwar period on military
history, military theory and the philosophy of war
most famous for his influential concept of the
indirect approach
direct attacks against an enemy firmly in position almost
never work and should never be attended
to defeat the enemy one must first upset his equilibrium,
which is not accomplished by the main attack, but must be
done before the main attack can succeed
My copy for Naval Leadership class!
1961

“In World War I, at the First Battle of the Marne, the British and French armies only by the
narrowest margin had stopped the initial German drive. Shortly afterward the Western Front had
settled down into a four-year stalemate. Continental strategy eventually won the war for the Allies,
but only at a terrible cost of lives and treasure. The British Empire alone lost nearly a million men.
To outflank the Western Front, Winston Churchill had advocated peripheral strategy [B H Liddell
Hart’s indirect approach-jbp] in the form of a campaign to seize Constantinople. The…attempt
failed both within the Dardanelles and among the rocky crags• of Gallipoli,
Potter and Nimitz, Sea Power. 1960. p. 565.

failed both within the Dardanelles and among the rocky crags• of Gallipoli, but in the years
following World War I military analysts had concluded Churchill’s plan was strategically sound—
that it failed through poor Allied planning, through a series of avoidable Allied errors,

failed both within the Dardanelles and among the rocky crags• of Gallipoli, but in the years
following World War I military analysts had concluded Churchill’s plan was strategically sound—
that it failed through poor Allied planning, through a series of avoidable Allied errors, and as a
result of the foresight and initiative of Liman von Sanders [the Kaiser’s advisor to the Turkish
army-jbp].”

“In World War II also, the war in the West had begun with a German drive aimed at the quick
defeat of France. This time the Germans succeeded..Churchill, the advocate of peripheral strategy
in World War I, returned to the same concept as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense in World
War II. After the fall of France and the evacuation of the British army, he had no stomach for a
return to western Europe—at least until Germany was greatly weakened….On the other hand,
Britain possessed ample naval power. In the circumstances, Churchill and the British Chiefs of
Staff limited their offensive against the Axis powers to air attacks on German industries and
communications, to attacks on German and Italian naval forces, …to the Egyptian campaign, to
distant attacks at Dakar and Madagascar, and to operations in Greece and Crete and probes at St.
Nazaire and Dieppe. When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, Churchill announced: ‘We shall give
whatever help we can to Russia and the Russian people.’ Thus Britain was reviving two of the main
features of Pitt’s Plan [of 1758 during the Seven Years War-jbp] : lending all possible material
support to allies on the Continent, while using her naval power to support operations around the
enemy’s continental position and beyond the seas. In other words, the British were reverting to
their strategy of the Seven Years War and the first three coalitions against revolutionary and
Napoleonic France.”
Ibid.
result of the foresight and initiative of Liman von Sanders.

“Soviet leaders, from the moment they found themselves in the war on the side of the British,
opposed the concept of peripheral strategy, demanding a ‘Second Front Now.’ ….
op. cit, pp. 565-566.
Napoleonic France.

opposed the concept of peripheral strategy, demanding a ‘Second Front Now.’ When the U.S.
entered the war [six months later], the American Joint Chiefs of Staff • (hereafter, JCS), ….”
op. cit, pp. 565-566.
Napoleonic France.

opposed the concept of peripheral strategy, demanding a ‘Second Front Now.’ When the U.S.
entered the war [six months later], the American Joint Chiefs of Staff • (hereafter, JCS), Gen.
Marshall, in particular, • also insisted on an early return of Allied forces to France. What Marshall
proposed was to seize a beachhead in France in the late summer of 1942, Operation
SLEDGEHAMMER. This was to be followed in 1943 by a major invasion, Operation ROUNDUP, and a
drive into Germany, involving a double envelopment of the Ruhr—as was actually carried out in
1944-45. In preparation for SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP, the JCS gave top priority to the
production of landing…craft (hereafter l/c) and began sending troops to Britain. But the British
Chiefs, after tentatively accepting the American plan, turned it down.”
op. cit, pp. 565-566.
Napoleonic France.

“ ‘The criticism of Sledgehammer is that we had so little and that it could virtually
have been destroyed,’ argued George Marshall after the war. ‘This overlooks the fact
that the Germans had little in the West and that little was of poor quality.’ It was true;
the Germans had only twenty-five divisions ready to repel Sledgehammer in 1942, but
over twice that number in France and the Low Countries in 1944. Marshall continued: ‘I
thought I had a firm commitment on Roundup,’ but in Washington ‘the backing of the
President weakened.’ ”
Andrew Roberts, Masters and Commanders. p. 219

“ …the situation prevailing in April 1942, ‘it was not possible to take Marshall’s
‘castles in the air’ too seriously! It must be remembered that we were at that time
literally hanging on by our eye-lids!’ With Australia and India under threat by the
Japanese, a temporary loss of control in the Indian Ocean [Repulse, Prince of Wales
12/41—jbp], Germany threatening Iranian and Iraqi oil supplies, Auchinleck hard pressed
in the Western Desert, and the battle of the Atlantic hanging in the balance, ‘We were
desperately short of shipping and could stage no large scale operations without
additional shipping. This shipping could only be obtained by opening the Mediterranean
and saving a million tons of shipping through the elimination of the Cape route [the WS
convoys—jbp]. To clear the Mediterranean, North Africa must be cleared first.’ ”—Brooke,
after the war
Andrew Roberts, op. cit. p. 160
Why the Emphasis on North Africa?

“Yet something had to be done in 1942. The Germans on the Russian front reconquered the
territory lost in the winter and thrust toward Stalingrad….There they could disrupt the flow of oil
from the Caucasus and block American and British supplies to Russia via the Persian Gulf route. In
North Africa, Rommel’s tanks, forging ahead toward the Egyptian delta, appeared to have
momentum that would carry them through to Cairo and the Suez Canal.
Potter, op. cit, p. 566.
plan, turned it down.

“Churchill proposed an invasion of western North Africa….Tunisia, Algeria,
Morocco and French West Africa, though loyal to the Vichy…government, were
not occupied by the Germans. If the area were [sic] brought over to the Allies,
Rommel could be trapped between the invading forces and the British Eighth
Army, Malta could be relieved, and the Med could be reopened to Allied shipping,
with a consequent saving of crucially short merchant tonnage. Moreover, bases
would be secured for attacks on Italy and elsewhere in Southern Europe, a French
army might be mustered for action against the Axis, and phosphates and other
resources would be denied the enemy.”
Ibid.
momentum that would carry them through to Cairo and the Suez Canal.

