The document discusses conflict prevention and human security in West Africa. It notes that while some countries have made democratic progress, the region remains poor and prone to crisis. It analyzes the nature of conflicts in West Africa, noting economic stagnation in the 1980s laid the groundwork. It argues a human security framework focusing on democracy, conflict resolution, and collective security is needed. Regionalism through ECOWAS is important but faces challenges. Different responses are required based on each country's situation to address issues like poverty, governance, and health issues, with regional integration and global partnership key to success.

1. Preventing Conflict and Promoting Human Security in West Africa –
Reflections 1
By J. ‘Kayode Fayemi2
Introduction
I have been asked to make my intervention on conflict prevention and human
security in West Africa, in light of the most recent experience in war-torn Liberia. While an
assessment of current developments in Liberia is useful and necessary, the critical question
for me, and which I believe should be of concern to fellow participants here, is the extent to
which we really share a common view of conflict prevention and human security in West
Africa. If there is such a common perception – it would be important to ask the extent to
which it is collectively articulated? Can we identify the underlying consensus and the
common value systems in the African perception of security with a view to developing clear
parameters for conflict prevention? A quick review of recent developments in the region still
underscores the continuing tension between a ‘national security’ – nation building approach
and a ‘human security’ – peace building approach to conflict prevention. In trying to get to an
articulated vision of human security for West Africa, I see my task in this presentation as
three-pronged: first, to reflect on the nature of conflict and insecurity in West Africa,
second, to highlight the challenges that must be confronted and third, to address the
prospects for a human security agenda in West Africa.
The Nature of Conflict and Prospects for Peace in West Africa
West Africa’s story has been one of reversal, stasis as well as progress. The sub-region has
witnessed significant changes in the 1990s decade. Peaceful alternation of power in Benin,
Senegal, Mali, Ghana, and Cape Verde, the emergence of constitutional governments in
Sierra Leone, Niger, Burkina Faso and the Gambia and the formal exit of the military from
the political affairs of the region’s giant, Nigeria provide justification for some cautious
optimism.
In spite of the progress made on the civil and political rights front though, West Africa
remains one of the poorest regions in the world and one of the most susceptible to crisis and
violent conflict, placing a huge question mark on the sustainability of the region’s electoral
democracies. With the cold peace in Liberia, continued instability in Cote d’Ivoire, Sierra
Leone’s emergence from a decade of civil war with great uncertainty, Guinea Bissau and
Guinea hovering between coup d’etats and cold peace, not to mention large numbers of
refugees and internally displaced population creating a major humanitarian emergency in
West Africa, it is clear that pro-forma democracies represented by ‘free and fair’ elections will
not be enough and that the most paramount tasks facing the region now include finding
1
Being paper prepared for presentation at the British Council/Human Rights Centre, Essex University held
at the University of Essex, March 1, 2004. DO NOT CITE!
2
Kayode Fayemi is African Studies Scholar-in-Residence, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois,
USA and Director of the Centre for Democracy & Development.
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2. sustainable solutions to the current violent conflicts in the Greater Mano River Basin,
stemming the ignition of potential conflicts by addressing fundamental political, social and
economic root causes of the regional crisis.
Social and Economic Indicators 2002
Country Population GDP GNP per Human Devt Life Expectancy Adult
(millions) ($bn)) Capita($) Index literacy
(%)
Benin 6.0 2.4 380 147 53.6 39
Burkina Faso 11.0 2.6 230 159 46.1 23
Cape Verde 0.4 0.6 1,330 91 69.4 74
Cote d’Ivoire 16.2 10.5 660 144 47.8 46
Gambia 1.3 0.4 330 149 45.9 36
Ghana 19.0 6.8 350 119 56.6 70
Guinea 7.0 3.3 450 150 47.1 35
Guinea-Bissau 1.2 0.2 180 156 44.5 38
Liberia 3.1
Mali 11.0 2.6 240 153 51.2 40
Niger 11.0 2.0 180 161 44.8 15
Nigeria 127.0 32.8 260 136 51.5 63
Senegal 9.3 4.7 500 145 52.9 36
Sierra Leone 5.0 0.6 130 162 38.3 32
Togo 5.0 1.4 300 128 51.6 56
Total 233.3 70.9 304(av)
Sources: World Development Report 2002 & UNDP Human Development Report 2002.
