Summerlin Asset Management, LLC (SAM), is a diversified real estate investment and management company. SAM's expertise is the purchase, service, and resale, of both performing and non-performing real estate notes secured by the Deed of Trust or Mortgage.

1. Summerlin Asset
Management, LLC
Investment:
Purchasing Bank Owned Real
Estate Portfolios
http://www.mortgagesforsale.net

2. 1.THE BUSINESS:
 1.1 Business Summary
Summerlin Asset Management, LLC
(SAM), is a diversified real estate
investment and management company.
SAM's expertise is the purchase, service,
and resale, of both performing and non-
performing real estate notes secured by
the Deed of Trust or Mortgage.

3. SAM has been operating for over three
years acquiring various residential
mortgage assets.
We provide secure Trust Deed or
Mortgage investments that are recorded
by a licensed title company with your
name documented on the public record in
the county recorders’ office as the
beneficiary.

4.  1.2 Investing in Bank Owned Real Estate
Notes - Example
Our entity will purchase a pool of sub-
performing and/or non-performing real
estate notes secured by the 1st Deed of
Trust or Mortgage. The purchase price
will be negotiated between SAM and the
financial institution that is holding the
note.

5. The main objective is to acquire the 1st
lien position note at a price that is
significantly lower than the current
market value of the subject property.
Another objective is to make the Trust
Deed or Mortgage a performing note that
can be sold for close to 1.5 times the
purchase price.

6. The relationships we have established
with banks throughout the United States
gives our investors the opportunity to
invest in “distressed” or “charged off”
real estate notes that are secured to
properties across the country.
We are able to purchase these
mortgages at a large discount, creating
an investment that is very secure and
offers an excellent rate of return.

7.  1.3 Business Opportunity
Banks make their money when
customers deposit money into their bank.
The bank will then invest a significant
amount of that money into real estate
notes aka; mortgages for sale.
Now SAM investors have an opportunity
to make the same investment at a
significant discount because real estate
prices have dropped significantly and
financial institutions are willing to sell at
discounted prices.

8. 2.THEORY:
 2.1 Money in Reference to Time
Since the beginning of time, the theory
remains; “money equals power.” Banks
have always had the money and
subsequently have always had the
power, until now.
Though they still have the money, their
power is diminishing. To defend that
statement, take a moment and
contemplate the housing market that we
live in today.

9. Financial Institutions across the world
have come into hard times for the
success of “GROWING” their portfolios.
Economic hardships and the course of
world conditions, whether it is political or
social, have placed a tremendous strain
on the Markets that we do business in
today.

10. These factors make the markets in which
we conduct our daily business both
lucrative and indefinite.
However, many reassuring opportunities
still present themselves.

11.  2.2 Current Situations Seen by Banks
These Institutions may have had
portfolios valued at 500 million to several
billion. However, these harsh times have
caused these billions of dollars in notes
to be worth a fraction of face value.
That being the case, we positioned
ourselves to create an opportunity for the
betterment of all parties involved in
these said Real Estate Portfolios.

12. The banks sell off their portfolios and are
once again liquid, we acquire notes at
significant discounts, and the end
user/borrower is provided a solution that
helps their financial position. At this
point, questions may be surfacing.

13.  2.3 In Preparation to Exploit
This may be the junction where you
question why the banks would ever want
to sell off their assets so cheap. The
answer is simple; a sub performing and
nonperforming asset is a liability for the
banks.

14. The banks are setting aside funds that
the Federal Government requires to
guarantee a scratch and dent loan.
Thus, recovery of capital on the note and
release of guaranteed funds that were
set aside is essential for the bank to get
money working for them again.

15. Why don’t banks simply do what we are
doing for themselves?
The long term costs necessary to set up
the infrastructure to service these
portfolios is one that is entirely unknown.
The problem created by attempting to
recover the notes themselves is the
uncertainty of the cost.

16. For instance, the time needed to create
an efficient recovery system will be more
costly than the spread to sell these notes
and to recover the guaranteed funds that
were set aside.
We now have the advantage. Our
company possesses the infrastructure
necessary to work on recovering the
balances on the first position deeds. This
is our absolute advantage over the
banks.

17.  2.4 Current Marketplace Analysis
The RMBS market has been, in our view,
the most disrupted and systematically
cheap corner of the fixed income
universe for the past few years.