“The venture was risky enough to satisfy the boldest. Much necessarily depended on the
unpredictable reaction of the North African French. Because of the British attacks on French naval
forces at Mers-el-Kebir and Dakar in 1940, the Germans had permitted the French to assemble and
equip a defense force of 120,000 men, 350 planes of fair quality, more than 200 tanks, a sizable
amount of light artillery and mortars, and naval units which included the modern battleship
Richelieu and a cruiser-destroyer force at Dakar….The unfinished battleship Jean Bart….If all
these forces fought with determination, and if the Germans moved into Spanish and French bases
to assist them, cutting the Allied supply route at Gibraltar, it appeared to many Allied staff officers
that the invasion might be defeated. But it seemed more probable that the Franco government
would resist a German entry into Spain and that many of the French units, if they fought at all,
would put up only a token resistance. Success however hinged as much on political as on military
and naval factors.
“Within the limits imposed by the need for secrecy…,everything possible was done to insure a
favorable French reaction to the landings….Since 1941 a corps of consular officials…had been
cultivating the good will and cooperation of leading French political and military figures in North
Africa….They also had been collecting intelligence concerning beach defenses, surf conditions,
roads, bridges and other information essential to the success of the landings. Two weeks before the
invasion….”
op. cit, pp. 567-568.
Strategic and Political Plans and Preparations

“The venture was risky enough to satisfy the boldest. Much necessarily depended on the
unpredictable reaction of the North African French. Because of the British attacks on French naval
forces at Mers-el-Kebir and Dakar in 1940, the Germans had permitted the French to assemble and
equip a defense force of 120,000 men, 350 planes of fair quality, more than 200 tanks, a sizable
amount of light artillery and mortars, and naval units which included the modern battleship
Richelieu and a cruiser-destroyer force at Dakar….The unfinished battleship Jean Bart….If all
these forces fought with determination, and if the Germans moved into Spanish and French bases
to assist them, cutting the Allied supply route at Gibraltar, it appeared to many Allied staff officers
that the invasion might be defeated. But it seemed more probable that the Franco government
would resist a German entry into Spain and that many of the French units, if they fought at all,
would put up only a token resistance. Success however hinged as much on political as on military
and naval factors.
“Within the limits imposed by the need for secrecy…,everything possible was done to insure a
favorable French reaction to the landings….Since 1941 a corps of consular officials…had been
cultivating the good will and cooperation of leading French political and military figures in North
Africa….They also had been collecting intelligence concerning beach defenses, surf conditions,
roads, bridges and other information essential to the success of the landings. Two weeks before the
invasion…Maj. Gen. Mark W. Clark USA • landed from a British submarine to meet with pro-
Allied French commanders in a secret conference near Algiers.”
op. cit, pp. 567-568.
picture in 1943

“Allied French commanders in a secret conference near Algiers. Without being given the exact
date, the French were told that the assault was coming and were urged to disrupt anti-invasion
plans when the operation began….On the eve of the attack therefore there were grounds for hope
that many French army and air force units were “fixed.”
“There was no success in winning over the French navy beforehand however, and that was
especially serious because the coastal batteries were manned by naval personnel. With few
exceptions the Navy was tenaciously loyal to Adm. François Darlan,• now Cinc of the Armed
Forces of Vichy France.…”
op. cit, p. 568.

“Allied French commanders in a secret conference near Algiers. Without being given the exact
date, the French were told that the assault was coming and were urged to disrupt anti-invasion
plans when the operation began….On the eve of the attack therefore there were grounds for hope
that many French army and air force units were “fixed.”
“There was no success in winning over the French navy beforehand however, and that was
especially serious because the coastal batteries were manned by naval personnel. With few
exceptions the Navy was tenaciously loyal to Adm. François Darlan,• now Cinc of the Armed
Forces of Vichy France. As a dynamic leader who had brought the Marine to the peak of
efficiency, Darlan could both legally and morally command the allegiance of all French forces in
North Africa….A few weeks before the landings, Darlan sent feelers to [U.S. Consul-General
Robert Murphy] suggesting negotiations. Murphy favored [this], but the State Department, deeply
distrusting the Vichy government, feard that such contacts would lead to leaks….Only three days
before D-day however, Darlan flew to Algiers to be at the bedside of his sick son. Thus purely by
chance he was well placed to exercise an immediate influence on…events. This totally unexpected
development was to prove fortunate for the Allies.”
op. cit, p. 568.
picture in 1937
picture in 1942

Text
II. Tactical Plans and Preparations
the details

Strategy & Politics = the big picture
Tactics = the details

PERMAC
Mnemonic for Amphib Warfare
as taught at the U S Navy Amphibious Warfare School, Little Creek, VA
in the summer of 1960

PERMAC
Preparation
Embarcation
Rehearsal
Movement to the Objective
Assault
Consolidation of the Beachhead

PERMAC
Preparation
Embarcation
Rehearsal
Movement to the Objective
Assault
Consolidation of the Beachhead
founded 16 July 1942
to train for Operation
Torch

“No sooner had one great argument between the British and Americans ended than
the next ones began, primarily over the issues of where, when and how to carry out
Operation Torch. Marshall • wanted to land on the Atlantic coast near Casablanca, and
gradually move eastwards along the coast towards Algiers, whereas Brooke • wanted to
land at Casablanca and Algiers but also further east too, indeed as far to the east as
possible, in order swiftly to gain control over the vital channel between Tunisia and
Sicily, over which the Afrika Korps was resupplied.… ”

“No sooner had one great argument between the British and Americans ended than
the next ones began, primarily over the issues of where, when and how to carry out
Operation Torch. Marshall • wanted to land on the Atlantic coast near Casablanca, and
gradually move eastwards along the coast towards Algiers, whereas Brooke • wanted to
land at Casablanca and Algiers but also further east too, indeed as far to the east as
possible, in order swiftly to gain control over the vital channel between Tunisia and
Sicily, over which the Afrika Korps was resupplied. The final compromise, which was to
attack at eight points along the North and North-west African coast, three near
Casablanca, two near Oran and three near Algiers • — but nothing further eastwards —
came about only once Roosevelt and Churchill intervened. ”

“Because the war against the European Axis was primarily an army responsibility, it was from
beginning to end commanded on the highest military level by an army officer, and naval forces
were assigned to the Army as needed. As a result the Army dominated joint operations2 (hereafter,
ops), and the Navy deferred to the Army’s desires, even in amphibious (hereafter, amphib)
assaults. This situation contrasted with that in the Pacific…, where the top command was naval,
and army units were assigned to the Navy as needed. As a result amphib ops developed along
somewhat different lines in the two theaters.
“Planning and preparation for Operation TORCH were complicated by division of command and
shortage of time. From his London headquarters (hereafter, HQ) Gen.Eisenhower and his British-
American staff directed the detailed planning for the assaults on Algiers and Oran. But because the
forces for Morocco were to stage from the U.S., plans and preparations for this phase of TORCH
were left to the JCS. Gen. Marshall delegated the planning for the landing force to the War
Department, which delegated the detailed planning to Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., Cdr.
Western Task Force.…”
Sea Power, pp. 568-569.
Tactical Plans and Preparations
________________
2 In American terminology a joint operation is one carried out by elements of more than one armed service of the same
nationality; a combined operation is one carried out by forces of two or more nations. The British use the term combined for
both sorts of operations.

Western Task Force.….”
USMA, ’09
1885-1945

Western Task Force.• Adm. King delegated the fleet-level planning…to Adm. Ingersoll, CincLant,
who delegated the detailed planning to RAdm. Kent Hewitt,• the prospective Cdr of the Western
Naval Task Force (TF 34)….”

