The document discusses the role of the Commonwealth in promoting peace and security in West Africa. It notes that while the Commonwealth has helped address issues like democratic backsliding in some countries, its influence faces challenges due to unequal power dynamics between members and a consensus-based approach. However, the Commonwealth could still play an important role by promoting human security, democracy, conflict resolution and regional cooperation. Key will be taking a nuanced view of each country's situation and challenges to conflicts, and supporting locally-driven solutions over broad external interventions.

1. Peace and Security in West Africa – Any role for the Commonwealth?
By
Kayode Fayemi,
Centre for Democracy & Development
Introduction
This year’s hosting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Nigeria
marks a significant watershed for democratisation and development in West Africa. Eight years
ago, in Auckland, New Zealand, Nigeria was the pariah state in the Commonwealth, and the
significant impetus for the establishment of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action
Group(CMAG) and the Millbrook Plan of Action, came from the flagrant violations of the 1991
post cold-war Harare Declaration by the ruling dictatorship in Nigeria. By the time of the
Edinburgh summit in 1997, the situation in West Africa had worsened, with two West African
States – Nigeria and Sierra Leone – subject of scrutiny by CMAG. Although Nigeria had begun a
journey towards international rehabilitation by CHOGM 1999 in Durban, South Africa, but
Gambia had joined Sierra Leone and Pakistan in the list of states under scrutiny. So, it could be
argued that CMAG and the Commonwealth Secretariat had always had cause to address
problems of violations of the Harare Declaration in one West Africa member country or the
other (except Ghana) since the establishment of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group.
In spite of its effort to promote the core values of the Harare Declaration in West Africa, there is
every reason to be sceptical about the Commonwealth especially at a time that African states are
keen to pursue local solutions to existing and emerging problems. First, given the way the
Commonwealth works, it is difficult to trace any shift in thinking or politics to the Association as
the significant and/or only player in the campaign for democratic governance in the last decade.
Second, the dominant influence of its Northern members (Australia, Britain, Canada) is a source
of continuing concern in Africa and Asia, where this unequal power relations is often seen as a
dampener of the Club spirit. Third, the consensual approach of its politics undermines the utility
of punishment and incentives for erring and progressive member states. This works in favour of
State parties to the detriment of the values espoused in the Harare Declaration and the yearnings
the Commonwealth peoples as a whole.
Beyond the romanticism of belonging to a club of ex-British colonies in a region dominated by
members of La Francophonie (only four out of sixteen West African states are ex-British colonies),
it is still possible to see the Commonwealth as a potential and real force for good in the region,
not least because 154 of the region’s 233 million people theoretically belong to the
Commonwealth. Without losing sight of the historical context, the challenge for the Heads of
Government and the parallel Commonwealth Peoples’ Forum meeting in Abuja is how to make
the Commonwealth relevant not just to the governments but the peoples of West Africa. How
can the Commonwealth help promote values of proper governance, human security and human
development in West Africa? How can it assist the promotion of regionalism in the global
context, in responding to the negative impact of globalisation and in the quest for fairer trade,
debt relief, transparency, accountability and genuine equality of opportunity? So, the issue for the
Commonwealth leaders meeting in Abuja is not just one of a more nuanced understanding of the
challenges of democratisation and development in West Africa, but also one of concretely
making a difference – deepening West Africa’s democratisation process in order to promote
development and prevent conflict. These are considerable challenges, but they are not
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2. insurmountable ones and Abuja 2003 offers another chance to at least agree on a journey with
annotated maps.
The Nature of Conflict and Prospects for Peace in West Africa
West Africa’s story has been one of reversal, stasis as well as progress. The sub-region has
witnessed significant changes in the 1990s decade. Peaceful alternation of power in Benin,
Senegal, Mali, Ghana, and Cape Verde, the emergence of constitutional governments in Sierra
Leone, Niger, and the Gambia and the formal exit of the military from the political affairs of the
region’s giant, Nigeria provide justification for optimism.
In spite of the progress made on the civil and political rights front though, West Africa remains
one of the poorest regions in the world and one of the most susceptible to crisis and violent
conflict, placing a huge question mark on the sustainability of the region’s electoral democracies.
