كيف يصنع العلويون في سورية مستقبلهم الوطني
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كيف يصنع العلويون في سورية مستقبلهم الوطني
- 1. ﻛﻴﻒ ﻳﺼﻨﻊ اﻟﻌﻠﻮﻳﻮن ﻓﻲ ﺳﻮرﻳﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﺒﻠﻬﻢ اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ ـ ـ
- 2. اﻟﺴﺒت ٣١/٨٠/١١٠٢ رؤﻴــﺔ ﻨﻌود ﻟﻨﺸر ﻫذا اﻟﻤﻘﺎﻝ اﻟذي ﻛﺎن ﻗد ﻨﺸر ﻓﻲ ٦٠٠٢ ﻓﻲ ﻫذا اﻟظرف اﻟوطﻨﻲ إﺼدا ات ر اﻟدﻗﻴق.. ﻤرﻛز اﻟﺸرق اﻟﻌرﺒﻲ ﻤواﻗف ﺘﻤت إﻀﺎﻓﺔ ﻤﻘﺎﻝ : ﻤﺎذا ﻴﻌد أﻫﻝ اﻟﺴﻨﺔ ﻟﻠﻌﻠوﻴﻴن ، ﻤﺘرﺠﻤﺎً ـ ﻤﻔﺎﻫﻴــم ﻤﺸﺎرﻛﺎت ﻓﻲ ﻨﻬﺎﻴﺔ ﻫذﻩ اﻟرؤﻴﺔ اﺤرﺼوا ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗ اءﺘﻪ ﻷﻨﻪ ﻫﺎم ﺠداً ر ﺘﻘﺎرﻴر ﻤﻠﻔﺎت ـ د اﺴﺎت ـ ﻛﺘب ر واﻟﻤﻘﺎﻝ اﻷﺼﻲ ﺒﺎﻟﻠﻐﺔ اﻹﻨﻛﻠﻴزﻴﺔ ﻤوﺠود ـ رﺠﺎﻝ اﻟﺸرق واﺤﺔ اﻟﻠﻘﺎء ﻤوﻗﻊ: www.syriacomment.comوﻫذا اﺒطﻪ: ر ﻋﻠﻰ “What do Sunnis intend for Alawis following Regime change?” by Khudr دﻴوان اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻀﻌﻔﻴن اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺸرﻗون اﻟﺠدد ﺘﺎرﻴﺦ اﻟﻤﻘﺎﻝ ٠٣/٨/٦٠٠٢ ﻗطـوف وﺘﺄﻤـﻼت ﺼﺎﺤب اﻟﻤوﻗﻊ اﻷﻛﺎدﻴﻤﻲ اﻷﻤرﻴﻛﻲ ﺠﺸوا ﻻﻨدﻴس ﻓﻲ اﻟﺘطوﻴرواﻟﺘﻨوﻴر ﻤن اﻟﺼﺤﺎﻓﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻤﻴﺔ أرﺴﻝ ﺒرﻴدك اﻹﻟﻛﺘروﻨﻲ ﺤوا ات ﻓﻲ ﻤدا ات ر ر ﻛﻴف ﻴﺼﻨﻊ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴون ﻓﻲ ﺴورﻴﺔ ة ﺴﺒﻴﻝ إﻟﻰ اﻟﺒﺼﻴر
- 3. ﻟﻴﺼﻝ إﻟﻴك ﺠدﻴدﻨﺎ ﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻠﻬم اﻟوطﻨﻲ ﻓﻘﻬﺎء اﻹﺴﻼم http://www.asharqalarabi.org.uk/ruiah/b-ruiah-620.htm ﻫﻴر ﺴﺎﻟم*ز ﻤﺎذا ﻴﻌد أﻫﻝ اﻟﺴﻨﺔ ﻟﻠﻌﻠوﻴﻴن ؟ ﺍﺷﺗﺭﺍﻙ ﻋﻨوان ﻤﻘﺎﻝ ﻨﺸر ﺒﺎﻟﻠﻐﺔ اﻻﻨﺠﻠﻴزﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻤوﻗﻊ ﺴﻴرﻴﺎ ﻛوﻤﻨت ﻓﻲ ٠٣ آب ٦٠٠٢ ، طرح ﺤزﻤﺔ ﻤن اﻻﻓﻛﺎر واﻟﺘﺴﺎؤﻻت ﺘﺴﺘﺤق اﻟﺘوﻗف ﺃﺭﺳــﻝ ﻋﻨدﻫﺎ وﻤﻨﺎﻗﺸﺘﻬﺎ . ﻟم ﻴﺸﺄ ﻛﺎﺘب اﻟﻤﻘﺎﻝ ان ﻴﻔﺼﺢ ﻋن اﺴﻤﻪ اﻟﺤﻘﻴﻘﻲ ، ﻤﻔﻀﻼً ان ﻴرﻤز ﻟﻪ ﺒﺄي اﺴم ﻴﺤﻤﻠﻪ اﺤد اﺒﻨﺎء اﻟطﺎﺌﻔﺔ !! ﺴﻨﻨﺎﻗش ﻓﻲ ﻫذا اﻟﻤﻘﺎم اﻻﻓﻛﺎر اﻟواردة ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻘﺎﻝ، وﻨﺠﻴب ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺘﺴﺎؤﻻت اﻟﻤطروﺤﺔ ﻋنإﻴﻤﺎﻨﺎ ﻤﻨﺎ ﺒﺄﻫﻤﻴﺔ وﺠدﻴﺔ ﻤﺎ طرح ، وﺼدﻗﻴﺔ ﻫذﻩ اﻻﻓﻛﺎر ﻓﻲ اﻟﺘﻌﺒﻴر ﺤﺎﻟﺔ ﻴﻌﻴﺸﻬﺎ ﻓرﻴق ﻤن اﺒﻨﺎء ﻤﺠﺘﻤﻌﻨﺎ ، ﺒﻐض اﻟﻨظر ﻋن ﺸﺨص اﻟﻛﺎﺘب وﺤﻘﻴﻘﺔ ودواﻓﻌﻪ . ئ ﻋﻠﻰ ٍ ﺴﻨﻀطر اﺒﺘداء اﻟﻰ ﺘﻘدﻴم ﺘﻠﺨﻴص واف ﻟﻠﻤﻘﺎﻝ ﻟﻨﻌﻴن اﻟﻘﺎر ً ﻤﺘﺎﺒﻌﺔ اﻟﺤوار . ﻨﺴﺘطﻴﻊ ان ﻨرﻛز اﻟﻤﻘﺎﻝ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻨﻘﺎط اﻟﺘﺎﻟﻴﺔ : * ﺤدﻴث ﻋن طﺒﻴﻌﺔ اﻟﻨظﺎم اﻟﻘﺎﺌم واﺴﺘﻨﺎدﻩ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻓ اد اﻛﺜر ﻤن ر اﺴﺘﻨﺎدﻩ ﻋﻠﻰ طﺎﺌﻔﺔ ، ﻓﻲ ﻤﺤﺎوﻟﺔ ﻟﻨﻔﻲ اﻟﺼﺒﻐﺔ اﻟطﺎﺌﻔﻴﺔ ﻋن اﻟﻨظﺎم ، ﺒﻤﻌﻨﻰ ان اﻟطﺎﺌﻔﺔ ﻟﻴﺴت ﻤﺴﺘﻔﻴدة ﺠﻤﻴﻌﺎ ﻤن ﻫذا اﻟﻨظﺎم . * دور ﺘﻌﺎﻗب اﻻﺠﻴﺎﻝ ﻓﻲ ﺼﻴﺎﻏﺔ اﻟﻤوﻗف اﻟطﺎﺌﻔﻲ ، ﻴﺒدو ان اﻟﻛﺎﺘب ﻴﻨﺘﻤﻲ اﻟﻰ اﻟﺠﻴﻝ اﻟﺜﺎﻨﻲ ﻤن ﺤﻛم اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن، ﻓﻬو ﻛﻤﺎ ﻴرﻴد ان ﻴﺨﺒرﻨﺎ ﻤن اﻟﺠﻴﻝ اﻟذي ﻟم ﻴﻌﺎﺼر )ﻤرﺤﻠﺔ اﻻﻀطﻬﺎد اﻟﺴﻨﻲ !!( ﻗﻀﻴﺔ ﻻ ﻨرﻴد أن ﻨﺘوﻗف ﻋﻨد ﻤﻨﺎﻗﺸﺘﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻫذا اﻟﺴﻴﺎق. * اﻟطﺎﺌﻔﺔ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﺔ ﻻ ﺘ اﻝ ﺘﺘﺤﻛم ﺒﺎﻟﻤواﻗﻊ اﻟﻤﻬﻤﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺠﻴش و ز
- 4. ة اﻷﻤﻨﻴﺔ .إﻗ ار ﻤﻔﻴد ﻓﻲ ﺴﻴﺎق اﻟﺤوار. ر اﻷﺠﻬز * ى اﻟﻛﺎﺘب أن اﻻﺘﺠﺎﻩ اﻟذي ﺘﺴﻴر إﻟﻴﻪ ﺴورﻴﺔ ﻻ ﻴﺒﺸر ﺒﺨﻴر ﻴر ..ﺜﻤﺔ ﺘﺨوف ﻤن ﻛﺎرﺜﺔ ﻴﻘﺎد إﻟﻴﻬﺎ اﻟﺒﻠد . ﻴﺤﻤﻝ اﻟﻛﺎﺘب ّ ة ، وﻟﻛﻨﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻤﺴؤوﻟﻴﺘﻬﺎ ﻤﺠﻤوﻋﺔ ﻤؤﻟﻔﺔ ﻤن طواﺌف ﻛﺜﻴر اﻟﻨﻬﺎﻴﺔ ﺴﺘﺤﻤﻝ ﻟﻠﻌﻠوﻴﻴن وﺤدﻫم )ﻴﺤﺎوﻝ اﻟﻛﺎﺘب أن ﻴﺸﻴر إﻟﻰ اﺸﺘ اك ﺠﻤﻴﻊ اﻟطواﺌف ﻓﻲ ﺤﻛم اﻟﺒﻠد أو ﻓﻲ ﺼﻨﻊ اﻟﻛﺎرﺜﺔ ( ر * ﺜم ﻴﺘﺴﺎءﻝ اﻟﻛﺎﺘب :ﻟﻤﺎذا ﻻ ﻴﻔﻌﻝ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴون ﺸﻴﺌﺎً ﻟﺘﻔﺎدي اﻟﻛﺎرﺜﺔ ؟ ﻟﻤﺎذا ﻨﺼﻤت ﻋﻨﻬﺎ ؟ وﻟﻤﺎذا ﻻ ﻴﻘوم ﺠﻨ اﻝ ﻋﻠوي ﺒﺎﻨﻘﻼب ر ي؟ﻋﺴﻛر * ﻟﻺﺠﺎﺒﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻫذﻩ اﻟﺘﺴﺎؤﻻت ﻴﺘﺤدث اﻟﻛﺎﺘب ﻋن ﻨوﻋﻴن ﻤن اﻷﺴﺒﺎب ، ﻋﺎم ﻴﺘﻌﻠق ﺒﺎﻟﺴورﻴﻴن ﺠﻤﻴﻌﺎً وﺨﺎص ﻴﺘﻌﻠق ﺒﺎﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن .. ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻴﺎق اﻟﻌﺎم ﻴذﻛر ﺴﺘﺔ أﺴﺒﺎب ﻨﻛﺎد ﻨواﻓﻘﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻤﻌظﻤﻬﺎ ؛ ﻓﺜﻘﺎﻓﺔ اﻟﺨوف اﻟﺘﻲ اﻨﺘﺸرت ﺒﻴن اﻟﻨﺎس ، وﻗﻴﺎم اﻟﺸك واﻟرﻴﺒﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻨﻔوس ة اﻷﻤرﻴﻛﻴﺔ ، اﻟﻤواطﻨﻴن، وﺜﺎﻟﺜﺎً اﻟﺼ اع اﻟﺨﺎرﺠﻲ اﻟذي ﺘﻔرﻀﻪ اﻹدار ر ة ، وﺘﺤﻛم اﻟرﺌﻴس اﻟ اﺤﻝ ﺒﺎﻟﺠﻴش ر ي ﻀد ﻫذﻩ اﻹداروﻋﺎطﻔﺔ اﻟﺸﺎرع اﻟﺴور واﺤﻛﺎم اﻟﻘﺒﻀﺔ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ، ﻤﻤﺎ ﻴﺼﻌب أي ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺔ ﺘﺤرك أو ﻴﺠﻌﻠﻬﺎ ﻤﺴﺘﺤﻴﻠﺔ ٕ ة ﺘﺠﻌﻝ اﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴر ﻓﻲ ﺴورﻴﺔ ﻤﺴﺘﺤﻴﻼ او ﺒﻌﻴد ؛ ﻛﻝ ﻫذﻩ اﻟﻌواﻤﻝ ﻤﺘﻀﺎﻓر اﻟﻤﻨﺎﻝ ﻛﻤﺎ ى ﻛﺎﺘب اﻟﻤﻘﺎﻝ ، ﻤﺎﻟم ﻴﺸﺎرك ﻓﻴﻪ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴون ، وﻫؤﻻء ﻴر اﻟﻌﻠوﻴون ﻟن ﻴﺸﺎرﻛوا ﻓﻲ اﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴر ﻤﺎﻟم ﻴروا ﺒدﻴﻼً واﻀﺤﺎً . وﻤن ﻫﻨﺎ ﻴطﺎﻟب اﻟﻛﺎﺘب اﻟﻤﻌﺎرﻀﺔ )أن ﺘﻘدم رؤﻴﺔ واﻀﺤﺔ ﻋن اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻝ ﺘطﻤﺌن ة ﺒﺎﻟﻤﻴ ات اﻟﻘﻠﻴﻠﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﻴﺘﻤﺘﻊ ﺒﻬﺎ ز ي ﺒﺤﻴث ﻴﻘﺘﻨﻊ ﺒﺎﻟﻤﺨﺎطراﻟﺸﻌب اﻟﺴور .وﻋﻠﻰ أﺴﻬﺎ اﻷﻤن . ﻴؤﻛد اﻟﻛﺎﺘب أﻨﻪ ﻻ ﺘ اﻝ ﻋﺒﺎ ات اﻟوﻋود اﻟﻌﺎﻤﺔ ر ز ر واﻟﻐﺎﻤﻀﺔ ﻋن اﻟدﻴﻤﻘ اطﻴﺔ واﻟﺤﻴﺎة اﻷﻓﻀﻝ ﺘﺼﺒﻎ ﺨطﺎب ﻤؤﻴدي ﺘﻐﻴﻴر ر اﻟﻨظﺎم !! ﻓﻲ اﻟﻨﻘﻠﺔ إﻟﻰ اﻷﺴﺒﺎب اﻟﺨﺎﺼﺔ ﺒﺎﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن . ﻴرﻛز اﻟﻛﺎﺘب ﻋﻠﻰ ان