Western Task Force.• Adm. King delegated the fleet-level planning…to Adm. Ingersoll, CincLant,
who delegated the detailed planning to RAdm. Kent Hewitt,• the prospective Cdr of the Western
Naval Task Force (TF 34)….”
USNA, ’06
1887-1972

“In practice, planning and preparation for the Moroccan attack were closely integrated, as
indeed they had to be for so organic an op as an amphib assault.…Then to achieve final
coordination, Patton’s staff moved to Hewitt’s HQ at Ocean View [shore front on Hampton Roads,
Little Creek, and the USN base-jbp], near Norfolk, VA. Because Hewitt, prior to assuming
command of TF-34, was Cdr Amphib Force Atlantic Fleet, (Comphiblant), the amphib training for
the Moroccan landing force was directed from his HQ.
“On 13 Oct 42 the JCS issued to all commands concerned with the Moroccan op their own
high-level plan, titled ‘Joint Army-Navy Plan for Participation in Operation Torch.’ It provided
that, once the expedition got under way, there should in each phase be a single commander at both
the theater [a military term meaning area, e.g., ETO=European Theater of Operations-jbp] and the
local level. For the first time in modern history a large-scale joint op was to be under unified
command throughout.3 Command relations were set forth as follows:”
op. cit, p. 569.
Naval Task Force (TF 34)….
refer to handout, “Joint Army-Navy Plan
for Participation in Operation Torch”
________________
3 The American invasion of Guadalcanal the preceding August had been under unified command, but that was not a joint
operation because the landing force was composed of marines. The admiral commanding the amphib force was and remained
senior to the general commanding the landing force. This chain of command was retained in the U.S. Pacific Fleet even after
army units were attached.

“The point particularly to be noted is that in place of the traditional system in amphib ops,
whereby the general commanding the landing force and the admiral commanding the naval
support force remained independent and coequal throughout the op, first Adm. Hewitt and then
Gen. Patton would be in overall command….Though the provision…was written only into the
directive for the Western TF, it became the model for subsequent directives in the ETO.
“The plans for the three main landings…were similar in purpose and outline. The objective…
was to hurl a large army and air force against a well equipped foe, for even if the French put up no
resistance, German and Italian reinforcements were sure to be rushed to Africa.…”
op. cit, p. 570.
command throughout.3 Command relations were set forth as follows:
________________

“The point particularly to be noted is that in place of the traditional system in amphib ops,
whereby the general commanding the landing force and the admiral commanding the naval
support force remained independent and coequal throughout the op, first Adm. Hewitt and then
Gen. Patton would be in overall command….Though the provision…was written only into the
directive for the Western TF, it became the model for subsequent directives in the ETO.
“The plans for the three main landings…were similar in purpose and outline. The objective…
was to hurl a large army and air force against a well equipped foe, for even if the French put up no
resistance, German and Italian reinforcements were sure to be rushed to Africa. Since nothing like
the huge volume required to sustain the invasion forces, 600-700 tons daily per division
[emphasis added-jbp] , could be handled across beaches, it was essential to seize well-developed
ports with ample berthing, unloading and stowage facilities.”
op. cit, p. 570.
command throughout.3 Command relations were set forth as follows:
________________
CASABLANCA
ALGIERS

Ibid.
ports with ample berthing, unloading and stowage facilities. But because direct assault inside
harbors in the teeth of harbor defenses was infeasible without prohibitive losses, plans called for
units to be landed on open beaches near the coastal cities so that their harbors could be taken
from the flanks and rear.”

Ibid.
taken from the flanks and rear. The troops would be carried to positions off the beaches in combat-
loaded*…”
_____________
* “combat-loaded” means that the transports and landing craft have units of men and material ready for combat. Each unit,
from squad level on up has the weapons, ammunition, rations, communication gear &c. ready to function for several days.
This is in contrast to putting the food for a company in one boat, the ammunition in another, &c. This way, if one boat/ship is
lost, there is minimal “ripple effect.” For instance, you don’t have a whole battalion with everything it needs, except
ammunition, and is, therefore, useless.

Ibid.
loaded* assault transports,•…”

Ibid.
loaded* assault transports,• and then transferred with their equipment to landing craft to be put ashore
in surprise night landings. Gunnery ships and naval a/c would support the flanking drives of the troops
while landing craft shuttled in reinforcements and supplies until the ports were secured and ready for
use Since the best chance for the enemy to defeat the onslaught was to deny the ports, and consequently
the supplies, needed to build up large forces, it was vital to take the harbors as quickly and with as little
damage as possible….special units were assigned to dash in at the start of the attacks and seize port
facilities at all three objectives. Simple in concept, complex in detail,…”

Ibid.
personnel & admin logistics intelligence operations

Ibid.
loaded* assault transports,• and then transferred with their equipment to landing craft to be put ashore
in surprise night landings. Gunnery ships and naval a/c would support the flanking drives of the troops
while landing craft shuttled in reinforcements and supplies until the ports were secured and ready for
use Since the best chance for the enemy to defeat the onslaught was to deny the ports, and consequently
the supplies, needed to build up large forces, it was vital to take the harbors as quickly and with as little
damage as possible….special units were assigned to dash in at the start of the attacks and seize port
facilities at all three objectives. Simple in concept, complex in detail,• the hastily drawn plans served as
a model for organizing further assaults in the ETO.”

Ibid.
a model for organizing further assaults in the ETO.
“ The training of the assault forces was beset with miriad difficulties. Few of the land, sea, or air
forces…were completely ready when the attack was ordered, nor did it seem likely in the scant five
months until D-day that they could be properly trained….
“Fortunately for the Allies, the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Navy entered the war with a
developed amphibious doctrine and training program. And though the [USMC was] committed to the
Pacific, the U.S. Army had commenced training based in part on [its] doctrine. During 1941 and early
1942 three American infantry divisions trained with the marines in the U.S. Other infantry divisions,
dispatched to Great Britain, trained amphibiously with British forces in Scotland and Northern Ireland.”

op. cit., pp. 570-571.
dispatched to Great Britain, trained amphibiously with British forces in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
In the time available however, it was not possible to train sufficient U.S. Army units to undertake all
three North African landings. In view of the French attitude it would have been desirable to make the
invasion an all-American show, but British troops had to make up the major part of the easternmost
force, operating against Algiers.
“ By later standards the training both for the initial landings and the subsequent combat fell far
short….training for crews for transports and landing craft was especially deficient…simply not enough
time….Landing craft were crucial items….Because of a failure to enlist small craft sailors…the Navy
hastily assembled some 3,000 recruits, who commenced small craft training in June 1942.

LCVP training-1, cargo nets
For Extra Credit
who are the two
anti-heroes below
and who drew
them?

op. cit., pp. 570-571.
hastily assembled some 3,000 recruits, who commenced small craft training in June 1942.
“German U-boat activity worsened matters by forcing the landing exercises…into the sheltered
waters of Chesapeake Bay at Solomons, MD. As a result landing craft crews were unable to gain much
needed experience in handling their craft in a heavy surf….

LCVP training-2, Broaching (getting slapped sideways by the surf)

LCVP training-2, Broaching (getting slapped sideways by the surf)
Broached

Solomons
Calvert Co.
MD During World War II, the island was chosen by the
Allied command as the site for training
amphibious invasion forces. … Three naval bases
were established at the mouth of the nearby
Patuxent River. These three facilities made a
major contribution to the war eﬀort and brought
new jobs to local residents. Between 1942 and
1945, the population of Solomons increased from
263 to more than 2,600. Over 60,000 troops
trained at Solomons during the war.

On Watch
(Commemorating The
World War II U.S. Naval
Amphibious Training
Base, Solomons,
Maryland, 1942-1945)by
artist Antonio Tobias
Mendez (2007 bronze).

