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[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Copyright 2002 WhiteHat Security All Rights Reserved
Topics ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Web Application Security Landscape Entertainment Message Boards WebMail Guest Books Voting Polls E-Commerce Shopping Auctions Banking Stock Trading Just Plain Crazy Printers PDA’s Cell Phones System Configuration .NET/Passport
Web Application  The Simple Definition A web application or web service is a software application that is accessible using a web browser or HTTP(s) user agent.
Web Application  The “EASIER” Definition If it runs on port 80 or port 443, then is probably a web application.
 
 
 
Why is Web Application Security Important? ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Common Web Application Security Mistakes Trusting Client-Side Data Unescaped Special Characters HTML Output Character Filtering SUID ActiveX/JavaScript Authentication Lack of User Authentication before performing critical task.
Trusting Client-Side Data DO NOT TRUST  CLIENT-SIDE DATA!!! Trusting client-side data is #1 cause of vulnerabilities. Identify all input parameters that  trust client-side data.
Unescaped Special Characters The Level of Trust : Searches/Queries/Templates Path: http://foo.com/cgi?val=string&file=/html/name.db Or better yet… http://www.foo.com/cgi?string=root&file=../../../../../etc/passwd
Unescaped Special Characters ! @ $ % ^ & * ( ) -_ + ` ~ | [ ] { } ; : ' &quot; ? / , . > < Check for: Unescaped special characters  within input strings
HTML Character Filtering Proper handling of special characters >  => &gt; <  => &lt; &quot; => &quot; &  => &amp; Null characters should all be removed.  %00
More mistakes… ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
WhiteHat Arsenal ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Web Application Penetration Methodologies Information Gathering & Discovery Input/Output Client-Side Data Manipulation
Information Gathering & Discovery ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Spidering
Spidering/Site Crawling ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Identifiable Characteristics Comment Lines URL Extensions Meta Tags Cookies Client-Side scripting languages Enormous wealth of information about process flows, debug command, system types and configurations.
Error and Response Codes HTTP Response Headers Server: IBM/Apache 1.3.19 Cookie Characteristics Error Messages Exception Messages (Java / SQL) 404 Error Pages Failed Login Locked Account Database or file non-existent
File/Application Enumeration Commonly referred to as “forced browsing” or “CGI Scanning”.
File/Application Enumeration Sample Files Template Directories Temp or Backup files Hidden Files Vulnerable CGIs
Common Directories
Common Log Files
Common Backup Files
Input/Output Client-Side Data Manipulation URL Manipulation CGI Parameter Tampering  HTTP Client-Header Injection Filter/Intrusion Detection Evasion Protocol/Method Manipulation Overflows
Input Manipulation Parameter Tampering &quot;Twiddling Bits.&quot; ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Cross-Site Scripting Bad name given to a dangerous security issue Attack targets the user of the system rather than the system itself. Outside client-side languages executing within the users web environment with the same level of privilege as the hosted site.
Client-Side Scripting Languages DHTML (HTML, XHTML, HTML x.0) Opens all the doors. JavaScript (1.x) Browser/DOM Manipulation Java (Applets) Malicious Applets VBScript Browser/DOM Manipulation Flash Dangerous Third-Party Interactivity ActiveX Let me count the ways… XML/XSL Another Door Opener CSS Browser/DOM Manipulation
The Scenarios Trick a user to re-login to a spoofed page Compromise authentication credentials Load dangerous of malicious ActiveX Re-Direct a user or ALL users Crash the machine or the browser
CSS Danger “The Remote Launch Pad.” Successfully CSS a user via a protected domain. Utilizing a Client-Side utility (JavaScript, ActiveX, VBScript, etc.), exploit a browser hole to download a trojan/virus. User is unknowingly infected/compromised within a single HTTP page load.  ActiveX Netcat Anyone?
