What impact do domestic power dynamics have on the type of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) that leaders choose to join? While IGO membership has proliferated over time, the question remains as to what motivates states to join the different types of regional IGOs that they do. We argue that leaders that face more political constraints and are ideologically distant from other domestic political institutions have an incentive to join regional IGOs and, thus, locking in and committing to a policy reform. However, this is mediated by the state’s capacity – their ability to negotiate and execute the policy mandates made by the regional IGOs they join -- to absorb the costs of regional membership. Using original data on state IGO membership for the period of 1975 and 2005, this paper shows that the number of domestic political actors, the extent of their ideological polarization and the state’s capacity shape the regional IGO membership choice of state leaders

1. Power Relations, Ideological
Polarization and State
Capacity on IGO
Membership
MAYRA VÉLEZ-SERRANO, UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO
KYEONGHI BAEK & MEHWISH SARWARI, SUNY-BUFFALO STATE
Prepared for the Midwest Political Science Association meeting 2016, Chicago, IL (April 7 –10, 2016)

2. Research Puzzles
Variation in regionalization outcomes and types of regional IGOs
Diverse experiences outside of Europe
Assumption of natural evolution towards greater regionalization has
not been fulfilled, in spite off the relative consensus of the need of
regionalization.
What impact do domestic power dynamics have on the type of
regional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) leaders choose to
join?
Introduction Velez-Serrano, Baek & Sarwari 2/ 15

3. Theoretical Propositions
Political constrains due to veto-players  More/Less participation
Ideological Polarization  More participation
State Capacity More participation
Theory Velez-Serrano, Baek & Sarwari 3/ 15

4. Research Design
Dependent Variable – IGO membership Classified by institutionalization or ability to enforce
compliance as minimal, structured, or interventionist
◦ Whether a state joined a particular regional organization
◦ How many particular regional organizations
Independent Variables
◦ Political Constraints
◦ Ideological Coherence
◦ State Capacity
Fixed Effects Panel Model-
◦ Logit – State Join or not that type of organization in that year
◦ Regression- Change on the number of memberships on that type of organization
Research Design Velez-Serrano, Baek & Sarwari 4/ 15

5. Regional IGO Membership 1975
Descriptive Statistics Velez-Serrano, Baek & Sarwari 5/ 15

6. Regional IGO Membership 1980
Descriptive Statistics Velez-Serrano, Baek & Sarwari 6/ 15

7. Regional IGO Membership 1990
Descriptive Statistics Velez-Serrano, Baek & Sarwari 7/ 15

8. Regional IGO Membership 2000
Descriptive Statistics Velez-Serrano, Baek & Sarwari 8/ 15

9. Changes in Regional IGO Membership
Descriptive Statistics Velez-Serrano, Baek & Sarwari 9/ 15

10. Changes in Regional IGO
Membership (con’t)
Results Velez-Serrano, Baek & Sarwari 10/ 15

11. Findings
Political Constraints do not always affect the likelihood of joining,
except in the case of Europe
As Capacity increases, states were 2.7 times more likely to join
regional structured IGOs
As Ideological Polarization decreases, states were 53% less likely to
join an interventionist regional IGO
Findings Velez-Serrano, Baek & Sarwari 11/ 15

12. Findings
Findings Velez-Serrano, Baek & Sarwari 12/ 15
.3.4.5.6.7
Predict
0 1
Ideological Coherence
Regional IGO Membership (Any Type)
MARGINAL EFFECTS: REGIONAL IGO
MEMBERSHIP AND IDEOLOGICAL COHERENCE
MARGINAL EFFECTS: REGIONAL INTERVENTIONIST
IGO MEMBERSHIP AND IDEOLOGICAL COHERENCE
0
.05
.1
.15
Predict
0 1
Ideological Coherence
Regional Interventionist IGO Membership

13. Predicted Probabilities & Marginal Effects
PREDICTED PROBABILITY: REGIONAL IGO MEMBERSHIP
AND CAPACITY
MARGINAL EFFECTS: REGIONAL IGO
MEMBERSHIP AND CAPACITY
0
.2.4.6.8
1
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Capacity
Predicted Probability Predicted Probability | Fixed Effect = 0
-.5
0
.5
1
1.5
Predict
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Capacity
Regional IGO Membership (Any Type)

14. Conclusion:
Political constraints (the number of veto players) do not explain
regionalization except for Europe
State capacity and Ideological Polarization do:
◦ States that can implement the necessary policies for
regionalization are more likely to join a regional IGO.
◦ Ideological polarization leads to greater regional integration.
Concluding Remarks Velez-Serrano, Baek & Sarwari 14/ 15

15. Acknowledgement
Jin Ng and Jorge Rivera for their invaluable research assistance.
SUNY Faculty Diversity Grant 2014-2015
UPRRP -Programa de Investigación Subgraduada 2016
Chairs Dr. Hector Martinez & Dr. Alex Betancourt for support
through TARE’s
Acknowledgement Velez-Serrano, Baek & Sarwari 15/ 15

16. Interested in seeing more maps?
Go to my web site to see IGO membership by scope, purposes (type),
and institutionalization of IGOs:
igomembership.wordpress.com
Thank you! Velez-Serrano, Baek & Sarwari 16/ 15