With the re-ignition of conflict in Liberia, continued instability in Cote d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone
emerging from a decade of civil war with great uncertainty, Guinea Bissau and Guinea hovering
between coup d’etats and cold peace, not to mention large numbers of refugees and internally
displaced population creating a major humanitarian emergency in West Africa, it is clear that pro-
forma democracies represented by ‘free and fair’ elections will not be enough and that the most
paramount tasks facing the region now include finding sustainable solutions to the current
violent conflicts in the Greater Mano River Basin, stemming the ignition of potential conflicts by
addressing fundamental political, social and economic root causes of the regional crisis.
Social and Economic Indicators 2002
Country Population GDP GNP per Human Devt Life Expectancy Adult literacy
(millions) ($bn)) Capita($) Index (%)
Benin 6.0 2.4 380 147 53.6 39
Burkina Faso 11.0 2.6 230 159 46.1 23
Cape Verde 0.4 0.6 1,330 91 69.4 74
Cote d’Ivoire 16.2 10.5 660 144 47.8 46
Gambia 1.3 0.4 330 149 45.9 36
Ghana 19.0 6.8 350 119 56.6 70
Guinea 7.0 3.3 450 150 47.1 35
Guinea-Bissau 1.2 0.2 180 156 44.5 38
Liberia 3.1
Mali 11.0 2.6 240 153 51.2 40
Niger 11.0 2.0 180 161 44.8 15
Nigeria 127.0 32.8 260 136 51.5 63
Senegal 9.3 4.7 500 145 52.9 36
Sierra Leone 5.0 0.6 130 162 38.3 32
Togo 5.0 1.4 300 128 51.6 56
Total 233.3 70.9 304(av)
Sources: World Development Report 2002 & UNDP Human Development Report 2002.
By choosing ‘Development and Democracy’ as the overriding theme of this year’s Summit, it
would appear that the Commonwealth understands the nature, causes and complexity of West
Africa’s dire situation and the inextricable link between democracy and development in any
attempt at addressing these challenges. Even so, it is important to emphasise this linkage,
especially given how post cold war developments – have brought this into clear relief and how
important it is to avoid simplistic understanding of the problems.
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3. To understand the causes and nature of violent conflict, Commonwealth leaders must examine
in a more nuanced manner the historic roots and contemporary trajectories of West Africa’s
violent conflicts and move away from simplistic interpretation of causes based on notions such
as ‘greed’, ‘poverty’, or ‘ethnicity’. The incontrovertible evidence is that West Africa’s conflicts
share a common backdrop of economic stagnation and faltering democratic rule that
undermined state capacity and legitimacy in the 1980s. Yet each conflict has followed its own
trajectory shaped by political and policy choices partly made by the ruling governments and
partly imposed by the international context. Among the most critical elements in understanding
the new conflict equation arising out of the 1990s political transition in the region are:
• The shifts in global and geopolitical power relations; in particular the end of the cold war and
the withdrawal of the metropolitan security umbrella which paved the way for serious
challenges to some client regimes in a manner previously considered impossible;
• With the demise of universalistic ideological battle between socialism and capitalism, new
forms of conflict emerged in the form of identity issues anchored on religion and ethnicity in
particular;
• The withdrawal of assistance by big states also resulted in the search for new forms of
sustenance leading to the exploitation of resources and criminal activity;
• Increasing availability and privatisation of instruments of violence, transforming the military
balance between the state and society.(A recent survey indicates that the permanent members
of the Security Council were together responsible for 81% of world arms exports from 1996
– 2000. The G8 nations sold 87% of total arms exports to the entire world.)
• New forms of violent and trans-national crime.
Yet in this context of internal cleavages and external fuelling of conflicts, one could almost reach
the flawed conclusion that the 1980s was a period of unbridled peace. The truth is however more
complex that this. Examined critically, the most important lesson of the 1990s conflict in West
Africa is that the 1980s laid a solid basis for them - through the severe economic and fiscal
compression exemplified by the structural adjustment shocks of the period. It is no longer in
doubt that the erosion of social capital, political legitimacy and institutional weakening of many
African states can be directly linked to the policy choices that informed governance during this
period. For example, the State lost its central relevance due to the agenda of Structural
Adjustment Policies, which was the choice of many states in the 1980s. In turn, the resistance
triggered by the SAP sufferings led to State militarism largely driven by the authoritarian culture
so widespread in the 1980s. This laid the basis for the new and more deadly societal militarism
represented by the warlords of the 1990s and the violent nature of crime.