- 5. اﻟﺴﺒب اﻟرﺌﻴس اﻟذي ﻴﺤوﻝ دون ﻓﺎﻋﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن ﻓﻲ دﻋم ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴر ﻫو)اﻟﺨوف ﻤن اﻵﺨر ( وﻫذا اﻵﺨر ﻓﻲ أﻴﻪ ﻴﺘﻤظﻬر ﻓﻲ ﻓرﻴﻘﻴن ﻤن ر اﻟﻨﺎس . اﻻوﻝ ﻋﻤﺎء اﻟﻤﻌﺎرﻀﺔ اﻟدﻴﻨﻴﺔ اﻟﺴﻨﻴﺔ و اﻷﻛ اد اﻟذﻴن ﻴﺘﻨﺎوﻟون ر ز ﺒﻔظﺎظﺔ ووﻀوح )ﻨرﻴد اﻨﻬﺎء اﻟﺤﻛم اﻟﻌﻠوي(. واﻟﻔرﻴق اﻟﺜﺎﻨﻲ ﻫم ﻛﻝ ﻤن ﻴﻘوﻝ ﻋﻠﻰ اﺴﺘﺤﻴﺎء أو ﺒﺈﻴﺠﺎز إﻨﻪ ﻴﺠب إﻨﻬﺎء اﺤﺘﻛﺎر اﻟﻤﻨﺎﺼب اﻟﻌﻠﻴﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺠﻴش و اﻷﻤن .. ﻋم اﻟﻛﺎﺘب أن أﺤدا ﻤن اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺴﻴﻴن أو اﻟﻤﺜﻘﻔﻴﻴن ﻟم ﻴﺠب ﻋﻠﻰﻴز اﻟﺴؤاﻝ :ﻤﺎ ﻫﻲ ﺨططﻛم ﺒﺎﻟﻀﺒط ﺘﺠﺎﻩ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن ﺒﻌد أن ﻨﺘﺨﻠﻰ ﻋن اﻟﺴﻠطﺔ ؟! ﺜم ﻴﺴرد اﻟﻌدﻴد ﻤن اﻷﺴﺌﻠﺔ ﻋن ﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻝ ﻤﺠﻤوﻋﺎت ﻤن اﻟﻤواطﻨﻴن اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻨﺤو اﻟﺘﺎﻟﻲ : ﻤﺎ ﻫﻲ ﺨططﻛم ﺘﺠﺎﻩ ﻋﺸ ات اﻷﻟوف ﻤن اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن اﻟﻌﺎﻤﻠﻴن ﻓﻲ ر اﻟﺠﻴش و ة اﻻﻤن؟ اﺠﻬز ي واﻟﻘوات اﻟﺨﺎﺼﺔ؟ ...ﻫﻝﻤﺎ ﻫﻲ ﺨططﻛم ﺘﺠﺎﻩ اﻟﺤرس اﻟﺠﻤﻬور ﺴﺘدﻓﻌون ﻟﻬم ﻤﻌﺎﺸﺎت ﺘﻘﺎﻋدﻴﺔ إذا ﻗررﺘم ﺤﻝ ﻗواﺘﻬم أم أﻨﻬم ﺴﻴطردون وﻴرﻤون ﻓﻲ اﻟﺸوارع –ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟطرﻴﻘﺔ اﻻﻤرﻴﻛﻴﺔ ؟! ﻫﻝ ﺘﻘدرون ﻤﺨﺎطر ﻤﺜﻝ ﻫذا اﻟﺘﺴرﻴﺢ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻻﻤن ؟! وﻤﺎﻫﻲ ﺨططﻛم ﺘﺠﺎﻩ ﻋﺸ ات اﻷﻟوف ﻤن اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن اﻟذﻴن ﻴﻌﻤﻠون ر ﻛﻤوظﻔﻴﻴن ﻓﻲ ﻛﺜﻴر ﻤن اﻟﻤؤﺴﺴﺎت ﻏﻴر اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻠﺔ -ﻴﻘﺼد اﻟوﻫﻤﻴﺔ – ﻫﻝ ﺴﺘﻐﻠﻘون ﻫذﻩ اﻟﻤؤﺴﺴﺎت؟ . ﻫﻝ ﺴﺘوﻗﻔون اﻟﻤﺸﺎرﻴﻊ اﻻﺼﻼﺤﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻨطﻘﺔ اﻟﺴﺎﺤﻠﻴﺔ ؟ ة اﻷ اﻀﻲ واﻋﺎدﺘﻬﺎ إﻟﻰ ﻤﻼﻛﻬﺎ ؟ ٕ ﻫﻝ ﺴﺘﻌﻛﺴون ﻗﺎﻨون ﻤﺼﺎدر ر ﻫﻝ ﺴﺘطﺎﻟﺒون ﺒﻤﺤﺎﻛﻤﺔ اﻟﻤﺴؤوﻟﻴن اﻷﻤﻨﻴﻴن ﻋﻠﻰ أﻋﻤﺎﻟﻬم ﺨﻼﻝ ٥٣ ﺴﻨﺔ اﻟﻤﺎﻀﻴﺔ ؟ وﻤﺎ ﻫﻲ اﻟرﺘب اﻟﺘﻲ ﺴﺘﻌﺘﺒروﻨﻬﺎ ﻤﺴؤوﻟﺔ ؟ ﻫﻝ ﺴﺘﺤﺎﻛﻤون اﻟﻨﺨﺒﺔ اﻟﺴﻨﻴﺔ أﻴﻀﺎ ﺒﻨﻔس اﻟﻤﻌﻴﺎر ؟! ﻴؤﻛد اﻟﻛﺎﺘب إن اﻻﺠﺎﺒﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻫذﻩ اﻷﺴﺌﻠﺔ ﻤطﻠوب وأن ﺘﺤﻴﻴد
- 6. اﻟﻘﻀﻴﺔ اﻟﻤذﻫﺒﻴﺔ واﻟﺴﻛوت ﻋﻨﻬﺎ ﻻ ﻴﺨدم اﻟﻘﻀﻴﺔ اﻟوطﻨﻴﺔ .. وأﻨﻪ إذا ﻛﺎن )اﻟﺴﻨﺔ ( ﻴرﻴدون ﺘﻐﻴﻴر اﻟﻨظﺎم ﻓﻌﻠﻴﻬم ﻤﻌﺎﻟﺠﺔ اﻟﻤﺴﺄﻟﺔ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﺔ أوﻻً ..وﺒﻐﻴر ذﻟك ﻟن ﻴﺘم اﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴر إﻻ ﺒطوﻓﺎن ﺸﻌﺒﻲ داﻫم وﻫو ﻤﺎ ﻴ اﻩ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴون ر ﺤﺘﻰ اﻵن اﻟﺨطر اﻟﺒﻌﻴد .. *** ***** *** ة ﺘﻔﻬم أﺒﻌﺎد اﻀطررﻨﺎ إﻟﻰ ﺘﻠﺨﻴص اﻟﻤﻘﺎﻝ ﻷﻫﻤﻴﺘﻪ ، وﻟﻀرور اﻟﺤوار وأﻓﺎﻗﻪ ﻓﻲ إطﺎر ﻤن اﻟﺼدق واﻟﺼ اﺤﺔ اﻟوطﻨﻴﻴن ، ﺤﻴث ﻻ ﺘﻨﻔﻊ ر ة واﻟﻤ اوﻏﺔ ، ﻛﻤﺎ ﻴﻘوﻝ اﻟﻛﺎﺘب . ﻨؤﻴد اﺒﺘداء أي اﻟﻛﺎﺘب أن ر ر اﻟﺸطﺎر ﻤﺸﺎرﻛﺔ اﻟﻤواطﻨﻴن اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن ﻓﻲ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴر ﺴﺘﺠﻌﻠﻬﺎ اﻛﺜر ﺴﻬوﻟﺔ وأﻛﺜر ﺴﻼﺴﺔ وأﻛﺜر أﻤﻨﺎً ﻟﻠﺠﻤﻴﻊ ؛ وﻟﻛﻨﻨﺎ ﻨؤﻛد ﻓﻲ اﻟوﻗت ﻨﻔﺴﻪ أن اﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴر ﻗﺎدم ﺒﺈذن اﷲ ﻷﻨﻪ ﺴﻨﺔ اﻟﺘﺎرﻴﺦ وﺴﻨﺔ اﻟﺤﻴﺎة .. وﻤﻠﺤوظﺘﻨﺎ اﻻﺒﺘداﺌﻴﺔ أن اﻟﻛﺎﺘب وﻀﻊ أﻫﻝ اﻟﺴﻨﺔ وﺤدﻫم )ﻋرﺒﺎ وأﻛ ادا( ﻓﻲ ﻤواﺠﻬﺔ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن!! ﻤﺘﻨﺎﺴﻴﺎً أن اﻟﻔﺌﺔ اﻟﺤﺎﻛﻤﺔ وﻀﻌت ر ي . ﻓﺎﻟﻛﺎﺘب ﻻاﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن ﻓﻲ ﻤواﺠﻬﺔ ﺠﻤﻴﻊ ﻤﻛوﻨﺎت اﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ اﻟﺴور ﻴﺴﺘطﻴﻊ أن ﻴﻨﻛر ﺤﺎﻟﺔ اﻻﺴﺘﻴﺎء اﻟﺘﻲ ﺘﺴود أﺒﻨﺎء اﻟﻤذاﻫب واﻟطواﺌف ة ﺠﻤﻴﻌﺎ ، ﻛﻤﺎ ﺘﺴود رﺠﺎﻝ اﻟﻔﻛر واﻟﺴﻴﺎﺴﺔ اﻟذﻴن ﻴﺼﻌب ﺤﺴﺒﺎﻨﻬم ﻤﺒﺎﺸر ﻋﻠﻰ ﺘﻴﺎر ﻤذﻫﺒﻲ أو طﺎﺌﻔﻲ .. ﺜم إن اﻟﺘﻘوﻴم اﻟﻌﺎم ﻟﻠﻨظﺎم اﻟﻘﺎﺌم ﻓﻲ ﺴورﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ أﻨﻪ ﺤﻛم أﻗﻠﻴﺔ ﻋﻠوﻴﺔ ﻻ ﻴﻌﺘﻤد ﻋﻠﻰ ﻤﻘﻴﺎس ﻤن ﻫو اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻔﻴد ﻤن اﻟﻨظﺎم!! ﻓﻨﺤن ﻨﻌﻠم أن اﻷﻗﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻔﻴدة ﻤن اﻟﻨظﺎم ﺘﺘوزع ﻋﻠﻰ ﺠﻤﻴﻊ اﻟطواﺌف وان ﺒﻨﺴب ٕ ﻤﺘﻔﺎوﺘﺔ ..اﻟﺼﺒﻐﺔ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﺔ ﺘﺴﺘﻨد ﻋﻠﻰ ﺤﻘﻴﻘﺔ ﻤن ﻫم اﻟﻘﺎﺌﻤون ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻨظﺎم ؟ ﻓﻨظرﻴﺔ اﺒن ﺨﻠدون ﻋن )اﻟﻌﺼﺒﻴﺔ( اﻟﺘﻲ ﺘﺤﻤﻲ اﻟﺴﻠطﺎن ﺘﺘﺠﻠﻰ ﻫﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻨظﺎم اﻷﻗﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﻌﻠوي ، اﻟذي ﻴﻘوم ﻋﻠﻰ دﻋم ﻨﺨﺒﺔﻓﻲ أوﻀﺢ ﺼور ﻤﻐﻠﻘﺔ ﻤن رﺠﺎﻝ اﻟﺠﻴش واﻷﻤن. وﻫو ﻤﺎ ﻻ ﻴﻨﺎزع ﻓﻴﻪ ﻛﺎﺘب اﻟﻤﻘﺎﻝ.
- 7. ﻤرﺘﻛ ات اﻟﺤﻛم ﻋﻠوﻴﺔ ﻤﺤﻀﺔ . دون أن ﻴﻌﻨﻲ ذﻟك أن ﺠﻤﻴﻊ أﺒﻨﺎء ز اﻟطﺎﺌﻔﺔ ﻤﺴﺘﻔﻴدون ، وان أﺤداً ﻤن ﻏﻴر أﺒﻨﺎء اﻟطﺎﺌﻔﺔ ﻻ ﻴﺴﺘﻔﻴد. ﻤن اﻟﻀروي ﺠداً أن ﻨﻤﻴز ﻓﻲ ﺘوﺼﻴف اﻟﻨظﺎم ﺒﻴن اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻔﻴدﻴن ﻤﻨﻪ واﻟﻘﺎﺌﻤﻴن ﻋﻠﻴﻪ . وﻨظن أن ﻗوﻝ اﻟﻛﺎﺘب ﻓﻲ إﺤدى ﻋﺒﺎ اﺘﻪ )ﻨﺘﺨﻠﻰ ﻋن اﻟﺤﻛم ( ر ﻏﻨﻴﺔ ﻋن أي ﺘﻌﻠﻴق . اﻟذي ﻴﺜﻴر اﻻﻫﺘﻤﺎم ﺒﺎﻟﻤﻘﺎﻝ اﻴﻀﺎ اﻋﺘ اﻓﻪ اﻟﺼرﻴﺢ ان اﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴر ر ي ﻤن اﻟداﺨﻝ ﻟن ﻴﻛون إﻻ ﺒﻤﺴﺎﻋدة اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن اﻨﻔﺴﻬم ، او ﺒﻘﻴﺎماﻟﺠذر اﻨﺘﻔﺎﻀﺔ ﺠﻤﺎﻫﻴرﻴﺔ ﻛﺎﺴﺤﺔ . وﻫﺎﺘﺎن اﻟﺤﻘﻴﻘﺘﺎن اﻟﻤﺘﻌﺎﻨﻘﺘﺎن ﺒﺤﺎﺠﺔ اﻟﻰ اﻟﻛﺜﻴر ﻤن اﻟﺘﺄﻤﻝ . ﺤﻘﻴﻘﺘﺎن ﺘﻤﺜﻼن رؤﻴﺔ ﺼﺎﺌﺒﺔ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺎ ، وﺘﻠﻘﻴﺎن ﻋﻠﻰ ﻋﺎﺘق اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن ﻤزﻴدا ﻤن اﻟﻤﺴؤوﻟﻴﺔ اﻟذاﺘﻴﺔ و اﻟوطﻨﻴﺔ. ان ﻟم ﺘﻛن اﻻوﻟﻰ ﻓﺴﺘﻛون اﻟﺜﺎﻨﻴﺔ، وﻤﺎذا ﺒﻌد اﻟﺜﺎﻨﻴﺔ؟! ﺜﻤن اﻟﻤﺸﺎرﻛﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴر يﺠﻤﻠﺔ اﻟﺘﺴﺎؤﻻت اﻟﺘﻲ طرﺤﻬﺎ اﻟﻛﺎﺘب ﺘﺸﻴر إﻟﻰ ﺤ اك ﻓﻛر ر ة ﺒﺨﻴر ﻤن ﻨﺎﺤﻴﺔ وﺴﻴﺎﺴﻲ ﻴﺘردد وﺴط اﻟطﺎﺌﻔﺔ . وﻫﻲ ﺘﺴﺎؤﻻت ﻤﺒﺸر ، ﻛﻤﺎ ﺘﺸﻴر إﻟﻰ ﻋﻘﻠﻴﺔ ﻤن ﻴرﻴد أن ﻴﺤﺘﻔظ ﺒﻘﺎﻨون ﻟﻼﻤﺘﻴﺎ ات ز اﻟﺨﺎﺼﺔ ﺼﻨﻌﻬﺎ ظرف ئ ﻓﻲ ﺘﺎرﻴﺦ اﻟوطن !! طﺎر ﺴﻨﻌود إﻟﻰ أﺼﻝ اﻟﻌﻨوان اﻟذي اﻗﺘرﺤﻨﺎﻩ ﻟﻤﻘﺎﻟﻨﺎ : ﻛﻴف ﻴﺼﻨﻊ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴون ﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻠﻬم اﻟوطﻨﻲ ؟! ﺴؤاﻝ ﻨطرﺤﻪ ﺒدورﻨﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن أﻨﻔﺴﻬم . وﻫم ﻓﻲ أﻴﻨﺎ اﻟطرف اﻷَوﻟﻰ و اﻷﻗدر ﻋﻠﻰ اﻹﺠﺎﺒﺔ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ .. ر ﻛﺎﺘب اﻟﻤﻘﺎﻝ وﻀﻊ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن ﺒﻴن ﺨﻴﺎرﻴن : ﻤﺸﺎرﻛﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺘﻐﻴﻴر ﺴﻠﻤﻲ ﻫﺎدئ و ﺴﻠس . أو اﻨﺘﻔﺎﻀﺔ ﺠﻤﺎﻫﻴرﻴﺔ ﻛﺎﺴﺤﺔ ﻴﻛون ﻟﻬﺎ ﻤﺎ ﺒﻌدﻫﺎ .. ﺼﺤﻴﺢ أن ءاً ﻤن اﻟﺠواب ﻤطﻠوب ﻤن اﻟﻘوى اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺴﻴﺔ ﺠز واﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻌﻴﺔ اﻟوطﻨﻴﺔ ؛ وﻟﻛن ء اﻷوﻓﻰ ﻤن اﻟﺠواب ﻤﻨﺘظر ﻤن اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن اﻟﺠز ة . . وﺴﺘﺒﻘﻰ اﻟﻔرﺼﺔ ﻤﺘﺎﺤﺔ ﻟﻠﻌﻠوﻴﻴن ﻤﺎ اﻟوا ﻴﻤﻠﻛون زﻤﺎم اﻟﻤﺒﺎدر ز ﻤؤﺸ ات ة دوﻟﻴﺔ و إﻗﻠﻴﻤﻴﺔ وﻤﺤﻠﻴﺔ ﺘؤﻛد أن اﻟﻔرﺼﺔ ﺒﺎﺘت ﻤﻬددة أو ر ﻛﺜﻴر