18. The buyer base transformation (from
ratings-based holders to credit
specialists) taking place in the massive
(>$1 trillion) Non-Agency market has
resulted in securities priced to quite
adverse outcomes that appear to be at
odds with observable housing market
trends over the longer term.
 High returns (to long average lives) are
achievable without improvement in
housing.

19. Since the spring of 2011, the distressed
Non-Agency RMBS landscape has
become an increasingly broken market
where (dramatically lower) prices have
become more and more detached from
(steady to improving) fundamentals.
We are regularly buying securities at 25-
35 percent discounts to trading levels
from earlier this year.

20. The state of disruption in the distressed
RMBS market is relatively stark.
It isn’t very often that the market
presents us with a chance to buy senior
debt securities with 20 percent or better
return potential that offer:

21.  Very low principal risk (IRRs to maturity
are slightly positive even in the event of
catastrophic housing deterioration from
current depressed levels). We believe
these securities are priced to withstand
more in the way of economic/housing
deterioration than just about any other
asset category in which we invest.

22.  Very high (1,000-1,500+) loss-adjusted
credit spreads to long average lives
(spreads would be even higher if we used
less conservative assumptions with
regard to defaults, loss severities,
prepayments, etc.)
 Relative value (loss-adjusted yields in
distressed RMBS are substantially higher
than nominal yields in other asset
classes)

23.  Exposure to an asset class that is naturally
(and significantly) improving in credit quality
as the worst borrowers continue to default;
as these pools become less distressed in
credit quality, it is likely that they will also
become less distressed in price as they
begin to appeal to a broader base of
investors and become priced to less severe
scenarios and/or lower yields; another way
of thinking about this is that credit
improvement can occur without housing
market improvement)

24.  Exposure to an asset class that has never
endured a distressed cycle, and where
traditional investors lack the credit background
necessary to underwrite this risk. Much of the
highest return profile collateral is found within
the SubPrime and Pay Option ARM sectors.
These are among the most complicated areas of
the market, where credit expertise and security
selection are critical, emerging variables such as
put-back settlements and modifications take on
amplified importance, and collateral is often
only available in small size. Due in part to these
factors, PPIP managers and mutual fund
complexes have been less active in these areas.

25.  Positive leverage to US dollar
debasement/inflation (which would tend
to boost homeowner equity, slowing
default rates and increasing recoveries)
 Rapid return of cash (many securities, by
virtue of seniority, amortize in excess of
20-30 percent per year; recouping our
investment quickly allows us to reduce
our dependence on a friendly back-end
housing/economic environment)

26.  Free options on voter-friendly policy
initiatives (principal modifications
designed to keep people in their homes
are increasing in frequency and
effectiveness; we are buying securities
that should benefit from the lower
default, higher recovery, higher
prepayment environment that could be
expected to result from a scenario in
which borrowers have higher home
equity)

27.  2.5 Background
In spring 2011, distressed Non-Agency
RMBS prices began to fall precipitously.
Importantly, the selloff occurred in the
absence of unforeseen deterioration in
housing fundamentals.

28. Rather, the initial downdraft arose from
supply fatigue attributable to the Federal
Reserve’s disorderly liquidation of its $31
billion Maiden Lane II portfolio (which
consists mostly of SubPrime, Alt-A and
Pay Option ARMs) and well-telegraphed
additional supply from other players
(such as Dexia’s >$7 billion portfolio).

29. Many market participants have relatively
short term investment horizons, and
were disinclined to buy or hold assets
with short term mark-to-market risk
when they knew additional supply of
those assets was due to hit the market in
the near future.

30. Subsequent to this flood of supply, the
severe risk-off climate in
August/September weighed further on
prices (especially as general de-risking
and uncertainty around capital
requirements resulted in reduced
participation from Wall Street investment
banks).

31. Like most markets, certain parts of the
mortgage arena are overbought while
others are either underappreciated or
thinly sponsored.
However, on the whole we believe certain
portions of this asset class are poised
over the next couple of years to generate
higher returns with less risk than
virtually any other sector in which we
operate.

32. The asymmetry embedded in these
assets at current prices (positive yields to
maturity even in a severe left tail
scenario, with quite high total return
potential in the event of reflation or even
a perpetuation of the status quo) stands
out starkly versus the rest of the RMBS
market as well as other asset classes.