Although it would appear that there is a greater understanding of the nature, causes and
complexity of West Africa’s dire situation and the inextricable link between democracy and
development; even so, it is important to emphasise this linkage, especially given how post
cold war developments – have brought this into clear relief and how important it is to avoid
simplistic understanding of the problems.
To understand the causes and nature of violent conflict, we must examine in a more
nuanced manner the historic roots and contemporary trajectories of West Africa’s violent
conflicts and move away from simplistic interpretation of causes based on notions such as
‘greed’, ‘poverty’, or ‘ethnicity’. The incontrovertible evidence is that West Africa’s conflicts
share a common backdrop of economic stagnation and faltering democratic rule that
undermined state capacity and legitimacy in the 1980s. Yet each conflict has followed its
own trajectory shaped by political and policy choices partly made by the ruling governments
and partly imposed by the international and local context. Among the most critical elements
in understanding the new conflict equation arising out of the 1990s political transition in the
region are:
• The shifts in global and geopolitical power relations; in particular the end of the cold war
and the withdrawal of the metropolitan security umbrella which paved the way for
serious challenges to some client regimes in a manner previously considered impossible;
• With the demise of universalistic ideological battle between socialism and capitalism, new
forms of conflict emerged in the form of identity issues anchored on religion and
ethnicity in particular;
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3. • The regional context of the new wars;
• The withdrawal of assistance by big states also resulted in the search for new forms of
sustenance leading to the exploitation of resources and criminal activity;
• Increasing availability and privatisation of instruments of violence, transforming the
military balance between the state and society. (A recent survey indicates that the
permanent members of the Security Council were together responsible for 81% of world
arms exports from 1996 – 2000. The G8 nations sold 87% of total arms exports to the
entire world.)
• New forms of violent and trans-national crime.
Yet in this context of internal cleavages and external fuelling of conflicts, one could almost
reach the flawed conclusion that the 1980s was a period of unbridled peace. The truth is
however more complex than this. Examined critically, the most important lesson of the
1990s conflict in West Africa is that the 1980s laid a solid basis for them - through the severe
economic and fiscal compression exemplified by the structural adjustment shocks of the
period. It is no longer in doubt that the erosion of social capital, political legitimacy and
institutional weakening of many African states can be directly linked to the policy choices
that informed governance during this period. For example, the State lost its central
relevance due to the agenda of Structural Adjustment Policies, which was the choice of many
states in the 1980s. In turn, the resistance triggered by the SAP sufferings led to State
militarism largely driven by the authoritarian culture so widespread in the 1980s. This laid the
basis for the new and more deadly societal militarism represented by the warlords of the
1990s and the violent nature of crime.
In short, the nature of conflict and politics in West Africa was in essence redefined by the
peculiar context of the 1990s and the nature of partnership between Africa and its
development partners. Addressing violent conflicts in the region therefore requires
broadening the notions of security and developing multi-faceted responses. Four pillars of
peace and security ought to form the core of this agenda:
1) human security as the bedrock for peace;
2) democracy and open governance;
3) transformation of violent conflicts through political processes; and,
4) collective security for all African states and the Commonwealth should be playing roles in
all of the four areas.
At the heart of this conflict prevention agenda is the transformation of Africa’s security
sector governance. Until recently, the mantra among donors is to emphasise cost-cutting
approach to dealing with security sector problems. However, the solutions required are first
and foremost political in nature and this relates essentially to the deepening of democracy by
ensuring that there is scope for involvement by all stakeholders in processes of
democratisation, both in terms of long term containment of conflict and in terms of
democratic consolidation.
