7.analysis and

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International
Analysis and application dam safety
of international dam safety policy
policy benchmarks
301
Joanne Tingey-Holyoak, John D. Pisaniello and Roger L. Burritt
School of Commerce, Centre for Accounting, Governance and Sustainability,
University of South Australia, Adelaide, Australia

Abstract
Purpose – Farm dam safety in Australia is being flouted and sustainability of catchments
compromised because of the potential and severe consequences of dam failure. Hence, the purpose of
this paper is to explore policy issues associated with safety of farm dam water storage through a
comparison of developments in two Australian states against an analysis of international benchmarks
and to provide an exemplar of best practice.
Design/methodology/approach – A strategic review and content analysis is firstly undertaken to
establish international dam safety policy benchmarks ranging from minimum to best practice as well
as selection guidelines for varying circumstances, and to identify an exemplar best practice model.
Longitudinal study over a 12-year period then provides the basis for case analysis in order to reinforce
the established minimum level benchmark and to demonstrate the application of the benchmarked
model policy selection guidelines.
Findings – Research results show that in Australia, South Australia is lagging international
benchmarks for on-farm dam safety management in a number of ways whilst a second state, Tasmania,
provides leadership in this respect. The paper adds to the existing international benchmarking literature
by identifying updated international best practice in private/farm dam safety assurance policy whilst
establishing and providing longitudinal case study reinforcement for an acceptable minimum level
benchmark in this area. The updated policy guidelines presented can be used to determine appropriate
dam safety policy for any jurisdiction.
Originality/value – The paper provides an original contribution of analysis, establishment and case
study validation of international benchmarks and guidelines on developing appropriate dam safety
management and assurance policy for varying jurisdictional circumstances. In addition, it provides an
updated exemplar of how policy benchmarks can go towards addressing cumulative threats of smaller
dams in catchments not previously addressed.
Keywords Farms, Dams, Safety, Benchmarking, Australia
Paper type Research paper

The Australian Research Council is acknowledged for its recent Discovery Project funding to
enable the recent research into the novel topic of cumulative catchment threats arising from farm
dams. The 1995 component of this study was undertaken as part of the Pisaniello (1997) doctoral
studies. These studies were made possible thanks to an Australian Postgraduate Research
Award scholarship provided through the University of South Australia, supervision by
Professor John Argue and Professor Jennifer McKay, and global information system data Benchmarking: An International
Journal
supplied by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, SA Government, Australia. Vol. 18 No. 2, 2011
The 2005-2007 components of this research were also made possible through University of South pp. 301-317
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Australia internal funding. Appreciation to Arthur Spassis for his valuable field work and 1463-5771
research assistance. DOI 10.1108/14635771111121720

BIJ 1. Introduction
18,2 The process of benchmarking has been used extensively to implement a wide variety of
internal management practices and techniques (Yasin, 2002). However, benchmarking
has also been used to respond to external forces, such as regulators, to search for
better practice and identify benchmarks that can be implemented in a target operating
environment (Bowerman et al., 2002; Yasin, 2002) such as for farm dam safety
302 management. There are an estimated 480,000 farm dams in Australia (Price et al., 2003)
which demonstrates the scope of the problem when considering that thousands of dam
structures have failed and many more pose signiﬁcant safety threats (Pisaniello and
McKay, 2007; Lave and Balvanyos, 2006). Failures of large dams are more spectacular
and receive much more attention than those of smaller dams. However, small dam
failures, particularly those of privately owned farm dams, occur far more frequently
(Lewis and Harrison, 2002; Pisaniello, 1997; Pisaniello and McKay, 2007). Small dam
failures internationally have had disastrous consequences (Silveira, 2008). For example,
in China the Shimantan and Banquia dams failed in 1975 because of the cumulative
failure of 60 smaller upstream dams, resulting in the death of 230,000 people (Fu and
Qing, 1998). In Italy, the Stava dam near Trento failed in 1985 and while releasing only
180 ml of tailings material, it killed 268 people and caused serious environmental
damage (Engels, 2005). In the USA, the 5 m Evans and Lockwood dams, which held only
89 and 39 ml of water, respectively, both collapsed in a cascade manner in 1989, killing
two people (Graham, 1999).
Graham’s (1999) study of dam failures in the USA that resulted in fatalities from 1960
to 1998, found that dams less than 15 m high (i.e. the typical height range of smaller
private and/or farm dams) caused 88 percent of deaths. This demonstrates that without
appropriate design, construction, maintenance and surveillance, poorly managed small
dams pose both signiﬁcant individual and cumulative/cascade threats, and can cause
considerable human, property and environmental losses. Hence, this paper focuses on
the appropriate management of private/farm dam structures and the provision of
adequate safety assurance policy processes for achieving sustainable farming
businesses as well as sustainable and safe catchments in the context of:
.
international benchmarks; and
.
developments in two states in Australia, Tasmania and South Australia, with
contrasting practices.
The research asks the core questions:
RQ1. What are adequate minimum and best-practice dam safety policy
benchmarks in private/farm dam catchment systems?
RQ2. Which benchmarks are appropriate for varying jurisdictional circumstances?