- 8. ﻤﻀﻴﻘﺔ . إذا أﻀﺎع اﻟﻌﻠوﻴون اﻟﻔرﺼﺔ ﻓﻼ أﺤد ي ﻛﻴف ﺴﻴﻛون ﻴدر اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻝ اﻟوطﻨﻲ ﺒﺸﻛﻝ ﻋﺎم ، وﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻝ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن ﺒﺸﻛﻝ ﺨﺎص . اﻟﻌﻠوﻴون ﺤﺴب ﻛﺎﺘب اﻟﻤﻘﺎﻝ ﻴﺘﺨوﻓون ﻤﻤﺎ ﺴﻴﺨﺴرون ، وﻟﻛن اﻵﺨرﻴن ﻻ ﻴﺠدون ﻤﺎ ﻴﺨﺴروﻨﻪ ، ﺒﻌد أن ﺠردﻫم اﻟﻨظﺎم اﻟﺤﺎﻛم ﻤن ﻛﻝ ﺸﻲء !! اﻟذي ﻨﺨﺎف ﻤﻨﻪ ﻛﻘوى وطﻨﻴﺔ ﻤﺴؤوﻟﺔ أن ﻴﻛون اﻟﺨﺎﺴر اﻷوﻝ ﻓﻲ ﻤﻌرﻛﺔ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻝ ﻫو ﺴورﻴﺔ ، أي أن ﻨﻛون ﺠﻤﻴﻌﺎً ﺨﺎﺴرﻴن !! وأن ﻴﻛون اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻔﻴد طرﻓﺎً ﺜﺎﻟﺜﺎً أو اﺒﻌﺎً ﻻ ي. ﻫذا أوﻝ ﻤﺎ ﻴﺤﺘم ﻋﻠﻴﻨﺎ أن ﻨﺘﺠرد ﻨدر ر ﻋن اﻟﺘﻔﻛﻴر ﻓﻲ ة )ﻨﺤن ( و)ﻫم( ﻓﻲ إطﺎر وطﻨﻲ . وﻫذا ﻤﺎ ﺘﺴﻌﻰ داﺌر اﻟﻘوى اﻟوطﻨﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﺴؤوﻟﺔ أﺠﻤﻊ إﻟﻴﻪ . وﻤن ﻫﻨﺎ ﻴﺄﺘﻲ اﻟﺠواب ﻋﻠﻰ ﺠﻤﻠﺔ اﻟﺘﺴﺎؤﻻت اﻟﺘﻲ طرﺤﻬﺎ ﻛﺎﺘب اﻟﻤﻘﺎﻝ ﻏﻴر ﻋﺎﺌم وﻻ ﻀﺒﺎﺒﻲ ، إﻨﻪ اﻟﺠواب اﻟوطﻨﻲ اﻟﻤﻌﺘﻤد ﻋﻨد اﻟﺠﻤﻴﻊ : اﻟﻤطﻠوب: وطن ﻟﺠﻤﻴﻊ أﺒﻨﺎﺌﻪ . وطن ﺘﻛون ﻓﻴﻪ اﻟﻤواطﻨﺔ اﺴﺎس اﻟﺤﻘوق واﻟواﺠﺒﺎت. ﻨظن أن ﻤن ﺤق اﻟﻤواطن )اﻟﻛردي( ﻤﻊ واﻓر اﻻﺤﺘ ام ، أن ر ﻴطﺎﻟب ﺒﺎﻟﻤﺴﺎوة اﻟﻤطﻠﻘﺔ ﺒﺎﻟﻤواطن اﻟﻌﻠوي ، دون أن ﻴﺘﻬﻤﻪ أﺤد ﺒﺎﻟﻔظﺎظﺔ ي ﻓﻲ ﻛﻝ ﻤﻔﺎﺼﻝ اﻟﺤﻴﺎة اﻟﻌﺎﻤﺔ ، وﻤﺎ!! وأن ﻴطﺎﻟب ﺒﺤﻘﻪ اﻟدﺴﺘور ة ى ﻴﻨﺒﻐﻲ أﻻ ﻴﻔﻛر ﻴﻨطﺒق ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻛردي ﻴﻨطﺒق ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺠﻤﻴﻊ. وﻤر أﺨر اﻟﻌﻠوﻴون ﺒﻘﺎﻨون /ﻟﻼﻤﺘﻴﺎ ات /ﺠدﻴد . ز اﻟﻤﻌﺎرﻀﺔ اﻻﺴﻼﻤﻴﺔ ﻤﺜﻼً اﻟﺘﻲ ﺘﺘﺤدث ﺒﺎﺴم ﺸرﻴﺤﺔ ﻤن اﻟﺤ اك ر اﻟوطﻨﻲ اﻻﺴﻼﻤﻲ ، واﻟﺘﻲ ﻤﺎرس رﺠﺎﻝ اﻟﺴﻠطﺔ ﺒﺤﻘﻬﺎ أﻗﺴﻰ اﻟﻤﺠﺎزر ، و ﻫﺎ دﻤوﻴﺔ وﺸﻤوﻟﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺘﺎرﻴﺦ ﺴورﻴﺔ اﻟﺤدﻴث ، ورﺒﻤﺎ اﻟﻘدﻴم أﻴﻀﺎً ؛أﻛﺜر ﻛﺎﻨت ﻤن اﻟﻤؤﺴﺴﻴن ﻟﻠﺘواﻓﻘﻴﺔ اﻟوطﻨﻴﺔ : ﺴورﻴﺔ ﻟﺠﻤﻴﻊ أﺒﻨﺎﺌﻬﺎ . واﻟﻤواطﻨﺔ ﻤﻨﺎط اﻟﺤﻘوق واﻟوﺠﺒﺎت ...وﻫﻲ اﺼدرت أﻛﺜر ﻤن ورﻗﺔ أﻋﻠﻨت ي ﻋﻠﻰﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﻤوﻗﻔﺎ ﻤﺘﻘدﻤﺎ ﻓﻲ رؤﻴﺔ اﻟﻬوﻴﺔ اﻟوطﻨﻴﺔ اﻟﺠﺎﻤﻌﺔ ﻟﻠﺸﻌب اﻟﺴور اﻟﺼﻌﻴدﻴن اﻻﺴﻼﻤﻲ واﻟﻘوﻤﻲ. ﻓﻌﻠﻰ اﻟﺼﻌﻴد اﻻوﻝ أﻛدت ﺒوﻀوح ان ﻤظﻠﺔ اﻻﺴﻼم ﺘظﻠﻝ ﺠﻤﻴﻊ اﻟﻤﻨﺘﻤﻴن إﻟﻴﻪ ﻤن اﺒﻨﺎء اﻟﻤذاﻫب ﺒﻤن ﻓﻴﻬم اﻟﻌﻠوﻴون اﻨﻔﺴﻬم . ﻓﺼﺎدرت ﺒذﻟك اﻟورﻗﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ طﺎﻟﻤﺎ ﻟﻌﺒت ﺒﻬﺎ اﻟﻤؤﺴﺴﺔ
- 9. اﻷﻤﻨﻴﺔ )ﻓﺘوى اﺒن ﺘﻴﻤﻴﺔ( ﻟﺘﺨوﻴف اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن ﻤن اﻟﺴﻛﻴن اﻟﺴﻨﻲ اﻟﻘﺎدم!! وﻟﻠﺤﻘﻴﻘﺔ اﻟﺘﺎرﻴﺨﻴﺔ أﻴﻀﺎ ﻓﺎن اﻟﻤﻌﺎرﻀﺔ اﻻﺴﻼﻤﻴﺔ ﻟم ﺘﻌﺘﻤد اﺒدا ﻫذﻩ اﻟﻔﺘوى ﻛﻤﻨﻬﺞ ﻟﻠﺘﻌﺎﻤﻝ ﻤﻊ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن أو ﻤﻊ ﻫم . ﻛﺎﻨت ورﻗﺔ ﻫذﻩ ﻏﻴر ة اﻷﻤﻨﻴﺔ ، ﻟﺒث اﻟﺨوف واﻟرﻴﺒﺔ ﺒﻴن اﻟﻤواطﻨﻴن ة ﻟﻸﺠﻬز اﻟﻔﺘوى ﻟﻌﺒﺔ ﻤﺎﻛر ،ﻛﻤﺎ ﻴﻘوﻝ اﻟﻛﺎﺘب ، وﺒﺎﻟﺘﺎﻟﻲ ﻟﺤﺸر أﺒﻨﺎء اﻟطﺎﺌﻔﺔ و اء اﻟﻨظﺎم وﺘﻔﺘﻴت ر اﻟوﺤدة اﻟوطﻨﻴﺔ ﻟﻤﺼﻠﺤﺘﻪ. ﻓﻲ ظﻝ اﻟﺤﻘﺎﺌق اﻟﺴﺎﺒﻘﺔ: ﺴورﻴﺔ ﻟﺠﻤﻴﻊ أﺒﻨﺎﺌﻬﺎ ، واﻟﻤواطﻨﺔ ﻤﻨﺎط اﻟﺤﻘوق واﻟواﺠﺒﺎت ، وﺴﻴﺎدة اﻟﻘﺎﻨون ﻻ ﻨظن ان ﻤن ﺤق اﺤد ان ﻴطﺎﻟب أن ﻴﻛون ﻓوق اﻟﻘﺎﻨون ، وﻻ ﺒﻤﻘدور اﺤد ان ﻴﻤﻨﺢ اﺤدا اﻤﺘﻴﺎز ﺒﻘﺎﻨون ا ﻋرﻓﻲ ﻤن ع ﺨﺎص.. دوﻟﺔ اﻟﺴواء اﻟوطﻨﻲ ﻫﻲ اﻟﺘﻲ ﻨدﻋو اﻟﺠﻤﻴﻊ اﻟﻴﻬﺎ ﻨو ، ﺒﻤن ﻓﻴﻬم اﻟﻌﻠوﻴون. وﺤﻴن ﻨﺘﺤدث ﻋن ﺴورﻴﺔ ﻟﺠﻤﻴﻊ أﺒﻨﺎﺌﻬﺎ ﻤن اﻟﺒدﻴﻬﻲ أن ﻨؤﻛد أن اﻟﺘﻔﻛﻴر ﻓﻲ ﻤواطن اﻟﻘﺎﻤﺸﻠﻲ أو دﻴ اﻟزور أو ر اﻟﺴوﻴداء ﻴﻨﺒﻐﻲ ان ﻴﻛون ﻋﻠﻰ ﻤﺴﺘوى اﻟﺘﻔﻛﻴر ﺒﺎﻟﻤواطن ﻓﻲ ﺤﻠب أو ﺤﻤﺎة أو دﻤﺸق أو طرطوس أو اﻟﻘرداﺤﺔ.. ﻓﻲ دوﻟﺔ اﻟﺴواء اﻟوطﻨﻲ ﻻ ﻤﻛﺎن ﻟﻤﻨطﻘﺔ ﺘﻬﻤﻝ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺤﺴﺎب ى. وﻻ ﺤق ﻟﻤواطن ان ﻴدﻋﻲ ﺤظﺎ أﺨر ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻬم اﻟوطﻨﻲ أوﻓر ﻤن اﺨﻴﻪ . إن اﻟﺤدﻴث ﻋن اﻟﺤﻛوﻤﺎت )اﻟﺴﻨﻴﺔ( اﻟﺴﺎﺒﻘﺔ أو اﻟﻤﺘﻌﺎﻗﺒﺔ ﻴﺨرج ﻋن اطﺎر اﻟوﺼف اﻟوطﻨﻲ اﻟطﺒﻴﻌﻲ. ان اﻟوطن اﻟذي ﻛﺎن ﻗد ﺨرج ﻟﺘوﻩ ﻤن ﻤرﺤﻠﺔ اﻻﺴﺘﻌﻤﺎر ، ﻫو اﻟذي ﻓﺘﺢ اﻟﺒﺎب واﺴﻌﺎ أﻤﺎم أﺒﻨﺎء اﻟطﺎﺌﻔﺔ ﻟﻴﻨﻀﻤوا اﻟﻰ اﻟﺠﻴش ﻓﻲ ظروف اﺠﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ ﻗﺎﺴﻴﺔ ، دون أن ﺘﺤﺴب ﺒدﻗﺔ اﻟﺤﺴﺎﺒﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ ﻗﺎدت اﻟوطن اﻟﻰ ﻫذﻩ اﻟﻤﺂﻻت اﻟﺼﻌﺒﺔ!! وﻻ ﻴﻤﻛن ان ﻴﻛون ﻓﻲ دوﻟﺔ اﻟﺴواء اﻟوطﻨﻲ ﻤﻛﺎن ﻟﺴﻴﺎﺴﺎت اﺴﺘﺌﺼﺎﻝ أو إﻗﺼﺎء أو ﺘﺠوﻴﻊ أو ﺘﻬدﻴد ﺒﺎﻟرزق أو ﺤرﻤﺎن ﻤن ﻓرﺼﺔ اﻟﻌﻤﻝ . وﻻ ﻴﻤﻛن ﻓﻲ دوﻟﺔ ﺴﻴﺎدة اﻟﻘﺎﻨون أن ﺘﺤﻤﻝ و ة وزر ى ، أﺨر ازر وﻋﻨدﻤﺎ ﻴﻛون اﻟﻘﺎﻨون ﻋﺎدﻻ ، واﻟﻘﺎﻀﻲ ﻨزﻴﻬﺎً ، واﻟﻤﺤﻛﻤﺔ دﺴﺘورﻴﺔ ﻓﻼ ً ﻴﺨﺎف ﻤن ﺘﺒﻌﺎت اﻟﻘﺎﻨون إﻻ اﻟﻤﺠرﻤون ..
- 10. إن اﻟﻘوى اﻟوطﻨﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺴورﻴﺔ ﻻ ﺘﻤﻠك )ﻤﻨدﻴﻝ أﻤﺎن( ﺘﻘدﻤﻪ ﻟﻠﻌﻠوﻴﻴن ؛ إن ﻟم ﻴﺴﻊ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴون أﻨﻔﺴﻬم إﻟﻰ إﺤﻼﻝ ﺸﻌﺎر أﻤن اﻟوطن ﻤﻛﺎن أﻤن اﻟﺴﻠطﺔ ، أﻤن اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻝ ﻤﻘﺎﺒﻝ ﻤﻛﺎﺴب اﻟﻠﺤظﺔ . ﻨﻘوﻝ ﻫذا ﺘﻘرﻴرً ﻻ ﺘﻬدﻴداً وﻻ ﺘﻠوﻴﺤﺎً ﺒﺘﻬدﻴد . ﻷن أﺤدا ﺒﺒﺴﺎطﺔ ﻻ ﻴﻤﺘﻠك ا اﻟﺴﺎﺤﺔ ﻟﺤظﺔ اﻨطﻼق )اﻨﺘﻔﺎﻀﺔ ﺠﻤﺎﻫﻴرﻴﺔ ﻛﺎﺴﺤﺔ( ﺤﺴب ﺘﻌﺒﻴر ﻛﺎﺘب اﻟﻤﻘﺎﻝ ﻨﻔﺴﻪ . ﺒﺎﺨﺘﺼﺎر ﺸدﻴد ﻴﻤﻛن اﻟﻘوﻝ ﻤﻊ ﻛﺎﺘب اﻟﻤﻘﺎﻝ ، إن ﻛﺜﻴر ﻤن أو اق ر ا اﻟﺨﻼص أو اﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴر ﻫﻲ ﻓﻲ أﻴدي اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن ، وﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن أن ﻴوازﻨوا ﺒﻴن اﻻﻨﺴﺤﺎب اﻟﻛﻴﻔﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻠﺤظﺔ اﻟداﻫﻤﺔ ﺘﺤت ﺴﻠطﺎن اﻟﻔوﻀﻰ ، وﺒﻴن ع وطﻨﻲاﻻﻨﺴﺤﺎب اﻵﻤن اﻟﻤﻨظم ﻓﻲ ظﻝ ﺤﺴﺎﺒﺎت دﻗﻴﻘﺔ وﻀﻤن ﻤﺸرو ﻋﺎم ﻴﺒﺴط اﻟﺠﻤﻴﻊ أﻴدﻴﻬم إﻟﻴﻪ!! ﻛﻠﻤﺔ اﻻﻨﺴﺤﺎب ﻫﻨﺎ ﻻ ﺘﻌﻨﻲ اﻨﺴﺤﺎﺒﺎً ﻤن اﻟﺠﻔ اﻓﻴﺎ أواﻨﺴﺤﺎﺒﺎً ﻤن ر اﻟﺤﻴﺎة اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺴﻴﺔ أو اﻻﺠﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ ﻓﻬذا ع ﻤن اﻻﻨﺴﺤﺎب ﻏﻴر وارد ﻓﻲ اﻟﻨو ع اﻟوطﻨﻲ ، واﻨﻤﺎ اﻟﻤﻘﺼود اﻻﻨﺴﺤﺎب اوﻻً ﻤن ٕ اذﻫﺎن اﺼﺤﺎب اﻟﻤﺸرو ﺒﻨﻴﺔ اﻟﺴﻠطﺔ واﻟﻛف ﻋن ﻤﻤﺎرﺴﺔ ﺴﻴﺎﺴﺎت اﻟﺘﺴﻠط واﻟﻔﺴﺎد واﻻﺒﺘ از. ز ة اﻟﺸرﻴﺤﺔ اﻟﻤﻨﻐﻤﺴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻟﻌﺒﺔ اﻟﻨظﺎم اﻟﺤﺎطﺒﺔ ﺒﺎﻟطﺒﻊ ﺴﺘﻌﻨﻲ ﻫذﻩ اﻟﻌﺒﺎر ﻓﻲ ﺤﺒﺎﻟﻪ ﻓﻘط . واﻻﻨﺴﺤﺎب ﺜﺎﻨﻴﺎ ﻤن ﺨﻨدق اﻟﺴﻠطﺔ ، واﻟﻛف ﻋن دﻋﻤﻬﺎ ، واﻟﺘﻐطﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺠر ﻫﺎ ، واﻟﺨروج ﻤن ﻟﻴﻝ اﻟﺼﻤت ﻋﻠﻰ ﺴﻴﺎﺴﺎت اﻟﻌﺴف اﺌر ع اﻟوطﻨﻲ وﺘﺤﻤﻝ ﺘﺒﻌﺎﺘﻪواﻟظﻠم واﻟﻔﺴﺎد . اﻨﺴﺤﺎب ﺒﺎﻟﺘﻘدم إﻟﻰ اﻟﻤﺸرو ﺒﺈﺨﻼص وﺼدق ، واﻟوﻗوف ﻓﻲ ﺨﻨدق اﻟﻨﻀﺎﻝ اﻟوطﻨﻲ إﻟﻰ ﺠﺎﻨب ﻋﺎرف ﻩ ﻤن اﻟﻛﺜﻴرﻴن اﻟذﻴن ﻨظروا إﻟﻰ أﻨﻔﺴﻬم ﻋﻠﻰ أﻨﻬم ﻤواطﻨون دﻟﻴﻠﺔ وﻏﻴر ﺴورﻴون ﻗﺒﻝ أن ﻴﻛون ﻟﻬم أي اﻨﺘﻤﺎء آﺨر .. وﺒﺎﻟطﺒﻊ ﺴﺘﺠد اﻟﺸ اﺌﺢ اﻟﻤﺴﺤوﻗﺔ ﻤن أﺒﻨﺎء اﻟطﺎﺌﻔﺔ ﺨﻼﺼﻬﺎ ر ي ﺒﺄﺒﻌﺎدﻩ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺴﻴﺔ واﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻴﺔع اﻟوطﻨﻲ اﻟﺘﺤرراﻟﺤﻘﻴﻘﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺸرو واﻻﺠﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ .
- 11. ي أن آﻝ اﻻﺴدﺘدرك اﻟﻘوى اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺴﻴﺔ ﻛﻤﺎ ﻴدرك اﻟﻤﺜﻘف اﻟﺴور ﺤﻛﻤوا وﻴﺤﻛﻤون ﺒﺄﺴم اﻟطﺎﺌﻔﺔ زورُ ، وﻴدرك ﺠﻤﻴﻊ ﻫؤﻻء أن اﻤﺘﻴﺎ ات ز ا اﻟﺤﻛم ﻟم ﺘﻨﻝ ﻛﻝ اﺒﻨﺎء اﻟطﺎﺌﻔﺔ ، وﻻ أﺤد ﻴﻨﺴﻰ أن ﻤﺤﻤد ﻋﻤ ان ﻤﺎت ر ﻤﻘﺘوﻻً ﺒﺘرﺘﻴب طﺎﺌﻔﻲ ، وأن ﺼﻼح ﺠدﻴد ﻤﺎت ﻓﻲ ﺴﺠن ﺤﺎﻓظ ، وأن إﺒ اﻫﻴم ﻤﺎﺨوس ﻤﺎ اﻝ ﻓﻲ ﻤﻨﻔﺎﻩ ،وأن ﻤﻨﻴر اﻻﺤﻤد ﻗﺘﻝ ﺘﺤت اﻟﺘﻌذﻴب ، ز ر ﻫم ﻛﺜﻴرﻴن ﻛﺎﻨوا اﻗطﺎﺒﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻌﺎرﻀﺔ اﻟوطﻨﻴﺔ ،وان ﺴﻠﻴﻤﺎن اﻻﺤﻤد وﻏﻴر ة )آﻝ اﻻﺴد( ﻟم ﺘﻌد دﻗﻴﻘﺔ ﺒﻌد اﻨﺸﻘﺎق رﻓﻌت وﻫم ﻋﻠﻰ ﻋﻠم أﻴﻀﺎً أن ﻋﺒﺎر وﺒﻨﻴﻪ ؛ وﻟﻛن ﻤن اﻟﺼﻌب ﻨﻘﻝ ﻫذا اﻻد اك إﻟﻰ رﺠﻝ اﻟﺸﺎرع اﻟﻌﺎدي ﻓﻲ ر ﺴﺎﻋﺔ اﻻﻨﺘﻔﺎﻀﺔ اﻟﺠﻤﺎﻫﻴرﻴﺔ اﻟﻛﺎﺴﺤﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ اﺸﺎر إﻟﻴﻬﺎ ﻛﺎﺘب اﻟﻤﻘﺎﻝ . وﻫذا ﻴﺨﻴﻔﻨﺎ ﻛﻘوى وطﻨﻴﺔ ﻤﺴؤوﻟﺔ وﻴﻔرض ﻋﻠﻴﻨﺎ أن ﻨﺤذر ﻤﻨﻪ . ﻤﻌﺎﻨﺎة اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن ﻓﻲ ﻤﻨﺎطﻘﻬم ﻤﺤﺴوﺴﺔ ﻟﻠﻨﺨﺒﺔ اﻟوطﻨﻴﺔ ﻓﻘط . ي ﻋﺎﻤﺔ ﻴﻌﺘﺒر ﻛﻝ ﻋﻠوي ﺸرﻴﻛﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻠطﺔ !! وﻴﻀﻌﻪاﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ اﻟﺴور ﻤوﻀﻊ اﻟرﻴﺒﺔ واﻟﺸك . اﻟﻌﻠوﻴون أﻨﻔﺴﻬم ﻫم اﻻﻗدر ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺨروج ﻤن ﻫم ﻓﻴﻪ اﻟﻨظﺎم .إن اﺸﺘ اك اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن ﻤﺜﻘﻔﻴن وﺴﻴﺎﺴﻴﻴن ر اﻟﺨﻨدق اﻟذي ﺤﺸر ع اﻟﺨﻼص اﻟوطﻨﻲ ، وﻓﻲ ﺘﺸﺨﻴص ﻤواطن اﻟﺨﻠﻝ ،ﻓﻲ ﺼﻴﺎﻏﺔ ﻤﺸرو ة ﻟﺤﻝ اﻻزﻤﺔ ، وﻓﻲ اﻗﺘ اح اﻟﺤﻠوﻝ ﻟﻠﻤﺸﻛﻼت ؛ ﻫو اﺤد اﻟﻤﺨﺎرج اﻟﻤﻨﺘظر ر أو ﻟﺘوﻗﻲ ﻨﺘﺎﺌﺠﻬﺎ. اﻟﺘﺸﺨﻴص اﻟﺼﺎﻤت ﻻ ﻴﺠدي .واﻟﻛﺘﺎﺒﺔ ﺒﺎﻟﻠﻐﺔ اﻻﻨﻛﻠﻴزﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻤواﻗﻊ اﻻﺠﻨﺒﻴﺔ ﻻ ﺘﺄﺘﻲ ﺒﺤﻝ . واﻻﻨﺘظﺎر ﻻ ﻴﻌﻨﻲ ﻏﻴر ﺘﻀﻴﻴق أﻛﺜر ﻟﻠﻔرﺼﺔ .. ﻩ أي ﻓرﻴق وطﻨﻲ ، ﻷﻨﻪ واﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻝ اﻻﻤن ﻻ ﻴﻛون ﺒوﻋد ﻴﺼدر ﺒواﻗﻌﻴﺔ وﺼدق ﻻ ﻴﻤﻠك أﺤد أن ﻴﺼدر ﻤﺜﻝ ﻫذا اﻟوﻋد . اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻝ اﻷﻤن ﻤﻤﻛن واﻟطرﻴق إﻟﻴﻪ ﻤﻴﺴور وﻫو ﺒﻴد اﻟطﺎﺌﻔﺔ ﻨﻔﺴﻬﺎ ..إﻨﻪ ﻓﻲ اﻻﻨﺨ اط ر ع اﻟوطﻨﻲ ، واﻟﺘﻀﺤﻴﺔ ﻤﻊ اﻵﺨرﻴن ، وﻋزﻝ اﻟﻨظﺎم )اﻟﻔرد(ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺸرو و)اﻟﻔﺌﺔ( ؛ ﻫذا ﻫو اﻟطرﻴق إﻟﻰ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻝ اﻷﻤن .. ﻴﻤﺘﻠك اﻟﻌﻠوﻴون اﻟﻴوم ﻋدة ﺨﻴﺎ ات ، ﺴﻴﻛون أﺴوءﻫﺎ أن ﻴﻘرروا ر اﻻﻨﺘظﺎر ، وﻛﺄن اﻻﻤر ﻻ ﻴﻌﻨﻴﻬم . ﺒﺸﺎر اﻻﺴد اﻟﻴوم ﻴﻠﻌب ﻋﻠﻰ وﺠودﻫم
- 12. وﻋﻠﻰ ﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻠﻬم . ﻓﻬﻝ ﻴﺘرﻛوﻨﻪ ﻴﻠﻌب ﺒورﻗﺘﻬم ﻛﻤﺎ ﻴﺸﺎء ، وأن ﻴﻐﺎﻤر ﺒﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻠﻬم وﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻝ أوﻻدﻫم وﻤن ﺒﺎب أوﻟﻰ ﺒﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻝ وطﻨﻬم ﺴورﻴﺔ ﻛﻤﺎ ﻴرﻴد؟! ع اﻟوطﻨﻲ ، وﻴﺼر ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻤﻀﻲ ﻓﻲﺒﺸﺎر اﻻﺴد ﻴرﻓض اﻟﻤﺸرو ﺴﻴﺎﺴﺔ اﻻﺴﺘﺒداد واﻟﻔﺴﺎد ﻟزﻴﺎدة ﻋواﻤﻝ اﻻﺤﺘﻘﺎن . ﺒﺸﺎر اﻻﺴد ﻴرﻓض اﻟﻤﺼﺎﻟﺤﺔ اﻟوطﻨﻴﺔ ﺒدﻋوى أﻨﻪ ﻟﻴس ﻫﻨﺎك ﺠرح وطﻨﻲ !! ﻤﺎﺌﺔ أﻟف ة اﻟوطﻨﻴﺔ ﻤن ﻗﺘﻠﻰ وﻤﻔﻘودﻴن وﻤﻬﺠرﻴن .اﻟﻰ إﻨﺴﺎن ﻫم ﺤﺼﻴﻠﺔ اﻟﻤﺠزر ﺠﺎﻨب ﻤﻤﺎرﺴﺎت ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﺠون ﻴﻨدى ﻟﻬﺎ اﻟﺠﺒﻴن . ﺒﺸﺎر اﻻﺴد ﻴﺼر ﻋﻠﻰ أﻨﻪ ﻟﻴس ﻫﻨﺎك ﺠرح وطﻨﻲ . ﺴﻴﻛون ﻤﺨطﺌﺎً ﻤن ﻴﺼدﻗﻪ ، أو ﻤن ﻴﺼدق أن ﻫذﻩ اﻟدﻤﺎء ﻫﺎﻨت ﻋﻠﻰ أﻫﻠﻬﺎ .. اﻟﻤﺼﺎﻟﺤﺔ اﻟوطﻨﻴﺔ ﻤﺨرج ، وﻫﻲ ﻤﻤﻛﻨﺔ ﻤﺎ داﻤت إ ادة اﻟﺨﻴر ﻗﺎﺌﻤﺔ ر ة ة ﻤن اﺒﻨﺎء اﻟوطن . اﻟﻤﺼﺎﻟﺤﺔ اﻟوطﻨﻴﺔ ﻤﺒﺎدر ة اﻟﻛﺎﺜر ﻓﻲ ﻨﻔوس اﻟﻛﺜر ﻫﺎ اﻟﻌﻘﻼء ﻤن أﺒﻨﺎء اﻟطﺎﺌﻔﺔ ﻟﻤﺼﻠﺤﺘﻬم ، ﻻﻤﺘﺼﺎص ﻋواﻤﻝ اﻟﺜﺄرﻴﺒﺎﺸر واﻟﻨﻘﻤﺔ واﻟﻐﻀب .. ة ى ﻻ ﻨﻘوﻝ ﻫذا ﺘﻬدﻴداً ، واﻨﻤﺎ اﺴﺘﺠﺎﺒﺔ ﻏﺒﺔ ﻟر ﻤر أﺨر ة. ﻛﺎﺘب اﻟﻤﻘﺎﻝ ﺒﺄﻻ ﺘﺤﻴد اﻟﻘﻀﺎﻴﺎ اﻟﺨطﻴر ﻓﻲ ظﻝ اﻟﻤﺼﺎﻟﺤﺔ اﻟوطﻨﻴﺔ ﻻ ﺒد أن ﻴﺘﺤﻤﻝ اﻟﻤﺴؤوﻟون اﻷوﻟون ﻤﺴؤوﻟﻴﺎت ﺠر ﻫم أو ﺠ اﺌﻤﻬم، ة ى ﻓﻲ ظﻝ ﺴﻴﺎدة اﻟﻘﺎﻨون واﻤﺎم وﻤر أﺨر ر اﺌر ي ﻋﺎدﻝ ...ﻗﺎض ﻨزﻴﻪ وﻗﻀﺎء دﺴﺘور اﻟﻐﻔ ان اﻟوطﻨﻲ ﻻ ﻴﻤﻠﻛﻪ ﻓرد أو ﻴﻤﻨﺤﻪ ﺤزب أو ﺠﻤﺎﻋﺔ ، اﻟﻐﻔ ان ر ر اﻟوطﻨﻲ ﺤﺎﻟﺔ ﻴﻤﻛن ﻟﻠطﺎﺌﻔﺔ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﺔ أن ﺘﺼﻨﻌﻬﺎ ﺒﺎﻟﺴﻌﻲ إﻟﻰ اﻴﺠﺎد اﻟظروف اﻟﻤﻨﺎﺴﺒﺔ ﻟﻬذا اﻟﻐﻔ ان وأوﻝ ﻫذﻩ اﻟظروف اﻟﺘوﻗف ﻋن ﺘﻐذﻴﺔ ر اﻻﺤﺘﻘﺎن . ﻛﻝ ﺒداﻴﺔ ﺴﻴﺎﺴﻴﺔ ﻴﻨﺒﻐﻲ أن ﻴﻛون ﻟﻬﺎ ظﻠﻬﺎ اﻻﺠﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ، واﻟﻘﺒوﻝ ﺒﺎﻻﺤﺘﻛﺎم إﻟﻰ اﻟﻘﺎﻨون ﺨﻴر ﻤن اﻻﺤﺘﻛﺎم إﻟﻰ اﻟﻔوﻀﻰ !! ورﺒﻤﺎ ﻴﻘوﻝ ﻗﺎﺌﻝ: إن اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن إذا ﻟم ﻴﺘﻠﻘوا ﺘطﻤﻴﻨﺎت ﺘﺤﺎﻓظ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻤﺘﻴﺎ اﺘﻬم وﻤواﻗﻌﻬم ز وﺘﻐطﻲ اﻟﺠ اﺌم اﻟﺘﻲ ارﺘﻛﺒت ﺒﺎﺴﻤﻬم وﺒﺄﻴدي ﺒﻌﻀﻬم ، ﻓﻠن ﻴﺸﺎرﻛوا ﻓﻲ ر
- 13. اﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴر ، وﺴﺘﻛون ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴر أﺼﻌب. وﻫذا ﻛﻠﻪ ﺼﺤﻴﺢ ، وﻟﻛﻨﻪ ﻴﻌﻨﻲ أﻴﻀﺎً أن اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن ﻗد ﻗرروا أن ﻴذﻫﺒوا ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻌرﻛﺔ ، اﻟﺘﻲ ﻓرﻀﻬﺎ آﻝ اﻻﺴد ﻋﻠﻴﻬم او ﺒﺎﺴﻤﻬم إﻟﻰ ﻨﻬﺎﻴﺘﻬﺎ ، وﻫو ﺨﻴﺎر ﻨﺤذر ﻤﻨﻪ دون ﺘﻬدﻴد ، ﻤﻌرﻛﺔ ﺴﺘﻛون ﺒﻴن اﻟطﺎﺌﻔﺔ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﺔ وﺒﻴن اﻨﺘﻔﺎﻀﺔ ﺸﻌﺒﻴﺔ ﻛﺎﺴﺤﺔ ﺘﺸﺘرك ي ﺒﻼ اﺴﺘﺜﻨﺎء !!ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﻛﻝ ﻤﻛوﻨﺎت اﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ اﻟﺴور وﻋﻠﻰ اﻟطرف اﻵﺨر ﻤن اﻟﻤﻌﺎدﻟﺔ اﻟﻴوم ﻗوى وطﻨﻴﺔ ﻤدرﻛﺔ وﻤﺴؤوﻟﺔ أﺴﻘطت ﻛﻝ ﻤرﺘﻛ ات اﻟﺘﻔﻛﻴر اﻟطﺎﺌﻔﻲ واﻟﻔﺌوي وﻫﻲ ﺘﻨﺎدي ز ﺒﺴورﻴﺔ ﻟﺠﻤﻴﻊ اﺒﻨﺎﺌﻬﺎ ﺒدون اﺴﺘﺜﻨﺎء ﻓﻬﻝ ﻴﺴﻤﻊ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴون اﻟﻨداء؟ ﻫﻝ ﻴﻘﺒﻠون ﺒﺤﻘوق اﻟﻤواطﻨﺔ ﻓﻲ دوﻟﺔ اﻟﺴواء اﻟوطﻨﻲ وﻓﻲ ظﻝ ﺴﻴﺎدة اﻟﻘﺎﻨون ، وﻓﻲ ظﻝ ﺘﻠك اﻟدوﻟﺔ وﻫذا اﻟﻘﺎﻨون ﻻ ﻴﺨﺎف إﻻ اﻟﻤﺠرﻤون . ---------------- *ﻤدﻴر ﻤرﻛز اﻟﺸرق اﻟﻌرﺒﻲ ﻟﻼﺘﺼﺎﻝ ﺒﻤدﻴر اﻟﻤرﻛز ٦٢٨٢٣٢٢٩٧٧٤٤٠٠ zuhair@asharqalarabi.org.uk ٠٣/٠١/٦٠٠٢ ﻤﺎذا ﻴﻌد اﻟﺴﻨﺔ ﻟﻠﻌﻠوﻴﻴن إﺜر ﺘﻐﻴﻴر اﻟﻨظﺎم اﺴﺘﻠﻤت ﻫذا اﻟﻤﻘﺎﻝ ﻋﺒر ﺼدﻴق ﻗدﻴم أرﺴﻠﻪ إﻟﻰ ﻤوﻗﻊ "ﺘﻌﻠﻴﻘﺎت ﺴورﻴﺔ" ﺒﻌﻨوان: ﻤﺄزق اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن اﻟﺴورﻴﻴن. ﻴﺘﻤﻴز اﻟﻤﻘﺎﻝ ﺒﻤدﺨﻠﻪ اﻟﻨزﻴﻪ واﻟﻤﺒﺎﺸر ﻟﻠﻤﺸﻛﻠﺔ اﻟطﺎﺌﻔﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﻠﺤﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺴورﻴﺔ. ﻛﺘب ﻗﺎﺌﻼً : ي ﺠﺸواﻋزﻴز اﻟﻤﻘﺎﻝ اﻟذي ﺒﻴن أﻴدﻴﻛم ﻤﻛﺘوب ﺒﻠﻐﺔ اﻨﺠﻠﻴزﻴﺔ رﻛﻴﻛﺔ ﻤﺤﺸوة
- 14. ﺒﺎﻷﺨطﺎء اﻟﻨﺤوﻴﺔ، ﻟﻛﻨﻨﻲ ﻏب إﻟﻴﻛم أن ﺘﻨﺸروﻫﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻤوﻗﻌﻛم ﺘﺤت اﺴم أر ﻤﺴﺘﻌﺎر، ﻤﺜﻝ " ي ﻤن اﻟﺸرق اﻷﻗﺼﻰ" أو "ﺨﻀر" أو أي اﺴم آﺨر ﺴور ﺘروﻨﻪ ﻤﻨﺎﺴﺒﺎً ﻛﺜﻴر ﻤن اﻟﻨﺎس ﻴﺘﺼﻔﺤون ﻤوﻗﻌﻛم وﻴﻌﻠﻘون ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻓﻲ ﻤواﻗﻌﻬم، ة ﻟﻘ اءﺘﻪ. وﺴﻴﻨﺎﻗﺸﻪ اﻟﻛﺜﻴر ﻤن اﻟﻤﺜﻘﻔﻴن ﻤﻤﺎ ﺴﻴﺴﻤﺢ ﺒﻔرﺼﺔ ﻛﺒﻴر ر اﻟﺴورﻴﻴن اﻟﻤﻐﺘرﺒﻴن ﻓﻲ ﻤواﻗﻌﻬم ، ﻋﻠﻰ اﻷﻗﻝ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻨﺘدﻴﺎت اﻹﻨﺠﻠﻴزﻴﺔ. ع ﻓﻲ ﻏﺎﻴﺔ اﻟﺤﺴﺎﺴﻴﺔ ﻋﻨدﻤﺎ ﻴطرح ﺒﺎﻟﻠﻐﺔﻴﺼﻨف وﻴﺘﻌﺎﻤﻝ ﻤﻊ اﻟﻤوﻀو اﻟﻌرﺒﻴﺔ ﻤﻊ اﻷﺴف! ع ﺒﺒﺴﺎطﺔ: ﻤﺎ ﻫﻲ ﺨﻴﺎ ات اﻟﺴﻨﺔ ﺘﺠﺎﻩ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن ﻓﻲ أﻋﻘﺎب ر اﻟﻤوﻀو ﺘﻐﻴﻴر اﻟﻨظﺎم؟ وأطرح ﻫذا اﻟﺴؤاﻝ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻀوء اﻟﻨﻘﺎش اﻟﻌﺎم اﻟذي ي ﺤﺎﻟﻴﺎً ﻋن ﻴﺠر ﺘوﻗﻌﺎت اﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴر ﻓﻲ ﺴورﻴﺔ. ﻓﻔﻲ اﻟوﻗت اﻟذي ﻴؤﻛد اﻟﺠﻤﻴﻊ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟوﺤدة اﻟوطﻨﻴﺔ، ﻴظن اﻟﻛﺜﻴر أن اﻟﺤدﻴث ﻋن اﻟطواﺌف اﻟدﻴﻨﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺴورﻴﺔ ﻴﺠب أن ﻴﺤﻴد أو ﻴوﻀﻊ ﺠﺎﻨﺒﺎً، واﻻ ﻓﺈﻨﻪ ﻴﺘﻬم ﺒﺄﻨﻪ ﺼﺎدر ﻋن ﻋﻠوي رﺠﻌﻲ ﻤﺘﻌﺼب. ﻟﺴت ﻤﺘﺸدداً إﻻ أﻨﻨﻲ ٕ ﻤﺘﻌﺼب ﻷﻤﻝ –أﻋﻠم أﻨﻪ ﻟن ﻴﺘﺤﻘق- ﻓﻲ ﺘﻛوﻴن وطﻨﻴﺔ ﺴورﻴﺔ ﻗوﻴﺔ وﻤﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﺸﺄﻨﻬﺎ ﺸﺄن اﻟوطﻨﻴﺔ اﻟﻴﺎﺒﺎﻨﻴﺔ أو اﻟﻛورﻴﺔ. ي ﻤﻬﻨدﺴﺎً، أﺠد ﻤن اﻟﻌﺒث أن ﻴﻌﺘﻘد اﻟﺴورﻴون أﻨﻬموﺒﺎﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﻗﺎدرون ﻋﻠﻰ ﺤﻝ ﻤﺸﻛﻠﺔ دون اﻟﻠﺠوء إﻟﻰ ﺘﺤﻠﻴﻠﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻘﺎم اﻷوﻝ، واﻟﺘﻌﺎﻤﻝ ﻤﻌﻬﺎ ﻤن اﻟﺒداﻴﺔ. ------- ﻤﺎذا ﻴﻌد اﻟﺴﻨﺔ ﻟﻠﻌﻠوﻴﻴن إﺜر ﺘﻐﻴﻴر اﻟﻨظﺎم ﺒﻘﻠم ﺨﻀر ﻤوﻗﻊ ﺴﻴرﻴﺎ ﻛوﻤﻨت / ٠٣ آب ٦٠٠٢