2 Types of CSS ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Dangerous HTML “HTML Bad” <APPLET> Malicious Java Applications <BODY> Altering HTML Page Characteristics <EMBED> Embedding Third-Party Applications (Flash, etc.) <FRAME> Directly calling in other uncontrolled HTML <FRAMESET> Directly calling in other uncontrolled HTML <HTML> Altering HTML Page Characteristics <IFRAME> Directly calling in other uncontrolled HTML <IMG> SCRing Protocol attacks and other abuses <LAYER> Directly calling in other uncontrolled HTML <ILAYER> Directly calling in other uncontrolled HTML <META> META Refreshes. (Client-Redirects) <OBJECT> ActiveX (Nuff Said) <SCRIPT> JavaScript/VBScript Loading <STYLE> Style Sheet and Scripting Alterations
Dangerous Attributes “Attributes Bad” ATTRIBUTE DANGER LIST  (Any HTML Tag that has these attributes) STYLE SRC HREF TYPE
Power of the Dots and Slashes piping input to the command line. Path Directory Traversal http://foo.com/app.cgi?directory=/path/to/data DotDot Slash: http://foo.com/app.cgi?dir=path/to/data../../../../etc/passwd Dot Slash: http://foo.com/app.cgi?dir=path/to/data../../../../etc/././passwd Double DotDot Slash: http://foo.com/app.cgi?dir=path/to/data....//….//….//etc/passwd
More Filter Bypassing Method Alteration (HEAD, PUT, POST, GET, ect.) URL Encode http://www.foo.com/cgi?value=%46%72%68%86 Null Characters http://www.foo.com/cgi?value=file%00.html More… Alternate Case, Unicode, String Length, Multi-Slash, etc.
Authentication & Session Management Brute/Reverse Force Session Hi-Jacking Session Replay Session Forgoing Page Sequencing
Reporting XML/HTML Based Manual Hack Attack Log w/ Descriptor Common Directory Force Browsing Common Log File Force Browsing Backup File Force Browsing Spider Log
Spider XML Log
Attempts XML Log
A few quick things to help secure a web application. ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Thank You! Questions? Jeremiah Grossman [email_address] WhiteHat Security All presentation updates will be available on www.whitehatsec.com and community.whitehatsec.com

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Web Application Security and Release of "WhiteHat Arsenal"

  • 1.
  • 2.
  • 3. Web Application Security Landscape Entertainment Message Boards WebMail Guest Books Voting Polls E-Commerce Shopping Auctions Banking Stock Trading Just Plain Crazy Printers PDA’s Cell Phones System Configuration .NET/Passport
  • 4. Web Application The Simple Definition A web application or web service is a software application that is accessible using a web browser or HTTP(s) user agent.
  • 5. Web Application The “EASIER” Definition If it runs on port 80 or port 443, then is probably a web application.
  • 6.  
  • 7.  
  • 8.  
  • 9.
  • 10. Common Web Application Security Mistakes Trusting Client-Side Data Unescaped Special Characters HTML Output Character Filtering SUID ActiveX/JavaScript Authentication Lack of User Authentication before performing critical task.
  • 11. Trusting Client-Side Data DO NOT TRUST CLIENT-SIDE DATA!!! Trusting client-side data is #1 cause of vulnerabilities. Identify all input parameters that trust client-side data.
  • 12. Unescaped Special Characters The Level of Trust : Searches/Queries/Templates Path: http://foo.com/cgi?val=string&file=/html/name.db Or better yet… http://www.foo.com/cgi?string=root&file=../../../../../etc/passwd
  • 13. Unescaped Special Characters ! @ $ % ^ & * ( ) -_ + ` ~ | [ ] { } ; : ' &quot; ? / , . > < Check for: Unescaped special characters within input strings
  • 14. HTML Character Filtering Proper handling of special characters > => &gt; < => &lt; &quot; => &quot; & => &amp; Null characters should all be removed. %00
  • 15.
  • 16.
  • 17. Web Application Penetration Methodologies Information Gathering & Discovery Input/Output Client-Side Data Manipulation
  • 18.
  • 20.
  • 21. Identifiable Characteristics Comment Lines URL Extensions Meta Tags Cookies Client-Side scripting languages Enormous wealth of information about process flows, debug command, system types and configurations.