33.  In this uncertain macro environment, we
believe that assets with these kinds of
return profiles (where left tails can be cut off
but right tail options are substantial) will be
increasingly coveted. Scarcity value should
also not be ignored – long-dated (5-10+
years), high loss-adjusted spread (>1,000
bps) debt with positive leverage to inflation
is hard to find at the moment outside of
distressed Non-Agencies (over time, pension
funds and insurance companies struggling to
meet liabilities should find this asset class
difficult to ignore).

34.  2.6 Credit-Intensive Approach
We deliberately are targeting some of the
most distressed mortgage pools that
were originated at the peak of the
housing market (2005-2007) and the
trough of lending standards. The reason
we are focused on these poor credit
quality pools is they require a great deal
of credit expertise and most of the
mortgage investor base do not employ a
credit-intensive approach.

35. Before 2008, the mortgage space was
dominated by ratings-based buyers
(insurance companies, banks, pensions
etc. that needed to buy AAA assets).
Credit rating, not credit quality, was the
primary criteria for investment.

36. The process of ratings downgrades a few
years ago is one of the primary reasons
this opportunity exists – the major
holders of this debt became forced sellers
in droves once it was downgraded.
Moreover, they were largely sellers into a
vacuum because there was not a well-
established distressed mortgage investor
base (this is the first nationwide
distressed cycle in the mortgage
market).

37. A credit-intensive approach to the space
leads us to believe that current prices do
not reflect the substantial returns likely
to be reaped from these distressed
mortgage pools.

38. This is largely a function of the fact that
the Non-Agency asset class is huge (over
$1 trillion), and the marginal
movers/determiners of price tend to be
the largest participants (Pimco,
Blackrock, TCW, etc.), members of the
long-only community that, due to the
vast sums of capital they have to deploy,
are compelled to take a somewhat
macro, less credit-intensive approach to
mortgage security analysis.

39. If these large asset managers tore apart
every $5M security for sale and stress-
tested it for several hundred default,
recovery, prepay and modification
scenarios (as we do), they would find it
difficult to put their money to work.
To some degree they need to buy and
sell in bulk and apply more blunt
methods of security valuation.

40. These dominant methods of mortgage
security valuation tend to set prices, and
(in our view) fail to appreciate various
forms of optionality (on fundamentals,
interest rates, and policies) embedded in
the assets as well as evolving dynamics
with regard to default and recovery
trajectories.

41. This phenomenon, in conjunction with
the more recent supply/demand
dislocation in the space resulting from
wide scale deleveraging, has resulted in
a situation in which these assets are
priced to adverse outcomes that seem to
be inconsistent with observable housing
market trends.

42. Our ability to perform in-depth analyses
into the underlying mortgages helps us
discern portfolio attributes (particularly
credit quality dispersion) and trends that
are generally missed by the bulk of
investors.
We have exploited numerous of these
opportunities in the mortgage market (on
both the long and short side) over the
last 4 years which have arisen from the
market’s tendency to extrapolate current
trends into the future.

43. Much of our success in the mortgage
space, which has taken place across very
different market environments, has
rested upon our ability to identify
inflection points where those trends
break down, creating opportunities for
high returns.

44. 3. OUR POSITION:
 3.1 What We Do
Our goal, through these transactions, is
solely based on the ability to acquire
these large portfolios of notes, service
each asset in-house, and then dispose of
the asset to attain the highest possible
ROI. Summerlin Asset Management has
direct relationships to purchase said
portfolios via Financial Institutions such
as Deutsche Bank, JP Morgan Chase,
HSBC, Bank of America, and Citi Group.

45. These large scale and accredited firms
have chosen to liquidate their Real Estate
asset portfolios. Recently the banks have
decided that it is essential to start
liquidating the pools of mortgage backed
securities and strip out the notes that
have trending delinquencies.
Ideally, they are holding mass portfolios
of liabilities; these said liabilities can be
acquired at significant discounts,
conversely turning them into assets for
our firm.

46.  3.2 Securitizing Your Investment
Your funds will be used for the
acquisition of these portfolios and will be
secured by first lien positions on
residential properties. Our LLC, which
you, the investor, will be a member of,
will be the recorded mortgagee on title in
the public domain. Quickly referencing
back, SAM is now the bank; we have the
money, and possess the power.

47. In addition, all operations will take place
under an LLC that you, the investor, is a
general partner. Direct access to all
financials will be available at your
discretion per the articles of organization
and the operating agreement.
At SAM, we service each transaction for
our investors and are dedicated to
complete operational transparency.

