1) An election in Colombia resulted in a runoff between the incumbent President Santos and challenger Zuluaga, with neither receiving a majority. 2) The election centered around a peace process with FARC rebels that is the top priority of Santos but faces skepticism from Zuluaga and his supporter, former President Uribe. 3) The campaign has been divisive with mudslinging between Santos, backed by his record of economic growth, and Zuluaga, who frames the choice as a return to the policies of Uribe.

1. A Nonviolent Alternative for Ukraine
Uribe believed that his successor would faithfully carry his agenda moving forward. There are bound
to be serious, long-term institutional costs for South America's oldest democracy.
Uribe, who in 2010 was barred by the Constitutional Court from running for a third term but was
elected to the Senate in March, handpicked his former finance minister, Óscar Iván Zuluaga, to
represent his nascent Democratic Center party. He commands key policy issues, from security to the
economy to the social agenda, and is the scion of a political family (his great uncle was president in
the 1930s). Many of Uribe's attacks against his former defense minister have been intemperate and
baseless, with warnings about the possible "Castro-Chávezisation" of Colombia. After nearly a
decade of battling the country's largest insurgency -- the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia) -- the tough, take-charge, and polarizing two-term president, Álvaro Uribe, turned over
the reins to his defense minister, Juan Manuel Santos.
But Uribe is nothing if not wily and shrewd, a consummate politician. But the progress is
indisputable.
This widespread wariness about the way the peace process has unfolded help accounts for the
election results. (The FARC hasn't yet officially weighed in on what it might do if Zuluaga were
elected.) But having provided Colombia with some $9 billion in security aid since 2000 -- far more
than any other country in the Western Hemisphere -- the United States has a huge stake in one of its
few strategic partners in Latin America
Colombia is indeed performing well -- both compared with the rest of Latin America as well as
during the Uribe presidency. The result has been a campaign dominated -- on both sides -- by an
issue that for many Colombians seems distant and is viewed as relatively inconsequential.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/05/28/a_nonviolent_alternative_for_ukraine
DIANA SANCHEZ/AFP/Getty Images)
Surprisingly for many, given his reputation as a hard-liner, Santos's tenor was far more conciliatory
than his predecessor's from the moment he was elected in June 2010. An inveterate Twitter user, he
has his finger on the pulse of Colombian public opinion. Santos would start his second term with
scant public enthusiasm and would face a formidable opponent in Uribe and his supporters in the
Senate. The extent of the bad blood was sharply revealed in the tumultuous first round of the
presidential election on May 25.
Santos, who knew the peace process was a huge gamble, lacks Uribe's popular touch. Defying the
polls and surprising most pundits, Zuluaga topped the field of five candidates, garnering 29 percent
of the vote, followed by Santos with 26 percent.
Moreover, there has been a disconnect between talk about the peace process -- which polls show is
not even among the top five concerns for most Colombians -- and more quotidian yet pressing issues
like health and education. Although the United States must figure out how to work with either
candidate, it had planned to cooperate with Santos to implement an eventual accord with the FARC.
Yet despite his pedigree, he has struggled to consolidate his political leadership. As soon as Santos
shifted ground, Uribe launched a relentless campaign to discredit him and deny his re-election