In short, the nature of conflict and politics in West Africa was in essence redefined by the
peculiar context of the 1990s and the nature of partnership between Africa and its development
partners. Addressing violent conflicts in the region therefore requires broadening the notions of
security and developing multi-faceted responses. Four pillars of peace and security ought to form
the core of this agenda: 1) human security as the bedrock for peace; 2) democracy and open
governance; 3) transformation of violent conflicts through political processes; and 4) collective
security for all African states and the Commonwealth should be playing roles in all of the four
areas.
At the heart of this conflict prevention agenda is the transformation of Africa’s security sector
governance. Until recently, the mantra among donors is to emphasise cost-cutting approach to
dealing with security sector problems. However, the solutions required are first and foremost
political in nature and this relates essentially to the deepening of democracy by ensuring that
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4. there is scope for involvement by all stakeholders in processes of democratisation, both in terms
of long term containment of conflict and in terms of democratic consolidation.
The above approach which places individuals at the centre of the security and
democratisation equation has gained increasing acceptance in Africa, and indeed in many
parts of the world. While protecting the state and its citizens from external aggression
remains a key consideration, the most serious threats facing countries on the African
continent at the beginning of the 21st century tend to be those that either derive from internal
causes or are trans-national and collective in nature. To many in Africa therefore, a safe and
secure environment is a necessary condition for sustainable democracy and poverty-reducing
development. This broader conception that articulates security and democracy in a manner
that the individual, the group as well as the state may relate to its fundamental objectives of
promoting and ensuring the right to life and livelihood and provision of a safe and secure
environment in an uncertain world underscores the importance of the inextricable link
between democracy and development in Africa and supports human security as the
appropriate framework for achieving proper governance.
So, if human security provides the framework for achieving democratisation and development,
regionalism is the basic institutional scaffolding that the Commonwealth ought to pay particular
attention to since the gains of a human security approach are best realised within a regional
context. The importance of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) can
hardly be overemphasised in this context and it is hoped that the Commonwealth will spend
some time on discussing the place of regional institutions in accomplishing the twin goals of
development and democracy.
This is not to suggest that these institutions are not without their own challenges. Indeed,
questions abound as to the extent to which regionalism is grounded in reality and can act as a
mechanism for promoting human security. Some of the challengess often highlighted include
amongst others: the enduring legacy of the Westphalian nation-state, lack of common core
values driving the regional project; a perpetual resource gap hampering progress and
implementation of regionalism, the formalism of the regionalist project which tend to emphasise a
wide array of institutions with little or no capacity to manage them; issues of regionalism as
leaderism in which people to people partnerships take the backseat whilst regionalism is only
happening at the Heads of States’ level and government realm, issues of regional hegemony – all
of which tend to give the impressions of regionalism as an externally driven agenda, and not the
product of the people’s lived experiences.
No doubt, regionalism still faces a critical problem of entrenchment in a region where efforts to
build homogenous nation-states on the basis of artificially constructed boundaries have resulted
in forced unity. Since sovereignty of the nation-state is regarded as sacrosanct, states that have
ceased to function as states in the traditional sense of providing basic needs for the citizens still
enjoy support and assistance in development circles even when it is known that these states are
nothing but privatised entities. Even when regional and sub-regional mechanisms put in place by
Africans have developed autonomous capacity to handle local conflicts – as recently witnessed in
ECOWAS’ successful efforts in Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea Bissau, the critical issue
remains how best to address the westphalian logic of sovereignty as well as moving away from
the regionalism of leaders in which regional integration is only recognised as happening at the
level of leaders with scant regard paid to the rising regional consciousness at the level of the
citizens. It is only when regionalism is taken seriously as a response to globalisation that Africans
can define a new relationship with the International community.
