1.
Resurgent
Regionalism
and
Democratic
Development
in
Western
Nigeria:
Challenges
and
Prospects
PROTOCOLS
Let
us
begin
from
the
beginning,
with
first
things
first.
It
gives
me
great
pleasure
to
be
here
today
to
address
some
of
the
most
brilliant
minds
that
Nigeria
can
boast
of.
And
I
like
to
say
thank
you
to
my
brother
and
the
Governor
of
Osun
State,
Ogbeni
Rauf
Aregbesola
and
the
Vice
Chancellor
of
the
Obafemi
Awolowo
University,
Professor
Tale
Omole.
Between
them,
both
men
shared
the
burden
of
being
hosts-­‐in-­‐chief
to
our
team.
I
can
testify
that
so
far,
they
have
hosted
us
very
well.
Permit
me
to
also
express
our
profound
appreciation
to
the
Ekiti
Development
Network
of
the
Obafemi
Awolowo
University
(OAU),
or
Great
Ife)
for
this
initiative.
I
understand
it
is
the
very
first
on
this
scale
by
the
Network.
By
offering
us
this
platform,
the
Network
is
lending
a
hand
in
our
quest
to
engage
purposefully
with
our
people
everywhere.
In
our
view,
the
result
can
only
be
a
series
of
exchanges
that
sharpen
our
perspectives
on
what
we
should
and
can
do
and
especially
how
to
do
it.
This
gives
all
stakeholders
a
window
on
what
–
and
how
much
–
to
expect
from
us.
I
also
feel
even
more
privileged
to
stand
before
you
because,
as
I
see
it,
Great
Ife
has
always
had
a
bias
for
public
service.
To
that
extent,
the
event
of
this
morning
speaks
of
a
home-­‐coming
as
rare
and
as
significant
as
anyone
can
imagine.
It
is
a
historic
fact
that
the
University
of
Ife,
as
it
then
was,
started
with
robust
linkages
between
town
and
gown.
Not
only
was
agriculture
a
main
plank
of
the
University’s
research
agenda,
practitioners
were
warmly
welcomed.
Thus
S.K.T.
Williams,
a
senior
agricultural
extension
officer
would
join
the
faculty
at
Ife,
become
a
professor,
and
serve
as
a
Deputy
Vice
Chancellor.
By
the
same
token,
Ife’s
Institute
of
Administration
would
serve
as
a
‘finishing
school’
of
1

2.
sorts
for
newly
recruited
Administrative
Officers
in
the
old
Western
Region
and
elsewhere.
It
would
also
help
retrain
and
re-­‐tool
officers-­‐on-­‐the-­‐job.
I
am
gratified
to
note
that
the
training
needs
of
the
civil
service
in
the
southwest
are
still
being
met
by
various
units
of
OAU,
not
least
by
my
own
the
Faculty
of
Administration.
There
are
personal
aspects
to
the
linkages
as
well.
Not
many
are
aware
that
I
am
a
Great
Ife
myself.
That
I
once
drank
from
the
veritable
spring
of
learning
and
culture
that
this
university
has
always
been
–
and,
hopefully,
will
always
be.
Fewer
still,
may
know
for
a
fact
that
Ife
gave
me
a
wife,
so
to
speak.
It
was
on
these
beautiful,
inspiring
grounds,
exactly
inside
the
Hezekiah
Oluwasanmi
Library
that
Bisi
and
I
began
a
friendship
that
has
since
blossomed
into
a
life-­‐partnership
powered
as
much
by
mutual
affection
as
by
shared,
deep-­‐commitment
to
social
actions
in
pursuit
of
a
life
more
abundant
for
all
and
sundry.
Mr
Governor,
Mr
Vice
Chancellor,
colleague-­‐academics,
ladies
and
gentlemen,
please
allow
me,
on
behalf
of
my
family,
to
express
our
most
profound
gratitude
to
Great
Ife
for
the
enduring
gifts
is
has
bestowed
on
us.
I
do
not
know
now
if
some
day
in
the
future,
Great
Ife
would
ask
for
a
fee
or
some
recompense
for
providing
the
setting
in
which
priceless
gift
of
love
and
companionship
came
my
way,
but
suffice
it
to
say
that
I
remain
personally
indebted
to
this
great
institution.