PERMAC
PERMAC
Consolidation of the
beachhead

op. cit., pp. 570-571.
needed experience in handling their craft in a heavy surf….
We’ve been looking at the landing craft boats for the 5th phase,
Assaulting the beachhead. Now it’s time to look at phase 6,
Consolidation of the beachhead.
Developed in time for TORCH, the ship [deﬁnition-“ship” vs “boat”=
Except for subs, boats are carried aboard ships] par excellence for
consolidation—the LCI (L)

LCI (L)-Landing Craft, Infantry (large)
158 ft
23 ft
draft fwd 5 ft 4 in
draft aft 5 ft 11 in

Training in England for TORCH

Earlier-1-350 LCIs
square pilot house
Later-351 and higher LCIs
round pilot house

Coastie
Notice the depth
indication—
the bow has run up
so that it’s beached
in about 1 ft of water

Text
Normandy, D + 1
Phase vi-Consolidation of the Beachhead

Potter, op. cit., p. 571.
“needed experience in handling their craft in a heavy surf…..The Army’s historian concludes: ‘Training
for the amphibious operations in French North Africa … fell short of what was desired and perhaps
below the requirements for victory over a well-armed and determined foe.’ The massive assault forces
that got under way from Britain …

that got under way from Britain…
Roskill, op. cit., v. ii.

that got under way from Britain and the United States knew that the French were not particularly well
armed. They had yet to find out if they were determined.
UGF-1
ﬁrst of the eastbound fast convoys
over 100 ships of TF-34 bound for
Casablanca, 24 Oct-8 Nov 42
Wikipedia

The British Master Mind 1898 (age 15)-Midshipman, RN
1915 (28)-his ﬁrst command in the Dover Patrol. Later (1918), as captain of the
destroyer HMS Broke, he would follow up Adm. Keyes’ raid on Zeebrugge with
a raid on Ostend
1938 (55)-he retired, but was coaxed out of retirement the next year by soon-
to-be First Lord of the Admiralty Churchill
24 August 1939-promoted to Vice-Admiral, he was placed in charge of the
Dover area of operations. His duties included overseeing the defence against
possible destroyer raids, the protection of cross-Channel military trafﬁc and the
denial of the passage through the Straits of Dover by submarines
27 May-4 June 1940-as Vice-Admiral Dover, he was responsible for the
Dunkirk evacuation, codenamed Operation Dynamo. Working from the
underground tunnels beneath Dover Castle, he and his staff worked for nine
days straight to rescue troops trapped in France by the German forces
then he was immediately faced with the enormous problems of defending the
waters off Dover from the expected German invasion. For nearly two years, he
commanded forces striving to maintain control against the Germans
he was to be appointed the Naval Force Commander for the invasion of
Europe on 29 April 1942, but the invasion was postponed and he was
transferred to become deputy Naval commander of the Allied invasion of North
Africa. Under the Allied Naval Commander of the Expeditionary Force, Sir
Andrew Cunningham, Ramsay planned the British landing efforts
Admiral Sir Bertram Home Ramsay !
KCB, KBE, MVO !
1883 – 1945

Text
III. Morocco
American landings in French Morocco;
8 November 1942

PERMAC
PERMAC
Movement to the objective

“The Western Naval Task Force [TF 34], commanded by Adm. Hewitt in heavy cruiser Augusta
[CA-31],• comprised 102 warships, transports and auxiliaries which, when united at sea, covered
more than 500 mi.2….• To mislead the enemy, the northern and southern attack groups sortied
from Hampton Roads on 23 Oct and took a southerly course. The next day the Center Attack
Group left Hampton Roads and took a northeasterly course as if headed for Britain. These groups
later united and were joined on the 27th by a Covering Group sailing from Casco Bay, ME; this
group included the new fast battleship Massachussetts [BB-59] • and two heavy cruisers [CAs].
An Air Group…comprising the aircraft carrier Ranger [CV-4],• four escort carriers [CVEs] newly
converted from tankers, and a screen of a light cruiser [CL] and nine destroyers [DDs]., joined the
force on the 28th in mid-ocean.”
op. cit, p. 571.
Morocco: The Approach
1931-1959
12 May 1942-1947
1934 - 1946

[CA-31],…”
op. cit, p. 571.
1931-1959

“The Western Naval Task Force [TF 34], commanded by Adm. Hewitt in heavy cruiser
Augusta [CA-31], comprised 102 warships, transports and auxiliaries which, when united at sea,
covered more than 500 mi.2….
op. cit, p. 571.

op. cit, p. 571.
12 May 1942-1947
group included the new fast battleship Massachussetts [BB-59]…”

op. cit, p. 571.
1934 - 1946
group included the new fast battleship Massachussetts [BB-59] • and two heavy cruisers [CAs].
An Air Group…comprising the aircraft carrier Ranger [CV-4],• four escort carriers [CVEs] newly
converted from tankers, and a screen of a light cruiser [CL] and nine destroyers [DDs]., joined the
force on the 28th in mid-ocean.”

Route Chart of
TASK FORCE “HOW”
23 October —- 8 November, 1942
LEGEND
! COVERING GROUP
! TRANSPORTS AND CARGO
VESSELS WITH ESCORT
! AIR GROUP
! COMBINED GROUP
! SPLIT UP FOR LANDINGS
Hampton Roads
Casco Bay
Bermuda
27 Oct
28 Oct

“…[TF 34] neared the African coast in a strong [from the] northwest wind that raised heavy
seas. [In a preview of the D-day, Adm Hewitt had to anguish over the call to go ahead] As the task
force approached Morocco, the men were cheered by the news of…the great British victory at El
Alamein on 5 Nov. On 7 Nov the Southern Attack Group turned south toward the small phosphate
port of Safi [6,500 troops, 90 medium and light tanks]….The Center Attack Group headed for the
small port of Fedala [19,500 troops, 79 light tanks] to advance on Casablanca from the north. The
Northern Attack Group shaped course for the coastal village of Mehdia to land 9,000 troops and
65 light tanks to capture the airfield at nearby Port Lyautey. The landings at Safi and Mehdia were
expected also to tie down French units that might otherwise close in on the main landing at Fedala.
The Covering Group moved toward Casablanca itself to take under fire ny naval forces that tried
to leave the harbor. The Air Group divided in order to support all three landings: one CVE to Safi,
2 to Mehdia, the Ranger and one CVE to Fedala and Casablanca, only 15 miles apart.”
op. cit, pp. 571-572.

PERMAC
PERMAC
Assault the beachhead

and Blue 2—assigned to one of the four battalion landing
teams. A 0335, the scout boats were to begin flashing
flashlights seaward. At 0350, they were to ignite colored
flares….”
op. cit, p. 573.
Morocco: The Main Assault
LOD

and Blue 2—assigned to one of the four battalion landing
teams. A 0335, the scout boats were to begin flashing
flashlights seaward. At 0350, they whereto ignite colored
flares. At H-hour, 0400, the landing craft, on signal from the
control destroyers,• would head for their assigned beaches,
accompanied by support boats armed with machine guns and
guided by the flares in the scout boats.”
op. cit, p. 573.
LOD

Big Mistake!
Can you say SNAFU!
Can you say FUBAR!