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5. Acknowledging the fact that an exclusive focus on the nation state has prevented an
understanding of regional specific determinants in the poverty-security-development complex
might help Commonwealth leaders to address some of the policy issues and possibilities that can
make a difference. Having secured an understanding of the nature and context of conflict in the
region, what are the prospects for addressing the challenges and what role is there for the
Commonwealth?
Prospects for addressing current challenges to peace and security?
For a start, as we move towards the CHOGM in Abuja, it is important to acknowledge that West
Africa’s violent conflicts and security problems can only be resolved through committed regional
leadership and genuine global partnership. The decades of the 1980s and the 1990s were a
testament to the dangers of ‘broad brush’ approaches, characterised by the external imposition of
macro-economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes that were sufficiently
inflexible to account for the diversity of circumstances and need. African leaders now argue for
more locally driven agenda, hence the launch of NEPAD. Yet, developing more ‘home grown’
approaches will require donors to relinquish greater responsibility to Africa’s leaders and their
people. Unfortunately, this is more apparent than real in the NEPAD programme so far as it
would appear that the drivers of NEPAD have hitched its success to enhanced partnerships with
donors, and paid limited attention to home grown partnerships. Given the different trajectories
of democratisation that we have seen in the region, and indeed, the entire continent, it is
important to develop a range of responses which fit the different typologies of African states in
the post cold war transitions, in order to avoid the failed broad-brush strategies of the past.
Given its knowledge of its member states, the Commonwealth stands a good chance to push this
line of argument with other bi-lateral and multilateral agencies.
For example, in analysing the human security situation in West Africa, at least five rough
categories can be identified, ranging from progress to stasis, and in a few cases reversal, and
requiring different responses from development partners. It is possible to talk of:
1) States in the process of consolidating their democracy – Benin, Ghana, Mali, Senegal;
2) States in various stages of transitions to democracy – Cape Verde, Nigeria, Niger,
Gambia, Burkina Faso;
3) States in conflict or emerging out of conflict – Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone;
4) States in relapse or remilitarisation – Guinea, Guinea Bissau; and,
5) Authoritarian states – Togo and Mauritania.
Without an exception, all the states continue to face various challenges to their human security
situation, and some of the central challenges they face include: poverty, political and economic
governance, education, youth crisis, small arms proliferation and trafficking, manipulation of
religion, citizenship and identity issues, gender, environmental degradation, migration, health,
especially malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/Aids pandemic.
While the identified issues above are common to all the states in question, it is important to
respond to them differently. Ultimately, our argument is that given the “glocal” nature of the
conflicts afflicting many of the states, state rebuilding and consolidation can only be reinforced
in the context of regional integration supported by global partnership. None of the countries in
question can respond to these problems on its own terms. Majority of the states are only
sovereign in the juridical sense, not in terms of making available basic provision to their citizens
and the most realistic way of addressing the problems they confront is by treating them as part of
a regional system. (Dependence of West African states on donors.)
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6. Support for peace building and reconstruction: For states in conflict or those emerging out of conflict,
State rebuilding after state collapse often requires a strong support for peace building and
reconstruction measures. Peace in this context has often been interpreted as mere absence of war
and state rebuilding is often seen only in terms of physical reconstruction. While physical
reconstruction may be a necessary departure point for state rebuilding, the defining characteristic
of state rebuilding from a human security approach is the presence of holistic security and a
model of conflict management, which emphasises the fundamentals of military security,
democratisation and consensus building, development, economic reform, human rights and
human dignity for the citizens to engage their rulers.
Therefore, although the conventional wisdom is to ignore it, the security required in the
immediate aftermath of conflict might also require higher rather than lower security expenditure
to enable the state and citizens cope with the impact of conflict – rehabilitating refugees and the
internally displaced, providing for a secure, safe and enabling environment in which development
initiatives can succeed and reintegrating former combatants into society and economy. In
situations where conditions of poverty prevail after post war conflict, it is reasonable to predict a
correlation between the lack of development opportunities in terms of direct income generation
to survivors and an increase in criminality and conflict.