The above approach which places individuals at the centre of the security and
democratisation equation has gained increasing acceptance in Africa, and indeed in many
parts of the world. While protecting the state and its citizens from external aggression
remains a key consideration, the most serious threats facing countries on the African
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4. continent at the beginning of the 21st century tend to be those that either derives from
internal causes or trans-national and collective in nature. To many in Africa therefore, a safe
and secure environment is a necessary condition for sustainable democracy and poverty-
reducing development. This broader conception that articulates security and democracy in a
manner that the individual, the group as well as the state may relate to its fundamental
objectives of promoting and ensuring the right to life and livelihood and provision of a safe
and secure environment in an uncertain world underscores the importance of the
inextricable link between democracy and development in Africa and supports human
security as the appropriate framework for achieving proper governance.
So, if human security provides the framework for achieving democratisation and
development, regionalism is the basic institutional scaffolding that we ought to pay particular
attention to in West Africa since the gains of a human security approach are best realised
within a regional context. The importance of the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) can hardly be overemphasised in this context and it is hoped that any
effort at promoting human security and preventing conflict will have ECOWAS at the
centre-piece.
This is not to suggest that the regional body is not without its own challenges. Indeed,
questions abound as to the extent to which regionalism is grounded in reality in West Africa
and can act as a mechanism for promoting human security. Some of the challenges often
highlighted include amongst others: the enduring legacy of the Westphalian nation-state, lack
of common core values driving the regional project; a perpetual resource gap hampering
progress and implementation of regionalism, the formalism of the regionalist project which
tend to emphasise a wide array of institutions with little or no capacity to manage them;
issues of regionalism as leaderism in which people to people partnerships take the backseat
whilst regionalism is only happening at the Heads of States’ level and government realm,
issues of regional hegemony – all of which tend to give the impressions of regionalism as an
externally driven agenda, and not the product of the people’s lived experiences.
No doubt, regionalism still faces a critical problem of entrenchment in a region where efforts
to build homogenous nation-states on the basis of artificially constructed boundaries have
resulted in forced unity. Since sovereignty of the nation-state is regarded as sacrosanct, states
that have ceased to function as states in the traditional sense of providing basic needs for the
citizens still enjoy support and assistance in development circles even when it is known that
these states are nothing but privatised entities. Even when regional and sub-regional
mechanisms put in place by Africans have developed autonomous capacity to handle local
conflicts – as recently witnessed in ECOWAS’ successful efforts in Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire
and Guinea Bissau, the critical issue remains how best to address the westphalian logic of
sovereignty and at the same time move away from leader-centric regionalism in which
regional integration is only recognised as happening at the level of leaders with scant regard
paid to the rising regional consciousness at the level of the citizens. It is only when
regionalism is taken seriously as a response to globalisation that Africans can define a new
relationship with the International community.
Acknowledging the fact that an exclusive focus on the nation state has prevented an
understanding of region specific determinants in the poverty-security-development complex
might help civil society actors and development workers to address some of the policy issues
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5. and possibilities that can make a difference. If the foregoing analysis of the nature and
context of conflict in the region and the challenges that must be confronted is reliable, what
then are the prospects for addressing these challenges?
Prospects for addressing current challenges to human security?
For a start, it is important to acknowledge that West Africa’s violent conflicts and security
problems can only be resolved through committed regional leadership and genuine global
partnership. The decades of the 1980s and the 1990s were a testament to the dangers of
‘broad brush’ approaches narrow nation-based nationalism, characterised by the external
imposition of macro-economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes that were
sufficiently inflexible to account for the diversity of circumstances and need and the
continental ‘non-interference’ policy. African leaders now argue for more locally driven
agenda, hence the launch of NEPAD. Yet, developing more ‘home grown’ approaches will
require donors to relinquish greater responsibility to Africa’s leaders and their people.