“As the Center Group transports, accompanied by cruisers
Augusta and Brooklyn and ten DDs, headed in toward their
anchorage,…”
Ibid.

anchorage,• the Fedala assault plan began to come apart. An
unexpected current carried the Center Group off course,
necessitating a series of emergency turns. The first line of
transports, those carrying the initial assault forces, reached
the anchorage shortly before midnight,…”
Ibid.

the anchorage shortly before midnight,• but by then the rest of
the transports…”
Ibid.

the transports • were straggling badly out of position. As a
result the landing craft from these vessels were late in
reaching their assigned transports or never found them at all.
The schedule was further retarded by the troops, who,
overloaded with 60 pound packs, debarked very slowly down
the landing nets into the pitching boats…”
Ibid.

the landing nets into the pitching boats.• As a result of these
delays, only about half the scheduled waves of boats had
reached the rendezvous area • by 0400…”
Ibid.

reached the rendezvous area • by 0400. The control destroyers
however could wait no longer and began conducting their
waves to the LOD,.”
Ibid.
LOD

reached the rendezvous area • by 0400. The control destroyers
however could wait no longer and began conducting their
waves to the LOD,• which they reached in about 50 minutes.
The beach-marking scout boats, uninformed of the delays,
had for some time been showing their lights, but this only
caused confusion, for two of the scout boats were out of
position, one by more than two miles.• At 0500, an hour late,
the first waves of boats headed for the beach, followed at five
to ten minute intervals by the second and third waves.”
Ibid.

…by the second and third waves. The noise of the landing craft, now operating at full throttle, finally
attracted the attention of shore batteries,…”
op. cit, pp. 573-574.

attracted the attention of shore batteries, • which turned on search lights, at first upward to look for a/c,
and then down on the water. When the support boats opened fire with machine guns, the lights went
out abruptly. Meanwhile the inexperience of the coxswains was taking its toll as l/c collided, crashed
into rocks or reefs • adjoining the designated beaches, or were caught in the surf, spun about, and
broached on the beach.….”
op. cit, pp. 573-574.

attracted the attention of shore batteries, • which turned on search lights, at first upward to look for a/c,
and then down on the water. When the support boats opened fire with machine guns, the lights went
out abruptly. Meanwhile the inexperience of the coxswains was taking its toll as l/c collided, crashed
into rocks or reefs • adjoining the designated beaches, or were caught in the surf, spun about, and
broached on the beach. Some troops were spilled into the sea where they were pulled down by their
heavy packs and drowned. Of the l/c that safely made shore, many were left stranded by the receding
tide and could not retract. Yet the naval crews who lost their craft were the exceptions. Most, despite
their brief training, the darkness, and the difficult sea conditions, brought their troops safely ashore
with their equipment and quickly returned to the transports. By dawn 3,500 troops had been landed,
and the first echelons advanced and seized control of the town of Fedala. The batteries flanking the
beach however were still in French hands.
“Would the French fight, or would they welcome the invaders? As first light grayed the morning
sky, the eyes of the fleet were on the French batteries, which would provide the answer….”
op. cit, pp. 573-574.

sky, the eyes of the fleet were on the French batteries, which would provide the answer. Friendly
officers in Morocco had been tipped off that the invasion was taking place but not just where or in
what strength. They had been working through the night trying to arrange for a bloodless landing.
But the key French commanders, Resident General Noguès and Vice Adm. Michelier, remained
unconvinced that there was a powerful American force offshore. They would not be a party to a
mere raid or temporary invasion. Were they to do so, Axis forces would also invade Northwest
Africa, and unless the Americans had sufficient power to make good their foothold…, France would
suffer reprisals….Michelier therefore refused to rescind his order…to defend the coast.
“Had the landing been made after dawn, as the Navy wished, or had the French batteries held
their fire until the morning mists had lifted and revealed the magnitude of the American force, it is
possible that General Noguès would have agreed to parley. But just as day began to break…the
batteries…opened fire on the landing forces and the control destroyers. The DDs quickly returned
the fire, and were soon joined by the guns of the Brooklyn and the Augusta. The Ranger’s a/c, over
Casablanca, now came under attack by French fighters; in a brief dogfight seven French and four
American planes were shot down. Spotting planes from the Covering Group were soon being
attacked by antiaircraft fire and fighter planes. At 0700 the Massachussetts and her consorts, the
Tuscaloosa and the Wichita, turned their 5-inch batteries on the French a/c, shooting one down.…”
op. cit, pp. 573-574.

sky, the eyes of the fleet were on the French batteries, which would provide the answer. Friendly
officers in Morocco had been tipped off that the invasion was taking place but not just where or in
what strength. They had been working through the night trying to arrange for a bloodless landing.
But the key French commanders, Resident General Noguès and Vice Adm. Michelier, remained
unconvinced that there was a powerful American force offshore. They would not be a party to a
mere raid or temporary invasion. Were they to do so, Axis forces would also invade Northwest
Africa, and unless the Americans had sufficient power to make good their foothold…, France would
suffer reprisals….Michelier therefore refused to rescind his order…to defend the coast.
“Had the landing been made after dawn, as the Navy wished, or had the French batteries held
their fire until the morning mists had lifted and revealed the magnitude of the American force, it is
possible that General Noguès would have agreed to parley. But just as day began to break…”
op. cit, pp. 573-574.

…shooting one down. Immediately afterward the battleship Jean Bart
in Casablanca harbor and the powerful battery at nearby Pointe El
Hank opened fire on the Covering Group, which replied at once. The
battle was on. To Adm. Michelier, putting up a fight was no longer just
a matter of policy or of carrying out orders from above; it had become
a requirement of honor. When later in the day a deputation from Gen.
Patton drove to Casablanca with an American flag and a flag of truce
to arrange a ceasefire, they were let through the lines and cheered in
the streets, but Michelier refused even to receive them….
“The Jean Bart, thought uncompleted and temporarily
immobilized, had an operational turret of four 15-inch guns that made
her a formidable floating battery. In Casablanca harbor there were also
eleven submarines, eight sloops, eleven minesweepers, two super-
destroyers, seven smaller DDs, and the light cruiser Primauguet. The
principle task of the American Covering Group was to prevent a sortie
of these vessels against the Center Attack Group…15 miles away at
Fedala….the guns of the Jean Bart and the steady and accurate fire
from El Hank’s eight well-protected…guns had straddled the
Massachussetts at 20,000 yards with their first salvo. The
Massachussetts concentrated the fire of her nine 16-inch guns on the
Jean Bart.• Her fifth salvo struck the …functional turret, jamming it.
For 45 minutes more the ships shot it out with the El Hank battery, …
but not demolishing the guns….”
op. cit, pp. 574-575.

her a formidable floating battery.….”
op. cit, pp. 574-575.

her a formidable floating battery. In Casablanca harbor there were also
eleven submarines, eight sloops, eleven minesweepers, two super-
destroyers, seven smaller DDs, and the light cruiser Primauguet. The
principle task of the American Covering Group was to prevent a sortie
of these vessels against the Center Attack Group…15 miles away at
Fedala….the guns of the Jean Bart and the steady and accurate fire
from El Hank’s eight well-protected…guns had straddled the
Massachussetts at 20,000 yards with their first salvo. The
Massachussetts concentrated the fire of her nine 16-inch guns on the
Jean Bart.• Her fifth salvo struck the …functional turret, jamming it.
For 45 minutes more the ships shot it out with the El Hank battery, …
but not demolishing the guns….”
op. cit, pp. 574-575.
USS Massachusetts