For policy makers, especially international organisations and donor agencies such as the
Commonwealth, there is always the pressure to construe their role in terms of immediate
restoration of peace and stability, rather than security and development. Almost to the letter,
elections is the top priority in the aftermath of conflict.. The concentration on elections and
elections monitoring, for example by the Commonwealth in say Liberia, Sierra Leone and
Nigeria in the past decade gives the impression that what mattered most was the election, not
democracy nor was there a recognition that elections are not enough to guarantee democracy and
development. Experience has since shown that while there are immediate tasks that must be
addressed in terms of peace building and reconstruction in every conflict situation – disaster
relief and management, repatriation and reintegration of refugees and reduction in the
proliferation of small arms and clearance of explosives, these are not the most critical ingredients
of a successful peace building strategy.
To promote sustainable security and peace building strategies therefore – international
organisations such as the Commonwealth must take a comprehensive look at peace building and
reconstruction strategies treating them as a continuum with short term (relief and emergency aid
and creating a secure and enabling environment); medium term (peace support operations) and
long term (reconstruction, democracy & development) components in an integrated manner.
Donor countries should be encouraged to foster greater coherence amongst their own policies at
an inter-agency level, as well as within their own regional structures (such as EU, OECD, etc). A
good example as we pointed out in the preceding section is the fact that arms sales from
developed countries is often at variance with the emphasis the same countries place on conflict
prevention and security sector governance.
Equally, in this respect, there is a need for stronger cooperation between the
Commonwealth, Bretton Woods institutions, the UN Systems and other multi and bi-lateral
development agencies as well as independent development institutions to reduce the overzealous
focus on achieving fiscal discipline and macro-economic stability at the expense of efforts to
protect social cohesion. Donor responses have often involved conditionalities relating to
automatic decreases in military spending and reductions of military and other security forces with
no attention paid to the expensive nature of security and the objective security threats that each
country faces. Especially in post conflict situations, this realization should inform international
attitudes towards security sector transformation on the one hand, and post conflict
reconstruction on the other.
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7. Third, it is extremely important that international institutions should seize the
momentum provided by the weak capacity of the state to align external assistance with local
needs and efforts, not an opportunity to impose received wisdom and new theories of
development. This is extremely important in the context of claims that NEPAD is Africa owned
– a claim that is rejected by many Africans. Where state institutional capacity is weak, an
immense burden of responsibility is placed on international organisations like the
Commonwealth, IFIs and development agencies in which real dialogue with the people and wide
consultations underscore whatever actions are taken. This is a point that the Commonwealth
Foundation has emphasised in the Kampala document following the tri-sectoral dialogues held in 10
Commonwealth countries in the past year.
Finally, international donors cannot ignore the international context in their response to
peace building and reconstruction efforts. How, for example, has the often convoluted linkage
between trans-national corporations, proliferation of arms and promotion of neo-liberal
globalising trends by the industrial world undermine the success of security and development
reforms in countries emerging out of conflict, especially within the context of an unstable region
in which domino effect is real rather than imagined. These are some of the issues that are central
to any discussion of the policy lever on peace building and reconstruction efforts and the extent
to which the Commonwealth Heads of Government consider them critically would determine
the possibilities of success that might accompany critical intervention on development and
democracy.
The Challenge of strengthening the territorial state: As has been argued above, this thinking itself is a
product of the state-centric notions of security that dominated traditional thinking in the cold war
era. Since the state is increasingly seen as unrepresentative and illegitimate, are there conditions
under which war might be seen to be a legitimate means of removing regime types that promote
conflicts and in which leaders have encroached upon common pool resources. To this end, some
questions might suffice in any consideration of complex political situations rather than focus
exclusively on state monopoly of means of coercion. This is not to suggest that states do not
have legitimate needs for security which might necessitate legitimate procurement and monopoly
of means of coercion, but this has to be demonstrated to ensure that security is treated as
common public good, not just regime good. It may therefore be necessary to consider:
• Under which circumstances, if any, is war necessary to remove bad governments? That is
how do we distinguish between justifiable rebellion and needless conflict?
• How is regional economic and political co-operation built between and among states to
address the pathology of militarism?
• How can state-centric definitions of security be de-emphasised, and the role of civil
society in peace building increased in the quest for common values?
• How is democratic control of the military to be built in states undergoing political
transition or moving from war to peace – through parliamentary oversight, effective
institutions of governance and genuine interaction between the military and the rest of
society?
