1. Oaks Grow from Little Acorns: Campaigning for Democracy Abroad
Background to International Campaign
From the work of a few concerned Nigerians intent on exposing the viciousness of the
Babangida regime to the various organisations campaigning for democracy under the
current dispensation, it is no exaggeration to say that the external campaign against
military dictatorship in Nigeria has come a long way. When we started the New
Nigeria Forum (earlier known as Movement for a New Nigeria) in the United
Kingdom in 1990, most of the Nigerian groups in existence concentrated, perhaps
advisedly, on socio-philanthropic work. They are state unions, ethnic solidarity
groups and social networking organisations. Human rights and campaign for
democracy were far removed from their agenda. [In fact, they pointedly told any one
who dared ask that politics was not on their agenda as though this were possible for
any people-based organisation.] At the apex of such groups was the Nigerian National
Union – a coalition of Nigerian organisations. The NNU portrayed itself, and it was
perceived in several quarters, as an extension of the Nigerian High Commission and a
defender of any government in power.
Setting up any remotely radical group that existed outside the control of the NNU
therefore created its own worries for the High Commission. Even for the ordinary
Nigerian just out in the UK to eke out a living after escaping the trauma of IBB’s
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), it was difficult to understand why people
would choose to oppose a man as ‘dangerous’ as Babangida. To this group, we should
just let the man go without as much as questioning any of his antics. Their position
was understandable: General Babangida was riding on the crest-wave of his
maradonaic fame, toasted by Queen and country, lavishly praised by Margaret
Thatcher and other world leaders for “forward looking economic strategies and
contribution to international peace-keeping.”. The fact that these same economic
policies drove these laid-back Nigerians out of the country and led to the anti-SAP
riots went unmentioned.
Those involved in the group were roundly condemned as killjoys and destroyers of
Nigeria’s image abroad who should be shunned and avoided like lepers. But the
Babangida government and its agents took a very keen interest in the activities of the
group, sending people to attend its open meetings, keeping tabs through their
intelligence outfits and making direct contacts with the group’s leadership with a view
to ‘settling’ them in the usual Nigerian manner. The military government was
convinced that the storm had began to gather. As though in tandem, another group
similar to NNF and very critical of the Babangida dispensation, but broadly
supportive of the transition programme had emerged in the United States, called the
Nigerian Democratic Awareness Committee [NDAC]. By the time the various human
rights and democracy groups inside the country founded the Campaign for
Democracy in 1991, the two groups were in place to support the domestic campaign
with their external contact.
Working for Democracy abroad
Regular contacts were developed with governments in Europe and America, briefing
sessions were held for human rights groups like Amnesty International, Committee
for the Protection of Journalists, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative and
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2. AfricaWatch [now Human Rights Watch/Africa] by the NNF. The group also started
its own regular journal, Nigeria Now. More importantly, forums were provided for
visiting activists and democracy campaigners to brief foreign journalists and
concerned politicians and individuals in Europe and America. No sooner had this
developed that the official press in Nigeria – namely New Nigerian and Daily Times
embarked on a campaign of denigration of the work of the NNF abroad.
Without a doubt, there was a gradual but seismic shift in the mentality of Nigerians
abroad following the plethora of consciousness raising activities that had become so
commonplace by 1992 courtesy of the democracy agitation of the NNF. This was
enough to worry any regime that cared more about its image than the substance of its
stewardship, and many would agree that Babangida’s was an image-conscious regime
par excellence. The last time any Nigerian regime had reason to explain itself and
their policy to the international community was during the civil war. Even then,
Nigeria often insisted on the floor of the United Nations and the Organisation of
African Unity that the problem was an internal one in which it could tolerate no
interference. In the two decades that followed the war, a combination of factors kept
Nigerians abroad from openly campaigning against successive governments at home.