48.  3.3 Choosing The Notes
There is a very tedious and important
timeline involved with these large unpaid
balances of notes. Most importantly is
the “scrubbing” process. This is a period
where we will assess each individual file
within the pool of notes. While looking
through these larger pools, we inevitably
find certain files with scenarios that will
take longer to exit and in that case we
can categorize whether the yield is high
enough to move towards acquisition.

49. After identifying these files, we, in some
cases, remove them from the pool, as
these types of notes do not fit our
business model.
This will typically bring down the unpaid
balance by 20 percent from an un-
scrubbed pool to a scrubbed pool,
ultimately saving investor dollars and
increasing the rate of return on capital
injected.

50. This is an important step in our due
diligence process to make our investor’s
money secured.
We also account for 3 percent attrition
rate on the scrubbed pool for these same
instances, bankruptcies, and deaths as
time goes on to collect or exit on the
notes.

51.  3.4 Workouts
Balance Reduction
In this scenario, the balance of the
borrower’s loan is 175 percent or greater
than the value of the home. In this case,
borrower wants to keep their home.
However, the borrower realizes they will
never recoup the negative equity that
they are paying down.

52. SAM will structure a 12 month program
to write down the balance of the
borrower loan in exchange for 12 months
of un-interrupted, on-time payments.
Here is an example below:

53. Unpaid Balance
$300,000.00
Home Value
$200,000.00
Purchase Price of Note
$120,000.00
Monthly Principal and Interest Payment
$1,896.20

54. We will give the borrower a $5000 per
month balance reduction at the end of
the 12th month assuming borrower has
made 12 on time payments.
The end result is our portfolio enjoys a
cash-on-cash return of 18.96 percent on
our $120,000 investment while the
borrower has the benefit of reducing the
balance of their loan by $60,000 by
month 12.

55. This gives the borrower hope that their
house will become an asset in the near
future. In addition, SAM now has the
ability to sell a 12 month, seasoned,
performing loan, upwards of 70 percent
of the home value. In conclusion, our
return on investment for 12 months is
35.62 percent.

56. Loan Modification/Forbearance
Agreement
In this case, the borrower fell behind for
a variety of reasons; loss of income,
health issues, career change, etc. The
borrower has expressed the desire to
stay in the home and demonstrated the
financial ability to sustain the current
mortgage payment. We create a
forbearance agreement that will take the
total amount of payments owing and
divide the sum by 12.

57. We add the 1/12 to the regular monthly
payment. This will immediately help
borrower to get back on track, increase
our cash-on cash return, and reestablish
the borrower as a seasoned performer.
In the event that the borrower lapses on
their forbearance payment, we reserve
the right to initiate foreclosure.

58. Cash for Keys/Deed in Lieu of
Foreclosure
This is an instance where borrower is
emotionally disconnected with the home
and is living in the home. We create an
opportunity where the borrower is
released from all personal liability on the
obligation and walk away with enough
cash to relocate and establish a new life.

59. We offer them an aggressive cash
incentive to sign over the deed to the
home. This scenario exists if the home
only has a first position lien (that we
purchased) and the balance of the loan is
higher than the value of the home.
After we come to a formal agreement in
writing, we perform a thorough
inspection of the home to identify
potential problems.

60. Our contract states that within our
discovery process we identify problematic
situations, i.e. roof leak, we have the
right to reduce our cash offer to the
current owner.
Our team encourages the home owner to
treat this as a business decision.

61. Short Payoff
One of the most equitable options we
have for a borrower is a short payoff. In
this instance, we provide a 6 month
option where borrower can pay off their
mortgage at a price below the market
value of the property. This happens by
way of a family member putting up the
cash, private money financing, or using
401k proceeds (if available) to pay off
the home.
Here is an example:

62. Unpaid Balance
$300,000.00
Home Value
$200,000.00
Purchase Price of Note
$120,000.00

63. In this case, we would offer the borrower
a payoff at $180,000.00. In addition, we
will write off the remaining debt and
relieve the borrower from the difference.
Since SAM is still profitable, we do not
1099 the borrower for the difference,
thus creating no tax liability for the
borrower.

64. Short Sale
The most common of all workouts, we
work with the borrower to list their
home. During the short sale period, we
allow the borrower to live in the home
with no mortgage payments.

65. Foreclosure
Foreclosure is the last resort for SAM. If
our asset managers are not able to
complete either of the above, we deploy
our legal team to recoup the asset via
Foreclosure. This process can take from
120 days to 360 days.