Again, two examples from West Africa in recent times have demonstrated the maturity of the
leaders in grappling with this dilemma whilst underlining the importance of developing an
effective regional system. Unlike before when leaders tended to ignore the internal conditions of
states and the repressive edge of their leaders, West African leaders and the regional body,
ECOWAS have demonstrated in their handling of recent crises in Liberia and Guinea Bissau that
it is possible to recognise constituted authority and still address genuine yearnings of the people.
By their collective and decisive approach to the removal of President Taylor of Liberia and the
forced resignation of President Kumba Yala of Guinea Bissau from office, regional leaders were
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8. espousing the importance of common core values to which all leaders must subscribe – whilst
disabusing the minds of others who often see regional institutions as clubs of leaders to pat one
another on the back. This paradigm shift should be affirmed and strengthened in the quest to
strengthen the territorial state. First, concerted efforts from the top should help address some of
the policy challenges posed for conflict transformation and security sector reform within the
NEPAD context and subject state monopoly of violence to international and regional checks.
Although there is evidence to suggest that African leaders and their international partners now
accept the argument about broadening the human security agenda to include the accountability
of leaders(Africa Peer Review Mechanism), but the commitment to the mutually reinforcing
interaction between the values of democracy, equity and sustainability still remain subordinate to
the core need for macro-economic stability and integration in the international political
economy. This is why many are still suspicious of the African leaders and their development
partners’ commitment to a human security approach in spite of the new rhetoric about local
ownership and social capital.
Promoting social coherence through civil society development and multi-cultural tolerance
If the Commonwealth takes peace-building as the sum total of activities that will support peace
making and conflict transformation: demobilisation, re-structuring of the local security system –
police and the military; resettlement of refugees and the internally displaced persons; removal of
dangerous weapons – mines and other unexploded firearms, reconstruction of shattered
infrastructure and humanitarian and disaster relief – very few still advocate that this could be
done without the inclusion of civil society. Indeed, even African leaders and international
development agencies now see civil society as key to the successful implementation of these
various aspects of post-conflict peace building process. In discussing rights based approach to
governance and security sector transformation, local ownership and development of social
capital rests with the civil society, but it is important to place this within the context of
developing institutional mechanisms for the management of diversity and difference and
incorporating international human rights framework into domestic law. Hence, the rights of the
people to their resources should not be compromised at the altar of encouraging foreign direct
investment, especially where this undermines environmental security.
It was assumed in policy and development circles that support for neo-liberal democracy
will help achieve this objective, hence there was the enthusiasm for democracy assistance and
‘good governance’ in the early 1990s and donor countries made some efforts to move economic
assistance away from former concerns about stimulating economic growth to an emphasis on
political objectives, including support for processes of democratisation and building of civil
society.
Although the above represented a shift from the days of the super-power ideological
rivalry, even this shift in the leadership’s thinking and IFIs’ assistance has concentrated primarily
on the reform of the public sector and involvement of the ‘civil society’ to the extent that it
promotes the neo-liberal paradigm, not on an alternative vision of bottom-up reforms driven by
societal consensus. The fact that many of the transitions of the last decade in Africa now
approximate to – at best electoral democracies and at worst elected dictatorships, has raised new
questions on how to deepen the democratic content of current reforms in a process oriented,
participatory and accountable manner. At every level, the idea of constitutionalising
democratising polities that have largely functioned as ‘virtual’ democracies along multi-
faceted lines is taking shape.