What with the relatively stable economy occasioned by the oil boom, Nigeria’s active
involvement in the international campaign against apartheid South Africa, and the
attendant Cold war dispensation that promoted authoritarian structures and relegated
good governance and democracy to the backburner.
The late 1980s witnessed a significant change in the international scene as
authoritarian regimes began to fall one after the other in Eastern Europe. Latin
America too was seeing the end of many long-standing caudillista regimes, hitherto
propped up by the west in the superpower rivalry of the time. The domestic scene was
also changing in many African states as several stooges of the superpowers lost the
patronage of these metropolitan powers. Multi-party democracy and good governance
became the buzzwords, military regimes began to experience short shrift even from
their staunchest supporters. In Nigeria, this was given an additional fillip by the
decimation and near total disappearance of its thriving middle class, courtesy of the
economic policies of the Babangida regime. Many of these displaced middle class
professionals had been forced into foreign lands as economic refugees. The growing
disaffection among Nigerians abroad against the regime that turned them into
migrants also made the work of activists groups a bit easier and more challenging. It
meant the skills for mobilising people and articulating the problems of Nigerians
under a repressive regime became easily available. It was no surprise therefore that
these democracy groups benefited from the prevalent residue of disaffection, which,
in turn helped in spreading the word and raising the consciousness of Nigerians
abroad.
The annulment and its aftermath
This was the state of play at the time the elections were held and annulled in June
1993. The reaction across the world was of course seen as spontaneous, and there
was, indeed an element of spontaneity to it. There was, however, a lot of co-ordinated
work as well, especially among the groups already in existence abroad and the cadres
of the Campaign for Democracy at home. All Nigerians abroad were united in their
disgust and a protest rally organised by several Nigerian organisations witnessed one
of the largest crowds ever to grace any Nigerian outing. One group that played a
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3. crucial role in this protest rally alongside the NNF was the Nigerian Democratic
Movement (NDM) which metamorphosed from a purely pro-Abiola cum SDP support
group abroad into a full-fledged campaigning body immediately after the annulment.
Since then, NDM has played a crucial role in mobilising Nigerians abroad.
In quick succession to the numerous rallies that took place, a major meeting was
organised by the NNF in August 14, 1993. By the time we held the public meeting at
the Westminster Central Hall opposite the British Houses of Parliament, attended by
nearly a thousand Africans, it was obvious that the British people could no longer
claim ignorance of the unfortunate events in Nigeria. The event was graced by the
president elect – Chief Abiola, Professor Soyinka, Senator Adesanya, Barrister Aka
Bashorun as well as other senior African politicians and international figures like
Nkrumahist – JH Mensah of Ghana, the late Abdulrahman Babu of Tanzania and Lord
Eric Avebury of the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group, it was widely
remarked that “not since the days of the anti-colonial campaigns of the West African
Students Union [WASU] has London witnessed such sheer determination on the part
of the people”1
For us in the Forum, and for many others outside the forum, there were two planks to
the campaign – we wanted to unite the international community against the
dictatorship, and second, we wanted to eschew ethnic chauvinism through the
formation of a broad democratic alliance in defence of the gains of June 12 that cut
across ethnic, religious and regional divide. The Campaign for Democracy was
already leading the campaign to the best of its ability at home but despondency
occasioned by battle weariness and inexperience had set in. Besides, other forces
involved in the democracy campaign were far too opportunistic, too depraved and
very much reluctant to break the bonds of friendship between them and the goons in
charge in Abuja. This was to have untold repercussions on the entire campaign,
culminating in the full blown return of the military in November 17, 1993. The
mistrust that resulted from accusations of endorsement of the coup by leading
campaigners nearly paralysed the work of the domestic movement. Indeed, some
would say we are yet to recover from this problem but a cursory look at organisations
of this type anywhere in the world would indicate a climate in which things constantly
evolved. As victims of the state machinery of manipulation and repression, it was
easy to see the ghost of enemies from within a broad movement, and thus play into
the hands of the dictators at large.