“The second phase of the Naval Battle of
Casablanca was initiated by Adm. Michelier,
who, observing that the Covering Group • had
maneuvered westward, away from the transports
off Fedala, seized the opportunity to send seven
of his destroyers to attack • the Center Group.
Eight submarines also sortied. This was
Michelier’s best chance to break up the landing.
Steaming close inshore and making expert use of
smoke, the French DDs approached the American
transports and had hit one l/c when they were
intercepted and driven back by the Augusta, the
Brooklyn, and two of the Center Group DDs,
which had been deployed to screen the transports
against just such an attack. The cruiser
Primauguet now sortied and led the French DDs
in a new advance. Hewitt had already summoned
the Covering Group to return to the area. For two
and a half hours the French ships dodged in and out of their smoke screen, exchanging salvos with the vessels of the
Center and Covering Groups. Planes from the Ranger meanwhile made several strafing and bombing runs on the
enemy force. Three of the French submarines had already been sunk in Casablanca harbor, but the remaining eight
sortied and entered the confused battle. Their torpedo spreads narrowly missed several American vessels.
“In the face of the immense American superiority of force, the gallant French attack, however skillfully conducted,
could hardly have ended other than in disaster for the attackers. When the engagement ended just before noon, none of
the American vessels had received damage of consequence. Of the French ships however, all but one had been severely
damaged. Two had sunk, two others were in sinking condition, one was dead in the water, and one had been beached to
avoid sinking. Only one of the submarines returned to Casablanca harbor, and two made Dakar.”
op. cit, p. 575.

to Casablanca harbor, and two made Dakar. Of
the rest, attacked by American planes or DDs, one
was beached, one was scuttled at Cadiz, and the
rest sunk.
“Early in the afternoon of 8 Nov, the
undamaged French DD and two sloops emerged
from Casablanca to pick up survivors. Adm.
Hewitt, taking this sortie for another attempt to
attack his transports, ordered action resumed. The
three French vessels made it back to the harbor
under a smoke screen, but a/c from Ranger
wrecked the Primauguet. At the end of the day
the El Hank battery was still active, and the
workmen had completed repairs on the Jean
Bart’s damaged turret.
“At Fedala the defending troops, chiefly
Senegalese, quickly surrendered, and even the
navy-manned shore batteries were in American
hands before noon. French fighter a/c made a few strafing runs over the beach, but bombers were chased off by a/c
from the Ranger. Gen. Anderson organized his troops to meet counterattacks and prepared for the advance on
Casablanca. He was severely hampered by the increasingly behind-schedule landings of troops and supplies. There
were not enough l/c to do the job properly, and the performance of the boat crews, exhausted after having worked all
night, did not improve with the coming of daylight. Collisions and broachings continued.The numerous boats stranded
and abandoned on the beach were banged together and shattered by the incoming tide and rising surf. By nightfall on
D-day nearly half the 347 l/c of the CAG had been destroyed, and only 40% of the 19,500 troops….had been brought
ashore. Unloading of supplies was even further behind schedule. It was apparent that the transports would have to
remain…for several days….”
op. cit, p. 575.

“Meanwhile, 150 miles by sea southwest of Casablanca, the Southern Attack Group had scored a
spectacular success at Safi. In the blackness before H-hour, despite debarking troubles caused by a
heavy ground swell and the inevitable errors of inexperienced personnel, the crucial phase of the
assault was conducted according to plan….”
op. cit, p. 576.
Morocco: The Southern Assault

assault was conducted according to plan.• First, a scout boat located the turning buoy marking the
entrance to Safi’s small breakwater-protected harbor.…”
op. cit, p. 576.

entrance to Safi’s small breakwater-protected harbor.• Next, guided by a light blinking seaward from
the scout boat, came two old four-stack destroyers of WW I vintage, razeed to reduce silhouette.
These carrying about 200 assault troops each [Co.s L & K of 1st Batt., 47th Regt., 9th Inf. Div.—
Wiki], led l/c directly into the harbor.…”
op. cit, p. 576.

entrance to Safi’s small breakwater-protected harbor.• Next, guided by a light blinking seaward from
the scout boat, came two old four-stack destroyers of WW I vintage, razeed to reduce silhouette.
These carrying about 200 assault troops each [Co.s L & K of 1st Batt., 47th Regt., 9th Inf. Div.—
Wiki], led l/c directly into the harbor.• The French had been alerted and there was a lively exchange of
fire as the first “fourpiper,” the Bernadou,• slowly steamed in and drove the French gunners to cover
…. Her consort, the Cole,• was able to come directly alongside the quay without a single casualty.
op. cit, p. 576.

While the old battleship New York • and the light cruiser Philadelphia • were silencing the coastal
batteries, American troops took over key positions in the town.…”
op. cit, p. 576.

While the old battleship New York • and the light cruiser Philadelphia • were silencing the coastal
batteries, American troops took over key positions in the town. That afternoon, after the ex-train
ferry USS Lakehurst had brought in her load of medium tanks, all objectives of the assault were
attained.• A/c from the CVE supporting the Southern Group destroyed most French planes in the
area on the ground. Naval gunfire stopped a half-hearted French attempt at counterattack. The entire
operation had been carried out with dispatch. Though supporting landings were made on beaches
flanking the harbor, only one l/c was lost. All ships were completely unloaded in three days
[PERMAC], By the time resistance officially ceased, an American tank force was on its way by road
from Safi to Casablanca accompanied along the coast by the Philadelphia, several DDs, and six
gasoline-carrying l/c. op. cit, p. 576.

“The primary objective of the Northern Attack Group was the Port Lyautey airfield, the only
airport in Morocco with concrete, all-weather runways.Troops were to be landed on both sides of the
Sebou, a narrow and winding but navigable river that connects Port Lyautey with the Atlantic.• The
initial attack was intended to overwhelm the seaside village of Mehdia and its ancient fortress, the
Kasba,• which guarded the mouth of the river.…”
op. cit, pp. 576-577.
Morocco: The Northern Assault

Kasba,• which guarded the mouth of the river. The invaders would then thrust inland to seize the
airfield by double envelopment and to occupy Port Lyautey. USS Dallas DD-199,• another razed
fourpiper, was to proceed upriver after a boom • blocking access had been cut, and land a force to
assist in capturing the airfield.…”
op. cit, pp. 576-577.

assist i n capturing the airfield.After the airfield was secured, an army fighter group catapulted from
one of the CVEs was to operate from the field, providing fighter cover for further operations by
bombers flown in from Gibraltar.
“The Northern Attack Group’s assault plan was a smaller version of the one used at Fedala,
except that the five landing beaches were much farther apart.…”
op. cit, pp. 576-577.

assist i n capturing the airfield.After the airfield was secured, an army fighter group catapulted from
one of the CVEs was to operate from the field, providing fighter cover for further operations by
bombers flown in from Gibraltar.
“The Northern Attack Group’s assault plan was a smaller version of the one used at Fedala,
except that the five landing beaches were much farther apart. Hence to the delays of debarking was
added mounting confusion. Few of the troops reached the right beach. Badly scattered, they missed
an early opportunity to seize the Kasba and the shore batteries near it, and were soon obliged to meet
counterattacks by French colonial troops closing in from Port Lyautey. Efforts of a boat party to cut
the boom blocking the river, and later efforts by the Dallas to ram it, failed completely under a hail
of fire from the Kasba. The initial loss of l/c was not great, but deteriorating weather and a rapidly
rising surf made the build-up of supplies perilously slow. By the end of the second day only half the
troops had been landed.”
op. cit, pp. 576-577.

