A new model elucidating when and when not to have legislative and presidential term limits. Case studies include: Russia, Columbia and South Korea. The presentation concludes that term limits are most necessary for presidential offices in developing countries, but could even harmful when used in legislatures in developed countries.
1. Terms Limits: Why or Why Not? Stephane Amoyel, Alexander Buchvald, Jonathon Flegg, Hee Jae Kim, William Oman, and Russell Saltz
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5. Paradigms: Who Benefits from Term Limits * Source: Kurfist 1996 Term-Limit Political Actors Progressivism Populism Republicanism Libertarianism Presidents and Governors Unlikely Somewhat Disadvantaged Unlikely Executive Agencies Likely Somewhat Unlikely Unlikely Legislative Staff Likely Somewhat Likely Unlikely State and Local Politicians Likely Disadvantaged Somewhat Disadvantaged Party Organizations Likely Somewhat Unlikely Unlikely Interest Groups Likely Likely Disadvantaged Somewhat Lobbyists Likely Somewhat Disadvantaged Somewhat Likely to Benefit from Term Limits Unlikely to Benefit from Term Limits Somewhat Likely to Benefit from Term Limits Likely to be Disadvantaged by Term Limits
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16. If p<π, term limits maximize welfare How do Term Limits Affect Expected Welfare? Expected Payoff of the Electorate No Term Limits Term limits Second Round π*1+(1- π)*0=π (In the last round, implementing his preferred policy strictly dominates implementing the non-preferred policy since R+G>R) π*1+(1- π)*0=π (In the last round, implementing his preferred policy strictly dominates implementing the non-preferred policy since R+G>R) First Round p*1+(1-p)*0=p The politician implements the “popular” policy a in first round to be reelected (regardless whether policy a is his preferred policy) since 2R+G> R+G π*1+(1- π)*0=π (In the last round(which is also his first), implementing his preferred policy strictly dominates implementing the non-preferred policy since R+G>R) Total Expected Utility π + p 2 π
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27. When Should We Have Term Limits? Term limits reduce barriers to entry and are most effective where electoral screening processes are ineffective. However, generally career politicians adapt to, rather than are limited by, term limits. Legislature Executive Developed Countries Lowest barriers from incumbency. Electoral screening is most elective. Low information asymmetry. Moderate barriers from state resources. Electoral screening is most effective. Low information asymmetry. Developing Countries Lowest barriers from incumbency. Electoral screening is least effective. High information asymmetry. Greatest barriers from state resources. Electoral screening is least effective. High information asymmetry. Term Limits ineffective or harmful Term limits most effective and desirable
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Notes de l'éditeur
Variation in presence and types of term limits across state legislatures in the United States: For the Governor you have California has 2 4-year terms Arkansas has an absolute two term limit (but not necessary consecutive) Illinois has no limit Georgia after two consecutive terms must wait 4 years and/or 1 full term before being eligible again Variation with-in state: Connecticut – Governor, Lt. Governor, and Secretary of State have no term limit Missouri– governor has a 2 term limit; Lt. Governor has no term limit Maryland – Governor after two consecutive terms must wait 4 years and/or 1 full term before being eligible again; Lt governor has a 2 term limit; Attorney General has no term limit
Progressivism . This thinking upholds the ideal of an expert and professional legislature, but maintains that it has been corrupted by representatives who put their own re-election and campaign donors above the public good. Populism. This thinking rejects the professional legislative ideal in favour of amateurism. This may be supported because one believes in a weak legislature vis-à-vis the executive, or that amateur politicians will bring representative closer to the people. Republicanism . These guys deplore professionalism for destroying the distance between representatives and their followers. However they also disagree with the populists by wanting their representatives to be like trustees. Having term-limits can free representatives from careerism and the need to win elections. Libertarianism . These guys oppose professionalised and strong legislatures to preserve a minimalist government. The careerism of politics attracts people who are predisposed to solve problems through government. Term-limits would therefore create more efficient policies. Demand for Term Limits: less government spending; fewer laws; political amateurism Eliminate inefficiency and corruption Fiscal Discipline
No clear consensus on who the winners and losers are from term limits Binding / Non Binding term limits: In order to bind, the term limit must be lower than what some critical proportion of the legislatures tenure would have been without the restriction. If term limit is not binding then it may prove to have little or no effect on a politicians tenure
Link it to who gains and loses Model to show moral hazard not a problem in certain circumstances Term limits can be good
&quot;More than 30 yrs has passed since President Park died. Because of bad memory of term limits, Korea has been very strict to term limits. (i.e. only one term for the president since then) Since then, Korean society became more democratic and also gained economic power. Nowadays, curing lame duck problem is most salient issue whenever there is discussion about constitutional reform in Korea
Jono – insert a short sentence Alternatives to term limits to achieve the term limits goals Campaign finance reform – other instruments to limits careerism and barriers to entry