Unfortunately, this is more apparent than real in the NEPAD programme so far as it would
appear that the drivers of NEPAD have hitched its success to enhanced partnerships with
donors, and paid limited attention to home grown partnerships. Given the different
trajectories of democratisation that we have seen in the region, and indeed, the entire
continent, it is important to develop a range of responses which fit the different typologies
of African states in the post cold war transitions, in order to avoid the failed broad-brush
strategies of the past. Given its knowledge of its member states, the Commonwealth stands
a good chance to push this line of argument with other bi-lateral and multilateral agencies.
For example, in analysing the human security situation in West Africa, at least five rough
categories can be identified, ranging from progress to stasis, and in a few cases reversal, and
requiring different responses from development partners. It is possible to talk of:
1) States in the process of consolidating their democracy – Benin, Ghana, Mali,
Senegal;
2) States in various stages of transitions to democracy – Cape Verde, Nigeria, Niger,
Gambia, Burkina Faso;
3) States in conflict or emerging out of conflict – Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra
Leone;
4) States in relapse or remilitarisation – Guinea, Guinea Bissau; and,
5) Authoritarian states – Togo and Mauritania.
Without an exception, all the states continue to face various challenges to their human
security situation, and some of the central challenges they face include: poverty, political and
economic governance, education, youth crisis, small arms proliferation and trafficking,
manipulation of religion, citizenship and identity issues, gender, environmental degradation,
migration, health, especially malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/Aids pandemic.
While the identified issues above are common to all the states in question, it is important to
respond to them differently. Ultimately, my argument is that given the “glocal” nature of the
conflicts afflicting many of the states, state rebuilding and consolidation can only be
reinforced in the context of regional integration supported by global partnership. None of
the countries in question can respond to these problems on its own terms. Majority of the
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6. states are only sovereign in the juridical sense, not in terms of making available basic
provision to their citizens and the most realistic way of addressing the problems they
confront is by treating them as part of a regional system. If one were to review the dire
figures in the table above and recent figures provided on aid dependence in West Africa
(Afrodad, ‘The Reality of Aid, African Edition 2002), it seems evident that to continue to
live under the illusion of juridical sovereignty is not the way to go. Instead, our states must
be reinforced through regional incentives and sanctions. A few ideas might suffice in trying
to respond to these challenges:
Support for peace building and reconstruction: For states in conflict or those emerging out of
conflict such as Liberia is currently dealing with, State rebuilding after state collapse often
requires a strong support for peace building and reconstruction measures. Peace in this
context has often been interpreted as mere absence of war and state rebuilding is often seen
only in terms of physical reconstruction. While physical reconstruction may be a necessary
departure point for state rebuilding, the defining characteristic of state rebuilding from a
human security approach is the presence of holistic security and a model of conflict
management, which emphasises the fundamentals of military security, democratisation and
consensus building, development, economic reform, human rights and human dignity for the
citizens to engage their rulers.
Therefore, although the conventional wisdom is to ignore it, the security required in
the immediate aftermath of conflict might also require higher rather than lower security
expenditure to enable the state and citizens cope with the impact of conflict – rehabilitating
refugees and the internally displaced, providing for a secure, safe and enabling environment
in which development initiatives can succeed and reintegrating former combatants into
society and economy. In situations where conditions of poverty prevail after post war
conflict, it is reasonable to predict a correlation between the lack of development
opportunities in terms of direct income generation to survivors and an increase in criminality
and conflict.
For policy makers, especially international organisations and donor agencies, there is
always the pressure to construe their role in terms of immediate restoration of peace and
stability, rather than security and development. Almost to the letter, election was always the
top priority in the aftermath of conflict and we have seen it come up in Liberia as it has done
in Iraq. The concentration on elections and elections monitoring, for example in say Liberia
or Sierra Leone in the past decade gives the impression that what mattered most was the
election, not democracy nor was there a recognition that elections are not enough to
guarantee democracy and development. Experience has since shown that while there are
immediate tasks that must be addressed in terms of peace building and reconstruction in
every conflict situation – disaster relief and management, repatriation and reintegration of
refugees and reduction in the proliferation of small arms and clearance of explosives, these
are not the most critical ingredients of a successful peace building strategy.