2. Literature review – benchmarking dam safety management policy
Governments around the world are encouraging the use of benchmarking across the
broad range of their policy activities (Samuels, 1998; Holloway et al., 1998). However,
the ability for government to benchmark policy has to be considered independently of
the private sector benchmarking literature: the absence of true market competition for
government makes motivators different from those for the private sector and thus this
paper acknowledges the complexities of issues at play, particularly the heightened

accountability required (Bowerman et al., 2002). For dam safety policy, the baseline in International
most countries, including Australia, is the owner responsibility that exists under dam safety
common law to manage dams according to current standards (McKay and Pisaniello,
1995; Pisaniello and McKay, 2007). In Australia, these standards are set by the policy
Australian National Committee on Large Dams (ANCOLD; see ANCOLD 2000a, b, 2003).
However, many jurisdictions in Australia and overseas have found that it is not enough
to rely solely on common law responsibility and benchmarks must be set to protect 303
downstream communities, property and the environment from poor dam safety
management practices (Li et al., 2008; Pisaniello and McKay, 2007; Pisaniello, 2009).
A number of management mechanisms in addition to Common Law and statutory
command and control are available to ensure dam safety. However, determining the
most appropriate combination of management mechanisms to meet policy benchmarks
for different jurisdictions with different circumstances can present a number of issues.
These issues are illustrated in the Australian context in the following sections.
The available management mechanisms are discussed based on international review.
The research draws broadly from benchmarking theory with a neo-institutional
foundation, which allows for consideration of benchmarking motivations, processes and
outcomes (van Helden and Tillemam, 2005) in the dam safety management setting.
Regulatory mix theory also forms part of the theoretical foundation as it describes the
requirement for policy that can address multifaceted environmental challenges
(Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999, 2002, 2006) and can assist in the creation of the optimal
policy mix for dam safety, equity and sustainability in the face of environmental risk
(Hartford, 2009). Therefore, the research also draws upon regulatory mix theory in order
to establish appropriate dam safety management benchmarks from “minimum” to
“best practice” (Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998). From this theoretical platform,
an international standard or benchmark is established against which the circumstances
of differing jurisdictions can be assessed for achieving adequate management.

3. Establishing international benchmarks and standards for achieving
“adequate” farm dam safety management
The dam safety management and assurance practices of Australia, the USA, Canada, the
UK, Finland, Portugal and South Africa have been comprehensively reviewed by
Pisaniello (1997) and Pisaniello and McKay (1998, 2007). This international review shows
that management schemes to control dam safety management vary between and within
countries. However, key components in certain practices can be identified. These include
common law, legislation, command and control regulation, administration, registration
and classification of dams, surveillance, accounting and reporting, codes and/or
standards of conduct, community education and preparedness, punitive enforcement and
owner education and guidance.
Analysis of the above international review identifies three main independent
methods for providing increased dam safety assurance to the public:
.
Method 1 – owner education, encouragement and guidance. Providing guidelines
and information publications to dam owners in the hope that they act
responsibly and in line with the dictates of common law (Gunningham and
Sinclair, 1999, 2002; Tietenberg and Wheeler, 2001).
. Method 2 – community preparedness through emergency action plans (EAPs).
Requiring the owners of all potentially hazardous dams to have EAPs in place

BIJ by law (Pisaniello and McKay, 2007). This also requires the establishment and
18,2 maintenance of a dams register by government to enable mandating of Plans of
increasing sophistication for increasing hazard potential (Pisaniello and McKay,
2007), whilst also enabling the general status of dam safety management to be
kept in check. Such law satisfies the “Community Right to Know” principle as
downstream communities are made aware of the risks and hazards they are living
304 under and provided with the opportunity for escape in the event of dam failure
(Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998).
.
Method 3 – command and control – strict regulation and supervision by means of
dam safety legislation. Setting specific rules, de facto standards, codes and
regulations on dam safety management which dam owners must follow by law,
and providing for supervision to ensure compliance and provide a level of
regulatory certainty (Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998; Eisner, 2004).