- 15. “What do Sunnis intend for Alawis following Regime change?” by Khudr ي ﻓﻲ أﺤد اﻟﻤواﻗﻊ ﻴدﻋو ﻓﻴﻪ ﻟﻠﻘﻴﺎمﻗ أت ﻤﻘﺎﻻً ﻟﻤﻌﺎرض ﺴور ر ي ﻋﻠﻰ طرﻴﻘﺔ اﻟﺠﻨ اﻝ ر ي ﺴوري ﻴﻘوم ﺒﻪ ﺠﻨ اﻝ ﻋﺴﻛر ر ﺒﺎﻨﻘﻼب ﻋﺴﻛر ﻤﺸرف. وﻛﺎن ذﻟك إﻋﺎدة ﺼﻴﺎﻏﺔ ﻟﻤﻘﺎﻝ ﺴﺎﺒق ﻛﺘﺒﻪ "وﻟﻛر ﺒﻴرﺜس" ﻤدﻴر اﻟﻤﻌﻬد اﻷﻟﻤﺎﻨﻲ ﻟﻠﺸؤون اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻤﻴﺔ واﻷﻤﻨﻴﺔ. ﻛﺘب اﻟﻤﻘﺎﻝ ﻓﻲ ﺨرﻴف ﻋﺎم ٥٠٠٢ ﻋﻨدﻤﺎ ﻛﺎن اﻟﻐرب ﻴﻔﻛر ﻋﻴم ﺠدﻴد ﻟﺴورﻴﺔ. وﻛﺎن اﻻﻓﺘ اض أن ر ﺒز ﻫذا )اﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴر( ﺴﻴﺤرك اﻷوﻀﺎع اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺴﻴﺔ واﻻﺠﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ واﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻴﺔ اﻟ اﻛدة ر ﻓﻲ ﺴورﻴﺔ ﻗدﻤﺎً ﻓﻲ اﻻﺘﺠﺎﻩ اﻟﺼﺤﻴﺢ. وﻤﻊ أن اﻟﻛﺎﺘب ﻛﺎن اﺴﺘﻔ ازﻴﺎ ز ة ﻤﺘﻌﻤدة ﻟﻛﻨﻪ أﺜﺎر ﺴؤاﻻً ﻓﻲ ﻏﺎﻴﺔ اﻷﻫﻤﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺒﻠد وﺼﻝ ﻛﻝ ﺒﺼور ي.ﺒﺎﺴﺘﺜﻨﺎء رﺌﻴﺴﻴن.رؤوﺴﺎﺌﻪ إﻟﻰ ﺴدة اﻟﺴﻠطﺔ ﻋﺒر اﻨﻘﻼب ﻋﺴﻛر ة ﻋﻔوﻴﺔ ﺴؤاﻻً أﻛﺜر ﺒﺎﻹﻀﺎﻓﺔ إﻟﻰ ﻤﺎ ﺴﺒق طرح اﻟﻤﻘﺎﻝ ﺒﺼور ي اﻟذيأﻫﻤﻴﺔ ﺤوﻝ وﻀﻊ اﻟطﺎﺌﻔﺔ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﺔ وﺘﻐﻴﻴر اﻟﻨظﺎم. ﻓﺎﻟﻘﺎﺌد اﻟﻌﺴﻛر ﺴﻴﺴﺘوﻟﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺴﻠطﺔ ﺴﻴﻛون ﻋﻠوﻴﺎً ﻷن اﻟﻀﺒﺎط ﻏﻴر اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن )اﻟﺴﻨﺔ واﻟدروزﺒﺸﻛﻝ رﺌﻴﺴﻲ( ﻟن ﻴﻛون ﻟﻬم ﻨﻔوذ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻷﻛﺜرﻴﺔ ﻤن اﻟﺠﻨود وﻀﺒﺎط اﻟﺼف واﻟﻀﺒﺎط اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن ﻀد ﻨظﺎم ﻋﻠوي ﻤﺘﺤﻛم ﺒﺎﻟﺴﻠطﺔ. ﻗﻠﺔ ﻗﻠﻴﻠﺔ ﻤن اﻟﻨﺎس ﻤن ﺘﺠﺎدﻝ ﺒﺈﻤﻛﺎﻨﻴﺔ ﺘﺤﻘﻴق ﺘﻐﻴﻴر ي ﻤن ﺠذر اﻟداﺨﻝ ﺒدون ﻤﺴﺎﻋدة اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن أﻨﻔﺴﻬم، ﺒﺎﺴﺘﺜﻨﺎء ﻗﻴﺎم اﻨﺘﻔﺎﻀﺔ ﺠﻤﺎﻫﻴرﻴﺔ ﻛﺎﺴﺤﺔ أو ﻏزو ﺨﺎرﺠﻲ. ﻋﻠﻰ اﻷﻗﻝ ﻻ ﺒد أن ﻴﺤظﻰ اﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴر ﺒﻤواﻓﻘﺔ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن اﻟﺴورﻴﻴن إذا واﻓﻘوا ﺒﺎﻟوﻗوف ﺠﺎﻨﺒﺎً وﻋدم اﻟﺘدﺨﻝ وﻫم ﻴ اﻗﺒون ر اﻨﺘﻬﺎء اﻟﺤﻛم اﻟﻌﻠوي. ي ﺒﺎﻨﻘﻼبي ﻫو: ﻟﻤﺎذا ﻻ ﻴﻘوم ﺠﻨ اﻝ ﺴور ر واذا ﻛﺎن اﻟﺴؤاﻝ اﻟﺠوﻫر ٕ ي؟ إﻻ أﻨﻨﻲ أود إﻋﺎدة ﺼﻴﺎﻏﺘﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻨﺤو اﻟﺘﺎﻟﻲ: ﻟﻤﺎذا ﻻ ﻴﻨﻬﻲﻋﺴﻛر اﻟﻌﻠوﻴون اﻟﺴورﻴون ﺤﻛم اﻷﺴد؟ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺒداﻴﺔ، ﻟﻴس ﻤن اﻟﻤﺒﺎﻟﻐﺔ ﻋم ﺒﺄن ﻛﺜﻴرً ﻤن اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن ﻏﻴر ا اﻟز ﺴﻌداء –ﻋﻠﻰ اﻷﻗﻝ- ﺒﺎﻟﻨظﺎم اﻟﺤﺎﻟﻲ. واﻷﺴﺒﺎب اﻟﻤوﺠﺒﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﻴروﺠوﻨﻬﺎ
- 16. ﻫﻲ : ة ة ﺤوﻝ دﻤﺸق، و ى اﻟﻔﻘﻴر اﻟﻘر ١- اﻟﻔﻘر )ﻤﺜﻼً اﻷﺤﻴﺎء اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﺔ اﻟﻔﻘﻴر ة ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻨطﻘﺔ اﻟﺴﺎﺤﻠﻴﺔ، اﻟﺦ( وﻨﺴب اﻟﺒطﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﻤﺘدﻫور ٢- اﻻﻋﺘﻘﺎﻝ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺴﻲ اﻟذي ﻻ ﻴﺠرؤون ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺘﺼدي ﻟﻪ)أﻤﺜﻠﺔ: ﺼﻼح ﺠدﻴد وﺤزب اﻟﻌﻤﻝ اﻟﺸﻴوﻋﻲ وﻋﺎرف دﻟﻴﻠﺔ ﺤﺎﻟﻴﺎً( ﻴوﺠد أﻴﻀﺎً أﺴﺒﺎب رﺌﻴﺴﻴﺔ ى ﻗﻠﻤﺎ ﻴﺘم ﺘداوﻟﻬﺎ، أﺸﻴر إﻟﻰ أﺤدﻫﺎ أﺨر ﻓﻲ ﻫذا اﻟﺼدد وﻫو ذﻟك اﻟﺠﻴﻝ ﻤن اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن اﻟذﻴن وﻟدوا ﺒﻌد ﺒداﻴﺔ اﻟﺴﺘﻴﻨﺎت ﻋﻨدﻤﺎ اﺴﺘوﻟﻰ اﻟﺒﻌث ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺴﻠطﺔ وﺘﺒوأ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴون ﻷوﻝ ة ﻤﻨﺎﺼب ﻋﻠﻴﺎ ﻤر ﻓﻲ ﺤﻛم ﺴورﻴﺔ: ﻟم ﻴﻌش ﻤﻌظﻤﻨﺎ اﻟظروف اﻟظﺎﻟﻤﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺨﻀﻊ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ آﺒﺎؤﻨﺎ وأﺠدادﻨﺎ ﺘﺤت ﺤﻛم اﻟﺴﻨﺔ، وﺒﺎﻟﺘﺎﻟﻲ ﻓﻠم ﻨﻘدر اﻟﺤﻛم اﻟﻌﻠوي اﻟذي ﺠﺎء ﺒﻪ اﻟرﺌﻴس اﻟ اﺤﻝ ﺤﺎﻓظ اﻷﺴد ﺒﻨﻔس درﺠﺔ ﺘﻘدﻴر آﺒﺎﺌﻨﺎ وأﺠدادﻨﺎ ر أﺤدث ﺤﺎﻓظ اﻷﺴد ﺘﺤﺴﻴﻨﺎت ﻫﺎﺌﻠﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻨﺎطق اﻟرﻴﻔﻴﺔ ﺒﻌدﻤﺎ أﻫﻤﻠت إﻫﻤﺎﻻً ﻛﺎﻤﻼً ﻤن ﻗﺒﻝ اﻟﺤﻛوﻤﺎت اﻟﺴﻨﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﺘﻌﺎﻗﺒﺔ، ﺴواء اﻟﻌﺜﻤﺎﻨﻴﺔ ة، ﻤﻨﻬﺎ أو اﻟﺴورﻴﺔ )ﻟﻛن ﻟﻸﺴف ﻛرر اﻷﺴد ﻫذا اﻹﻫﻤﺎﻝ ﻓﻲ ﻤﻨطﻘﺔ اﻟﺠزﻴر ﻓﻲ ﺸﻤﺎﻝ ﺸرق ﺴورﻴﺔ(. ﻟﻛن ﻫذﻩ اﻟﺘﺤﺴﻴﻨﺎت أﺼﺎﺒﻬﺎ اﻟﺠﻤود ﻤﻨذ أﻛﺜر ﻤن ﺠﻴﻝ وﺘﺄﺨرت اﻷﺤواﻝ أﻛﺜر ﻤﻤﺎ ﺘﻘدﻤت. ﻓﻲ ﻤرﺤﻠﺔ ﺸﺒﺎب آﺒﺎﺌﻨﺎ ﺘﺤوﻟت اﻟﻤدن اﻟﺴﺎﺤﻠﻴﺔ اﻟواﻗﻌﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺴﻔوح ﺠﺒﺎﻝ اﻟﺴﺎﺤﻝ ﻤﺜﻝ طرطوس وﺒﺎﻨﻴﺎس وﺠﺒﻠﺔ واﻟﻼذﻗﻴﺔ ﻤن ﻤﺠﺘﻤﻌﺎت ﺴﻨﻴﺔ ﺼرﻓﺔ إﻟﻰ ﻤدن ﺤدﻴﺜﺔ ﻤﺘﻌددة اﻟطواﺌف ﻨﺴﺒﻴﺎ. ﻟﻛن ﺨﻼﻝ ﺠﻴﻠﻨﺎ ﺘﺤوﻟت ﻫذﻩ ة ﺒﺴﺒب ﺴﻴﺎﺴﺎت اﻟﻔﺴﺎد وﺴوء اﻟﺘﺨطﻴط ة ﻗذر اﻟﻤدن إﻟﻰ ﻤدن ﻓﻘﻴر ة واﻟﻤﺤﺴوﺒﻴﺔ. وﺸﺎﻫدﻨﺎﻫﺎ ﺘﺘﺤوﻝ ﻤﺴرﺤﺎً ﻟﻤ اﻫﻘﻲ اﻟﺠﻴﻝ اﻟﺠدﻴد ﻤن ﻋﺸﻴر ر اﻷﺴد ﻓﻲ اﻟﻘرداﺤﺔ اﻟذﻴن ﻴطﻠق ﻋﻠﻴﻬم أﺤﻴﺎﻨﺎً اﻟﺸﺒﻴﺤﺔ ٣- ﻛﺎن دﻋم آﺒﺎﺌﻨﺎ اﻟﻛﺒﻴر ﻟﺤﺎﻓظ ﻨﺎﺘﺠﺎً ﻤن اﺴﺘﻴﺎﺌﻬم ﻤن اﻟﺒورﺠوازﻴﺔ اﻟﻐﻨﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﻋم ﺤﺎﻓظ وﺤزب اﻟﺒﻌث ﻤﻨﺎﻫﻀﺘﻬﺎ اﻷﻤر اﻟذي ز ﻋﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺤرﻛﺘﻪ. ﻛﺎن أﺘﺒﺎع رﻓﻌت اﻷﺴد ﻓﻲأﺴﺒﻎ اﻟﻛﺜﻴر ﻤن اﻟﺸر
- 17. اﻟﺴﺒﻌﻴﻨﺎت ﻴرددون ﻋﻠﻰ ﻤﺴﺎﻤﻌﻨﺎ ﻋﺒﺎ ات اﻹﻋﺠﺎب ﺒﻪ ﻷﻨﻪ ﻛﺎن ﻟم ﻴﻛن ر ﻴﺘورع ﻋن اﻟﺘﻘﺎط ﻋﻠﺒﺔ ﺴﻤك ﻏﺔ ة وﻴﺸرب ﺒﻬﺎ اﻟﺸﺎي. ﻟﻛﻨﻨﻲ أﺘﺴﺎءﻝ ﻓﺎر ﻗذر ﻩ اﻟﺒﺎذﺨﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻴوم ﺒم ﻴﻔﻛرون ﺒﻪ وﻫو ﻴﺴﺘﺨدم اﻷواﻨﻲ اﻟذﻫﺒﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻗﺼور ﻓرﻨﺴﺎ واﺴﺒﺎﻨﻴﺎ؟ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺎﻀﻲ أﻋﺠب اﻟﻌﻠوﻴون ﺒﻛﺜﻴر ﻤن اﻟرﻤوز اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻛز اﻟﺴﻠطﺔ. ﻟﻛﻨﻨﻲ ﻟم أﻟﺘق ﺸﺨﺼﺎً ﻴﺤﻤﻝ أدﻨﻰ درﺠﺎت اﻹﻋﺠﺎب ﻟ اﻤﻲ ر ﻤر أو آﺼف ﻋﻠﻰ ﺴﺒﻴﻝ اﻟﻤﺜﺎﻝ ﻻ اﻟﺤﺼر. وﻟﺴوء اﻟﺤظ ﻓﻨﺤن ﻨ اﻗب اﻟﺤﻛﺎم ر اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن وﻛﺜﻴرً ﻤن أﺒﻨﺎﺌﻬم وﻗد أﺼﺒﺤوا ﻨﺴﺨﺔ ﻋﻤﺎ ﻋﻠﻤوﻨﺎ ﻛ اﻫﻴﺘﻪ ر ا ﻩ. واﺤﺘﻘﺎر ٤ـ ﺜﻤﺔ ﺤﻘﻴﻘﺔ ﻻ ﺒد ﻤن ﺘﺠﻠﻴﺘﻬﺎ أن اﻟطﺎﺌﻔﺔ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﺔ ﻻ ﺘ اﻝ ﺘﺘﺤﻛم ز ى أن ﻫذاة اﻷﻤﻨﻴﺔ اﻟﺴورﻴﺔ. واﻟﺤﻘﻴﻘﺔ اﻷﺨر ﺒﺎﻟﻤواﻗﻊ اﻟﻤﻬﻤﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻷﺠﻬز ة ﻓﻲ أﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻬرم، وﻫﻲ اﻟﺘﻲ ﻴﺘﻀﺎءﻝ ﻨﻔﻌﻬﺎ اﻟﺘﺤﻛم ﻻ ﻴﺨدم إﻻ ة ﺼﻐﻴر داﺌر ة ﻓﻲ اﻟﻘﺎﻋدة وﺘﻔﺎﻋﻠﻬﺎ ﻤﻊ أﻋﻀﺎء اﻟطﺒﻘﺔ اﻟﻔﻘﻴر ٥ـ وﺒﻤﻼﺤظﺔ أن ﻨظﺎم اﻷﺴد اﻨﺨرط ﻛﻠﻴﺎً ﻓﻲ ﺘﺤﺎﻟﻔﺎت ﻤﻊ اﻷﺴر اﻟﺴﻨﻴﺔ ﻤن ﺨﻼ ﻝ اﻟزواج )اﻟرﺌﻴس ﻤﺜﻼً، وﺒﻨﺎت ﻨﺎﺼﻴف، اﻟﺦ( أو ﻤن ﺨﻼﻝ اﺤﺘﻛﺎر اﻟﺼﻔﻘﺎت )ﻤﺎﻫر ﻤﺜﻼً وﺒﻬﺠت ﺴﻠﻴﻤﺎن وآﺼف، اﻟﺦ(، ﻓﻘد ﺨﺴر اﻟﻨظﺎم دﻋواﻩ ﺒﺄﻨﻪ ﻴﻤﺜﻝ اﻟطﺎﺌﻔﺔ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﺔ أو ﻴداﻓﻊ ﻋن ﺤﻘوﻗﻬﺎ. أﻤﺎ اﻟدﻋﺎوى اﻟﺘﻲ اﺴﺘﺨدﻤﻬﺎ ﺤﺎﻓظ وﺠﻴﻠﻪ ﻟﻴﻘﻨﻌوا ﺒﻬﺎ آﺒﺎءﻨﺎ ﻟﻴﻘدﻤوا ﻟﻪ اﻟدﻋم ﻓﻘد ﻓﻘدت أﺴﺒﺎﺒﻬﺎ إﻟﻰ ﺤد ﻛﺒﻴر. ٦- إن اﻻﺘﺠﺎﻩ اﻟذي ﺘﺴﻴر إﻟﻴﻪ ﺴورﻴﺔ ﻻ ﻴﺒﺸر ﺒﺨﻴر. ﻓﺂﺨر ﻤﺎ ة، ﻴﻨظر إﻟﻴﻪ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴون أن ﻴﻛون ﻫﻨﺎك ﻤﺠﻤوﻋﺔ )ﻤؤﻟﻔﺔ ﻤن طواﺌف ﻛﺜﻴر وﻟﻴس ﻓﻘط ﻤن اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن( ﺘﻘود ﺴورﻴﺔ إﻟﻰ ﻛﺎرﺜﺔ، ﻓﻲ اﻟوﻗت اﻟذي ﻴﺘﻬﻤﻬم ﻛﻝ اﻟﺴورﻴﻴن اﻵﺨرﻴن ﺒﺄﻨﻬم اﻟﻤﺴؤوﻟون ﻋن ﻫذﻩ اﻟﻛﺎرﺜﺔ. ﻓﻠﻤﺎذا ﻻ ﻴﻔﻌﻝ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴون ﺸﻴﺌﺎً ﻟﺘﻔﺎدي اﻟﺤﺎﻟﺔ؟ وﻟﻤﺎذا ﻨﺼﻤت ي؟ﻋﻨﻬﺎ؟ وﻟﻤﺎذا ﻻ ﻴﻘوم ﺠﻨ اﻝ ﻋﻠوي ﺒﺎﻨﻘﻼب ﻋﺴﻛر ر ﺘﻨﻘﺴم اﻷﺴﺒﺎب إﻟﻰ ﻋﺎﻤﺔ ﺘﺘﻌﻠق ﺒﻛﻝ اﻟﻤواطﻨﻴن اﻟﺴورﻴﻴن، واﻟﻰ ٕ أﺴﺒﺎب ﺨﺎﺼﺔ ﺒﺎﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن:
- 18. أوﻻً: اﻷﺴﺒﺎب اﻟﻌﺎﻤﺔ اﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﺒﻛﻝ اﻟﻤواطﻨﻴن اﻟﺴورﻴﻴن ي ﺒﺼرف١- ﻟﻘد ﻋت ﺜﻘﺎﻓﺔ اﻟﺨوف وﺘﺠذرت ﻓﻲ ع ﻛﻝ ﺴور رو زر اﻟﻨظر ﻋن طﺎﺌﻔﺘﻪ وﺠﻨﺴﻪ ٢- ﻟﻘد ﺘﻛﻠﺴت ﺤﺎﻟﺘﻨﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻤﺴﺘوى ﻋﻤﻴق ﻤن اﻟرﻴﺒﺔ واﻟﺸك ﺒﻛﻝ إﻨﺴﺎن ﺤﺘﻰ أﺼﺒﺢ ﻤن ﺸﺒﻪ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺤﻴﻝ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻛﻝ ﺴورﻴﻴن أن ﻴﻌﻤﻠوا ﻤﻌﺎً ﻓﻛﻴف ﺒﺎﻟﺘﻨظﻴم ﻓﻲ ﻤﺠﻤوﻋﺔ واﺤدة. وﺤﺘﻰ ﻨدرك ﻋﻤق اﻟﻤﻌﻀﻠﺔ: اﻨظر إﻟﻰ ﻩ. ﻤدى ﺘﻔرق اﻟﺴورﻴﻴن ﻓﻲ اﻟﺸﺘﺎت ﺤﺘﻰ ﻋﻨدﻤﺎ ﻴﺒﺘﻌدون ﻋن اﻟﻨظﺎم وﺘﺄﺜﻴر ﻟم ﻴﻌد ﺒﻤﻘدور ﻤﻐﺘرﺒﻴن ﺴورﻴﻴن أن ﻴﻨظﻤوا ﺘﺠﻤﻌﺎً ﺜﻘﺎﻓﻴﺎً ﻨﺎﻫﻴك ﻋن ﺤزب ﺴﻴﺎﺴﻲ، وﻤﺎ ﻴﻛﺎد ﻴﻨﺸﺄ ﺤزب ﺠدﻴد ﺤﺘﻰ ﻴﺒدأ أﻋﻀﺎؤﻩ اﻟذﻴن ﻫم ﻤن ﻨﻔس اﻟطﺎﺌﻔﺔ واﻟﺠﻨس واﻟﺨﻠﻔﻴﺔ ﻴﻨﺸطرون ﻋﻨﻪ ﻓﻲ ﻤﺘواﻟﻴﺎت ﻏﻴر ﻤﺘﻨﺎﻫﻴﺔ. ٣- اﻟﻌداء اﻟﺨﺎرﺠﻲ ﻟﻠوﻻﻴﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﺤدة ﻴﺸﻝ اﻟﺤرﻛﺎت اﻟداﺨﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﻨظﻤﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻤﻠﺔ ﻀد اﻟﻨظﺎم ﺒﺼرف اﻟﻨظر ﻋن ﻤﻘﺎﺼدﻫﺎ. ﻓﻼ ﻴوﺠد ﻤن ﻴود اﻟﻤﺠﺎزﻓﺔ ﺒﺘﺤرك ﻤﺎ ﻀد اﻟﻨظﺎم ﺒﻴﻨﻤﺎ اﻟﻌدو ﻤﺘرﺒص ﻋﻠﻰ اﻷﺒواب. وﻓﻲ ﻨﻔس اﻟوﻗت ﻟم ﺘﺒد اﻟوﻻﻴﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﺤدة أي إﺸﺎ ات ﻤﻬﻤﺔ ﻟﺘﺤﺴﻴن اﻟوﻀﻊ ر اﻟداﺨﻠﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺴورﻴﺔ أو ﻤﺴﺎﻋدة اﻟﺒﻠد. ﻛﻝ ﻤﺎ ﺘطﻠﺒﻪ اﻟوﻻﻴﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﺤدة ﺒﺠﻼء وﺼوت ﻤرﺘﻔﻊ ﻫو إﺠ اء ﺘﻐﻴﻴر ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺴﺎت اﻟﺨﺎرﺠﻴﺔ، ﻫذﻩ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺴﺎت ﻻ ر ﻋﻲ اﻫﺘﻤﺎم اﻟﻤﻌﺎرﻀﺔ اﻟﺴورﻴﺔ. ﻓﺎﻟﻨظﺎم ﻴﺘﻤﺘﻊ ﺒﺸﻌﺒﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻫذﻩﺘﺴﺘر اﻟﻤﺴﺎﺌﻝ ﻤﺜﻝ ﻤﺴﺄﻟﺔ اﺤﺘﻼﻝ ﻓﻠﺴطﻴن واﻟﺠوﻻن واﻟﻌ اق. ر ي ﺤﺎﻟﻴﺎً ﻤﻨﺎﻫﻀﺔ ﻷﻤرﻴﻛﺎ. وﻫذا ﻴﻌﻨﻲ أن أيﻋﺎطﻔﺔ اﻟﺸﺎرع اﻟﺴور ي ﻴﺠب أن ﺘﻛون ﻤﻌﺎرﻀﺔ ﻷﻤرﻴﻛﺎﻤﻌﺎرﻀﺔ ﺘود ﻛﺴب ﺘﻌﺎطف اﻟﺸﺎرع اﻟﺴور وﻤرﻓوﻀﺔ ﻤن اﻟﻐرب، ﻤﺜﻝ ﺤﻤﺎس. وأي ﻤﻌﺎرﻀﺔ ﺘروم اﻟدﻋم اﻟﺨﺎرﺠﻲ ﺘﻔﻘد اﻟﺸﺎرع ﻛﻤﺎ ﻫﻲ ﺤﺎﻟﺔ ﺨدام. ﻨﺤن ﻓﻲ ﺤﺎﻟﺔ دﻗﻴﻘﺔ وﺤﺴﺎﺴﺔ ﻴﻔﻬﻤﻬﺎ اﻟﻨظﺎم ﺠﻴداً وﻴوظﻔﻬﺎ ﻟﻤﺼﻠﺤﺘﻪ ﺒﺒ اﻋﺔ. ر ٤- ﺘﺤﻛم اﻟرﺌﻴس اﻟﺴﺎﺒق ﺤﺎﻓظ اﻷﺴد ﺒﺘﻨظﻴم اﻟﺠﻴش واﻟﻘوات اﻟﻤﺴﻠﺤﺔ ﺒﺒ اﻋﺔ ﻓﺎﺌﻘﺔ ﻟﻴﺘﺤﺎﺸﻰ اﻻﻨﻘﻼﺒﺎت ﻤﺜﻝ ﺘﻠك اﻟﺘﻲ ﻫزت ﺴورﻴﺔ ر