2. ambition.
But the mutual goodwill has proved fleeting, and Santos's tenure has been anything but smooth. But
when Santos took office, conditions seemed more propitious than ever -- ironically, thanks in large
measure to Uribe's effective offensive against the FARC.
The biggest casualty of first-round voting was public confidence in Colombia's politics. Among
Uribe's close associates, Zuluaga was the candidate who had the best chance of beating Santos. This
highly coveted prize has eluded every Colombian president over the past quarter-century. Many
remain skeptical about whether the rebels are negotiating in good faith and whether this round of
peace talks can succeed where so many previous attempts have failed.
Indeed, no matter who wins on June 15, it is likely that the next administration will find governing
extremely difficult. From the outset, Santos's every move has been calculated to achieve what he
hoped would ultimately be his legacy -- a peace accord with the FARC and an end to decades of
armed conflict. As a measure of apathy and disenchantment with the degradation of the electoral
process, abstention was at a record high. And behind it is his tenacious predecessor who is intent on
being the pilot once again.
The process has moved along, but much slower than the government initially projected. And, as
Sunday, May 25's results confirmed, just slightly more than a quarter of all Colombians favor his re-
election.
After Santos was elected resoundingly in 2010, he remarked that since Uribe had built a runway,
Colombia could now fly. And so he chose a proxy to bring Santos down. Meanwhile, both contenders
are scurrying to get support from the three other vanquished candidates on the right, left, and
center.
While Santos sought to lower the temperature from the confrontational politics that characterized
the preceding eight years, he initially had nothing but praise for Uribe's record. Despite significant
levels of violence and criminality, Colombia has been known for its comity in the political sphere.
This campaign, however, has been far from ennobling. The remaining issues, however, are
particularly tricky and contentious: the FARC's role and participation in Colombian politics and the
terms of justice for its past crimes.
. Zuluaga, on the other hand, would have Uribe at his side, but would need to work with a
congressional majority that has supported Santos. The economy grew over 5 percent last year,
foreign investment is pouring in, inflation is at its lowest point in decades, and levels of poverty and
unemployment have been declining. Polls consistently show that while Colombians want to end the
nation's terribly costly war -- and would prefer to end it without further bloodshed -- they oppose
what they view as impunity for the widely despised FARC. He promised continuity on key economic
and security policies, but was far more inclined to forge consensus among Colombia's diverse
political forces. The key question, however, is why so many voters are attracted to the "change"
option when the country is advancing so impressively on many fronts.
For Uribe, the direction Santos has moved since becoming president -- first his rapprochement with
Uribe's bête noire, the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, and then the peace process with
the FARC -- are acts of personal betrayal. His polling numbers are over 60 percent negative. His
search for governance and a reform agenda led Santos quickly to form the National Unity coalition
of parties, which accounted for about 90 percent of Congress when he assumed office.

3. In his victory speech, it was striking that Zuluaga framed the final vote as a fundamental choice
between continuity and change -- or, perhaps more directly, a return to Uribe. He has insisted that
the FARC cease criminal activity before any further negotiations take place and has vowed that, as
president, he would suspend the current process.
It is doubtful that in the less than three weeks before the second round, the campaign will be
elevated. An unprecedented feud emerged between the two Colombian presidents, chiefly about how
best to sustain the country's security gains under Uribe and end the long-standing armed conflict.
But Santos has encountered turbulence halfway into his flight plan. In many respects, Colombia has
taken off. Colombians are bracing themselves for another round of scandals, mudslinging,
accusations, and personal attacks between the Santos and Zuluaga campaigns (with Uribe as the
principal political operative of the latter). In the campaign, Santos has surprisingly neglected to tout
his government's enviable record on economic and social progress or to explain how he plans to
build on such accomplishments in a second term. To be sure, serious problems remain: persistent
agrarian protests, deficient education and health, and stubbornly high levels of inequality. The
runoff will be held on June 15.
Four years ago, Colombia -- Washington's closest ally on the continent and a nation that a decade
earlier had been widely viewed as on the verge of being a failed state -- bore all the traces of
continuing a remarkable transition to a robust democracy. Its former presidents have traditionally
transcended partisan squabbling. As gratuitous as Uribe's attacks have been, they have clearly
resonated with broad swaths of the Colombian public.
Since November 2012, Santos's able negotiating team has reached agreement with the FARC
leadership on several key questions, including how to deal with long-standing battles over land and
addressing the production and shipment of illicit drugs -- an important source of revenue for the
FARC. Instead, it is reasonable to expect that what most analysts agree was an unusually dirty
campaign will degenerate even further. There were charges, for example, that Zuluaga
commissioned a hacker to spy on the peace talks and that drug traffickers had bribed a key Santos
campaign advisor. Absent reduced tensions and some measure of reconciliation, it is hard to be
optimistic that much will be accomplished under either scenario.
For Washington, which considered a second Santos administration nearly a foregone conclusion, the
current uncertainty is worrying. Uribe has also charged -- largely without foundation -- that security
gains under his administration have been reversed under Santos.
A peace process is also under way -- the centerpiece of the Santos government and the chief issue in
his re-election campaign. True, he is a divisive figure, and there is some "Uribe fatigue." But his
followers are loyal, passionate, and ready for a restoration behind Zuluaga. Having served as
minister in three administrations, however, Santos may be Colombia's best-prepared president.
Zuluaga -- with Uribe at his side, doggedly pounding away -- has lambasted what he sees as Santos's
excessively soft approach in dealing with the rebels. The former president's undeniable success in
debilitating the country's five-decade insurgency and improving the overall security situation led
Santos to call Uribe "Colombia's second-greatest liberator" (behind independence hero Simón BolÃ-
var, of course).
More than anything else, the peace process has infuriated Uribe and sustained his feud with Santos