All mechanisms can be included in an appropriate regulatory mix (Gunningham and
Grabosky, 1998) designed to provide the basis for an international standard or
benchmark against which the circumstances of differing jurisdictions for achieving
adequate on-farm water storage safety management can be established (Schaltegger et al.,
2003). Faced with the possibility of a crisis incorporating all three methods into a dam
safety assurance policy would obviously provide maximum assurance to the public and
would represent a best practice model. But theoretically it is possible to begin and even
continue operating at the lowest possible benchmark of method 1 only (Gunningham and
Sinclair, 1999). That is, in a voluntary setting, to educate with information
(e.g. accounting information) and encourage community preparation, then if and when
the farmer is seen to be behaving badly, command and control regulation is brought
in along with associated penalties for poor behaviour. This process of increasing
regulation and penalties as behaviour is seen by the regulator to deteriorate suggests that
theoretically the minimum could be method 1 – where voluntary action by the farmer to
“do the right thing” is relied upon. The best outcome is not necessarily use of methods
2 and 3 if the voluntary approach is working. However, in practice previous work in the
dam safety area suggests that methods 1 plus 2 are the lowest possible standard required
for a minimum level benchmark (Pisaniello and McKay, 1998, 2007). Hence, a discrepancy
exists between theory and practice. This paper therefore considers whether a
voluntary/educative mechanism (i.e. method 1) alone could actually provide for the
community right to know element of method 2, and thus make method 1 an acceptable
minimum level benchmark (as suggested by regulatory mix theory) by asking the
following research sub-question: is a purely voluntary/educative mechanism (method 1)
acceptable as a minimum benchmark or does it always need to be supplemented by at
least community right to know legislation (method 2)? This sub-question is firstly
answered through an analysis of theory and logic and then supported by longitudinal
case study evidence as follows.
An “acceptable” minimum level benchmark for areas where hazardous dams exist
would be for owners always to be educated and guided on their common law
responsibilities and liabilities, for government to maintain a register of dams to enable the
status of dam safety management to be kept in check and for downstream communities
to at least know the risks and hazards they are living under and be provided with
the opportunity for salvation in the event of a disaster. This should be set as the minimum

level benchmark for two reasons. First, in order to provide for adequate public protection, International
it is always paramount for downstream communities to be prepared, warned and
provided with the opportunity for salvation in the event of dam failure – this under no
dam safety
circumstances should be left to chance (i.e. under a purely voluntary regime) as it is akin policy
to a basic human right in line with the community right to know principle (Sand, 2002[1];
Pisaniello and McKay, 1998, 2007). Second, a need always to keep check of dam
population and safety status in a jurisdiction as catchment circumstances are continually 305
changing because new dams are being built and new communities may form downstream
of dams – such a checking mechanism cannot be properly provided in a purely
voluntary/educative regime. In fact, the need for such a checking mechanism is explicit
within the regulatory mix theory (Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998; Gunningham and
Sinclair, 1999, 2006), i.e. how can regulation be ramped up as “determined” necessary if
there is no register for a checking mechanism to make the determination? Therefore,
a dam safety assurance policy should always incorporate both the first and second
methods in any area where hazardous dams exist, and safety accountability is implicated.
This proposition is supported by the case study in Section 5.0. This “reasonable”
minimum level benchmark provides the basis for establishing a range of policy models
appropriate for varying circumstances.
Essentially, the models comprise the following:
.
Minimum practice – methods 1 plus 2 (i.e. the minimum level benchmark).
.
Average practice – methods 1 plus 2 plus some element(s) of 3.
.
Best practice – methods 1 plus 2 plus 3 (i.e. the best practice benchmark).
The main characteristics of each of the above-selected international practices are
analysed by Pisaniello (1997) and Pisaniello and McKay (1998, 2007), to identify
elemental benchmarks of “better” practice. In turn, these elements are used to develop
detailed policy models of “best”, “average” and “minimum” practice in line with the model
benchmarks developed. In Table I, elements of each policy model are identified under the
minimum, average and best practice model benchmarks (established above) for
application in any jurisdiction. Then for a government to determine the extent of private
dam safety assurance policy necessary for its particular jurisdiction (i.e. which of the
three models presented in Table I) requires an indication of the scope of the local dam
safety problem. Pisaniello (1997) identifies two main indicators that have been used by
international practices for this purpose):
.
Level 1 Indicator. Density of potentially hazardous reservoirs.
. Level 2 Indicator. Density of deficient potentially hazardous reservoirs.
The first-level indicator is the simplest to use, requiring the least effort and resources.
Dams merely have to be identified from aerial photography, assessed for potential
downstream consequences in the event of failure and then assigned a subjective hazard
rating. The second-level indicator requires much more effort and resources as a safety
evaluation of each dam must be conducted, but it provides more accurate indication of
the problem at hand. However, because of the significant advances made in the fields of
meteorology and flood hydrology, updated design floods are commonly found to
be considerably greater than the floods which could cause failure of existing dams.
As a result, most existing dams will have insufficient spillway capacities when reviewed
(Pisaniello, 1997, 2009; Pisaniello and McKay, 2007) – this is also demonstrated