- 19. ة ﻋﻠﻰ ﺨﻼﻝ ﺜﻼﺜﺔ ﻋﻘود ﺒﻌد اﺴﺘﻘﻼﻝ ﺴورﻴﺔ. ﻓﻛﻝ اﻟﻘوات اﻟﺴورﻴﺔ اﻟﻘﺎدر اﻟﻘﻴﺎم ﺒﺎﻨﻘﻼب )ﻤﺜﻝ اﻟوﺤدات اﻟﺨﺎﺼﺔ واﻟﺸرطﺔ اﻟﻌﺴﻛرﻴﺔ و ة اﻷﻤن( أﺠﻬز ﻀﺨﻤﺔ ﻴﺼﻌب ﺘﺤرﻴﻛﻬﺎ وﻤرﻛزﻴﺔ ذات ﻫﻴﻛﻝ ﻗﻴﺎدة ﺒﺎﻟﻎ اﻟﺘﻌﻘﻴد ﻤﺼﻤم ﻋن ﻗﺼد ﻟﻴﺨﻴب أﻤﻝ اﻟﻤﺘﺂﻤرﻴن. اﻻﺘﺼﺎﻻت اﻟﺜﻨﺎﺌﻴﺔ ﺒﻴن اﻟوﺤدات ﻤﻤﻨوﻋﺔ ة ﻤطﻠﻘﺔ، إذ أن ﻛﻝ اﻻﺘﺼﺎﻻت ﻴﺠب أن ﺘﻤر ﻋﺒر ﻤﺴﺎر ﻤﺘﻌرج، و ﺒﺼور ﻴﺠب أن ﺘﺼﻌد أوﻻً ﻓﻲ ﻫﻴﻛﻝ اﻟﻘﻴﺎدة إﻟﻰ اﻟﻘﻤﺔ ﻗﺒﻝ أن ﺘﻨزﻝ ﺜﺎﻨﻴﺔ إﻟﻰ ة ﻟﻬﺎ ﺼﻔوف اﻟوﺤدة اﻟﺜﺎﻨﻴﺔ. واﻷﻛﺜر أﻫﻤﻴﺔ أن اﻟوﺤدات واﻷﻗﺴﺎم اﻟﻛﺜﻴر ﻫﻴﻛﻠﻴﺔ ﻗﻴﺎدﻴﺔ ﻤﺘﺸﺎﺒﻛﺔ ﺒﺤﻴث ﻻ ﺘﻨﺘﻔﻲ اﻟذاﺘﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ أو ذاﺘﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﺴﻴﻴر. ﻨﻀرب ﻤﺜﺎﻻً: ﺘﻘﻊ أي وﺤدة ﺠوﻴﺔ ﺘﺤت ﺴﻠطﺔ ﻤﺨﺎﺒ ات اﻟﻘوى اﻟﺠوﻴﺔ ر واﻟﻤﺨﺎﺒ ات اﻟﻌﺴﻛرﻴﺔ وا ة اﻟﺘوﺠﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﻌﻨوي واﻟﺸرطﺔ اﻟﻌﺴﻛرﻴﺔ وﻗﻴﺎدة ٕ دار ر ي واﻟﻘﺼر.اﻟﻘوى اﻟﺠوﻴﺔ واﻟﻘﻴﺎدة اﻟﻌﺎﻤﺔ ﻟﻠﻘوات اﻟﻤﺴﻠﺤﺔ واﻟﺤرس اﻟﺠﻤﻬور ة واﻟﻀﺒﺎط أﺼﺤﺎب اﻟوﻻءات ﻟﻬذﻩ اﻷﻓرع اﻷﻤﻨﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ ﻴﻨﺘﺸرون ﺒﺼور ﻛﻴﻔﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻗوات اﻷﻤن. ﻻ ﺸك أن ﻫذا اﻟﻬﻴﻛﻝ اﻟﻘﻴﺎدي ﻋدﻴم اﻟﻔﺎﺌدة ﻤن اﻟﻨﺎﺤﻴﺔ اﻟﻌﻤﻠﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻤواﺠﻬﺔ اﻷﻋداء اﻟﺨﺎرﺠﻴﻴن ﺒﺴﺒب ﺘﻨظﻴﻤﻪ اﻟﺴﺨﻴف ﻤن وﻻءات ﻤﺘﻌددة، ﻟﻛﻨﻪ ﺒﺎﻟﻎ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻠﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻀﻤﺎن اﻻﺴﺘﻘ ار اﻟداﺨﻠﻲ إذ ﻴﻤﻛن ر . ﺒواﺴطﺘﻪ إﺤﺒﺎط أي ﻤﺤﺎوﻟﺔ ﻟﻠﺘﻤرد ﻋﺔ واﻟﺘﻌﺎﻤﻝ ﻤﻌﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻷرض ﺒﺴر ٥- ﻤﻌظم اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن اﻟﺴورﻴﻴن اﻟﺴﺎﺨطﻴن ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻨظﺎم اﻟﺤﺎﻟﻲ ﻻ ﻩ ﺒدون ﺒدﻴﻝ واﻀﺢ. ﻓﻤن واﺠب اﻟﻤﻌﺎرﻀﺔ أن ﺘﻘدم ﻴرون ﻓﺎﺌدة ﻤن ﺘﻐﻴﻴر ة ي ﺒﺤﻴث ﻴﻘﺘﻨﻊ ﺒﺎﻟﻤﺨﺎطررؤﻴﺔ واﻀﺤﺔ ﻋن اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻝ وﺘﻠﻬم اﻟﺸﻌب اﻟﺴور ﺒﺎﻟﻤﻴ ات اﻟﻘﻠﻴﻠﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﻴﺘﻤﺘﻌون ﺒﻬﺎ، وﻋﻠﻰ أﺴﻬﺎ اﻷﻤن. ﻻ ﺘ اﻝ ﻋﺒﺎ ات ر ز ر ز اﻟوﻋود اﻟﻌﺎﻤﺔ واﻟﻐﺎﻤﻀﺔ ﻋن اﻟدﻴﻤﻘ اطﻴﺔ واﻟﺤﻴﺎة اﻷﻓﻀﻝ ﺘﺼﺒﻎ ﺨطﺎب ر ﻤؤﻴدي ﺘﻐﻴﻴر اﻟﻨظﺎم . ٦- ﻻ ﺒد ﻤن اﻻﻋﺘ اف ﺒﺄن اﻟﻔﺴﺎد ﺘﻐﻠﻐﻝ ﻓﻲ ﻨﻔوس ﻛﻝ اﻟﺴورﻴﻴن ر ﺘﻘرﻴﺒﺎً. وﻤن اﻟﻤﺸﻛوك ﻓﻴﻪ أن أي ﺸﻛﻝ ﻤن أﺸﻛﺎﻝ ﺘﻐﻴﻴر اﻟﻨظﺎم ﺴﻴﻔﻠﺢ ﻓﻲ إﻨﺠﺎز ﺘﺤوﻻت اﺠﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ أواﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻴﺔ ﺤﻘﻴﻘﻴﺔ ﻗﺒﻝ أن ﻴﻤﻬد ﻟﻬﺎ ﺒﻌﻤﻠﻴﺔ ﺠذرﻴﺔ طوﻴﻠﺔ ﻤن اﻹﺼﻼح واﻹﺤﻴﺎء اﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓﻲ
- 20. ﻗﻴﺎدﺘﻨﺎ ﻓﺎﺴدة، ﻟﻛن أي ﻗﻴﺎدة ﺸرﻴﻔﺔ ﺴﺘﺠد ﻤن اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺤﻴﻝ اﻟﺘﻐﻠب ﻋﻠﻰ ﺜﻘﺎﻓﺔ اﻟرﺸوة اﻟﻤﻨﺤرﻓﺔ ﺒﺼرف اﻟﻨظر ﻋن اﻟﻌﻤﻝ اﻟﺸﺎق وﻋدم اﻻﻛﺘ اث ر ﺒﺎﻟﻤﺼﻠﺤﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻤﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﻴﺸﺘرك ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﻛﻝ ﻤن ﻤوظﻔﻲ اﻟدوﻟﺔ واﻟﻘطﺎع اﻟﺨﺎص ﻋﻠﻰ ﺤد ﺴواء. ﻟﻘد أﺼﺒﺢ ﺸﻌور ﻤﻌظم اﻟﺴورﻴﻴن ﺒﺎﻟﻔﻀﻴﻠﺔ ﻤﻠﺘوﻴﺎ ﺤﺘﻰ ة ﻫﻲ ﻏش اﻟزﺒون. أﺼﺒﺤت اﻟﻤﻬﺎر ﻫﻝ ﻴﻤﻛن ﺤﻘﺎً ﻓرض اﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴر ﻤن اﻷﻋﻠﻰ إﻟﻰ اﻷﺴﻔﻝ؟ ﻴﺘﺤﺎﺸﻰ ة اﻟداﻋون إﻟﻰ ﺘﻐﻴﻴر اﻟﻨظﺎم ﻫذا اﻟﺴؤاﻝ اﻟﺸﺎﺌك، ﻟﻛن ﻴﺠب ﺘﻨﺎوﻟﻪ ﺒﺠﺴﺎر واﻟﺤوار ﻓﻴﻪ. ﻫﻝ ﻨﺤن اﻏﺒون ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﻤﻝ واﻟﺘﻔﻛﻴر ﺒﺸﻛﻝ ﻤﺨﺘﻠف ﻋﻨدﻤﺎ ر ﻴﺘﻐﻴر اﻟﻨظﺎم؟ ﺜﺎﻨﻴﺎً: أﺴﺒﺎب ﺨﺎﺼﺔ ﺒﺎﻟﻤواطﻨﻴن اﻟﺴورﻴﻴن اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن: اﻟﺴﺒب اﻟرﺌﻴﺴﻲ اﻟذي ﻴﺤوﻝ دون ﻓﺎﻋﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن ﻓﻲ دﻋم أي ﻤن ﺨطط ﺘﻐﻴﻴر اﻟﻨظﺎم ﻫو ﺨوﻓﻬم ﻤن "اﻵﺨر". إن أوﻟﺌك اﻟذﻴن ﻴﻌﺘزﻤون ﺘﻐﻴﻴر اﻟﻨظﺎم ﺒدون أن ﻴوﻀﺤوا ﻟﻨﺎ ﻤﺎذا ﺴﺘﻌﻨﻲ ﻨﻬﺎﻴﺔ اﻟﺤﻛم اﻟﻌﻠوي ﻵﻻف اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن اﻟﻌﺎدﻴﻴن ﻟن ﻴﺼﻠوا إﻟﻰ ﻨﺘﻴﺠﺔ. ﺜﻤﺔ ﻨوﻋﺎن ﻤن "اﻵﺨر" ﻓﻲ ﺴورﻴﺔ: آ- ﻋﻤﺎء اﻟﻤﻌﺎرﻀﺔ اﻟدﻴﻨﻴﺔ اﻟﺴﻨﻴﺔ واﻷﻛ اد اﻟذﻴن ﻴﻨﺎدون ﺒﻔظﺎظﺔ ر ز ووﻀوح: "ﻨرﻴد إﻨﻬﺎء اﻟﺤﻛم اﻟﻌﻠوي" ب- واﻟﺜﺎﻨﻲ ﻫو ﻛﻝ ﻤن ﻴﻘوﻝ ﻋﻠﻰ اﺴﺘﺤﻴﺎء أو ﺒﺈﻴﺠﺎز أﻨﻪ" ﻴﺠب اﻨﻬﺎء اﺤﺘﻛﺎر اﻟﻤﻨﺎﺼب اﻟﻌﻠﻴﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺠﻴش واﻷﻤن ﻤن طﺎﺌﻔﺔ واﺤدة" ي أو ﻋﻴم ﺴﻴﺎﺴﻲ أو ﻛﺎﺘب ﻤرﻤوق ز ﻟم ﻴﻌﺎﻟﺞ أي ﻤﺜﻘف ﺴور ي اﻟﺘﺎﻟﻲ:اﻟﺴؤاﻝ اﻟﺠوﻫر ﻤﺎﻫﻲ ﺨططﻛم ﺒﺎﻟﻀﺒط ﺘﺠﺎﻩ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن ﺒﻌد أن ﻨﺘﺨﻠﻰ ﻋن اﻟﺴﻠطﺔ؟ ﻟﻤﺎذا ﻛﻝ اﻷﺠوﺒﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻫذا اﻟﺴؤاﻝ ﻏﺎﻤﻀﺔ وﻋﺎﻤﺔ؟ ﻤﺎ ﻫﻲ ﺨططﻛم ﺘﺠﺎﻩ ﻋﺸ ات اﻷﻟوف ﻤن اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن اﻟﻌﺎﻤﻠﻴن ﻓﻲ اﻟﺠﻴش و ة اﻷﻤن أﺠﻬز ر ي واﻟﻘوات اﻟﺨﺎﺼﺔ اﻟﻤﺸﻛﻠﺔى؟ ﻤﺎ ﻫﻲ ﺨططﻛم ﺘﺠﺎﻩ اﻟﺤرس اﻟﺠﻤﻬوراﻷﺨر
- 21. ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻘﺎم اﻷوﻝ ﻤن اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن؟ ﻫﻝ ﺴﺘدﻓﻌون ﻟﻬم ﻤﻌﺎﺸﺎت ﺘﻘﺎﻋدﻴﺔ إذا ﻗررﺘم ﺤﻝ ﻗواﺘﻬم؟ أم إﻨﻬم ﺴﻴطردون وﻴرﻤون ﻓﻲ اﻟﺸوارع وﻴذﻟون وﻴﻨﺒذون ﻛﻤﺎ ﻓﻌﻝ اﻷﻤرﻴﻛﺎن ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌ اق؟ وﻫﻝ ﻋﻨدﻛم ة ﻋن اﻟﻤﺨﺎطر اﻟﺘﻲ ﻴﻨطوي ﻓﻛر ر ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻤﺜﻝ ﻫذا اﻟﺘﺴرﻴﺢ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻷﻤن؟ وﻫﻝ ﻴرﻀﻴﻛم ﺴﻴﻨﺎرﻴو ﺒﻘﺎء ﻫذﻩ اﻟﻘوات ﻓﻲ أﻤﺎﻛﻨﻬﺎ ﻟﻘﺎء ﺘﺨﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻋن اﻟﺴﻠطﺔ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺴﻴﺔ؟ وﻤﺎ ﻫﻲ ﺨططﻛم ﺘﺠﺎﻩ ﻋﺸ ات اﻷﻟوف ﻤن اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن اﻟذﻴن ﻴﻌﻤﻠون ر ﻤوظﻔﻴن ﻓﻲ ﻛﺜﻴر ﻤن اﻟﻤؤﺴﺴﺎت ﻏﻴر اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻠﺔ؟ ﻫﻝ ﺴﺘﻐﻠﻘون ﻫذﻩ اﻟﻤؤﺴﺴﺎت؟ وﻫﻝ ﻟدﻴﻛم ة ﻋن اﻟﻌواﻗب اﻻﺠﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ ﻟﻤﺜﻝ ﻫذا اﻹﻏﻼق؟ ﻓﻛر وﻫﻝ ﺴﺘوﻗﻔون اﻟﻤﺸﺎرﻴﻊ اﻹﺼﻼﺤﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻨطﻘﺔ اﻟﺴﺎﺤﻠﻴﺔ ﺸﺄﻨﻛم ﻓﻲ ذﻟك ة ﺸﺄن ﻛﻝ اﻟﺤﻛوﻤﺎت اﻟﺴﻨﻴﺔ ﻤﻨذ اﻻﺴﺘﻘﻼﻝ؟ وﻫﻝ ﺴﺘﻌﻛﺴون ﻗﺎﻨون ﻤﺼﺎدر اﻷ اﻀﻲ واﻋﺎدﺘﻬﺎ إﻟﻰ ﻛﺒﺎر اﻟﻤﻼﻛﻴن اﻟﺴﻨﺔ ﺒﻌدﻤﺎ ﺘم ﺘوزﻴﻌﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻋﺸ ات ر ٕ ر اﻵﻻف ﻤن اﻟﻤز ﻋﻴن؟ ار وﻫﻝ ﺴﺘطﺎﻟﺒون ﺒﻤﺤﺎﻛﻤﺔ اﻟﻤﺴﺌوﻟﻴن اﻷﻤﻨﻴﻴن ﻋﻠﻰ أﻋﻤﺎﻟﻬم ﺨﻼﻝ اﻟـ٥٣ ﺴﻨﺔ اﻟﻤﺎﻀﻴﺔ؟ وﻤﺎ ﻫﻲ ﺴوﻴﺔ اﻟرﺘب اﻟﺘﻲ ﺴﺘﻌﺘﺒروﻨﻬﺎ ﻤﺴؤوﻟﺔ؟ وﻫﻝ ﺴﺘطﺎﻟﺒون ﺒﺎﻟﻤﺤﺎﻛﻤﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻤﻤﺎرﺴﺎت اﻟﺴﺎﺒﻘﺔ؟ واذا ﻛﻨﺘم ﺴﺘﺤﺎﻛﻤوﻨﻬم ٕ ﻓﻬﻝ ﺴﺘﺤﺎﻛﻤون اﻟﻨﺨﺒﺔ اﻟﺴﻨﻴﺔ أﻴﻀﺎً ﺒﻨﻔس اﻟﻤﻌﻴﺎر؟ وﻫﻝ ﺴﺘﻌﺎﻤﻝ اﻟﻌﺎﺌﻼت اﻟﺴﻨﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ اﺴﺘﻔﺎدت ﻤن اﻟﻨظﺎم ﻋﺒر ﺼﻔﻘﺎت اﻻﺤﺘﻛﺎ ات واﻟﻤﺤﺎﺒﺎة ﻤﺜﻝ ر ﻋﺎﺌﻠﺔ اﻟﻨﺤﺎس اﻟدﻤﺸﻘﻴﺔ وﺠود اﻟﻼذﻗﺎﻨﻴﺔ ﺒﻨﻔس ﻤﻌﺎﻤﻠﺔ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن؟ ي اﻟﻤﻌﺎرﻀﺔاﻹﺠﺎﺒﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻫذﻩ اﻷﺴﺌﻠﺔ ﻤطﻠوب ﻟﻴس ﻤن ﻤﻔﻛر ي ﻏﻴر ﻋﻠوي. ﻤﺎذا ﺴﺘﻔﻌﻠون ﺒﻨﺎ إذا أﻋدﻨﺎ ﻟﻛمﻓﺤﺴب ﺒﻝ وﻤن ﻛﻝ ﺴور اﻟﺴﻠطﺔ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺴﻴﺔ؟ ﻫﻝ أﻨﺘم اﻏﺒون ﺒﺎﻟﻌﻴش ﻤﻌﻨﺎ ﺠﻨﺒﺎً إﻟﻰ ﺠﻨب ﻟﺘدﻋﻴم ر ي وﻋﻨدﺌذ ﻨﻌﺘﺒر اﻟﺴﻨوات اﻷرﺒﻌﻴن اﻟﻤﺎﻀﻴﺔ ﻤﺠرد ﺤﺎدﺜﺔ ﻓﺎﺸﻠﺔع اﻟﺴوراﻟﺘﻨو ى ﻤن ﺘﺎرﻴﺨﻨﺎ اﻟطوﻴﻝ اﻟﺤﺎﻓﻝ ﺒﺎﻟﺜو ات اﻟﻔﺎﺸﻠﺔ. ر أﺨر ياﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴر ﻨﺤو اﻷﻓﻀﻝ ﻴﺠب أن ﻴﺸﻤﻝ ﻛﻝ ﻗطﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ اﻟﺴور ﺒﻤن ﻓﻴﻬم اﻟﻌﻠوﻴون اﻟﺴورﻴون. وﻷن اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﻴن ﻴﺘﺤﻛﻤون ﺒﻛﻝ ﻗوات اﻷﻤن ﻓﻲ اﻟدوﻟﺔ ﻓﻠن ﻴﺘﻐﻴر اﻟﻨظﺎم ﻤﺎ ﻟم ﺘﻤﻨﺢ ﻟﻬم ﺘﺄﻛﻴدات ﺒﺄﻨﻬم ﺴﻴﺘﺒوؤون
- 22. ﻤﻛﺎﻨﺎً ﻓﻲ ﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻝ ﺴورﻴﺔ اﻟﺠدﻴد. وﺒدون ﻤﺜﻝ ﻫذﻩ اﻟﺘطﻤﻴﻨﺎت واﻟﺘﺄﻛﻴدات ي أﻛﺜرﻓﻠن ﻴﻛون "ﻤﺸرف ﻋﻠوي" وﻟن ﻴﺠﻠب أي ﺠﻨ اﻝ ﻴﻘوم ﺒﺎﻨﻘﻼب ﻋﺴﻛر ر ﻤن اﻟﻔوﻀﻰ إﻟﻰ ﺴورﻴﺔ. ﻴرﻓض اﻟﺴورﻴون اﻟﺤدﻴث ﺒﺎﻨﻔﺘﺎح وأﻤﺎﻨﺔ ﻋن أﻛﺜر ﺘﺤدﻴﺎﺘﻨﺎ ة، وﻛﺜﻴر ﻤن اﻟﺤوا ات ﻴﺘم اﻟﺘﺤﻔظ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟزواﻴﺎ اﻟﻤظﻠﻤﺔ، ﻟﻛن ر ﺨطور ة أو اﻟﻤ اوﻏﺔ. ﻴﺠب ﻋﻠﻴﻨﺎ أن ﻨواﺠﻪ وﻨﻨﺎﻗش ر ﻫذا اﻟوﻗت ﻟﻴس ﻟﻠﺸطﺎر ة ﺒﺼ اﺤﺔ وأﻤﺎﻨﺔ. إذا ﻛﺎن اﻟﺴﻨﺔ ر اﻟﻤواﻀﻴﻊ اﻟدﻴﻨﻴﺔ واﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻌﻴﺔ ﻤﺒﺎﺸر ِ ﻴرﻴدون ﺘﻐﻴﻴر اﻟﻨظﺎم ﻓﻌﻠﻴﻬم ﻤﻌﺎﻟﺠﺔ اﻟﻤﺴﺄﻟﺔ اﻟﻌﻠوﻴﺔ أوﻻً. وﻤﺎ ﻟم ﺘﻨﺠﻝ اﻷﺠوﺒﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻷﺴﺌﻠﺔ اﻟﻤطروﺤﺔ ﻤن ﻛﻝ اﻟﻘوى اﻟﻤﻌﻨﻴﺔ واﻷﻓ اد أﺼﺤﺎب ر اﻟﺼﻠﺔ ﻓﻠن ﺘروق ة ﺘﻐﻴﻴر اﻟﻨظﺎم ﻟﻠﻌﻠوﻴﻴن ﻤﻬﻤﺎ ﻛﺎﻨوا ﺴﺎﺨطﻴن ﻋﻠﻰ ﻓﻛر اﻟﻨظﺎم أو ﻗﺎﻨطﻴن ﻤﻨﻪ: وﻟن ﻴﺘﺨﻠوا ﻋن ﻤﺘ اس اﻟﺴﻠطﺔ. ر ﺘرﺠﻤﺔ: وﻟﻴد ﺴﻔور ----------- ﺒﺎﻟﻠﻐﺔ اﻷﺼﻲ اﻟﻤﻘﺎﻝ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻤوﺠود اﻹﻨﻛﻠﻴزﻴﺔ ﻤوﻗﻊ: www.syriacomment.comوﻫذا اﺒطﻪ: ر “What do Sunnis intend for Alawis following Regime change?” by Khudr ﺘﺎرﻴﺦ ٠٣/٨/٦٠٠٢ “What 0B do Sunnis intend for Alawis following Regime change?” by Khudr 6002 ,Wednesday, August 30th 1B I received this article by an old friend who has posted on Syria