“…troops had been landed. B Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, Jr. • who commanded the landing force in
this assault, did not at first make much use of naval gunfire. Light cruiser Savannah • kept down the
fire from the Kasbah with her 6-inch shells,…” op. cit, pp. 576-577.

fire from the Kasbah with her 6-inch shells, but the 14-inch shells of the old battleship Texas,• which
could have smashed the fort, were considered too dangerous to be fired at targets near where
American troops were operating. Scout planes from both the cruiser and the battleship however
made a potent contribution in breaking up enemy tank columns by means of a novel but effective
technique—dropping antisubmarine depth charges equipped with impact fuses.…”
op. cit, pp. 576-577.

fire from the Kasbah with her 6-inch shells, but the 14-inch shells of the old battleship Texas,• which
could have smashed the fort, were considered too dangerous to be fired at targets near where
American troops were operating. Scout planes from both the cruiser and the battleship however
made a potent contribution in breaking up enemy tank columns by means of a novel but effective
technique—dropping antisubmarine depth charges equipped with impact fuses. .
“On November 10, the situation took a turn for the better. In an early morning attack, the invaders
broke through to the airfield against French defenders who, expecting an early armistice, no longer
offered strenuous resistance. By that time a boat party had at last cut the main cable of the river
boom, enabling the Dallas to crash through and…to land her troops near the airdrome. Shortly
afterwards the army planes from one of the CVEs were flown in and began operating from the field.
Bombers from the other CVE attacked the Kasbah, which promptly surrendered….French armored
forces coming up the coast road from Rabat, the Moroccan capital, were turned back by cruiser and
destroyer fire. When a column of troop-laden trucks was spotted advancing on Port Lyautey from the
interior the Texas reached more than eight miles inland and cratered the road with her big shells,
whereupon the column quickly dispersed. That afternoon the French general…called for a cease-
fire….The attack had obtained its main object, capturing the airfield—but too late to support the
battle for Casablanca.”
op. cit, pp. 576-577.

Dallas was to carry a US Army Raider battalion, and land
them up the narrow, shallow, obstructed river to take a
strategic airport near Port Lyautey, French Morocco. On 10
November she began her run up the Oued Sebou under the
masterful guidance of René Malavergne, a civilian pilot who
was to be the first foreign civilian to receive the Navy Cross.
Under fire by cannon and small arms during the entire run, she
plowed her way through mud and shallow water, narrowly
missing the many sunken ships and other obstructions, and
sliced through a cable crossing the river, to land her troops
safely just off the airport….
—Wikipedia

Dallas was to carry a US Army Raider battalion, and land
them up the narrow, shallow, obstructed river to take a
strategic airport near Port Lyautey, French Morocco. On 10
November she began her run up the Oued Sebou under the
masterful guidance of René Malavergne, a civilian pilot who
was to be the first foreign civilian to receive the Navy Cross.
Under fire by cannon and small arms during the entire run, she
plowed her way through mud and shallow water, narrowly
missing the many sunken ships and other obstructions, and
sliced through a cable crossing the river, to land her troops
safely just off the airport.• Her brilliant success in completing
this mission with its many unexpected complications won her
the Presidential Unit Citation.
—Wikipedia

The young news reporter Walter Cronkite was on board
Texas starting in Norfolk, Virginia, through her service
off the coast of North Africa, and thence back to the US
On the return trip, Cronkite was flown off Texas in one
of her OS2U Kingfisher aircraft • when Norfolk was
within flying distance. He was granted permission to be
flown the rest of the distance to Norfolk so that he
could outpace a rival correspondent on Massachusetts
to return to the U.S. and to issue the first uncensored
news reports to published about Operation Torch. …
—Wikipedia

The young news reporter Walter Cronkite was on board
Texas starting in Norfolk, Virginia, through her service
off the coast of North Africa, and thence back to the US
On the return trip, Cronkite was flown off Texas in one
of her OS2U Kingfisher aircraft • when Norfolk was
within flying distance. He was granted permission to be
flown the rest of the distance to Norfolk so that he
could outpace a rival correspondent on Massachusetts
to return to the U.S. and to issue the first uncensored
news reports to published about Operation Torch.
Cronkite's experiences aboard Texas launched his
career as a war correspondent. —Wikipedia

“Gen. Anderson’s troops and armor meanwhile had advanced from Fedala to the outskirts of
Casablanca.…” op. cit, pp. 577-578.
Morocco Secured

“Gen. Anderson’s troops and armor meanwhile had advanced from Fedala to the outskirts of
Casablanca.• Two French corvettes, advancing at 1000 on 10 Nov to fire on the American troops
were chased back into Casablanca harbor by the Augusta. Then the Augusta took to her heels as
shells from the repaired turret of the Jean Bart began to fall around her. Hewitt called for air support,
and the Ranger sent in dive bombers that scored two hits with 1,000-pound bombs that left the
French battleship settling into the harbor mud with her decks awash.
“At the end of the 10th, the Americans had Casablanca surrounded. They planned an all-out
attack from land, sea, and air for the next morning. Fortunately, before the attack could be launched,
Adm. Michelier received orders to cease resistance….’now that this is over, we are ready to
cooperate.’ Soon the French and the Americans were working together to restore the port as a major
rear base for supplying the prospective campaign into Tunisia.
“The Axis got into the Moroccan campaign after all, causing the Americans far greater material
losses than the French did. U-boats that TF-34 had evaded…were now converging on the Casablanca
area. The transports of the CAG, with no troops aboard but still unloading cargo, were obliged to
remain off Fedala because a new convoy approaching from the U.S. would occupy all available
space in Casablanca’s protected harbor. In the early evening of 11 November, U-173 slipped into the
unloading area and sank a transport and damaged a DD and an oiler….The following afternoon,
U-130 got into the area and sank three more transports.” U-130 got away safely, but U-173, after
heavily damaging an American cargo ship off Fedala in the 15th, was sunk the next day by three
American DD s.
op. cit, pp. 577-578.
Morocco Secured

Text
IV. Algeria
The Vichy Government of North Africa Capitulates
8-10 November 1942

“When the Allied forces staging from England steamed through the Straits of Gibraltar into the
Med, the fact that some major move was under way could no longer be kept form the Axis powers.…”
op. cit, p. 578.
Algeria: Algiers

“When the Allied forces staging from England steamed through the Straits of Gibraltar into the
Med, the fact that some major move was under way could no longer be kept form the Axis powers.
The Italian naval command correctly guessed that Algeria must be the Allied target, but they were
overruled by the Germans, who first estimated that the convoys were going to southern France, then
that they were headed for Crete, for Tripoli, or possibly for the relief of Malta. Axis forces,
submarine, surface, and air, concentrated in the straits of Sicily, leaving the Allied transports largely
unmolested. One American transport was torpedoed by a German a/c off the African coast, but most
of its personnel arrived safely.…Otherwise the Eastern Naval Task Force arrived off Algeria without
incident.
“A massive array of naval strength supported the Mediterranean landings. The Royal Navy’s
Force H, based at Gib, acted as a covering force. Consisting…of three BBs, a BC, two CVAs, and
lighter vessels, Force H was to guard the amphib forces from intervention by the Italian navy or by
the Vichy French fleet based at Toulon. The Support Force of the EN Attack Force consisted of three
CLs, two CVEs, three antiaircraft cruisers (CLAA),.”
op. cit, p. 578.
Algeria: Algiers

“A massive array of naval strength supported the Mediterranean landings. The Royal Navy’s Force
H, based at Gib, acted as a covering force. Consisting…of three BBs, a BC, two CVAs, and lighter
vessels, Force H was to guard the amphib forces from intervention by the Italian navy or by the
Vichy French fleet based at Toulon. The Support Force of the EN Attack Force consisted of three
CLs, two CVEs, three antiaircraft cruisers (CLAA),• a monitor, 13 DDs and 17 smaller
warships.Directed from a British “headquarters ship,” prototype of the later American amphib
command ship (AGC),…”
op. cit, p. 578.
Algeria: Algiers