BIJ
18,2

306

Table I.

their elements
Model benchmarks and
Minimum practice model Average practice model Best practice modela

Owner education and guidance Provide for extensive owner education As per minimum practice model Dam owners need to be educated to
and guidance to help owners understand understand their responsibilities and
their common law responsibilities and liabilities associated with their dams in
liabilities associated with their dams and line with both common law and the
to strongly encourage surveillance and prevailing dam safety regulations.
maintenance of dams by producing and Education and guidance are often
promoting guideline publications in line provided through guidelines (ANCOLD,
with ANCOLD (2003) 2003)
Registration and classification of Require local government authorities to As per minimum practice model Establish and maintain a register of
dams maintain registration of at least high and “applicable dams” that should be
significant hazard dams, and provide regulated, based on a minimum size
data for central government to monitor criteria and using a permit or licensing
the density of potentially hazardous system. Also, assign general hazard
dams ratings based on a three-level hazard
rating system (ANCOLD, 2003)
Community education and Provisions of the community “right to As per minimum practice model Provide for community education,
preparedness know” principle are mandated by law awareness and preparedness through the
and administered by, say, local requirement of EAP for all high and
governments. The owners of high and significant hazard dams. Such plans
significant hazard dams are required to informs all people living downstream of
provide for EAPs checked by state hazardous dams of the risks and hazards
emergency services under which they are living.
Furthermore, the plans provide an
opportunity for escape in the event of
failure
Legislative purposiveness None Establish enabling legislation which at Create dam safety legislation either in the
least provides power to local government form of specific or enabling legislation:
authorities to question the safety of any specific legislation – where strict
private dam and direct necessary owner provisions and regulations are
action following approval from the established within a specific dam safety
minister responsible for water resources act; enabling legislation – where
provisions are incorporated within
existing water law enabling dam safety
management to be controlled
(continued)

Minimum practice model Average practice model Best practice modela

Administrative enforcement None None An administrative authority needs to be
adequately empowered and sufficiently
funded to enforce the legislation and any
standards provided under regulation
Surveillance, inspection and None None Require dam owners to arrange for a
safety reviews minimum level of periodic surveillance
and review of their dams by contracting
experienced engineers and subsequently
allocate responsibility for gathering data
and reporting all information to the
relevant enforcement authority. The
enforcement authority must also
periodically conduct formal inspections
to review surveillance information
Owner responsibility with None None Establish an enforced level of owner
information responsibility with any information and
material relating to the safety of their
dams by requiring owners to maintain a
special safety file that must be easily
accessible to all concerned, especially
when an accident threatens
Punitive enforcement None None Attach, under legislation, criminal
liability (and/or severe penalties) to any
owners not willing to comply with either
standard requirements, rules or
regulations specified or promulgated
under statute or directions given by an
enforcement authority in line with
statutory provisions
Note: aTasmania provides a good, modern example of a model of best practice as reported in Section 4.0
Source: Adapted from Pisaniello (1997)
International

policy
dam safety

307

Table I.