To promote sustainable security and peace building strategies therefore – a
comprehensive look at peace building and reconstruction strategies must be taken - treating
them as a continuum with short term (relief and emergency aid and creating a secure and
enabling environment); medium term (peace support operations) and long term
(reconstruction, democracy & development) components in an integrated manner. Donor
countries should be encouraged to foster greater coherence amongst their own policies at an
inter-agency level, as well as within their own regional structures (such as EU, OECD, etc).
A good example as we pointed out in the preceding section is the fact that arms sales from
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7. developed countries is often at variance with the emphasis the same countries place on
conflict prevention and security sector governance.
Equally, in this respect, there is a need for stronger cooperation between the regional
bodies, the Bretton Woods institutions, the UN Systems and other multi and bi-lateral
development agencies as well as independent development institutions to reduce the
overzealous focus on achieving fiscal discipline and macro-economic stability at the expense
of efforts to protect social cohesion. Donor responses have often involved conditionalities
relating to automatic decreases in military spending and reductions of military and other
security forces with no attention paid to the expensive nature of security and the objective
security threats that each country faces. Especially in post conflict situations, this realization
should inform international attitudes towards security sector transformation on the one
hand, and post conflict reconstruction on the other.
Third, it is extremely important that international institutions should seize the
momentum provided by the weak capacity of the state to align external assistance with local
needs and efforts, not an opportunity to impose received wisdom and new theories of
development. This is extremely important in the context of claims that NEPAD is Africa
owned. Where state institutional capacity is weak, an immense burden of responsibility is
placed on international organisations like the Commonwealth, IFIs and development
agencies in which real dialogue with the people and wide consultations underscore whatever
actions are taken.
Finally, international donors cannot ignore the international context in their response
to peace building and reconstruction efforts. How, for example, has the often convoluted
linkage between trans-national corporations, proliferation of arms and promotion of neo-
liberal globalising trends by the industrial world undermine the success of security and
development reforms in countries emerging out of conflict, especially within the context of
an unstable region in which domino effect is real rather than imagined. These are some of
the issues that are central to any discussion of the policy lever on peace building and
reconstruction efforts in countries like Liberia.
The above is crucial in the case of Liberia given the recent successes that had been
attained by the international community in its fundraising efforts for post-conflict
reconstruction in Liberia. It will be absolutely crucial to ensure that not only do the pledges
made are delivered, but also to ensure that they are not ‘tied’ in a way that they lose their
significance to the Liberian post conflict reconstruction efforts. Critically in this regard, it is
hoped that greater synergy will be sought between the United Nations, ECOWAS and the
various bi-lateral development agencies interested in assisting the Liberian process.
The Challenge of strengthening the territorial state: As argued above, this thinking itself is a product
of the state-centric notions of security that dominated traditional thinking in the cold war era.
Since the state is increasingly seen as unrepresentative and illegitimate, are there conditions
under which war might be seen to be a legitimate means of removing regime types that
promote conflicts and in which leaders have encroached upon common pool resources? To
this end, some questions might suffice in any consideration of complex political emergencies
rather than focus exclusively on state monopoly of means of coercion. This is not to suggest
that states do not have legitimate needs for security which might necessitate legitimate
procurement and monopoly of means of coercion, but that this has to be demonstrated to
ensure that security is treated as common public good, not just regime good. It may
therefore be necessary to consider:
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8. • Under which circumstances, if any, is war necessary to remove bad governments?
That is how do we distinguish between justifiable rebellion and needless conflict?
• How is regional economic and political co-operation built between and among states
to address the pathology of militarism?
• How can state-centric definitions of security be de-emphasised, and the role of civil
society in peace building increased in the quest for common values?
• How is democratic control of the military to be built in states undergoing political
transition or moving from war to peace – through parliamentary oversight, effective
institutions of governance and genuine interaction between the military and the rest
of society?