66. Our philosophy is to price the asset to
sell at the foreclosure court steps. In
doing so, we immediately recoup funds
and do not ensure the sale process.
In the event the asset reverts back to
SAM, our team of realtors will list and
dispose of the asset as an REO.
Sam will perform an asset search of any
borrower. If other assets exist, we will
explore our deficiency rights against the
borrower. This is an unlikely scenario,
but one that still exists.

67. 4.PARTNERS:
 4.1 James Stepanian
 Jim Stepanian spent 17 years in the
Telecommunications industry. In 1992, Mr.
Stepanian started Step Overseas
Telecommunications, Inc., a
telecommunication agency that quickly
became the 2nd largest agency out of over
100 agents that marketed Telecommunication
service for Execuline of Sacramento, Inc. In
1998, Mr. Stepanian founded and served as
Chief Executive Officer of Wholesale Telecom
Incorporated, a California Public Utility.

68. Jim Stepanian was one of the first
Telecommunication executives to
introduce marketing wholesale bandwidth
solutions into multiple resale channels
within the communications industry.
In 2007, Mr. Stepanian started Nutri88
Inc., DBA: MyNutritionStore.com a
Nutraceutical Company marketing
natural products to health and fitness
professionals throughout North America.

69. In 2007, Mr. Stepanian earned the “Best
New Concept” award at the annual SCIA
(Southern California Business
Association) for the
MyNutritionStore.com business model.
Mr. Stepanian was recently recognized by
several media and news organizations for
his 2003 written letter to the NASD
(National Association of Securities
Dealers) Los Angeles chapter that
predicted systemic problems at Merrill
Lynch.

70. The issues Mr. Stepanian wrote about in
his 2003 letter then surfaced during the
2008 global financial crisis. Currently Mr.
Stepanian is founder and Chief Executive
Officer of Summerlin Asset Management,
LLC., a diversified real estate investment
and management company.

71. Jim Stepanian has over 17 years of
experience in corporate management
including sales and marketing, new
product development/distribution,
regulatory compliance, and mergers &
acquisitions. In 2002, Mr. Stepanian
earned his Bachelor’s Degree in Health
and Human Services from the University
of Phoenix.

72.  4.2 Peter G. Pakes
Mr. Pete Pakes is currently the
company’s Chief Financial Officer and
Senior Vice President of Investor
Relations. In 1994, Mr. Pakes was hired
by SBC Global Services and served for 15
years as Senior Executive AM covering
the financial sector in the Midwestern
United States.

73. Mr. Pakes left SBC in 2005 and partnered
with Adam Pakes to create a lending and
development company that engaged in
commercial land development.
Today, Mr. Pete Pakes works with SAM
investors and the company’s partners to
maximize and grow SAM assets.

74. Mr. Pakes is noted for his attention to
detail and his ability to come up with
innovative ideas to insure that financial
goals are met.
He is a graduate of Ball State University
with a degree in International Finance
and minor in Criminal Justice and
Criminology.

75.  4.3 Adam C. Pakes
Adam C. Pakes, is Vice President and
Chief Operating Officer of Summerlin
Asset Management, LLC. Mr. Pakes has
over 6 years of experience in the
mortgage industry. Since 2004, Mr.
Pakes has held a Broker’s license in
California, Arizona, Florida, and
Washington. Mr. Pakes is a graduate
from California State University of Long
Beach with a Bachelor of Science degree
in Human Resource Management.

76. As Chief Operating Officer, Mr. Pakes
oversees the acquisition and disposition
of all non-performing and performing
Mortgages and/or Deeds of Trust.
Through his experience, Mr. Pakes has
grown SAM assets under management to
over $50,000,000.

77. As a mortgage broker and active member
in the real estate community over the
last nine years, Mr. Adam Pakes has
been consistently realizing his investors a
12-26 percent per annum.
He has been working with private
investors to issue private money loans
for the last three years.

78. His track record includes over 80 private
transactions. This demonstrates his
ability to scrub through opportunity and
secure his investors in a manner that the
rewards outweigh the risks.

79.  4.4 Shannon DeRosby
Shannon DeRosby’s is a Senior Asset
Manager for Summerlin Asset
Management, with a core competency in
transactional real estate including
Escrow, Title, and Processing
Management. In 1992 Mrs. DeRosby was
hired at First American Title, where she
worked her way up to a Certified Escrow
Officer position.