BIJ by the South Australian case study below (Section 5.0). Therefore, most governments
18,2 would be content to make a decision based solely on the magnitude of the first indicator.
At most, for additional reassurance that a problem does exist, a government may opt to
initiate a small safety evaluation program based on only a sample of say, 10-20 private
dams. Nevertheless, policy guidelines have been developed for both level 1 and level 2
indicators.
308 In order to establish limiting indicator criteria (i.e. limiting values which would
necessitate differing levels of policy), five leading international practices were analysed
implicitly by Pisaniello (1997) with regard to:
.
the extent of the private dam safety problem in the area based on level 1 indicator
and if available, also level 2 indicator; and
.
the level of assurance policy which has been implemented in order to
accommodate it.

The level of assurance policy was quantified as a proportion of the model of
“best practice”, above, depending on the number of key elements of best practice
that are common, and subsequently graded as either: “almost complete coincidence”,
“substantial coincidence” or “moderate only coincidence”. From this analysis (Pisaniello,
1997; Pisaniello and McKay, 1998, 2007) two simple and “reasonable” generic precedents
can be identified as follows:
(1) a policy based on the model of “minimum practice” is acceptable only in
countries or states containing not more than 20 hazardous private dams; and
(2) a policy based on the model of “best practice” is only necessary where more
than 70 hazardous private dams are contained within a country or state and
where more than 20 of these are deficient in some manner.

Cases which fall between these precedents can be dealt with under the provisions of the
model of “average practice”.
Based on these precedents, generic guidelines and criteria have been established
for determining “appropriate” safety assurance policy for any jurisdiction, as presented
in Table II. Tasmania has recently implemented dam safety management
accountability and assurance policy that is in line with the international
“best-practice” standard, and which targets the type of farm dam safety management
issues identified here; hence, the Tasmanian example advances the policy benchmarking
and selection guidelines represented by Tables I and II providing an exemplar for
best practice. A review of the Tasmanian “model” policy is therefore warranted and
follows.

4. A “model” best practice approach from Tasmania
Tasmania has over 30 percent of Australia’s total water storage capacity, including
thousands of farm dams, and in the last few years there has been a large expansion of
storages for irrigation underway, to support sustainable agricultural production
(DPIWE, 2005). Hence, the Tasmanian Government tightened legislative controls to
ensure the safety of dams. This was achieved in late 2002 by amending the Water
Management Act 1999, and the following year by passing the Water Management
(Safety of Dams) Regulations 2003, which now operate across the state.

No. of potentially hazardous No. of deficientb potentially
private damsa hazardous private dams Equivalent policy model to be implementedc

.70 . 20 Best practice modeld
.70 , ¼ 20 Average practice model (review situation in 15 years)
Average practice model (but review no. of deficient dams in five years:
20-70 . 20 if still . 20, upgrade to best practice)
20-70 10-20 Average practice model (review situation in 15 years)
20-70 , 10 Minimum practice model (review in ten years)
,20 .2 Minimum practice model (review in five years)
Do nothing – advise owners of the deficient dams of their
,20 0, 1 or 2 responsibility under common law (review situation in ten years)
a
Notes: This refers to the total number of potentially hazardous private dams contained within a country or state; for primary exploration, “potentially
hazardous dams” can be taken as those which are significant in size and pose either a high or significant hazard potential (i.e. in accordance with
ANCOLD (2000a, b) classifications); secondary consideration should then also be given to smaller catchment dams that pose cumulative flood threats
within catchments; government would have to establish an inventory of all such dams in a region if one is not already in place; bdeficiency can result from
either inadequate structural integrity, insufficient spillway flood capability or inadequate earthquake resistivity, as determined from a safety review; the
safety review undertaken in the SA case study (Section 5.0) illustrates this. A cost effective spillway review procedure that is in line with modern
engineering practice has been developed (Pisaniello and McKay, 2007) and can be used for this purpose; review can be undertaken on a sample of, at least
ten potentially hazardous private dams in a region (rather than the entire population), and the resulting percent that are found to be inadequate can be
translated to the overall population; note that the level 2 indicator guidelines are not intended to provide a basis for “relaxing” existing policy once the
number of deficient dams is reduced; they are merely intended to act as an initial guide for states which are either “policy absent” or “policy deficient”; cthe
key elements for each policy model are available in Table I, See also Pisaniello and McKay (1998, 2007) for further details of these elements; Tasmania
provides a good, modern example of a model of best practice as reported in Section 4.0; dif there has been no prior provision of methods 1 and 2,
government could start with a model of average practice, and review the situation in five years to check if the situation has improved; if the situation has
improved enough within the criteria of these guidelines, then policy can remain with average practice model, otherwise there is a need to ramp up to the
best practice model (as demonstrated to be needed in the SA case study, see Section 5.0)
Sources: Adapted from Pisaniello (1997); Pisaniello and McKay (1998)
International

policy for any jurisdiction
Updated guidelines

dam safety assurance
“appropriate” private
for determining
policy
dam safety

309

Table II.