Again, two examples from West Africa in recent times have demonstrated the maturity of
the leaders in grappling with this dilemma whilst underlining the importance of developing
an effective regional system. Unlike before when leaders tended to ignore the internal
conditions of states and the repressive edge of their leaders, West African leaders and the
regional body, ECOWAS have demonstrated in their handling of recent crises in Liberia and
Guinea Bissau that it is possible to recognise constituted authority and still address genuine
yearnings of the people. By their collective and decisive approach to the removal of
President Taylor of Liberia and critical role in the resignation of President Kumba Yala of
Guinea Bissau from office, regional leaders were espousing the importance of common core
values to which all leaders must subscribe – whilst disabusing the minds of others who
often see regional institutions as clubs of leaders dedicated to patting one another on the
back.
Since there is evidence to suggest that African leaders and their international partners
now accept the argument about broadening the human security agenda to include the
accountability of leaders(Africa Peer Review Mechanism), this paradigm shift should be
encouraged. The fact that the commitment to the mutually reinforcing interaction between
the values of proper governance, democracy, equity and sustainability still remain
subordinate to the core need for macro-economic stability and integration in the
international political economy ought to remain a source of worry. This is why many are still
suspicious of African leaders’ and their development partners’ commitment to a human
security approach in spite of the new rhetoric about local ownership, peer review and social
capital promotion.
Promoting social coherence through civil society development and multi-cultural tolerance
If we take peace-building as the sum total of activities that will support peace making
and conflict transformation: demobilisation, re-structuring of the local security system –
police and the military; resettlement of refugees and the internally displaced persons;
removal of dangerous weapons – mines and other unexploded firearms, reconstruction of
shattered infrastructure and humanitarian and disaster relief – very few still advocate that this
could be done without the inclusion of civil society. Indeed, even African leaders and
international development agencies now see civil society as key to the successful
implementation of these various aspects of post-conflict peace building process. In
discussing rights based approaches to governance and security sector transformation, local
ownership and development of social capital rests with the civil society, but it is important to
place this within the context of developing institutional mechanisms for the management of
diversity and difference and incorporating international human rights framework into
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9. domestic law. Hence, the rights of the people to their resources should not be compromised
at the altar of encouraging foreign direct investment, especially where this undermines
environmental security. It was assumed in policy and development circles that support for
neo-liberal democracy will help achieve this objective, hence there was the enthusiasm for
democracy assistance and ‘good governance’ in the early 1990s and donor countries made
some efforts to move economic assistance away from former concerns about stimulating
economic growth to an emphasis on political objectives, including support for processes of
democratisation and building of civil society.
Although the above represented a shift from the days of the super-power ideological
rivalry, even this shift in the leadership’s thinking and IFIs’ assistance has concentrated
primarily on the reform of the public sector and involvement of the ‘civil society’ to the
extent that it promotes the neo-liberal paradigm, not on an alternative vision of bottom-up
reforms driven by societal consensus. The fact that many of the transitions of the last decade
in Africa now approximate to – at best electoral democracies and at worst elected
dictatorships, has raised new questions about how to deepen the democratic content of
current reforms in a process oriented, participatory and accountable manner. At every level,
the idea of constitutionalising democratising polities that have largely functioned as
‘virtual’ democracies along multifaceted lines is taking shape.
Today, the fact that the struggle for reconstituting the African state is taking place in
no fewer than twenty African states in Angola, Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Cote d’Ivoire,
Swaziland and Lesotho, to mention but a few, underscores a paradigmatic shift from
constitutionality to constitutionalism, a situation where constitutions are now seen as tools
for building bridges between the state and civil society, a social compact based upon a
foundation of consensus among the constituent elements within the polity and between
them and the state in the quest for common value systems. What has to be emphasised
however for the purpose of human security is the importance of an organic link between the
constitution as a rule of law instrument incorporating international human rights framework
and primarily concerned with restraining government excesses, and the constitution as a
legitimisation of power structures and relations based on a broad social consensus and the
values in diverse societies. In short, if human security is to promote the mutually reinforcing
role of development, security and democracy, the task today is largely between bridging the
gap between “juristic security” and “political and socio-economic security” in the search for common
core values.