Nigerians
emerged
from
recent
elections
more
emboldened
than
before
about
the
prospects
of
the
democratic
enterprise.
Yet
our
country
remains
at
a
critical
crossroads.
Although
election
has
come
and
gone,
the
first
challenge
that
the
President
confronted
was
post-­‐election
violence
in
parts
of
the
north
believed
to
have
been
caused
by
perceived
inequities
much
deeper
than
what
happened
during
the
election.
Nowhere
are
the
limits
of
the
democratic
project
in
Nigeria
more
apparent
than
in
the
question
of
creating
appropriate
institutional
arrangements
for
the
political
accommodation
and
management
of
social
diversities
and
difference.
By
its
very
nature,
the
working
of
democratic
politics
radically
alters
the
existing
social
boundaries
and
divisions,
often
accentuating
hitherto
dormant
identities
and
conflicts
in
a
supposedly
united
entity.
The
consequences
of
the
relationship
between
the
two
have
not
only
posed
a
challenge
to
those
who
seek
to
understand
these
dynamics,
it
has
also
placed
a
question
mark
on
the
very
viability
of
Nigeria’s
democratic
enterprise.
It
is
in
this
sense
that
the
debate
on
the
post-­‐election
violent
phenomenon
known
as
Boko
Haram
is
itself
a
debate
about
the
status
and
quality
of
democracy
in
Nigeria;
a
debate
about
the
future
2

3.
of
the
country
as
a
united,
federal
entity.
With
bombs
going
off
occasionally
in
the
Federal
capital
and
the
North
Eastern
part
of
the
country
in
particular
and
an
increasing
level
of
panic
in
other
parts
of
the
country,
thinking
of
innovative
ways
of
accommodating
social
diversity
in
a
democratic
frame
is
a
challenge
that
is
at
once
intellectual
and
political
and
it
is
perhaps
the
greatest
challenge
to
democratic
transition
and
security
in
our
country
today.
There
is
a
positive
angle
to
this
challenge,
if
only
in
the
realisation
that
democratic
transition
in
countries
emerging
from
prolonged
authoritarian
past
should
elicit
restrained,
rather
than
exaggerated
expectations
after
elections.
Unfortunately,
the
euphoria
that
often
accompanies
elections
relegates
this
position,
treating
elections
as
end
in
themselves
and
processes
assumed
to
be
irreversible.
The
superficiality
of
these
claims
begin
to
manifest
itself
sooner
rather
than
later.
When
fragile
‘democracies’
receive
reminders
of
their
own
precarious
status,
as
has
been
the
case
in
Nigeria
in
the
last
two
months,
the
hope
is
that
the
realisation
would
encourage
those
of
us
in
government
and
citizen-­‐observers
to
think
less
teleologically
about
democratic
transitions
automatically
producing
democratic
development
and
more
pragmatically
in
search
of
institutional
frameworks
for
deepening
our
democracy.
Given
the
experience
of
post-­‐Cold
War
democratic
transitions
in
Africa
in
the
last
decade,
this
understanding
should
now
be
commonplace.
Indeed,
while
democratic
transitions
may
lead
to
democratic
development,
forged
transitions
have
not
necessarily
led
to
consolidating
democracies
nor
stemmed
the
tide
of
democratic
reversals,
especially
in
places
where
the
ethos,
language
and
character
of
public
discourse
have
been
completely
militarised
and
there
remains
several
unresolved
questions
of
identity,
nationality,
ethnicity
and
management
of
social
and
religious
diversities.
Consequently,
it
is
my
view
that
we
must
at
least
see
what
is
happening
in
Nigeria
today
as
an
outcome
of
the
nature
of
the
country’s
democratic
transition
and
an
argument
for
treating
Nigeria’s
quest
for
democracy
as
a
work
in
progress
that
is
not
easily
susceptible
to
instructions
from
above.
Boko-Haram, Democracy and the Current State of the Nigerian Nation
One
dominant
way
of
explaining
recent
controversy
around
Boko
Haram
has
been
to
trace
it
to
some
kind
of
Moslem
exceptionalism;
an
exceptionalism
which
allegedly
makes
moslem
societies
incapable
of
3

4.
democratisation
because
of
the
pre-­‐ determined
nature
of
religion
as
a
way
of
life
–
an
implicit
constitution
providing
a
blueprint
of
a
social
order
for
all
moslems.