Part of that evolution resulted in the formation of the National Democratic Coalition
[NADECO] in May 1994 - a group, which brought together leading politicians, ex-
military generals and civil society activists. NADECO came at a particularly timely
period when the new dictatorship appeared to have consolidated its grip on power.
Through its deft moves, it succeeded in dividing the opposition to it by offering key
politicians ministerial appointments, creating a serious crisis of confidence within the
democratic movement. The fact that the coalition has in its cadre well known
Nigerians also guaranteed the needed media coverage that stood it in good stead.
Besides all these though, NADECO came out with a very clear agenda that people
could identify with – actualisation of the June 12 elections, convening of the
1
See Olu Oguibe (Ed) Democracy in Nigeria: The June 12 Mandate (London: New Nigeria Forum &
Africa Research and Information Bureau, 1993) in which speeches delivered at the August 14 gathering
was published.
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4. Sovereign National Conference and the reconstitution of the military – earlier
promoted as core princples within the Campaign for Democracy. In addition, within
weeks of its formation, NUPENG and PENGASSAN – the two oil workers unions,
called the ten week long national oil strike that paralysed the Nigerian oil fields. The
national strike shook the regime so much that its eventual failure inevitably meant the
hounding and harassment of leading figures in NADECO and the oil unions. Many of
those affected are still being held in jails across the country, and several fled into
exile.
It was at this stage that NADECO took the steps of opening a branch abroad, which
has been active since September 1994 to date. In complementary roles to the
democracy groups are the environmental and minority rights lobby, the women’s’
groups, the human rights organisations, all of which, have assumed greater
prominence since the mindless execution of Ken Saro Wiwa and his colleagues in
November 1995, a decision which earned Nigeria its current suspension from the
Commonwealth group.
Strengths and Weaknesses
The cynic of course might argue that the international campaign has not had any
success since the military are still in power in Nigeria, and several leaders of the
democracy movement still in jail or exile. Others might even argue that the
opposition to the military is riven by various ideological and petty divides, which only
serve to consolidate the grip of the dictatorship. Well, the cynic would be wide off the
mark on both counts. It is of course very difficult to assess the precise role and
influence of the democracy, human rights and environmental lobbies in certain
decisions, there can be no doubt that we have succeeded in internationalising the
struggle against military dictatorship in Nigeria, and very little doubt exists in the
world today that the Nigerian regime is a pariah regime. This has been made possible
by the objective conditions on the ground, but more importantly, by the articulation
and presentation of such conditions, in terms of the contribution made by the
information available to international organisations, embassies and governments and
the citizenry. The fact that many of these governments and organisations in turn
approach the groups for specific information and details can only be a measure of the
credibility they have gained over the many years of campaign. The fact that the
Nigerian groups abroad and their international allies were able to mobilise widespread
support inside Britain, the rest of Europe, Africa and the Americas on the Nigerian
question has made it easier for the Commonwealth and other world leaders to take up
the issue with increased vigour. The relationship between domestic pressure and
international campaign has been very direct on the oil sanctions campaign as with
other campaigns of a similar nature.
On the second plank of unifying the campaign under an umbrella and eschewing
ethnic dissension, the objective remains an essential one for virtually all the groups
involved in democracy campaigns, even if complete success is not achieved yet. That
is why we now have NADECO and the United Action for Democracy join the CD as
coalitions of organisations inside Nigeria and the United Democratic Front of Nigeria
and NADECO-Abroad working in the international arena. As with every young
campaign, it often takes time to work through group differences in order to have one
single, unifying organisation at the apex of the struggle. Some even argue that this is
not a feasible project, given the differences in ideological outlook of the various
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5. groups, generation divides and egomaniacal pursuits of those involved. More
objectively, there is need for a clearer position on what unification sets out to achieve
– formation of a political party or an ephemeral movement for change. Although,
they are not mutually exclusive since examples abound the world over of activists
groups turning into political parties as we had with Solidarnosc in Poland and African
National Congress in South Africa, the position has to be stated at the outset to ensure
revolutionary discipline necessary for the sustenance of such political movements.