The core issues around values can only be addressed in the context of principles to
which all Africans willingly subscribe - values of representation, ownership, accessibility to
all levels of government, accountability, openness and collective responsibility. CSSDCA has
done a lot of work on developing a consensus driven value systems which is what would be
the subject of its peer review mechanism. NEPAD is also developing similar parameters and
indicators. While this is welcome by all, the scepticism that has attended the search for
common values to be promoted across Africa has been informed by the anti-democratic and
reprehensible behaviour of some of the leaders who are at the forefront of the NEPAD
campaign and their total contempt for some of the supposed values to which they have
committed themselves. In spite of this general scepticism, constitutionalism as a social
compact remains the best route for forging the kind of value system and reorientation that
can deepen our democracy in order to prevent conflict and build peace.
Building assets that provide security against disasters and economic shocks
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10. Conventionally, most international organisations and development agencies have promoted
the building of assets against disasters and economic shocks by focusing on macro-economic
stability strategies like Structural adjustment reforms, electoral democracies and support of
measures that seek to provide the enabling environment for foreign direct investment and
the global integration of the economy – a mutual pursuit of political and economic
liberalisation. This is the fundamental principle guiding most post conflict state-rebuilding
projects. Yet, the logic of trickle down economics has failed to produce an integrated world
economy in which all zones are winners. Indeed, as Caroline Thomas and Peter Wilkin
argue,
In the process of globalisation, the continent (Africa) has quite literally been left
behind in terms of the distribution of the spoils of the process. The promised
advantages of economic restructuring, as hailed by the IMF, World Bank and
individual developed countries, have not been borne out. Foreign investment fails to
flow in; debt burdens continue; commodity prices fluctuate; environmental
degradation proceeds…and industrialisation fails to occur. (Thomas & Wilkin: 1998).
This clearly contradicts the core assumption of globalisation that wealth would
automatically be created when the free market gains universal acceptance in the world. By
arguing that the way to build assets against shocks is not via the creation of local self
sufficiency, but national economies should concentrate on what they can contribute to the
world economy, globalisation ignores the comparative advantage of the North, locks African
states further into relative powerlessness by creating conditions for conflict which further
weakens the mediatory role of the states. Instead, it empowers those elites within the state
who can form part of the network in business and government capable of acting
independently of the juridical state. The fallout of this globalising trend is the unregulated
trade in mineral resources, proliferation of arms and narcotics and the illicit trade in banned
items all of which ultimately undermine food security, environmental security and the
security of the individual – factors responsible for conflict today in many African states. It
has also helped in deepening the rural-urban divide, fostered inter-generational strife
occasioned by youth frustration and exacerbated the scourge of refugees and the internally
displaced, all of which have moved the hapless below the poverty line and moved them
closer to violence and conflict.
In our view therefore, the greatest assets against shocks and disasters ultimately lie
with the development of human resources, better management of natural resource
endowment and respect for local ownership of the post-conflict reform agenda - whether in
determining the role of the State or in arriving at the most effective tension relieving
mechanisms. In fairness, the Commonwealth has always paid attention to this distinction,
but only within the context of a free and unregulated market. Hence, it is also useful to
examine and analyse individual situations on their merit, rather than assume that the market
is the answer to every problem. This is of course not to suggest that market has no role in
reforming states structures. It is to say that there are no universal models of the market as
providing the best assets against shocks and disasters, hence civil society leaders and donor
agencies must learn from these highly differentiated experiences of the market in formulating
realistic policies.