BIJ Tasmania is the only state in Australia to acknowledge that, because of potential
cascade/cumulative threats, even small, low hazard dams must be registered and
18,2 supervised, albeit to a modest extent. To this end, Tasmanian policy imposes some form
of dam safety management accountability upon the owners of all dam storages down to
as small as 1 ml. The key elements of the Tasmanian legislation relevant to farm dam
safety management, accounting and reporting are briefly analysed here.
310 Section 165G of the Tasmanian Water Management Act 1999 expressly imposes a
duty on all dam owners to, as far as is reasonably practicable, maintain and operate their
dams so as not to cause, or be likely to cause, material environmental harm or serious
environmental harm or danger to any person or property. Part 8A of the act gives wide
powers to the minister to supervise and assure the safety of all registered dams and that
owners are not in breach of their duty. As part of this role, the minister has specific
functions under the act (Section 165C) which include:
.
maintaining a register of all dams;
.
ensuring all dams comply with requisite standards of design, construction,
maintenance and review as specified under the regulations; and
.
obtaining information and keeping records on matters relating to the safety of
dams.

In order to account for the safety management of their dams, dam owners are obligated
to provide information (i.e. reporting) on their dams either as a condition of a permit
under Section 157 of the Act or from a direct order from the minister under various other
sections relating mainly to ongoing surveillance and maintenance (e.g. Sections 165F (2),
165H, 165J, 165L, 165M, or 165N). All standards of design and safety management must
comply with ANCOLD guidelines: this includes spillway design standards (ANCOLD,
2000b), the frequency and thoroughness of surveillance and review and any
requirements for EAPs (ANCOLD, 2003). These physical guidelines are generally in
line with international benchmarks as determined by Pisaniello and McKay (2007).
Overall, Tasmanian policy encompasses dams, large and small, of lower and greater
hazard and sets out levels of safety surveillance (see Water Management (Safety of
Dams) Regulations, 2003, Section 7). To avoid placing significant cost on owners
smaller, less hazardous dams do not require sophisticated engineering reports; owners
may prepare the report with a guided pro-forma (DPIW, 2009: a copy of this pro forma is
available in Appendix 3 of DPIW, 2009). This assists in keeping the cascade/cumulative
threats of smaller catchment dams in check which is a key contribution towards the best
practice benchmark established above.

5. Farm dam safety in South Australia
This section shows that safety of farm dams has long been an issue in South Australia,
but that it has been met by dogged resistance to change, as cases document over a
12-year period. South Australia has many farm dam storages. There are over 22,000 in
the Mount Lofty Ranges alone (McMurray, 2004, p. 5) many of which represent
considerable hazard potential (Pisaniello, 1997). However, dam safety assurance policy
remains limited. There are no statutory provisions in place to ensure either adequate
dam design and construction or adequate supervision and maintenance of private
dams. This is the situation despite ongoing evidence and warnings over the past
two decades.

5.1 A 12-year demonstrative case study International
Pisaniello (1997) undertook case studies of hazardous private dams in the Mount Lofty dam safety
Ranges of South Australia to test their condition and general maintenance. Over
100 farm dams were identified as having at least significant hazard potential per policy
ANCOLD (1994) guidelines. In 1995, 11 hazardous earthen farm dams were randomly
selected for investigation (Table III). Detailed inspections were made of each sample
dam’s general condition and apparent maintenance. In 2007, permission was given to 311
revisit only five of the dams in Table III (marked with superscript “b”). Site inspections
re-affirmed their hazard ratings against the updated ANCOLD (2000b) guidelines and
provided results for comparison with the 1995 data. The inspections explored whether
dams met the basic ANCOLD (1994) requirements, which are now found in ANCOLD
(2003). Any potential problems or basic limitations associated with owner management
practices were noted. A summary of these results is provided in Table III.
As part of the 1995 inspections, the spillways of the dams were also measured in order
to test their flood capabilities against ANCOLD guidelines (Table IV). In 2005, spillway
measurements were repeated for five dam cases (marked with superscript “b” in Table IV).
The flood capability assessments were undertaken in accordance with modern best
practice engineering processes as detailed in Australian Rainfall and Runoff (IEAust,
1987, 1999). A summary of the flood capability results is presented in Table IV.