The
view
that
poses
Islam
in
some
sort
of
oppositional
‘clash
of
civilisation’
remains
an
attractive
one
and
has
influenced
attitudes
and
coverage
of
the
popular
media
in
Post
9/11
world
and
even
here
in
Nigeria
but
it
is
one
that
is
contested
in
every
Moslem
society.
In
the
Nigerian
case,
it
obfuscates
rather
than
explains
what
is
responsible
for
the
present
dangers
that
are
threatening
the
polity.
One,
the
ethnic-­‐religious
construction
of
the
problem
has
made
it
impossible
for
people
to
come
out
and
take
a
clear
and
enlightened
stand
on
the
post
election
violence
and
Boko
Haram
debate.
If
you
were
from
the
north
of
Nigeria,
you
are
expected
to
call
for
dialogue
with
Boko
Haram
because
you
are
not
expected
to
openly
attack
its
adherents.
If
you
were
from
the
southern
part
of
the
country,
you
opposed
it
and
call
for
maximum
weight
of
the
law
against
it,
whilst
using
it
as
a
crutch
to
attack
the
Hausa-­‐Fulani
–
often
accused
to
be
at
the
butt
of
all
problems
in
Nigeria.
In
reality,
the
thousand
odd
lives
that
have
been
lost
to
violence
since
the
advent
of
civilian
rule
in
Nigeria
have
occurred
as
a
result
of
a
combination
of
factors
-­‐
environmental/decentralisation
problems
(Odi,
Niger
Delta),
inter-­‐ethnic/religious
animosities
(Kaduna,
Aba)
and
land/intra-­‐ethnic
disputes
(Ife/Modakeke,
Takum/Jukun,
Urhobo/Itsekiri).
This
is
a
pointer
to
the
fact
that
there
is
nothing
unique
in
the
violence
that
has
followed
elections
in
the
Northern
part
of
the
country
co-­‐mingling
with
Boko
Haram,
unfortunate
and
unwelcome
as
it
is.
It
is
also
an
indication
of
a
problem
much
more
fundamental
about
the
nature
of
the
Nigerian
state,
a
problem
that
is
cross-­‐sectional,
cross
religion
and
cross
regional.
The
challenge
is
therefore
to
place
post
election
violence
and
ethnic
crisis
within
the
context
of
the
people’s
efforts
to
clarify
the
link
between
citizenship
and
rights
whilst
handling
difference
in
a
supposedly
liberal
democracy.
Beyond
all
the
arguments
about
religion,
the
fundamental
issue
about
Boko
Haram
and
post
election
violence
is
that
it
now
lies
at
the
heart
of
identity
politics
in
Nigeria
and
the
centrality
that
identity
politics
has
assumed
has
ensured
that
it
is
not
being
clothed
in
other
intervening
variables.
Why
is
this
so?
My
argument
is
that
many
of
the
internal
contradictions
of
the
Nigerian
state
have
been
sharpened
to
a
point
that
the
bare
bones
are
now
visible.
The
failure
to
resolve
the
national(ity)
question
in
an
inclusive
manner
is
evident
in
the
varied
responses
across
country
to
conflicts
over
identity,
nationality,
self-­‐determination
and
autonomy.
These
issues
are,
in
turn,
bound
up
with
such
questions
as
what
manner
of
federation
do
Nigerians
want?
Unlike
in
the
past
when
military
governments
always
drove
such
‘sensitive’
issues
underground,
Nigerians
are
now
forcing
these
issues
in
4

5.
the
open
and
the
hitherto
authoritarian
might
of
the
federal
centre
is
being
put
to
test.
This
view,
self-­‐evident
as
it
is
does
not
strip
bare
the
explanatory
power
of
other
causes
-­‐
causes
which
reside
in
the
political
and
economic
realm
of
the
Nigerian
crisis
today.
For
example,
there
can
be
no
doubt
that
the
Boko
Haram
issue
and
the
post
election
violence
in
the
North
are
clearly
reactions
to
perceived
or
real
loss
of
power
by
an
elite
stratum
that
is
predominantly
“Northern”
and
also
“Moslem”
even
if
the
leading
figures
in
this
agenda
do
not
necessarily
count
religious
piety
among
their
greatest
attributes.
