My theses at conference "East of Europe, Out of Schengen: Perspective of Post-Soviet World". Wroclaw, 2012-04-20.

1. Post-election Russia,
End of Putin's Era?
Oleg Kozlovsky
Wroclaw, 2012-04-20

2. Decline of Support for Regime
(until December 2011)

Endemic corruption

Lack of rule of law

Censorship

Government's opaqueness

Economic hardship

New, richer, more self-respecting middle class

Increased civic responsibility

Proliferation of the Internet

3. Decline of Support for Regime
(up until December 2011)

January 2011: «Party of Crooks and Thieves»

September 24, 2011: Putin, Medvedev switch
seats

November 27, 2011: Putin booed at a wrestling
match

December 4, 2011: Duma elections

4. Duma Elections
(December 4, 2012)

Widespread fraud and irregularities (ballot
stuffing, multiple voting, fake protocols etc.)

Level of fraud not much higher than earlier
elections

Better publicized thanks to new technologies

More attention to and interest in elections

Significant drop of official figures for UR, below
50%

5. Inter-elections Protests
(December 2011 — February 2012)

Until December 2011, most protests had had at
most 3,000 to 5,000 participants (usually under
500); Moscow had been considered «too
wealthy to revolt»

Between elections, four major rallies were held
in Moscow that gathered 20,000 to 120,000
participants

100+ cities joined, but had significantly lower
figures (up to 15,000 in Saint Petersburg)

A number of journalists, writers, actors etc.
expressed support for the protests

6. Inter-elections Protests
(December 2011 — February 2012)

The vast majority of participants were ordinary
citizens, not activists

Old opposition leaders (both systemic and non-
systemic) negotiated with the authorities and did
technical organizing, but barely controlled the people

Facebook (along with Twitter, Vkontakte, LiveJournal)
was the main tool for raising awareness, mobilizing,
and discussing the protest

The protests were explicitly non-violent, non-
confrontational; «change, not revolution»

Extensive use of creativity and humour

7. Regime's Reaction
(December 2011 — February 2012)

First attempts to counter protests failed

One-way concessions: more democratic party &
election legislation, return of gubernatorial elections,
removal of Surkov, webcams at polling stations

Desertions & attempts of dialogue

Counter-propaganda against protesters' leaders; «anti-
Orangist», anti-American campaign

Gathering big pro-regime rallies (February 4&23)

8. Presidential Elections
(March 4, 2012)

Only «approved» candidates

Putin's overwhelming presence on TV

Mobilization of supporters

Outright fraud (except Moscow)

GOTV: Go Observe The Vote campaign in
Moscow

Russia: 64% for Putin; Moscow: 47% (fewer
votes than ever before)

9. Movement's Fatigue
(March 2012)

Smaller, more confrontational (but still non-
violent) demonstrations

Despair, infighting among activists and leaders

Too high expectations lead to disappointments

10. Preliminary Results

Pro-democracy movement has become
mainstream

Thousands of new, smart and enthusiastic
people have become active in promoting
democracy's cause

Regime's legitimacy was badly damaged by
revealed election-rigging and protests

New laws partially dismantle Putin's system of
«managed democracy»

11. Future: Regional Outreach

April 1: Hundreds activists from Moscow go to
Yaroslavl to observe local mayoral elections;
opposition candidate Urlashov wins runoff with
70% of votes

April 14: 5,000-strong protest in Astrakhan
(1500 km South of Moscow) against stolen
mayoral elections; hundreds supporters from
Moscow and other cities participate

Next up: Omsk, Krasnoyarsk

12. Future: Parties & Elections

New legislation simplifies creation of political
parties and participation in elections: takes only
500 members (instead of 40,000), signature-
gathering waived or simplified

Non-systemic opposition will at last have a
chance to participate in most elections

Municipal and regional level elections can be
won even under Putin's «managed
democracy»: proved in Yaroslavl

Small victories are important to prove
seriousness and legitimacy of the opposition

13. Future: New Initiatives

Many of those who «woke up» since December
are professionals occupied in business, design,
IT, education, etc., i.e. so-called «creative
class»

Some of them will channel their energy in new
initiatives, projects, and groups dealing with
various issues, from corruption to censorship to
environment problems

The next year or two will see much more civic
activism of different sorts

14. Future: How It's Going to End

The protests have changed Russia forever

The regime won't regain legitimacy

More active and capable civil society will
increase pressure on the government

New protests will be dedicated to other issues

Any event or series of events can spark a new,
stronger wave of protests that will finish off the
regime

15. Oleg Kozlovsky
oleg@kozlovsky.ru
facebook.com/kozlovsky
@kozlovsky