- 23. Comment before: Asad’s Alawi Dilemma. His present article is remarkable for its honest and direct approach to Syria’s essential sectarian problem. He wrote: Dear Joshua, I wrote the attached article in poor English full of grammatical mistakes but I hope you can publish it on your website under a pseudonym, such as “Syrian in the far east,” or “Khudr”, or whatever you like. Many people read your blog and comment about it in their blogs or sites, which makes the chance that this will find a proper readership high. Many Syrian expatriate intellectuals will also discuss it on other sites, at least the English language forums. The subject is too sensitive in Arabic, alas. The subject is: What do Sunnis intend for Alawis following regime change? I ask this question in light of the general discussion now being carried out about the prospects for change in Syria. In a time when everybody is emphasizing national unity, many would think that talking about issues between religious communities in Syria should be put aside or that they come from a backward Alawi fanatic. I am not a zealot, the only thing I am fanatical about is my hope, one I know will never come true, of the creation of a pure Syrian nationalism as strong and independent as Japanese or Korean Nationalism. As an engineer, I find it absurd that Syrians believe they can solve a problem without first analyzing it and dealing with it head on. What do Sunnis intend for Alawis following regime change? by Khudr Syria Comment August 30, 2006 I came across an article in a blog in which the writer, a Syrian
- 24. dissident, calls for a coup-d’etat by a Musharraf-like Syrian Army General. This is a reformulation of an earlier article by, Volker Perthes, director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, which was written when the West was casting about for a new leader for Syria during the Fall of 2005. The assumption is that this will move the stagnating economic, social, and political situation in Syria forward in the proper direction. Although the author is deliberately provocative, he raises an extremely important question in a country where almost all the rulers in its modern history, except two presidents, have risen to power through a coup-d’etat. The article is also, unintentionally, asking a more fundamental question regarding the position of the Alawi sect on the issue of regime change. The Army General who is to take power should be an Alawi. This is because non-Alawi officers (mainly Sunni and Druze) have no leverage to lead mostly Alawi soldiers, sergeants and officers against the Alawi regime in power. Although, rarely explicitly said, few people would argue that radical change from within can be achieved without the help of the Alawis themselves, excluding a full-fledged mass uprising or a foreign invasion. At the very least, this change has to be approved by Alawi Syrians if they have to stand aside watching the Alawi rule terminated. The original question of the article (why a Syrian Army General would not do a coup d’etat?) can then be re-written as: Why the Alawi Syrians do not terminate Assad’s rule? First, I think it is not an exaggeration if we say that many Alawis are not happy, to say the least, with the present regime. The reasons that are usually circulated are:
- 25. - Poverty (slum living Alawis around Damascus, poor villages and deteriorated unemployment rate in the costal area, etc, as examples); and - Political imprisonment if they dare to challenge (Salah Jdeed and Communist Work Party in the past, and Aaref Dalilah in the present given as examples). There are also other fundamental reasons that are rarely spoken of. I refer by “we” herein to a generation of Alawis borne after the beginning of the sixties, when the Baath took power and the Alawis assumed for the first time a dominant position in ruling Syria: 1. Most of us have not lived the unjust circumstances that our fathers and grand-fathers were subjected to by the Sunnis. As such, we do not have the same appreciation as our fathers of the Alawi rule that the late president Hafez Assad brought. 2. Hafez made huge improvement to our rural areas after they had been completely and utterly neglected by successive Syrian governments, whether Ottoman or Syrian. (A negligence that the Assad regime has sadly repeated in the Jazeera, the east- northern parts of Syria). However, these improvements have long been frozen, and for more than one generation, things have been heading backwards and not forwards. In our fathers’ youth, coastal cities at the foot of the Costal Mountains, such as Tartous, Banias, Jabla, Lataqia, were transformed from purely Sunni communities to organized multi- sectarian modern cities (of course relatively speaking). But, our generation lived during times when those nice cities became slum-like dirty places due to corruption, bad-planning and patronage. We watched them become a playground for the cowboys of the new generation, the Assad clan in Kurdaha,
- 26. sometimes called the Shabbiha. 3. Our fathers’ support for Hafez was driven largely by their resentment for the wealthy bourgeois that Hafez and his Baath claimed to oppose and which imbued their movement with much of its legitimacy. The followers of Rifa`at al-Assad used to recount to us in the seventies how they admired him because he would pick up a dirty used tuna can from the floor and drink tea from it. I wonder what those people think about him now that he uses golden utensils in his multi-million dollar villas in France and Spain? In the past, older Alawis honestly admired many Alawi figures in power. I still have not met a single person who has the slightest admiration for Rami or Asaf, for example. Unfortunately, we are watching how the Alawi rulers and many of their children, are becoming the very same thing they taught us to despise. 4. It is a fact that Alawis still control the important positions in the security systems in Syria. However, it is also a fact that this control serves only a small circle at the top of the pyramid and is becoming less and less beneficial or responsive to the poor members at the base. 5. Seeing that most of the Assad regime on top has made full- fledged alliances with Sunni families through marriage (like the president himself, Nassif’s daughters etc..), or through monopoly enterprises (like Maher, Bahjat Suleiman, Asaf, etc..), the regime has lost any claim to representing the Alawi sect or to defending its rights. The claims that Hafez and his generation used to convince our fathers to support him with have largely been lost. 6. The direction Syria is now heading does not look good. The last thing Alawis want is to have a group of people (composed of many sects, not only Alawis) leading Syria to a catastrophe,
- 27. while everyone else in Syria accuses the Alawi sect of being responsible for it. So why then don’t Alawis are do anything about the situation? Why are we silent? Why doesn’t an Alawi Army General carry out a coup? A. Reasons general to all Syrian citizens: 1. The culture of fear has been deeply planted in every Syrian person regardless of their sect or race. 2. We have been deeply conditioned to mistrust and be suspicious of everyone, making it extremely hard for any two Syrians to work together, not to mention organize in a group. To see how deep this problem has become, look at how much the Syrians in the Diaspora are fragmented even when they are away from the regime and its influence. No two Syrian expatriates are able to organize a cultural gathering, not to mention a political party. No sooner does a new party emerge than its members, who are from the same sect and race and background, start to split apart into uncountable factions. 3. The external animosity of the United States paralyzes internal movements, organized to act against the regime, no matter how well intentioned they are. No one wants to risk a serious move against the regime while there is an enemy at the door. The United States has not shown any sings that is interested in improving Syria’s internal situation or helping Syria. What the U.S. is asking for clearly and loudly are changes in external policies, period. Most of those policies are not attractive to the Syrian opposition. The regime is popular on most of these issues, such as the occupation of Palestine, the Golan, or Iraq.