What
is
happening
in
my
view
is
a
contest
over
raw
political
power:
who
lost
power,
who
won
power,
and
who
wants
power
back.
The
processes
that
threw
up
President
Goodluck
Jonathan
as
the
candidate
of
this
elite
stratum
were
intimately
bound
up
with
the
political
crisis
that
has
gripped
the
‘northern’
political
class.
For
a
political
‘north’,
which
has
always
been
in
position
of
power
and
authority,
the
idea
of
getting
used
to
‘powerlessness’
poses
a
huge
challenge.
This
is
a
crisis
for
power
brokers
and
beneficiaries
of
power
in
the
north.
And
one
of
the
ways
in
which
the
Boko
Haram
is
being
interpreted
is
the
service
it
offers
such
power
deprived
elite
stratum
to
play
cynical
politics
without
alienating
themselves
from
their
communities.
Linked
to
this
of
course
is
the
contest
between
the
conservative
traditional
authority
and
a
more
progressive
successor
generation
in
the
North.
There
is
clearly
a
breakdown
in
this
traditional
authority
in
the
north
where
it
used
to
be
very
strong
in
the
country.
Young,
dynamic
and
street
smart
politicians
are
edging
out
the
old
(a
common
phenomenon
all
over
the
country)
but
they
are
yet
to
consolidate
their
grip
on
power
and
Islamic
radicalism
offers
a
strong
incentive
on
that
consolidation
agenda.
Hence,
the
perennial
but
oft-­‐denied
accusation
that
the
erstwhile
Governor
of
Borno
State
was
the
progenitor
of
Boko-­‐Haram,
as
a
means
of
protecting
his
party’s
precarious
hold
on
power
in
a
State
perceived
to
run
the
risk
of
losing
power
to
the
People’s
Democratic
Party
(PDP).
For
the
leading
lights
of
the
Boko
Haram
campaign
therefore,
religion
offered
a
most
appropriate
mechanism
for
winning
over
a
largely
sceptical
citizenry
in
communities
where
leaders
were
largely
perceived
as
‘dealers’
-­‐
and
totally
unrepresentative
of
the
interests
of
their
toiling
masses
who
voted
them
into
office.
But
convincing
as
the
‘power’
argument
is,
it
cannot
explain
why
it
has
fired
popular
imagination
amongst
ordinary
people
in
Northern
Nigeria.
That
explanation
has
to
come
from
somewhere
else.
The
issue
of
democracy
dividend
assumes
centrality
here
when
one
examines
the
reckless
abandon
of
those
involved
in
the
post-­‐election
violence
and
the
Boko
Haram
crisis.
But
perhaps
there
is
method
to
this
madness
and
a
logic
to
the
action
of
a
people
who
had
little
at
stake
-­‐
especially
if
one
locates
their
5

6.
action
within
the
context
of
communities
where
the
youths
are
largely
deprived.
It
is
a
fact
that
the
foot
soldiers
of
the
post
election
violence
are
the
unemployed
youths
still
awaiting
their
own
democracy
dividends.
This
therefore
means
the
problem
goes
beyond
religion.
It
is
about
the
disillusionment
of
those
who
had
been
hard
done
by;
underscoring
the
importance
of
tackling
the
underlying
problems
which
issues
like
Boko
Haram
feed
on.
As
long
as
we
have
the
unemployed,
the
hungry
and
the
desperate,
a
hapless
citizenry
would
always
be
exploited
by
the
manipulators
of
difference,
secure
in
the
knowledge
that
there
would
be
foot
soldiers
to
take
their
war
to
the
street.
The
same
is
true
of
the
exploitation
of
other
problems
around
the
country.
Yet,
valid
as
the
above
is,
it
would
still
be
wrong
to
dismiss
the
place
of
religion
altogether
in
the
current
debate.
Indeed,
the
Shari’a
issue
can
be
seen
as
a
response
by
so-­‐called
Islamic
fundamentalism
to
an
equally
virulent
form
of
Christian
fundamentalism.