5.2 Investigative results and analysis
The condition of the dams and apparent levels of maintenance varied but many basic
deficiencies were common. These included purposefully blocked spillways using
obstructions such as sandbags, severely diminishing dam capability to safely withstand
floods, and trees and vegetation allowed to grow out of the embankment which increases
the likelihood of dam leakage and failure by piping. The results in Table III demonstrate
that most of the selected dams in 1995 were deficient in some ways. In fact, nine (82 percent)
were rated unacceptable, five of these being “high hazard”. For the five dams re-inspected
in 2007, where four of these are high hazard, the deficiencies remain in every case and in
most cases were worse. In none of the cases have EAPs of any form been provided. The
dire situation prevails when looking at the flood capabilities of the dams as presented in
Table IV. In 1995, ten (91 per cent) of the dams were unacceptable compared to ANCOLD
guidelines. In fact, the flood capabilities of three of the six high hazard dams (50 percent)
did not even satisfy the required ANCOLD criteria for low hazard dams (i.e. minimum 1 in
100 AEP). For the five dams which had their spillways re-assessed in 2005, the situation
only got worse in most cases, and where any improvement was observed it was no-where
near sufficient to meet ANCOLD requirements.
The owners of the dams surveyed in 1995 were repeatedly warned of the problems by
the local council. In subsequent years, much encouragement and guidance to review,
maintain and upgrade dams in cost-effective ways have been made available to farmers
in SA (see Pisaniello and McKay, 2007 for details), but the results of the surveys
undertaken in 2007 show that none of the identified problems had been rectified in the
12-year period. This result confirms that these owners have, in the past 12 years, ignored
the warnings on their dams’ risks and hazards, as well as their common law
responsibility to maintain them. This demonstrates clearly that the need for some form
of private dam safety assurance policy in South Australia in accordance with Table II is
urgent.

BIJ
18,2

312

Table III.

over 12 years
Rated summary of

level of sample dams
condition/maintenance
Hazard 1995 condition/ 1995 1995 2007 condition/ 2007 2007
ratinga Max. maintenance level any acceptability maintenance level any acceptability Condition/
(high, dam Storage When rating (good, EAP per ANCOLD rating (good, EAP per ANCOLD maintenance
Dam sig. or height capacity built reasonable, poor, or in (1994) reasonable, poor, or in (1994/2003) level change
no. low) (m) (ml) (year) very poor) place? guidelines very poor) place? guidelines in 12 years

1 High 7.8 147 1968 Good No Acceptable n/a n/a n/a n/a
2b High 9.2 83 1990 Very poor No Unacceptable Very poor No Unacceptable Worse
3b High 10.5 249 1939 Poor No Unacceptable Poor No Unacceptable Unchanged
4b High 9.0 89 1967 Poor No Unacceptable Very poor No Unacceptable Much worse
Pre-
5 High 8.0 162 1970 Poor No Unacceptable n/a n/a n/a n/a
6b High 10.7 50 1975 Very poor No Unacceptable Very poor No Unacceptable Worse
7 Sig. 8.1 177 1980 Reasonable No Acceptable n/a n/a n/a n/a
Pre-
8 Sig. 7.5 60 1970 Very poor No Unacceptable n/a n/a n/a n/a
Pre-
Pre-
11b Sig. 8.4 70 1965 Very poor No Unacceptable Very poor No Unacceptable Worse
Notes: aIn accordance with ANCOLD (1994) guidelines, and more recently in accordance with ANCOLD (2000b, 2003) guidelines; bthe only ﬁve dams for
which permission could be gained to re-inspect in 2007

ANCOLD guidelines
(1986, 2000a) minimum
Hazard rating acceptable flood 1995 actual dam 1995 acceptability 2005 actual dam 2005 acceptability Flood capability
Dam (high, sig. or capability 1/AEPa flood capability per ANCOLD flood capability per ANCOLD change in
no. low) (years) 1/AEPa (years) guidelines 1/AEPa (years) guidelines 12 years