Today, the fact that the struggle for reconstituting the African state is taking place in no
fewer than twenty African states in Angola, Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Cote d’Ivoire, Swaziland
and Lesotho, to mention but a few, underscores a paradigmatic shift from constitutionality to
constitutionalism, a situation where constitutions are now seen as tools for building bridges
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9. between the state and civil society, a social compact based upon a foundation of consensus
among the constituent elements within the polity and between them and the state in the quest
for common value systems. What has to be emphasised however for the purpose of CHOGM
and human security is the importance of an organic link between the constitution as a rule of law
instrument incorporating international human rights framework and primarily concerned with
restraining government excesses, and the constitution as a legitimisation of power structures and
relations based on a broad social consensus and the values in diverse societies. In short, if
CHOGM is to promote the mutually reinforcing role of development, security and democracy,
the task today is largely between bridging the gap between “juristic constitutionalism” and “political
and socio-economic constitutionalism” in the search for common core values. Although the
Commonwealth has played a significant role in constitutional development within the
Commonwealth, there is a lot more that could be done by the Commonwealth leaders as
highlighted in the significant study by the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative.(Ebrahim et-
al)
The core issues around values can only be addressed in the context of principles which
all Africans willingly subscribe. Values of representation, ownership, accessibility to all levels of
government, accountability, openness and collective responsibility. CSSDCA has been doing a
lot of work on developing a consensus driven value systems which is what would be the subject
of the peer review mechanism. NEPAD is also developing a similar parameters and indicators.
While this is welcome by all, the scepticism that has attended the search for common values to
be promoted across Africa has been informed by the anti-democratic and reprehensible
behaviour of some of the leaders who are at the forefront of the NEPAD campaign and their
total contempt for some of the supposed values to which they have committed themselves. In
spite of this general scepticism, constitutionalism as a social compact remains the best route for
forging the kind of value system and reorientation that can deepen our democracy in order to
prevent conflict and build peace and the Commonwealth ought to be doing more, not less in this
regard.
Building assets that provide security against disasters and economic shocks
Conventionally, most international organisations and development agencies have promoted the
building of assets against disasters and economic shocks by focusing on macro-economic
stability strategies like Structural adjustment reforms, electoral democracies and support of
measures that seek to provide the enabling environment for foreign direct investment and the
global integration of the economy – a mutual pursuit of political and economic liberalisation.
This is the fundamental principle guiding the NEPAD document. So far, the logic of trickle
down economics has failed to produce an integrated world economy in which all zones are
winners. Indeed, as Caroline Thomas and Peter Wilkin argue,
In the process of globalisation, the continent (Africa) has quite literally been left behind
in terms of the distribution of the spoils of the process. The promised advantages of
economic restructuring, as hailed by the IMF, World Bank and individual developed
countries, have not been borne out. Foreign investment fails to flow in; debt burdens
continue; commodity prices fluctuate; environmental degradation proceeds…and
industrialisation fails to occur. (Thomas & Wilkin: 1998).
This clearly contradicts the core assumption of globalisation that wealth would automatically be
created when the free market gains universal acceptance in the world. By arguing that the way to
build assets against shocks is not via the creation of local self sufficiency, but national economies
should concentrate on what they can contribute to the world economy, globalisation ignores the
comparative advantage of the North, locks African states further into relative powerlessness by
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10. creating conditions for conflict which further weakens the mediatory role of the states. Instead, it
empowers those elites within the state who can form part of the network in business and
government capable of acting independently of the juridical state. The fallout of this globalising
trend is the unregulated trade in mineral resources, proliferation of arms and narcotics and the
illicit trade in banned items all of which ultimately undermine food security, environmental
security and the security of the individual – factors responsible for conflict today in many
African states. It has also helped in deepening the rural-urban divide, fostered inter-generational
strife occasioned by youth frustration and exacerbated the scourge of refugees and the internally
displaced, all of which have moved the hapless below the poverty line and moved them closer to
violence and conflict.
In our view therefore, the greatest assets against shocks and disasters ultimately lie with
the development of human resources, better management of natural resource endowment and
respect for local ownership of the reform agenda whether in determining the role of the State or
in arriving at the most effective poverty eradicating mechanisms. In fairness, the
Commonwealth has always paid attention to this distinction, but only within the context of free
and unregulated market. Hence, it is also useful to examine and analyse individual situations on
their merit, rather than assume that the market is the answer to every problem. This is of course
not to suggest that market has no role in reforming states structures. It is to say that there are no
universal models of the market as providing the best assets against shocks and disasters, hence
Commonwealth leaders and donor agencies must learn from their own experiences of the market
in formulating realistic policies. For example, the British state cannot be taken railways into
public ownership on the basis of the inadequacies of the market, and still continue to promote
unbridled market fundamentalism in hapless states.