The
advent
and
proliferation
of
Pentecostal
Christianity
as
a
powerful
social
and
political
force
in
Nigeria
represents
a
growing
concern
amongst
Moslems
and
orthodox
Christians
alike.
The
sight
of
a
President
Jonathan
kneeling
down
before
popular
Pastor
Adeboye
of
the
Redeemed
Church
sends
a
more
definitive
statement
about
who
is
perceived
to
be
in
charge
in
some
religious
circles.
It
was
no
surprise
therefore
that
General
Buhari
countered
that
by
his
choice
of
a
southern
radical
Pastor
as
running
mate.
In
addition,
there
is
a
sense
in
which
it
is
believed
that
Christians
have
also
now
appropriated
Jonathan’s
government
as
their
own
government.
The
problem
is
that
this
Pentecostal
strain
of
Christianity
is
fundamentalist,
and
viscerally
opposed
to
resurgent
Islam,
unlike
the
erstwhile
mainstream
churches
(Catholic
and
Protestant)
which
are
more
liberal
and
embracing.
This
has
created
genuine
tension
in
between
the
Christian/Moslem
communities
in
Nigeria.
Many
Christians
have
become
more
confident
and
outspoken.
It
would
appear
that
Christians
have
concluded
that
religion
has
played
a
key
part
in
ensuring
the
tenacity
and
staying
power
of
Moslems
in
government
over
these
years,
hence
the
signs
and
symbols
of
government
have
taken
on
a
strong,
Christian
streak.
This
represents
an
extreme
form
of
religiosity,
which
has
overtaken
the
Nigerian
landscape,
threatening
it
to
its
very
foundations.
Whilst
it
may
not
resolve
all
of
the
problems,
one
solution
to
the
on-­‐going
crisis
lies
in
making
the
State
a
neutral
arena,
separate
from
religion,
in
which
people
of
different
faiths,
and
those
of
no
faiths
can
meet
on
equal
terms.
This
is
not
a
suggestion
to
exclude
religion
from
public
life
–
an
argument
that
will
be
vigorously
opposed
by
both
Moslems
and
Christians.
Indeed,
one
will
be
underestimating
the
pro-­‐Sharia
and
Pentecostal
forces,
especially
the
way
they
have
seized
popular
imagination
and
clearly
influenced
public
opinion
in
the
6

7.
domain
of
operation,
using
strategies
to
sway
the
ordinary
people
in
communities
where
there
is
an
acute
failure
of
leadership.1
Resurgent
Regionalism
as
a
Response
to
Nigeria’s
Crisis
of
Governance
What then is the connection between regionalism and the crisis of governance that
Nigeria is currently experiencing? The connection, in my humble opinion lies in the search for
the most appropriate institutional mechanism for promoting consensus, mediating conflict and
managing diversities in a multi-ethnic, multi-religious country. What has compounded the
governance crisis and underplayed the need for dialogue have been the pervasive role of oil and
the influence of years of military rule in Nigeria. The militarisation of the national psyche also
affects individuals in their daily lives. Nigeria witnessed, especially under military dictatorship
and the civilian government under President Obasanjo, intense communal conflicts that disrupted
peaceful relations in several communities. Some of the conflicts have antecedents in old
animosities, but many were resource-driven, spurred by perceptions of unequal distribution of
government resources. Causes of increased violence and crime include the high unemployment
and poverty levels. At root however is the loss of a culture of compromise and accommodation.
This point cannot be overemphasised: Nigerians lost their culture of dialogue in a period when
militarisation and the primacy of force had become state policy. All will agree that we need to
return to a culture of dialogue. Any indication that government is willing to create the conditions
for dialogue in the country is bound to reduce the increasing level of tension since many within
deprived communities now believe the only language that government understands is violence.
And it is commendable that President Jonathan has significantly reduced the rampaging,
authoritarian streak in government.