- 28. A coup-d’etat at this moment risks being labeled American- made even if it does not have the slightest connection to America. The present sentiment in the Syrian street is anti-American. This means that any opposition that seeks support from the Syrian street will be anti-American and will be spurned by the West, as happened with Hamas. Any opposition that seeks external support will lose the street, as is the case with Khaddam. We are in a tricky situation; the regime understands this well and has exploited it well. 4. The organization of the Army and security forces was masterminded very cleverly by the late president Hafez Assad to prevent coups similar to those that rocked Syria during the three decades after Syrian independence. The Syrian forces capable of carry out a coup-d’etat (Army, Special Forces, Police Force, and Security Apparatuses) are all bulky and centralized with an extremely complicated command structure, purposefully designed to frustrate plotters. Lateral communication is absolutely forbidden between units; all communications between units must travel through a cumbersome vee, first ascending up the command structure to the top level of one unit before descending down again through the ranks of the other unit. Most importantly, the many units and departments have an interlocking command structure so that no entity is autonomous. They cannot act without several other departments knowing about it. For example, any air force unit is under the influence of aerial-security (Mukhabarat Jawiyyah), army-security (Mukhabarat Askariyyah), the morale- guidance headquarters (Idarat el Tawjih al-manawi), military police, air force headquarters, army general headquarters, the Republican Guards, and the Palace. Officers with loyalties to theses various branches of security are sprinkled liberally
- 29. throughout the security forces. This command structure makes the military practically useless against foreign enemies because of its stultifying array of conflicting loyalties, but extremely effective at guaranteeing internal stability. Any attempt to rebel is quickly thwarted and can be dealt with on the spot. 5. Most Syrians, as unhappy as they are with the present regime, see no point in changing the regime without a solid alternative. The opposition has yet to present a clear vision for the future that would inspire people to risk the few joys of Syrian life that they have, security being at the top of the list. Vague and generalized talk about democracy and a better life are the only promises made by present regime-change advocates. They aren’t reassuring. 6. We have to admit that corruption has insinuated its deep into the souls of almost every Syrian. It is highly questionable that any form of regime change is going to achieve real economic or social change, without being preceded by a long process of grass roots reform and cultural revival. We do have a corrupt leadership, but even an honest leadership would find it impossible to overcome the pervasive culture of bribery, disrespect for hard work, and indifference to public interest that is shared by state, and indeed, private sector employees. Most Syrians’ sense of virtue has become so crooked that fooling a customer is defined as cleverness. Can change really be enforced from the top down? The regime changers avoid this thorny question, but it must be aired and debated. Are we willing to act, think, and work differently when the regime is changed? B. Reasons specific to Alawi Syrian citizens:
- 30. The main reason that prevents Alawis from being active in supporting any regime change plans is their fear of the “other.” Those who propose regime change without explaining to us what the end of Alawi rule will mean for thousands of ordinary Alawis will get no where. There are two sorts of “others” in Syria: a. First are the Sunni religious and Kurdish opposition leaders who say bluntly and clearly: “We want to end the Alawi rule”. b. Second is everyone else, who says shyly and elliptically: “The monopoly over top army and security posts by one sect should end.” Not a single Syrian intellectual, political leader, or plain good- will writer, has ever dealt with the following fundamental question: What exactly are your plans for the Alawis after we give up power? Why do answers to this question have to be vague and general? What are your plans for the tens of thousands of Alawis who work in the army and other security apparatuses? What are your plans for the republican guard and the special forces that are staffed primarily by Alawis? Are you going to pay them pensions if you decide to disband their forces? Or will they be fired and dumped on the streets, humiliated and ostracized as the Americans did in Iraq? Do you have any idea of the impact on security such dismissals would engender? Will you be satisfied with a scenario by which these forces remain in their positions in exchange for their giving up political power? What are your plans for the tens of thousands of Alawis who work as government employees in many non-functional
- 31. establishments? Are you going to close these establishments? Do you have any idea of the social impact of such closures? Are you going to stop improvement projects in the costal area as all past Sunni governments have done since independence? Are you going to reverse confiscation laws to return land taken from Sunni landlords and distributed among tens of thousands of farmers? Are you going to demand that security officials stand trial for their actions during the last 35 years? What is the highest rank that you are going to hold responsible? Are you going to ask for trials for past deeds? How about the present leading elite? Who exactly are the people you want to hold responsible? And If you do bring them to trial, are you going to hold the Sunni elite to the same standard? Will Sunni families who have benefited from the regime through monopolies and sweet-heart deals, such as the Nahhas family in Damascus and the Jood family in Latakia, be treated as Alawis are? These questions should be answered not only by opposition intellectuals, but also by every non-Alawi Syrian. What do you want to do with us if we give you back political power? Are you really willing to live side by side with us, to cherish Syria’s diversity, and consider the past 40 years merely another failed episode in our long history of failed revolutions. A change for the better must include all sectors of Syrian society, including Alawi Syrians. Because Alawis control all the main security forces of the state, regime change will not happen without assuring them that they too will have a place in Syria’s new future. Without such assurances, there will be no Alawi Musharif, nor will any other army General carry out a coup d’etat that will bring anything other than chaos to Syria. Syrians refuse to speak openly and honestly about our most
- 32. important challenges; so much is kept in the dark. But this is no time for “shatara” or dissembling. We must confront and discuss religious and communal issues directly and honestly. If Sunnis really want regime change, then they have to address the Alawi issue head on. Unless the answers to these questions ,are cleared up by all concerned forces and individuals, Alawis no matter how dissatisfied and disappointed with the present leadership, will not entertain the idea of regime change; they .will not relinquish the ramparts of power --------------------- ة ﺘﻌﺒر ﻋن أي ﻛﺎﺘﺒﻬﺎ ر اﻟرؤﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﻨﺸور ﺘﻌﻠﻴﻘﺎت اﻟﻘ اء ر ﺸــﻛرً ﻟﻸﺴــﺘﺎذ ﻫﻴــر أﻨــك دﺨﻠــت ﻗﻠــب اﻟﺠــرح اﻟﻤﻔﺘــوح ﺒرؤﻴــﺔ ﻋﺼــرﻴﺔ، ز ا وطﻨﻴـﺔ، ﻓﻬـذا اﻷﻤـر اﻟـذي ﺸـﺒﻬﺘﻪ ﺒﺎﻟدﻤﻠـﺔ اﻟﻤﺤﺘﻘﻨـﺔ اﻟﺘـﻲ ﻴﺠـب ﻓﻘﺄﻫـﺎ ـ ّ ع ـ ﻫـو ﺤﺴـﺎس، واﻟﻌدﻴـد ﻴرﻴـد ﺘﻔﺨﻴﺨـﻪﻛﺘﺒـت أﻛﺜـر ﻤـن ﻤﻘـﺎﻝ ﺒﺎﻟﻤوﻀـو ﺒﻤزﻴد ﻤـن اﻷﻟﻐـﺎم واﻟﻘﻨﺎﺒـﻝ اﻟﻤوﻗوﺘـﺔ ﻛـﻲ ﻻ ﻴﻘﺘـرب ﻤﻨـﻪ أﺤـد، ﻓـﻲ ﺤـﻴن أﻨـﻪ اﻫـن، وﺤﺎﻀــر ﺒﻘـوة ﻓــﻲ اﻟﻤﻌﺎدﻟـﺔ اﻟﺴـورﻴﺔ، وﻓــﻲ اﻟـذﻫن اﻟﺸــﻌﺒﻲ، ر وﺤﺘــﻰ ﻋﻨــد اﻟﻨﺨﺒــﺔ واﻟﻤﻌﺎرﻀــﺔ، وﻓــﻲ رؤى اﻟﺒــدﻴﻝ.. وأﻋﺘﻘــد أن اﻟﻤزﻴــد ﻤن اﻟﺤوا ات اﻟﺸﺠﺎﻋﺔ، اﻟﻤوﻀوﻋﻴﺔ، اﻟﻤﺴؤوﻟﺔ ﻀرورﻴﺔ ﻛـﻲ ﻻ ﻴﺒﻘـﻰ، ر ﻩ، ﺴﻴوﻓﺎُ ﻤﺴﻠطﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ رﻗﺎب اﻟﺘﻔﻛﻴر ﻫو وﻏﻴر ﺠﻼﻝ / ﻋﻘﺎب ﻴﺤﻴﻰ =========================
- 33. ـ ـ ـ. ﻤن ﺤق اﻟ اﺌر اﻟﻛرﻴم أن ﻴﻨﻘﻝ وأن ﻴﻨﺸر ﻛﻝ ﻤﺎ ﻴﻌﺠﺒﻪ ﻤن ﻤوﻗﻌﻨﺎ . ﻤﻌزواً إﻟﻴﻨﺎ ، أو ﻏﻴر ﻤﻌزو ز