Conclusion: In pursuit of human security and human development in West Africa
There is definitely a sense in which a deep feeling of disillusionment is widespread in Africa with
the current democratisation and development agenda and this threatens to undermine the long
standing partnerships with institutions like the Commonwealth. Indeed, many now feel that the
hype surrounding democracy is more than what the eventual product offers. Hence, one can see
a major opposition to the current slow pace of democratic and economic development. Indeed,
deepening democratic development remains an uphill task in several African countries, especially
in the aftermath of the global shock occasioned by the 9/11 tragedy in America. There are
indications that even the enthusiasm that greeted the NEPAD initiative in the G8 countries has
been enveloped in another global shift which is now in favour of despotic peace in place of
democratic, even if unsettling, freedom. The greatest challenge of course is to understand that
despite the frustrations and impatience of the people with this democratic deficit, there is
realisation that transitions are inherently unstable and unpredictable.
It is our hope that the leaders meeting in Abuja in December will bear the above in mind
as they deliberate on this important theme as ‘Development and Democracy.’ – one that secures
the world and promote peace. Based on the above analysis of the peace and security dynamics in
West Africa, a number of measures seem to suggest themselves to us about a role for the
Commonwealth, especially in developing a human security approach that promotes human
development:
1. There is an urgent need for clarification of values and norms subscribed to by Africans and
adopted in a widespread manner by the citizens. For example, it would be useful as the
Commonwealth finalises its own review to promote synergy between the Harare Declaration
and the ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy & Good Governance with a view
to sharing experiences and learning lessons. The Commonwealth has a lot to offer
ECOWAS in the latter’s quest to institutionalise best practice.
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11. 2. There is a need for conceptual clarity through a comprehensive approach to peace and
security in policy and development circles – one that recognises that while there is no
teleological link between elections and democracy, deepening democracy offers the best
chance of preventing violent conflict and building durable peace, but this must be
accompanied over the long term by economic development;
3. There Commonwealth must recognise the importance of strengthening regional integration
and promote regional mechanisms that can help sustain democratic development and
consolidation through the adoption of a regional approach to conflict prevention;
4. The Commonwealth must recognise the need to reconcile economic and social development
and enhance the input of non-state actors – in policy formulation to enhance social capital
rather than entrench the leverage of IFIs and donor agencies on States;
5. The Commonwealth must promote the recognition of legitimate security needs of nation-
states must be factored into the human security approach through the promotion of
governmental and non-governmental peace-building strategies
6. The Commonwealth must problematise the link between globalisation and conflict, rather
than assume that it is always going to be positive in the promotion of pro-poor growth in the
search for and implementation of sustainable livelihood and poverty reduction strategies;
7. The Commonwealth must locate the security agenda within the democracy and development
framework and reflect the link between politics and economics, and between security and
opportunities;
8. Human security approach is a process, whose results will not necessarily be immediate, hence
the need for a long term view by interested stakeholders and anti-poverty strategists.
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12. REFERENCES
Buzan, B. et al. 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.
CODEP, 2000. Report on the outcomes of the consultation on globalisation and conflict for the White Paper on
International Development: Globalisation & Development. London, June 2000.
Commonwealth Foundation, 2003, Kampala Vision: Communiqué of the Pan-Commonwealth Tri-Sector
Conference on Partnerships for Governance, held in Kampala, Uganda in August 2003
DFID, 2000. Security Sector Reform and the Management of Military Expenditure: Risks for Donors, High
Returns for Development, Report on an International Symposium, February 14-16, 2000.
Ebrahim, Hassen, Fayemi Kayode & Loomis Stephanie, 2000, Principles and Mechanisms of
Constitution Making in Commonwealth Africa, Delhi: CHRI
Fayemi, J.K. 2000. “Security Challenges in Africa”, Seminar: Indian Journal of Opinion, Special Issue
on African Transitions 490, June 2000.
Martin, B. 2000. New Leaf or Fig Leaf? The Challenge of the New Washington Consensus. Report
prepared for Bretton Woods Project and Public Service International.
NEPAD Strategy Document – www.mapstrategy.org; www.nepad.org.za
Thomas, C. & P. Wilkin (eds.) 1998. Globalisation, Human Security & the African Experience,
Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.
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