While Nigerians are happy about this new disposition and acknowledge that the
demilitarisation of politics has widened the space within which democratic reform is taking
1
A recent survey on popular attitudes to democracy in Nigeria reveals, not surprisingly, that the average Nigerian in
a crisis situation will first approach a religious priest/malam, and or a traditional ruler. The elected representative
comes last in the list. See Afrobarometer survey, “Down to Earth: Changes in Attitudes Toward Democracy and the
Markets in Nigeria” November 2001,(www.afrobarometer.org)
7

8.
place, many believe that this will not automatically translate into a complete
overhaul of politics from its military roots, especially in a body politic that has become so
atomised and unitarised, and in which the symbols, values, and ethos of the ‘big-man’ are now
replicated in large sections of society. Yet while we must alter the landscape of Nigerian politics
by removing the obstacles of region, ethnicity, religion and personality so that our people can see
the issues in a clear sighted manner, this can only happen within the context of current socio-
economic realities. It is now clear to all that the formal end of authoritarian rule did not lead to
the acceptance of the nation state as representing a broad social consensus beyond the juridical
principles enshrined in the constitution. Without a doubt, issues of nationality, identity and
ethnicity still dominate the analysis of nation-state, state building and democratic transition in
Nigeria, especially following the end of military rule in 1999. These concerns are attended to by
the prevalence and ferocity of internal conflicts across the country, thereby leading scholars to
suggest that the State can be reconstituted purely on the basis of resolving the quandaries of
nationality, identity and ethnicity.
Yet while the challenges we face maybe internal and ethnic in nature, oftentimes the
interlocking nature of these challenges underscore the artificiality of state boundaries and call for
a broader response driven by social consensus. If it is the case that the challenges are regional,
and perhaps global, as they involve a range of different actors – national, sub-national and trans-
national, it stands to reason that their resolutions must also involve a range of options including
regional ones. Important as it is to resolve the crisis of governance on a state basis, tying
solutions to territorial boundaries in a nation in which power is located in sub-national and supra-
national political, social and economic networks undermine the envisioned end-product of
development, at least in the creation of social harmony and consensus amongst different
communities and constituencies within the polity.
As things are, Nigeria is trapped between the extremes of a super-nation and the inward
looking localisation that wears the toga of ethnocentrism resulting in the increasing illegitimacy
of the artificial state. This is where the opportunity offered by a return to regionalism as a
panacea to the much weakened state comes in. Indeed, it seems to me that any prospects for
democratisation and development in Nigeria must build on the scaffolding of regionalism if it is
to experience any chance of success. The last decade in Nigeria has witnessed the strengthening
of integrative development links in the South-South(BRACED Commission), Northern
8

9.
Governors Forum, South East Governors’ Forum and now our own
modest emerging steps in Western Nigeria. Yet, regional dimension to governance and
development can still be influenced by national and sub-national factors. In rethinking
regionalism therefore, it is necessary to go beyond the proforma creation of mechanisms that are
just mere technicalities. For regionalism to be an effective antidote to extreme nationalism and
ethnocentrism, it must consciously permeate the State in a more deeply rooted manner.
Otherwise, if the current challenges posed to the State by non-State actors are gauged, the future
prospects for the consolidation of the processes of democratisation are slim, if not non-existent.
It is for this reason that the recognition of the necessity of a multi-dimensional understanding of
development without a re-conceptualisation of state boundaries will ultimately undermine the
search for a holistic developmental agenda.
What
then
are
the
prospects
for
deepening
our
fledgling
democracy
through
regional
integration?
How
do
we
ensure
that
our
states
can
rise
above
territorial
inhibitions
to
embrace
a
regional
development
agenda?
Given
the
manner
in
which
Nigeria
has
found
herself
between
the
forces
of
globalisation
and
the
strictures
of
localisation,
the
road
to
development
has
become
more
tortuous,
provoking
in
its
wake
increased
post-­‐election
violence
and
insecurity
in
communities
and
constituencies
that
espouse
democratic
norms
and
values.
Faced
with
the
artificiality
of
states
and
the
refusal
to
fully
embrace
the
recalcitrant
nation,
it
would
appear
that
at
no
time
has
the
need
to
turn
to
consensual
resolutions
become
more
urgent.
This
increasing
importance
of
regionalism
in
Nigeria
must
be
located
within
the
twin
trajectories
of
the
incipient
localisation
of
conflicts
and
the
nationalisation
of
political
and
economic
realities.
In
arguing
for
a
re-­‐conceptualisation
of
the
concept
of
regional
development
which
de-­‐
emphasises
state
boundaries,
the
motive
is
not
a
form
of
territorial
revisionism.