  • 22. Error and Response Codes HTTP Response Headers Server: IBM/Apache 1.3.19 Cookie Characteristics Error Messages Exception Messages (Java / SQL) 404 Error Pages Failed Login Locked Account Database or file non-existent
  • 23. File/Application Enumeration Commonly referred to as “forced browsing” or “CGI Scanning”.
  • 24. File/Application Enumeration Sample Files Template Directories Temp or Backup files Hidden Files Vulnerable CGIs
  • 28. Input/Output Client-Side Data Manipulation URL Manipulation CGI Parameter Tampering HTTP Client-Header Injection Filter/Intrusion Detection Evasion Protocol/Method Manipulation Overflows
  • 29.
  • 30. Cross-Site Scripting Bad name given to a dangerous security issue Attack targets the user of the system rather than the system itself. Outside client-side languages executing within the users web environment with the same level of privilege as the hosted site.
  • 31. Client-Side Scripting Languages DHTML (HTML, XHTML, HTML x.0) Opens all the doors. JavaScript (1.x) Browser/DOM Manipulation Java (Applets) Malicious Applets VBScript Browser/DOM Manipulation Flash Dangerous Third-Party Interactivity ActiveX Let me count the ways… XML/XSL Another Door Opener CSS Browser/DOM Manipulation
  • 32. The Scenarios Trick a user to re-login to a spoofed page Compromise authentication credentials Load dangerous of malicious ActiveX Re-Direct a user or ALL users Crash the machine or the browser
  • 33. CSS Danger “The Remote Launch Pad.” Successfully CSS a user via a protected domain. Utilizing a Client-Side utility (JavaScript, ActiveX, VBScript, etc.), exploit a browser hole to download a trojan/virus. User is unknowingly infected/compromised within a single HTTP page load. ActiveX Netcat Anyone?
  • 34.
  • 35. Dangerous HTML “HTML Bad” <APPLET> Malicious Java Applications <BODY> Altering HTML Page Characteristics <EMBED> Embedding Third-Party Applications (Flash, etc.) <FRAME> Directly calling in other uncontrolled HTML <FRAMESET> Directly calling in other uncontrolled HTML <HTML> Altering HTML Page Characteristics <IFRAME> Directly calling in other uncontrolled HTML <IMG> SCRing Protocol attacks and other abuses <LAYER> Directly calling in other uncontrolled HTML <ILAYER> Directly calling in other uncontrolled HTML <META> META Refreshes. (Client-Redirects) <OBJECT> ActiveX (Nuff Said) <SCRIPT> JavaScript/VBScript Loading <STYLE> Style Sheet and Scripting Alterations
  • 36. Dangerous Attributes “Attributes Bad” ATTRIBUTE DANGER LIST (Any HTML Tag that has these attributes) STYLE SRC HREF TYPE
  • 37. Power of the Dots and Slashes piping input to the command line. Path Directory Traversal http://foo.com/app.cgi?directory=/path/to/data DotDot Slash: http://foo.com/app.cgi?dir=path/to/data../../../../etc/passwd Dot Slash: http://foo.com/app.cgi?dir=path/to/data../../../../etc/././passwd Double DotDot Slash: http://foo.com/app.cgi?dir=path/to/data....//….//….//etc/passwd
  • 38. More Filter Bypassing Method Alteration (HEAD, PUT, POST, GET, ect.) URL Encode http://www.foo.com/cgi?value=%46%72%68%86 Null Characters http://www.foo.com/cgi?value=file%00.html More… Alternate Case, Unicode, String Length, Multi-Slash, etc.
  • 39. Authentication & Session Management Brute/Reverse Force Session Hi-Jacking Session Replay Session Forgoing Page Sequencing
  • 40. Reporting XML/HTML Based Manual Hack Attack Log w/ Descriptor Common Directory Force Browsing Common Log File Force Browsing Backup File Force Browsing Spider Log
  • 43.
  • 44. Thank You! Questions? Jeremiah Grossman [email_address] WhiteHat Security All presentation updates will be available on www.whitehatsec.com and community.whitehatsec.com