“A massive array of naval strength supported the Mediterranean landings. The Royal Navy’s Force
H, based at Gib, acted as a covering force. Consisting…of three BBs, a BC, two CVAs, and lighter
vessels, Force H was to guard the amphib forces from intervention by the Italian navy or by the
Vichy French fleet based at Toulon. The Support Force of the EN Attack Force consisted of three
CLs, two CVEs, three antiaircraft cruisers (CLAA),• a monitor, 13 DDs and 17 smaller
warships.Directed from a British “headquarters ship,” prototype of the later American amphib
command ship (AGC),• the Support Force had the tasks of protecting the amphib force from air and
submarine attack and from shore bombardment, and of providing tactical support for Allied troops
while landing and ashore. Only 10,000 troops of the 33,000-man landing force were American, but
because of the known French bias against the British, the major ground units were placed under
American commanders so that the invasion would appear to be primarily American.”
op. cit, p. 578.
Algeria: Algiers

“The plan for the capture of Algiers, capital of Algeria and the best port on the Barbary Coast,
called for simultaneous landings on three flanking beach areas and, as at Safi, a raid by two DDs to
seize port facilities and shipping in the harbor..” op. cit, pp. 578-579.
Algeria: Algiers

seize port facilities and shipping in the harbor. In a relatively quiet and almost tideless sea, troops
began to transfer to l/c scheduled to hit the beaches at 0100 8 Nov. Luckily for the invaders, there
was no immediate opposition, for the troops and naval personnel assigned to this assault had had
little opportunity for training in amphib techniques. Hence the ship-to-shore movement to some of
the Algerian beaches was even more confused and behind schedule than at any of the Moroccan
landings. In one sector battalions were intermingled and scattered for miles along the coast.
Nevertheless the landing forces managed to form up and push rapidly inland toward their objectives.
Thanks to the activities of pro-Allied officers, many French troops, including the garrisons of two
important airfields surrendered without resistance. The swift Allied advance soon turned the
operation into more of an occupation than a campaign, for only the coastal forts east of Algiers
offered serious opposition.
“Meanwhile two British DDs had failed in their attempt to seize the port to prevent sabotage of the
facilities.…” op. cit, pp. 578-579.
Algeria: Algiers

seize port facilities and shipping in the harbor. In a relatively quiet and almost tideless sea, troops
began to transfer to l/c scheduled to hit the beaches at 0100 8 Nov. Luckily for the invaders, there
was no immediate opposition, for the troops and naval personnel assigned to this assault had had
little opportunity for training in amphib techniques. Hence the ship-to-shore movement to some of
the Algerian beaches was even more confused and behind schedule than at any of the Moroccan
landings. In one sector battalions were intermingled and scattered for miles along the coast.
Nevertheless the landing forces managed to form up and push rapidly inland toward their objectives.
Thanks to the activities of pro-Allied officers, many French troops, including the garrisons of two
important airfields surrendered without resistance. The swift Allied advance soon turned the
operation into more of an occupation than a campaign, for only the coastal forts east of Algiers
offered serious opposition.
“Meanwhile two British DDs had failed in their attempt to seize the port to prevent sabotage of the
facilities. Confused by darkness and strange waters in the early hours of 8 Nov, the Broke • and
Malcolm missed the narrow harbor entrance on their first try In their second, the Malcolm was so
severely holed by shore batteries that she was forced to retire.The Broke however crashed through
the boom, reached a quay, and landed her troops, who were quickly pinned down by small arms fire
and captured [“…forced to surrender seven hours later. However they succeeded in preventing the
destruction of the port before the defenders in turn surrendered to the larger invading forces.”—Wikipedia]
The Broke managed to escape, but she was so badly damaged that she later sank under tow.”
op. cit, pp. 578-579.
Algeria: Algiers

“Luckily for the Allies an early cease-fire in Algiers yielded them the port intact. Radio orders to
stop resisting issued in the name of Gen. Giraud had produced no effect. During the day however
Robert Murphy [US Consul Gen’l to Algeria, who had worked secretly before the invasion to line up
pro-Allied French officers] • succeeded in persuading Adm. Darlan • to authorize the French
commanding general to negotiate a truce. An oral armistice was reached at 1840 8 Nov, and an hour
and 20 minutes later the Americans formally took over control of Algiers. Two days later Darlan,
with Marshal Petain’s secret concurrence, ordered a cease-fire for all French units in Africa.
“It was well for the Anglo-Americans that the French were ready to quit. As D-day progressed,
the weather worsened so rapidly that by 1800 all further support landings had to be cancelled. By
that time also, poor boat handling had cost the Eastern Naval Task Force 90% of its l/c. So few
reinforcements and so little material had been unloaded that the situation ashore bight have become
desperate had French resistance continued. But Murphy’s diplomatic triumph permitted the
completion of the unloading of troops and supplies in the port of Algiers itself and paved the way for
the launching of the Allied drive into Tunisia.”
op. cit, pp. 578-579.
Algeria: Algiers

“The most powerful of the Allied attacks was that made at Oran by the Center Task Force.
Because French feeling had been inflamed there by the British attack on the French fleet at nearby
Mers-el-Kebir in July, 1940, the planners allotted to this assault the best-trained American units
available, the 1st Infantry Division and half of the 1st Armored Division, the latter including two
armored combat teams with light and medium tanks and tank destroyers.…”
op. cit, p. 579.
Algeria: Oran

armored combat teams with light and medium tanks and tank destroyers. For the same reason no
British ground troops were assigned to the operation, although units of the Royal Navy screened and
escorted the transports. The Center Naval Task Force included a BB, a CVA, two CVEs, an CLAA, 13
DDs, more than a score of smaller warships, and transports carrying 39,000 troops, nearly all
American. The plan was almost identical to that for Algiers.…”
op. cit, p. 579.
Algeria: Oran

armored combat teams with light and medium tanks and tank destroyers. For the same reason no
British ground troops were assigned to the operation, although units of the Royal Navy screened and
escorted the transports. The Center Naval Task Force included a BB, a CVA, two CVEs, an CLAA, 13
DDs, more than a score of smaller warships, and transports carrying 39,000 troops, nearly all
American. The plan was almost identical to that for Algiers.• Simultaneous landings were to be made
at two beaches west of the city, and—the major effort—on a stretch of coast east of the city adjoining
and including the small port of Arzew Two converted U.S. Coast Guard cutters, given to Great
Britain earlier in the war, would carry raiders into the port of Oran to seize harbor facilities and
prevent sabotage. Airfields behind the city were to be quickly seized so that planes could be flown
there from the airstrip at Gib.”
op. cit, p. 579.
Algeria: Oran

there from the airstrip at Gib.
“At Oran the transports debarked the troops smoothly…into their l/c shortly before [2400 7 Nov].
Coming ashore between 0100-0130, the troops were much less scattered than in the other landings.
They moved out quickly toward their assigned objectives.… ”
op. cit, p. 579.
Algeria: Oran
Arzew
armored
units

U.S. Navy in WWII: Allied Offensive in North Africa

U.S. Navy in WWII: Allied Offensive in North Africa

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

What's hot

What's hot (20)

Viewers also liked

Viewers also liked (20)

Similar to U.S. Navy in WWII: Allied Offensive in North Africa

Similar to U.S. Navy in WWII: Allied Offensive in North Africa (20)

More from Jim Powers

More from Jim Powers (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

U.S. Navy in WWII: Allied Offensive in North Africa