Instead,
our
intention
is
the
revision
of
the
territorial
state
where
artificial
boundaries
have
formed
the
legitimating
force
for
arrested
development
in
several
states,
thereby
turning
them
into
empty
constitutional
entities
which
are
totally
meaningless
to
their
internal
publics.
Translated
into
a
sustainable
democratic
agenda,
it
is
safe
to
argue
in
favour
of
a
confinable
regional
development
mechanism
that
is
properly
structured.
Development
Agenda
for
Western
Nigeria
9

10.
The
above
represents
the
strategic
and
theoretical
basis
for
our
current
regional
developmental
programme
in
Western
Nigeria
(incorporating
the
eight
states
carved
out
of
the
old
Western
State).
It
is
aimed
at
facilitating
the
process
of
political,
legal,
economic,
social
and
cultural
cooperation
between
juridical
states
for
rapid
growth
and
development.
We
believe
that
collaboration,
properly
conceived
and
structured
will
enable
participant
states
to
prosecute
projects
in
areas
of
mutual
benefits
and
comparative
advantages
in
a
cooperative
manner
as
a
way
of
reinventing
the
development
paradigm
of
the
old
Western
region.
Integration
therefore
binds
participant
states
to
put
on
the
front
burner
collective
interest
and
place
an
obligation
on
them
to
cooperate
and
support
one
another
and
avoid
destructive
competition
over
resources.
For
us,
development
is
freedom
and
it
is
the
essential
basis
of
life
more
abundant
and
to
this
end
–
the
provision
of
infrastructure,
transportation,
power
generation,
commerce,
agriculture
and
other
emerging
areas
like
information
technology
is
a
sine
qua
non.
When
Governors
of
Western
Nigeria
met
in
Ado-­‐Ekiti
on
July
8th
2011,
the
intention
was
to
kick
start
the
process
of
building
a
new
momentum
for
engaging
and
mobilising
our
people,
respective
states
and
inherent
capacities.
It
will
also
enable
us
to
build
a
consensus
on
major
issues
of
communal
concern
and
also
facilitate
a
genuine
process
of
political
and
economic
cooperation
for
the
much
needed
rapid
growth
and
development
of
our
dear
states.
It
is
my
humble
opinion
with
all
sense
of
modesty
that
with
determination
and
concerted
efforts,
we
can
collectively
surpass
the
1952
benchmark,
enunciate
a
developmental
paradigm
and
also
provide
a
window
of
hope
for
our
people
that
would
herald
a
new
dawn
for
the
region.
Imagine
where
Western
Nigeria
would
have
been
now
had
it
not
been
for
the
overweening
influence
of
a
supra-­‐national
entity
that
subjected
her
to
a
huge
pall
of
arrested
development.
Though
deeply
ideological
and
historically
progressive,
the
region
came
under
the
control
of
an
ultra-­‐
conservative
class
and
the
quality
of
governance
declined
abysmally.
A
region
that
used
to
set
the
standard
regressed
badly
into
mediocrity.
Our
quest
now
is
to
halt
this
slide
and
return
the
West
to
its
path
of
honour
and
glory.
The
region
according
to
the
The
Nation
of
Sunday,
3rd
April,
2011
has
a
remarkable
history
on
its
side.
It
did
it
in
1952–1959,
and
to
some
extent
in
1979–1982
as
LOOBO
States.
More
crucially
and
overwhelmingly,
it
even
did
it
before
colonialism,
with
political
and
economic
structures
that
were
breathtaking
not
only
in
Africa
but
also
fairly
competitive
in
the
global
world.
We
can
do
it
again.
If
only
we
can
all
subscribe
to
a
unified
regional
developmental
agenda.
10

11.
Ladies
and
gentlemen,
in
the
eight
States
of
Edo,
Ekiti,
Delta,
Lagos,
Ogun,
Ondo,
Osun
and
Oyo,
about
14%
of
children
between
the
ages
of
six
and
eleven
are
not
in
school,
and
of
those
in
primary
schools,
only
50%
who
sat
for
the
NECO
examination
made
a
credit
pass
in
five
subjects
including
English
and
Mathematics.