80. Eventually, Shannon switched title
companies, and was promoted up the
ranks to Assistant County Manager /
Sales Manager for Mohave County,
Arizona.
In this position, Shannon helped
hundreds of Realtor’s develop marketing
programs and techniques to help
increase their bottom line. In October of
2007, Shannon decided to venture near
her parents in Flagstaff, Arizona.

81. In 2009, Shannon was hired to open the
Keller Williams office as the Team Leader
for Keller Williams Realty in Flagstaff,
Arizona.

82. STRATEGY: Risks and Advantages
 Risks
There are necessary steps that SAM will
take in order to insure that your capital is
secured. This includes our responsibility
to conduct due diligence to establish
collateral value, insurance, title history,
and terms of the note.

83. This is traditionally conducted in the
same manner as conventional lenders.
We provide a level field of controlled risk
and hold tightly to consistent risk
management practices.

84. In addition to the significant amount of
due diligence, we have created a 16
point algorithm to establish the degree of
risk under each individual file.
To furthermore establish a true value of
the assets on hand, we base all values
off of a conservative 30-day fire sale
basis. This ensures that the most
accurate values of these properties is
taken into account and held as closely as
possible to true market 30-day value.

85. SAM will purchase assets within a strict
value protocol equal to 50-64 percent of
our appraised 30-day property value.
At the high range of 64 percent we would
pay $128,000 for a first mortgage,
whereas property value is appraised at
$200,000. Therefore, risk to capital is
mitigated by the steep discount SAM
purchases its assets for.

86.  5.2 Advantages
In every transaction there exist certain
factors that must be in line to set itself
above other investment opportunities.
Our product being offered possesses
many of these attractive qualities.
Diversification is primarily the most
attractive quality that makes this
opportunity feasible.

87. There also is the opportunity to purchase
a pool of notes that have performing,
sub-performing and non-performing
notes to further diversify the pool.
The trend of diversification is becoming
vitally important given the turbulence in
world markets. In addition, there is no
churning that takes place with this
investment.

88. What this means is that you don’t
experience a payoff on your investment
as you would with individual trust deeds.
That being the case, your money never
sits idle while you look for the next
investment opportunity.

89. 6. OPPORTUNITY:
 6.1 Direct Purchase of Performing and
Non-Performing Notes
Our greatest advantage to this product is
the direct purchase of performing and
non-performing 1st position notes. As
previously stated, an asset that does not
produce predictable income is essentially
a troubled asset.

90. We are able to negotiate directly with the
lien holders on these assets. This allows
us to name our own price and acquire
these notes without having your
investment being eaten up by heavy
commissions, fees, and transfer costs.
Performing deeds allows us to mitigate
risk alongside the non-performing deeds
and allows for a balance of cash flow to
offset the non-performing assets.

91.  6.2 Servicing and Underwriting
Through the relationship we possess with
our servicing and underwriting partners,
our objective is to increase a non-
performing note by 30 to 40 percent of
its purchase value. We will achieve this
through restructuring the note ourselves
via our servicing partner.

92. Once we own the notes and have
restructured the debts, the collection of
the notes is done through the same
entity.
Currently, our servicing partner has their
corporate office in Southern California
and is licensed in all 50 states.

93.  6.3 Conservative Estimations
Our LLC projects it will return 100
percent of capital money invested within
18 months. Communication with the
borrowers is the key to a successful
outcome and usually produces an
expedited exit or disposition of the note.
Total liquidation of the portfolio is
estimated to be 12 to 18 months.

94. This will allow us to maximize the dollars
collected and provide a great solution to
the borrower and their position on the
property they own.
Net ROI to the LLC upon complete
disposition of the portfolio is estimated to
be 40 to 55 percent.

95. 7. INVESTOR POTENTIAL:
 7.1 Making Your Money Work for You
Option 1: As Sam disposes of each asset
investor monies will be paid first until
100 percent of your capital is returned.
After your capital is returned you will see
a preferred return of eight percent (8
percent) per annum on that investment.
In addition to this preferred return, you
will also accrue thirty three percent (33
percent) of the net profits recovered by
our LLC.

96. Your preferred return will be distributed
quarterly with statements produced by
our accounting department. Upon a
complete payback of the capital, thirty
three percent (33 percent) of all funds
will be disburse to the investor.

97. 8.PROFORMA

98. Contact us at:
Call Toll Free: 855-726-6683
http://www.investinsam.com