1 High 10,000 40 Unacceptable n/a n/a n/a
2b High 10,000 80 Unacceptable 280 Unacceptable Insufficiently improved
3 High 10,000 97 Unacceptable n/a n/a n/a
4b High 10,000 150 Unacceptable 310 Unacceptable Insufficiently improved
5b High 10,000 320 Unacceptable 110 Unacceptable Worse
6b High 10,000 2,750 Unacceptable 210 Unacceptable Much worse
7 Sig. 1,000 190 Unacceptable n/a n/a n/a
11b Sig. 1,000 1,400 Acceptable 90 Unacceptable Much worse
Notes: aAEP – annual exceedance probability; bthe only five sample dams for which the spillways were re-measured in 2005
International

of sample dams against
Flood capability results

ANCOLD guidelines over
ten years
policy
dam safety

313

Table IV.

BIJ 6. Discussion
18,2 Appropriate dam safety policy for any jurisdiction can be determined using the policy
benchmarks and guidelines presented in Section 3.0. The analysis and application of the
benchmarks answer the core research questions presented in Section 1.0. Tasmanian
policy represents the best practice benchmark policy model for other states in Australia.
The consideration of the two states highlights the substantial safety risks that are
314 associated with large and small dams, high and low hazard, if they are improperly
managed structures. Such risks arise at the individual and cumulative levels within
catchments and are magnified by the attitudes, behaviours and practices of dam owners
and the responses of policy makers; demonstrated here by both overseas and local
experiences with dam failures and the South Australian case studies on dam safety
management. The SA case study also provides evidence towards the sub research
question presented and answered in Section 3.0 – that for an acceptable minimum level
benchmark in this area a voluntary/educative mechanism (method 1) does always have
to be supplemented by at least community right to know legislation (method 2),
as suggested by Pisaniello and McKay (1998, 2007). This is because as evidenced in SA,
no matter how much education and guidance is provided, farmers cannot be relied upon
to manage their dams properly let alone provide for “community right to know” of their
own fruition.
The SA case study also demonstrates the application of the benchmarked policy
selection guidelines. When the above results from SA (Section 5.0) are applied to Table II
a model of “best practice” is clearly warranted given that SA has at least 100 potentially
hazardous private dams (i.e. level 1 indication) and over 80 of these would be inadequate
both for structural integrity and for spillway capability (i.e. level 2 indication based on
translating the case studies sample results to the entire population). The case study also
indicates there is no benefit to starting with a lower, more voluntary benchmark (as per
Table II final footnote) as its longitudinal basis means that farmers have already been
informed and educated over a 12-year period without response.
In practice, in order to stimulate progress in SA to follow the path of the international
and Tasmanian benchmarks, there is a need for political will guided by appropriate data.
In order to gain the requisite political will, there is need to understand and change
attitudes, complacency and perceptions of all stakeholders involved, as well as understand
any other interrelated factors, e.g. technological, regulatory, economic, environmental and
social issues, including cultural habits and conflicting values and interests.

7. Conclusions
The paper addresses the core research questions RQ1 and RQ2. It models adequate
minimum and best-practice benchmarks in private/farm dam catchment systems, and the
benchmarks appropriate for varying jurisdictional circumstances. The paper also answers
RQ2 by providing evidence to suggest that a purely voluntary/educative mechanism is
unacceptable as a minimum benchmark and always needs to be supplemented by at least
community right to know legislation. International benchmarks and updated guidelines
on developing appropriate private dam safety management accountability and assurance
policy for varying jurisdictional circumstances have been established here. Such
guidelines are based on international experience and best practice, and dam safety
programs that are workable and not too costly. Tasmania provides an exemplar of an
Australian jurisdiction that is in line with these guidelines and is proactively addressing

private dam safety issues, including the management of both individual and cumulative International
dam safety threats and the development of the cost-effective engineering/accounting dam safety
technology. Since it is the role of government to protect the community, government must
be encouraged to provide appropriate management and policies, as discussed in this policy
paper, which assure the community that owner accountability and participation protect
against unacceptable dam safety management practices.
315
Note
1. Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act 1986 which establishes a Toxics
Release Inventory, in addition to at least 25 US States’ ‘right to know’ laws- the US
experience is what prompted Australia to also establish the Pollutant Release and Transfer
Register in the late 1990s.

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Corresponding author
Joanne Tingey-Holyoak can be contacted at: Joanne.Tingey@unisa.edu.au

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