It
is
very
disheartening
to
note
that
the
State
with
the
highest
percentage
score
credit
pass
in
any
five
subjects
recorded
just
13.2%,
while
the
one
with
the
least
percentage
score
recorded
just
1.11%
of
the
students
registered
for
the
examination.
This
happened
in
a
region
whose
main
stake
in
the
Nigerian
project
used
to
be
her
excellence
in
education.
(Oshun,
2010)
I
have
gone
through
this
historical
excursion
to
underscore
the
critical
nature
of
this
issue
and
to
assure
our
people
that
help
is
on
the
way.
We
are
aware
that
the
expectations
are
huge,
we
are
also
aware
that
it
is
going
to
be
a
daunting
task,
but
it
is
not
an
insurmountable
challenge.
We
are
thus
resolved
as
a
people
to
move
beyond
our
most
recent
wounds
because
we
do
not
suffer
a
dearth
of
ideas.
It
is
therefore
a
notorious
fact
that
having
achieved
electoral
credibility,
it
is
now
time
to
achieve
performance
credibility
through
collective
efforts,
competence
and
compassion
for
our
people.
Most
of
the
critical
issues
which
confront
us
today,
including
how
to
organise
a
livable
society
that
guarantees
a
decent
life
for
the
greater
number
of
our
people
have
been
articulated
by
Chief
Obafemi
Awolowo
in
his
books
The
People’s
Republic
and
The
Strategy
and
Tactics
of
a
People’s
Republic.
In
those
books,
the
great
Awo
posited:
“The
man
is
the
alpha
and
omega,
the
only
dynamic
means
and
the
sole
end,
of
all
earthly
human
activities;
and
that
any
development
plan
is
a
failure
which
falls
short
of
benefiting
every
member
of
the
society
in
accordance
with
deeds
or
needs
as
the
case
may
be”
(p.82)
Ladies
and
gentlemen,
colleague-­‐academics,
today’s
meeting
represents
a
watershed
in
our
determination
to
return
the
Old
Western
Region
to
the
path
of
real
growth
and
pragmatic
development.
It
is
our
expectation
that
you
would
rigourously
interrogate
issues
such
as
the
nature
and
structure
of
collaboration,
the
development
of
a
legal
framework,
mechanism
for
information
sharing
and
evaluation,
enunciate
a
developmental
paradigm
for
the
region,
the
desirability
of
a
Peer
Review
Mechanism,
and
development
of
a
policy
guideline
on
an
on-­‐going
basis
aimed
at
strengthening
the
11

12.
efficiency
and
effectiveness
of
integration
and
also
locate
the
cause
of
the
retrogression
in
the
region,
proffer
solutions
and
contribute
to
the
development
of
a
regional
action
plan.
In
concluding,
we
should
remind
ourselves
that
history
has
placed
on
our
shoulders
a
very
serious
burden
because
we
are
“heirs
to
a
tradition
of
hope
and
tireless
expectations”
–
which
Awo
captured
repeatedly
as
“Ba
o
ku,
ise
o
tan”
–
can
we
then
afford
to
give
up?
We
return
then
in
the
end
to
the
endless
optimism
of
that
eternal
spirit
of
possibilities
made
manifest
in
the
person
and
leadership
of
Obafemi
Awolowo.
We
cannot
be
tired
of
reminding
ourselves
of
this.
In
the
voice-­‐over
of
the
Unity
Party
of
Nigeria
(UPN)
anthem,
Awo’s
voice
rings
through
the
ages:
“It
is
a
duty
we
owe,
to
our
dream
motherland
To
our
dear
great
motherland
To
enhance
her,
and
to
boost
her
In
the
eyes
of
the
entire
world…”
Mr
Governor,
Mr
Vice-­‐Chancellor,
colleague-­‐academics,
students,
I
like
to
thank
you
most
sincerely
for
this
opportunity
to
once
again
reflect
seriously,
in
the
direction
of
our
regional
developmental
goals
and
particularly
to
a
people-­‐centred
leadership
in
the
Land
of
Honour.
I
look
forward
to
an
insightful
debate
and
pragmatic
deliberation
of
the
points
which
I
have
laid
before
you
this
morning.
Thank
you
and
God
bless
you
all.
12

13.
13

14.
14