Inevitably, success will come when we create a structure in which differing
tendencies find expression in an open and democratic manner, even when there are
disagreements on tactics and strategies. For now, the objective of unification should
be pursued from the perspective of joint working groups on specific projects, allowed
to develop incrementally into a solid movement for change.
If the objective of a united coalition is not immediately achievable, it may well be
asked whether all this work will yield major dividend in its international campaign
beyond the symbolic international action already taken against the regime. For
example, will the campaign achieve its goal of an oil embargo, where powerful
interests can continue to drive a wedge between the groups and emphasise their
divisions rather than common purpose. Since Shell is still in Nigeria, and the
consociational alliance between international monopoly capital, the military junta and
the local compradorial class seems to be waxing stronger, one might be inclined to
reach such a conclusion. There is no doubt however that the current campaign against
Shell and other oil multinationals has helped to focus attention on Nigeria and
demonstrated the significant opposition to the military dictatorship in Nigeria as well
as the shoddy practices of foreign oil multinationals. Had there been no furore
surrounding the environmental record of Shell and its counterparts in Nigeria, it
would have found its way back in Ogoni, polluting the countryside. Instead, we now
have a ‘listening’ Shell subjecting its operations to a Niger-Delta Environmental
Survey and producing a charter on human rights upon which it now plans to base its
operations anywhere in the world. Although we may still see this as just keeping up
appearances, these are no small steps for an organisation that is rigid in structure and
steeped in tradition.2 It is of course not always possible to block all deals as we have
seen with the half a million dollars donated to the Mr Clinton’s Democratic Party by
General Abacha’s chief agent – Mr Chagouri, or stop all multinationals from their
operations given their international network and strong influence in governments, but
there can hardly be any doubt that the Nigerian situation constitutes a major worry to
international interests. After all, Shell never left South Africa even at the height of
the apartheid regime’s madness. But we must also note that they are controlled by
shareholders, and increasingly their shareholders are becoming sensitised to the cries
and campaigns of the oppressed the world over. What is important therefore is that the
matter should be kept under surveillance with rapid response as and when necessary.
A marathon, not a dash!
It is of course rather premature for any of the groups involved in the campaign against
military dictatorship to start counting the chickens of success as yet. Indeed, all will
agree that training in organisational and institution building is needed for greater
efficiency and task oriented campaigns. There is hardly any doubt that the campaign
is still dominated in certain areas by pettiness and personality differences. As a young
2
See Janet Guyon, “Shell: Why is the World’s Most Profitable Company turning itself Inside Out?”,
Fortune Magazine, 4 August 1997.
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6. campaign, it still lacks the structure that can make it adaptable to changing
circumstances in an ever-changing world. Many in the struggle are beginning to take a
longer-term view of the work involved though; they know that this is a marathon, not
a dash and even the removal of the military will not signify the end of the struggle.
Yet, in spite of its shortcomings, there can be no doubt that the work done by groups
abroad in complementing our colleagues at home gives the dictatorship sleepless
nights. This is best imagined by those who have come face to face with the level of
paranoia often displayed by regime operatives. The fact that most of the leading
figures currently in exile are charged with treason, and those operating the opposition
democracy radio are equally condemned - remains a pointer to how the regime sees
the groups campaigning abroad. Another evidence that might well be worth
considering is the amount the regime spends in propping up foreign lobbies and
campaigners abroad.
Ultimately, only the oppressed people in Nigeria can win freedom and democracy for
Nigeria but international action by their colleagues and friends can make the task a
little easier, and perhaps bloodless. The activities of the several groups campaigning
for democracy abroad continue to give one hope that this dictatorship will collapse,
and it will not do so on its own terms. © KF
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