In pursuit of human security and human development in West Africa
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11. There is definitely a sense in which a deep feeling of disillusionment is widespread in Africa
with the current democratisation and development agenda and this threatens to undermine
the quest for sustainable development. Indeed, many now feel that the hype surrounding
democracy is more than what the eventual product offers. Hence, one can see a major
opposition to the current slow pace of democratic and economic development. Indeed,
deepening democratic development remains an uphill task in several African countries,
especially in the aftermath of the global shock occasioned by the 9/11 tragedy in America.
There are indications that even the enthusiasm that greeted the NEPAD initiative in the G8
countries has been enveloped in another global shift which is now in favour of despotic
peace in place of democratic, even if unsettling, freedom. The greatest challenge of course is
to understand that despite the frustrations and impatience of the people with this democratic
deficit, there is awareness that transitions are inherently unstable and unpredictable.
Based on the above reflections on conflict prevention and human security dynamics
in West Africa, a number of measures seem to suggest themselves, especially in terms of
developing a human security approach that promotes human development:
1. There is an urgent need for clarification of values and norms subscribed to by Africans
and adopted in a widespread manner by the citizens. The ECOWAS’s Supplementary
Protocol on Democracy & Good Governance goes to some extent in tacking this, but
the African Peer Review Mechanism as developed by both CSSDCA and NEPAD offers
an opportunity in this regard.
2. There is a need for conceptual clarity through a comprehensive approach to peace and
security in policy and development circles – one that recognises that while there is no
teleological link between elections and democracy and between democracy &
development, deepening democracy offers the best chance of preventing violent conflict
and building durable peace, but this must be accompanied over the long term by
economic development;
3. The importance of strengthening regional integration and promote regional mechanisms
that can help sustain democratic development and consolidation through the adoption of
a regional approach to conflict prevention must be understood and promoted;
4. The need to reconcile economic and social development and enhance the input of non-
state actors – in policy formulation to enhance social capital rather than entrench the
leverage of IFIs and donor agencies on States must be underscored;
5. The recognition of legitimate security needs of nation-states must be factored into the
human security approach through the promotion of governmental and non-
governmental peace-building strategies;
6. We must problematise the link between globalisation and conflict, rather than assume
that it is always going to be positive in the promotion of pro-poor growth in the search
for and implementation of sustainable livelihood and poverty reduction strategies;
7. Let us locate the security agenda within the democracy and development framework and
reflect the link between politics and economics, and between security and opportunities;
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12. 8. Human security approach is a process, whose results will not necessarily be immediate;
hence the need for a long term view by interested stakeholders and anti-poverty
strategists.
I hope these thoughts can stimulate debate and generate useful responses that can take
Africa forward.
I thank you.
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13. REFERENCES
AFRODAD, Reality of Aid – African Edition 2002.
Buzan, B. et al. 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne
Rienner.
CODEP, 2000. Report on the outcomes of the consultation on globalisation and conflict for the White
Paper on International Development: Globalisation & Development. London, June 2000.
Commonwealth Foundation, 2003, Kampala Vision: Communiqué of the Pan-Commonwealth Tri-
Sector Conference on Partnerships for Governance, held in Kampala, Uganda in August 2003
DFID, 2000. Security Sector Reform and the Management of Military Expenditure: Risks for Donors,
High Returns for Development, Report on an International Symposium, February 14-16,
2000.
Ebrahim, Hassen, Fayemi Kayode & Loomis Stephanie, 2000, Principles and Mechanisms of
Constitution Making in Commonwealth Africa, Delhi: CHRI
Fayemi, J.K. 2000. “Security Challenges in Africa”, Seminar: Indian Journal of Opinion, Special
Issue on African Transitions 490, June 2000.
Martin, B. 2000. New Leaf or Fig Leaf? The Challenge of the New Washington Consensus. Report
prepared for Bretton Woods Project and Public Service International.
NEPAD Strategy Document – www.mapstrategy.org; www.nepad.org.za
Thomas, C. & P. Wilkin (eds.) 1998. Globalisation, Human Security & the African Experience,
Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.
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